LAY, Chief Judge.
On January 9, 1976, the Interstate Commerce Commission authorized Burlington Northern, Inc. (BN) and Chicago & North Western Transportation Company(CNW) to construct and operate a joint rail line in the Powder River Basin, Wyoming.
BN substantially paid for the line and now operates unit coal trains over it. CNW has not operated trains over the line.
Beginning in 1975, BN and CNW executed a series of three Joint Line Agreements that purport to govern the rights and obligations of the railroads in construction, operation, and ownership of the joint line. On June 13,1979, CNW applied to the Commission for its approval of these agreements. The agreements provided that if
CNW had not paid its equal share of the construction costs by November 30, 1979, CNW would be deemed to have withdrawn from the agreement. CNW failed to pay on time. On November 30, 1979, the Commission issued an order asserting that it had jurisdiction over the agreements and the operation of the line, without regard to CNW’s alleged default.
The present appeal relates to an action filed by BN seeking a declaratory judgment in state court that CNW had breached its contract obligation and seeking to determine the effect of CNW’s alleged default. CNW removed to the district court alleging a federal question.
The district court determined that the Commission had primary jurisdiction over the agreements and dismissed the case.
Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Chicago & North Western Transportation, Co.,
495 F.Supp. 109, 110-11 (D.Minn.1980). We affirm the dismissal.
BN argues that CNW’s default on November 30, 1979, raises only a breach of contract issue which breach allegedly (1) cancels the joint line agreements, (2) deprives the Commission of any jurisdiction it might have had over the agreements, and (3) entitles BN to a declaration that CNW has no rights under the agreements. Additionally, BN argues that, irrespective of CNW’s default, (4) the Commission has no statutory authority to settle contract disputes and, therefore, lacks authority to modify or extend the joint line agreement, (5) this case presents issues not within the primary jurisdiction of the Commission and (6) the district court erred in failing to remand the matter to the Minnesota state court.
The ICC has primary authority to determine its own jurisdiction. The Commission’s decision of November 30, 1979, asserts that the issue of whether CNW can participate in the operation of the joint line is cognizable in its proceedings in the first instance by virtue of 49 U.S.C. §§ 10901 and 11343.
BN admits that the Commission has jurisdiction over initial construction of a joint line and over abandonment of a joint line,
but asserts the Commission has no jurisdiction during the interim between these events. We need not reach, and we express no opinion herein, as to whether Congress intended the Commission to be without jurisdiction over the joint line agreements.
The Commission’s assertion of jurisdiction can be challenged on appeal after the Commission has reached a final decision in its pending proceedings.
Weinberger
v.
Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
412 U.S. 645, 93 S.Ct. 2488, 37 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). A determination of the Commission’s jurisdiction is unnecessary now because the Commission’s decision may moot the very issue BN seeks to adjudicate. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of railroads will be secured, and the limited functions of the courts in this business more rationally exercised, if we defer to the Commission’s proceedings pending a final decision.
Far Eastern Conference v. United States,
342 U.S. 570, 574-75, 72 S.Ct. 492, 494-495, 96 L.Ed. 576 (1952). The soundness of this conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the Commission has played a vital role in the initiation of this joint line, as well as in the development of the transportation of coal from the Powder River Basin, which roles make the Commission’s views of particular benefit to the courts where ultimately the validity of any arrangement will be tested.
See generally Marine Terminal Association v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic,
400 U.S. 62, 68-69, 91 S.Ct. 203, 208-209, 27 L.Ed.2d 203 (1970);
Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.,
379 U.S. 411, 421, 85 S.Ct. 551, 558, 13 L.Ed.2d 386 (1965).
As a general rule, judicial interference should be withheld until the administrative process has run its course.
Myers
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 463-464, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938). It follows that declaratory actions should not be used to circumvent administrative procedures.
Bentex Pharmaceuticals,
412 U.S. at 652-53, 93 S.Ct. at 2493-2494;
FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
406 U.S. 621, 647, 92 S.Ct. 1827, 1842, 32 L.Ed.2d 369 (1972);
Whitney National Bank,
379 U.S. at 417-18, 422, 85 S.Ct. at 556, 558. In
Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co.,
344 U.S. 237, 73 S.Ct. 236, 97 L.Ed. 291 (1952), Justice Jackson stated:
[t]he declaratory judgment procedure will not be used to pre-empt and prejudge issues that are committed for initial decision to an administrative body or special tribunal any more than it will be used as a substitute for statutory methods of review. It would not be tolerable, for example, that declaratory judgments establish that an enterprise is not in interstate commerce in order to forestall proceedings by the National Labor Relations Board, the Interstate Commerce Commission or many agencies that are authorized to try and decide such an issue in the first instance.
Cf. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
303 U.S. 41 [58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638];
Eccles v. Peoples Bank,
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LAY, Chief Judge.
On January 9, 1976, the Interstate Commerce Commission authorized Burlington Northern, Inc. (BN) and Chicago & North Western Transportation Company(CNW) to construct and operate a joint rail line in the Powder River Basin, Wyoming.
BN substantially paid for the line and now operates unit coal trains over it. CNW has not operated trains over the line.
Beginning in 1975, BN and CNW executed a series of three Joint Line Agreements that purport to govern the rights and obligations of the railroads in construction, operation, and ownership of the joint line. On June 13,1979, CNW applied to the Commission for its approval of these agreements. The agreements provided that if
CNW had not paid its equal share of the construction costs by November 30, 1979, CNW would be deemed to have withdrawn from the agreement. CNW failed to pay on time. On November 30, 1979, the Commission issued an order asserting that it had jurisdiction over the agreements and the operation of the line, without regard to CNW’s alleged default.
