MESCHKE, Justice.
The Burleigh County Water Resource District, two recreational organizations, and two interested individuals (collectively, the WRD) appeal a district court judgment affirming the Burleigh County board of commissioners refusal to take action for removal of an existing encroachment along a section line. We affirm.
DuWayne and Sharon Ternes purchased a home and later discovered it extended at
least seven feet into the public right of way along an open section line.
See
NDCC 24-07-03.
At a 1992 public meeting with the Terneses, the board “accept[ed] the existence of the obstruction” and declined to “take any action under Section 24-06-28” and related statutes.
The WRD appealed this decision to the district court. The district court concluded the board did not erroneously exercise its discretion in “allowing the encroachment to remain ... as a matter of grace.” The WRD appeals.
Any aggrieved person may appeal from the decision of county commissioners. NDCC 11-11-39. An aggrieved person is one who has more than a nominal, formal, or technical interest.
Washburn Public School District No. 4 v. State Board of Public School Education,
338 N.W.2d 664, 667 (N.D. 1983). We held in
Huber v. Miller.
[T]he party must have some legal interest that may be enlarged or diminished by the decision to be appealed from. In other words, such party must be injuriously affected by the decision....
101 N.W.2d 136, 140 (N.D.1960) (citations omitted). It is a close call in this case, but we conclude that the WRD’s legal interests in a section line right of way are sufficiently affected for them to be aggrieved by the board’s decision.
The appellants say that they are acting as members of the public. A person acting as a member of the public normally has only a generalized grievance and cannot appeal a board’s decision.
Huber v. Miller,
101 N.W.2d at 140 (location of farm-to-market road to be constructed by county). However, the right of passage on open section lines belongs to the public and cannot be alienated by the State, which holds the section lines as trustee for the public.
Saetz v. Heiser,
240 N.W.2d 67, 72 (N.D.1976),
citing Small v. Burleigh County,
225 N.W.2d 295, 298 (N.D.1974). In keeping with our preference for deciding disputes on their merits, we conclude that the WRD’s specific interests in preserving the public’s right in this narrow category affecting section fine rights of way makes the appellants sufficiently aggrieved for judicial review.
In reviewing a decision by a local legislative body, a court must not substitute its judgment for that of the body, but rather must determine whether the body erroneously exercised its discretion.
Ennis v. Williams County Board of Commissioners,
493 N.W.2d 675, 679 (N.D.1992), relying upon
Shaw v. Burleigh County,
286 N.W.2d 792, 796-97 (N.D.1979). We independently review the board’s actions, and we apply the same standard of review as the district court to determine whether “the Board’s action comports with a correct interpretation of the law and whether or not the Board has acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner.”
Conway v. Board of County Commissioners of Grand Forks County,
349 N.W.2d 398, 400 (N.D.1984). We conclude that the board acted reasonably when it chose not to compel the Terneses to immediately move part of their home.
The WRD argues that NDCC 24-06-28 requires the board either to remove an unauthorized obstruction or to order the offending person to provide additional land to preserve the full width of the public’s easement. They also argue that the board’s decision arbitrarily and illegally deprives the public of the right to passage proclaimed in NDCC 24-07-03 for every open section line outside platted subdivisions. The WRD asks us to reverse the board’s decision refusing to remove the encroachment, or to direct that legislative body to declare a public necessity and to condemn additional land for a full right of way around the obstruction. They seek this relief despite the facts that the board has not yet decided to improve the road on that part of the section line, and that the right of way is not impassable.
The board claims that it is not compelled by law to remove all unauthorized permanent obstructions. The board argues there is no need to acquire additional land at this time because the Terneses’ home does not completely block the public’s ability to travel on the section line. The board further argues that, even if a necessity exists, the decision to condemn land for a public road is left to its discretion.
Unless closed by board action, congressional section lines outside platted subdivisions are public roads, open to a width of thirty-three feet on each side. NDCC 24-07-03;
State v. Silseth,
399 N.W.2d 868, 869 (N.D.1987). Obstruction of a public highway without written permission is prohibited, and may result in criminal liability. NDCC 24-12-02;
Silseth
at 869-70. The placement of permanent obstructions, stones, or rubbish on a section line easement, without permission from the county commissioners, is also prohibited. NDCC 24-06-28.
Still, not every obstruction jeopardizes the public’s right of travel.