The present appeal relates to an action filed by BN seeking a declaratory judgment in state court that CNW had breached its contract obligation and seeking to determine the effect of CNW’s alleged default. CNW removed to the district court alleging a federal question.
The district court determined that the Commission had primary jurisdiction over the agreements and dismissed the case.
Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Chicago & North Western Transportation, Co.,
495 F.Supp. 109, 110-11 (D.Minn.1980). We affirm the dismissal.
BN argues that CNW’s default on November 30, 1979, raises only a breach of contract issue which breach allegedly (1) cancels the joint line agreements, (2) deprives the Commission of any jurisdiction it might have had over the agreements, and (3) entitles BN to a declaration that CNW has no rights under the agreements. Additionally, BN argues that, irrespective of CNW’s default, (4) the Commission has no statutory authority to settle contract disputes and, therefore, lacks authority to modify or extend the joint line agreement, (5) this case presents issues not within the primary jurisdiction of the Commission and (6) the district court erred in failing to remand the matter to the Minnesota state court.
The ICC has primary authority to determine its own jurisdiction. The Commission’s decision of November 30, 1979, asserts that the issue of whether CNW can participate in the operation of the joint line is cognizable in its proceedings in the first instance by virtue of 49 U.S.C. §§ 10901 and 11343.
BN admits that the Commission has jurisdiction over initial construction of a joint line and over abandonment of a joint line,
but asserts the Commission has no jurisdiction during the interim between these events. We need not reach, and we express no opinion herein, as to whether Congress intended the Commission to be without jurisdiction over the joint line agreements.
The Commission’s assertion of jurisdiction can be challenged on appeal after the Commission has reached a final decision in its pending proceedings.
Weinberger
v.
Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
412 U.S. 645, 93 S.Ct. 2488, 37 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). A determination of the Commission’s jurisdiction is unnecessary now because the Commission’s decision may moot the very issue BN seeks to adjudicate. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of railroads will be secured, and the limited functions of the courts in this business more rationally exercised, if we defer to the Commission’s proceedings pending a final decision.
Far Eastern Conference v. United States,
342 U.S. 570, 574-75, 72 S.Ct. 492, 494-495, 96 L.Ed. 576 (1952). The soundness of this conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the Commission has played a vital role in the initiation of this joint line, as well as in the development of the transportation of coal from the Powder River Basin, which roles make the Commission’s views of particular benefit to the courts where ultimately the validity of any arrangement will be tested.
See generally Marine Terminal Association v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic,
400 U.S. 62, 68-69, 91 S.Ct. 203, 208-209, 27 L.Ed.2d 203 (1970);
Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.,
379 U.S. 411, 421, 85 S.Ct. 551, 558, 13 L.Ed.2d 386 (1965).
As a general rule, judicial interference should be withheld until the administrative process has run its course.
Myers
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 463-464, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938). It follows that declaratory actions should not be used to circumvent administrative procedures.
Bentex Pharmaceuticals,
412 U.S. at 652-53, 93 S.Ct. at 2493-2494;
FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
406 U.S. 621, 647, 92 S.Ct. 1827, 1842, 32 L.Ed.2d 369 (1972);
Whitney National Bank,
379 U.S. at 417-18, 422, 85 S.Ct. at 556, 558. In
Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co.,
344 U.S. 237, 73 S.Ct. 236, 97 L.Ed. 291 (1952), Justice Jackson stated:
[t]he declaratory judgment procedure will not be used to pre-empt and prejudge issues that are committed for initial decision to an administrative body or special tribunal any more than it will be used as a substitute for statutory methods of review. It would not be tolerable, for example, that declaratory judgments establish that an enterprise is not in interstate commerce in order to forestall proceedings by the National Labor Relations Board, the Interstate Commerce Commission or many agencies that are authorized to try and decide such an issue in the first instance.
Cf. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
303 U.S. 41 [58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638];
Eccles v. Peoples Bank,
333 U.S. 426 [68 S.Ct. 641, 92 L.Ed. 784],
See Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549 [66 S.Ct. 1198, 90 L.Ed. 1432]. Responsibility for effective functioning of the administrative process cannot be thus transferred from the bodies in which Congress has placed it to the courts.
Id.
at 246-47, 73 S.Ct. at 241-242.
In
FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
406 U.S. at 647, 92 S.Ct. at 1842, the Supreme Court dismissed an action for injunctive relief because a proceeding was pending before the FPC, notwithstanding the utility’s contention that the Commission lacked jurisdiction. Justice Douglas stated:
The FPC had exercised its primary jurisdiction and was conducting proceedings to determine whether the Green System was subject to its jurisdiction. In that circumstance, the District Court and the Court of Appeals were obliged to defer to the FPC for the initial determination of its jurisdiction.
See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
303 U.S. 41 [58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638] (1938). The need to protect the primary authority of an agency to determine its own jurisdiction “is obviously greatest when the precise issue brought before a court is in the process of litigation through procedures originating in the [agency]. While the [agency’s] decision is not the last word, it must assuredly be the first.”
Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn. v. Interlake S. S. Co.,
370 U.S. 173, 185 [82 S.Ct. 1237, 1243, 8 L.Ed.2d 418] (1962). Review of the FPC decision may proceed in due course... .
406 U.S. at 647, 92 S.Ct. at 1842.
The district court’s order dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint is affirmed.