A landowner abutting an open section line retains ownership of the property within the easement, subject to the public’s right to travel.
Small v. Burleigh County,
225 N.W.2d at 297.
Compare Hjelle v. J.C. Snyder & Sons,
133 N.W.2d 625, 629 (N.D.1965) (landowner retains ownership of property included in highway easement). The public’s easement is limited to the right to travel, and does not include an absolute right to an object-free zone for the complete length and width of the section line. In
Hjelle,
we held that a highway right of way is not “obstructed” when a placement did not impede the public’s right of passage. 133 N.W.2d at 630. We recently held that cattle guards or gateways do not have to be sixty-six feet wide to comply with NDCC 24-07-03, when approved by the board.
Ames v. Rose Township Board of Township Supervisors,
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MESCHKE, Justice.
The Burleigh County Water Resource District, two recreational organizations, and two interested individuals (collectively, the WRD) appeal a district court judgment affirming the Burleigh County board of commissioners refusal to take action for removal of an existing encroachment along a section line. We affirm.
DuWayne and Sharon Ternes purchased a home and later discovered it extended at
least seven feet into the public right of way along an open section line.
See
NDCC 24-07-03.
At a 1992 public meeting with the Terneses, the board “accept[ed] the existence of the obstruction” and declined to “take any action under Section 24-06-28” and related statutes.
The WRD appealed this decision to the district court. The district court concluded the board did not erroneously exercise its discretion in “allowing the encroachment to remain ... as a matter of grace.” The WRD appeals.
Any aggrieved person may appeal from the decision of county commissioners. NDCC 11-11-39. An aggrieved person is one who has more than a nominal, formal, or technical interest.
Washburn Public School District No. 4 v. State Board of Public School Education,
338 N.W.2d 664, 667 (N.D. 1983). We held in
Huber v. Miller.
[T]he party must have some legal interest that may be enlarged or diminished by the decision to be appealed from. In other words, such party must be injuriously affected by the decision....
101 N.W.2d 136, 140 (N.D.1960) (citations omitted). It is a close call in this case, but we conclude that the WRD’s legal interests in a section line right of way are sufficiently affected for them to be aggrieved by the board’s decision.
The appellants say that they are acting as members of the public. A person acting as a member of the public normally has only a generalized grievance and cannot appeal a board’s decision.
Huber v. Miller,
101 N.W.2d at 140 (location of farm-to-market road to be constructed by county). However, the right of passage on open section lines belongs to the public and cannot be alienated by the State, which holds the section lines as trustee for the public.
Saetz v. Heiser,
240 N.W.2d 67, 72 (N.D.1976),
citing Small v. Burleigh County,
225 N.W.2d 295, 298 (N.D.1974). In keeping with our preference for deciding disputes on their merits, we conclude that the WRD’s specific interests in preserving the public’s right in this narrow category affecting section fine rights of way makes the appellants sufficiently aggrieved for judicial review.
In reviewing a decision by a local legislative body, a court must not substitute its judgment for that of the body, but rather must determine whether the body erroneously exercised its discretion.
Ennis v. Williams County Board of Commissioners,
493 N.W.2d 675, 679 (N.D.1992), relying upon
Shaw v. Burleigh County,
286 N.W.2d 792, 796-97 (N.D.1979). We independently review the board’s actions, and we apply the same standard of review as the district court to determine whether “the Board’s action comports with a correct interpretation of the law and whether or not the Board has acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner.”
Conway v. Board of County Commissioners of Grand Forks County,
349 N.W.2d 398, 400 (N.D.1984). We conclude that the board acted reasonably when it chose not to compel the Terneses to immediately move part of their home.
The WRD argues that NDCC 24-06-28 requires the board either to remove an unauthorized obstruction or to order the offending person to provide additional land to preserve the full width of the public’s easement. They also argue that the board’s decision arbitrarily and illegally deprives the public of the right to passage proclaimed in NDCC 24-07-03 for every open section line outside platted subdivisions. The WRD asks us to reverse the board’s decision refusing to remove the encroachment, or to direct that legislative body to declare a public necessity and to condemn additional land for a full right of way around the obstruction. They seek this relief despite the facts that the board has not yet decided to improve the road on that part of the section line, and that the right of way is not impassable.
The board claims that it is not compelled by law to remove all unauthorized permanent obstructions. The board argues there is no need to acquire additional land at this time because the Terneses’ home does not completely block the public’s ability to travel on the section line. The board further argues that, even if a necessity exists, the decision to condemn land for a public road is left to its discretion.
Unless closed by board action, congressional section lines outside platted subdivisions are public roads, open to a width of thirty-three feet on each side. NDCC 24-07-03;
State v. Silseth,
399 N.W.2d 868, 869 (N.D.1987). Obstruction of a public highway without written permission is prohibited, and may result in criminal liability. NDCC 24-12-02;
Silseth
at 869-70. The placement of permanent obstructions, stones, or rubbish on a section line easement, without permission from the county commissioners, is also prohibited. NDCC 24-06-28.
Still, not every obstruction jeopardizes the public’s right of travel.
A landowner abutting an open section line retains ownership of the property within the easement, subject to the public’s right to travel.
Small v. Burleigh County,
225 N.W.2d at 297.
Compare Hjelle v. J.C. Snyder & Sons,
133 N.W.2d 625, 629 (N.D.1965) (landowner retains ownership of property included in highway easement). The public’s easement is limited to the right to travel, and does not include an absolute right to an object-free zone for the complete length and width of the section line. In
Hjelle,
we held that a highway right of way is not “obstructed” when a placement did not impede the public’s right of passage. 133 N.W.2d at 630. We recently held that cattle guards or gateways do not have to be sixty-six feet wide to comply with NDCC 24-07-03, when approved by the board.
Ames v. Rose Township Board of Township Supervisors,
502 N.W.2d 845, 850 (N.D.1993). Only when an obstruction effectively deprives the public of the ability to travel on an open section line is their right to travel violated.
The WRD argues that NDCC 24-06-28 requires the board to remove all permanent obstructions regardless of their impact on the public’s right to travel. This argument has some support in the Century Code. County and township boards have power either to order a landowner to remove rubbish, stones, trees, or fences placed in the easement, or to remove them at the landowner’s expense. NDCC 24-06-29, 24-06-30. Inexplicably, these directions do not expressly compel removal of a permanent obstruction like a building. Still, it is clear that “the Legislature has the power, within reasonable limits, to define what constitutes interference with the public’s easement.”
State v. Silseth,
399 N.W.2d at 870. For whatever reason, the Legislature has not directed the board to remove permanent obstructions, as it has for rubbish, stones, trees and fences.
The construction of NDCC 24-06-28 suggested by the WRD would render meaningless the powers of county commissioners under NDCC 24 — 06-29 and 24-06-30 to remove rubbish, stones, trees, and fences, and to tax the costs against the property. We must give effect to all of these statutes and attempt to harmonize their meaning and application.
Ebach v. Ralston,
469 N.W.2d 801, 804 (N.D.1991). Therefore, we conclude that 24-06-28 does not mandate that the board remove permanent obstructions.
Our interpretation of NDCC 24-06-28 does not permit the board to indiscriminately approve all permanent obstructions. We held in
Small
that the public cannot be deprived of use of the right of way along section lines that remain open. For like reasons, the board cannot arbitrarily approve an encroachment that prevents the public from travelling on an open section line that is free of natural obstacles. This record does not reflect that the partial encroachment in this case completely blocks the public from using this section line.
The board’s power under the statutes to remove all prohibited placements is unaffected by our decision. The State also retains the right under NDCC 24-12-02 to prosecute anyone who obstructs “any public highway in any manner” or “[wjillfully ... obstructs] ... any public highway or right of way.”
The power of public authorities to respond to encroachments is not limited to instances where the public right to travel is completely deprived.
A board of county commissioners does not erroneously exercise its discretion when its decision is the result of a rational mental process.
Ames v. Rose Township Board of Township Supervisors,
502 N.W.2d at 851. The board’s decision here achieves “a reasonable balance ... between the public’s right to travel and the rights of those who have an interest in the land” subject to the easement.
Ames
at 850. We conclude that the board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in balancing the competing interests in this case.
The board has no immediate legal duty to move the Temeses’ home, and did not erroneously exercise its discretion by tolerating this encroachment. We affirm.
SANDSTROM, Acting C.J., and LEVINE and NEUMANN, JJ., and JOHN T. PAULSON, District Judge, concur.
PAULSON, JOHN T., District Judge, sitting in place of VANDE WALLE, GERALD W., C.J., disqualified.