Burke v. Allegheny County

9 A.2d 396, 336 Pa. 411, 1939 Pa. LEXIS 530
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 4, 1939
DocketAppeal, 245
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 9 A.2d 396 (Burke v. Allegheny County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burke v. Allegheny County, 9 A.2d 396, 336 Pa. 411, 1939 Pa. LEXIS 530 (Pa. 1939).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Schaffer,

Earl B. Burke entered into a contract with the County of Allegheny for the construction of approaches to a bridge. He was paid the sum of $88,931.97 for the work done and the county admits there is still due him $1,198.30. He refused to accept this sum and claimed there was still due him $25,219.12, with interest. To recover this amount he brought the present action. The jury found a verdict in his favor for $9,277.06. From the judgment entered on the verdict the county appeals.

The level of the bridge in question had been raised. It was, therefore, necessary that the approaches be reconstructed to meet the new level. The structure of the bridge consisted of two parallel side foundation walls leading to the bridge connected with each other by a number of tie or cross walls. The contract provided for the erection of new side and tie walls and for filling between that portion of the walls projecting above the original surface of the ground and the paving of the approach. It divided the work to be done and the materials to be furnished into various items, and set forth the estimated quantity of each. A unit price was bid for each of these respective items. The contract stated that the estimates set forth were only approximate and that the contractor should be paid for the actual work done and materials supplied in accordance with its terms and specifications. The contract was completed in compliance with the plans and specifications.

*413 The principal dispute is as to the amount of excavation for which plaintiff is entitled to he paid. He contends that the only practical way to do the excavating, in order that the walls for its approaches could he built, was to remove all the earth between the side walls down to the base of the footer course and for a certain distance outside of the walls. He testified that he so excavated. The county urges that, even if he did so excavate, which is disputed, this was simply a method of performing the work, and he can be paid for only certain portions thereof, under the provisions of the contract. The only item covering excavation was Item 1, entitled Excavation for Foundations contract. In the Supplemental Instructions to Bidders, expressly made part of the contract, it is provided: “The quantities of Excavation for Foundations to be paid for under Item 1 shall be determined as specified under Item 17 of the Schedule of Items on Page 20 of the Standard Contract.” The Standard Contract contains the following language: “17. Excavation for Foundations. . . . The quantity to be paid for shall be the actual volume excavated between the neat lines [trench lines] of the base of the structure and the original ground surface or bed of stream before work was begun, the sides of the excavation being considered as vertical.”

In his statement of claim plaintiff alleged that the extra excavation for which compensation is sought was caused by “the impractical and erroneous requirements of the plans and specifications for the performance of the construction work on the south approach, to-wit, providing only for excavation to the neat lines of wall construction.” The complaint that the specifications are impractical cannot prevail. If plaintiff was not satisfied with the specifications, he should have had them altered before bidding or executing the contract. After he signed it, he was bound by it. An allowance to plaintiff of compensation for work not provided for in the contract and not directed by the county commissioners, *414 would be to substitute a new contract for the one signed. Under the bidding requirements, bidders were required to examine the location of the work and to determine, in their own way, the difficulties likely to be encountered in its prosecution. In the contract plaintiff declared that he had read each and every clause in the advertisement, instructions to bidders, schedule of items, specifications and articles of agreement, fully understood the meaning of the same, and that he had thoroughly examined the contract, plans and specifications, and the location of the proposed improvements, and fully understood the character of the work to be done under the contract. Plaintiff must be restricted in his recovery to the terms of the agreement which he signed: O’Neill Const. Co., Inc., v. Phila., 335 Pa. 359, 6 A. (2) 525.

Plaintiff in his brief on appeal stands upon the proposition that payment for the excavation he did is regulated, not by Item 17 of the standard form of contract, but by Item 93. We are unable to reach this conclusion. Item 93 deals with the excavation work necessary to properly grade the approaches. This is demonstrated by a reading of Item 93 (a) : “Approach excavation shall consist of the removal and satisfactory disposal of all materials taken from within the limits of the work, including widening of curb and the flattening of slopes necessary for the construction and preparation of the roadbed, subgrade, shoulders, ditches, waterways, intersections, private entrances and work incidental thereto, as indicated or directed.” It was not contemplated that this excavating would be paid for as part of Item 1. The contract expressly provided otherwise in Item 17. In addition, paragraph 9 of the Supplemental Instructions to Bidders sets forth: “Compensation for all excavation to be done under this contract except the excavation to be paid for under Item 1 shall be included in the price bid under Item 2.” Item 2 is the quantity of embankment “measured in place at the conclusion of the work.” Therefore, even if it be assumed that the excavation claimed *415 does not come within Item 17, but rather under Item 93, this would not help plaintiff, as there is no provision for payment for the work as a separate and distinct item, but he was to be compensated for this excavating in the price he was paid for the embankments and fills erected. Even under Item 93, it is provided, “that no excavation beyond authorized lines shall be included for payment.” The authorized lines as shown by the plan were “the neat lines of the base of the structure and the original ground surface . . . the sides of the excavation being considered as vertical.”

The second item of plaintiff’s claim is for embankments or fills constructed by him. Item 2 of the Bidding Schedule covers embankments. On this item also it is claimed that the additional embankments were made necessary by reason of the “impractical and erroneous requirements” of the plans and specifications. The amount paid to plaintiff for embankments and fills under Item 2 was for the amount of embankment or fills contained between the old level of the approaches and the new. Plaintiff claims, however, that he is entitled to be paid for the entire amount of embankments or fills constructed by him. Here again his contention cannot be supported under the terms of the contract. Paragraph 9 of the Supplemental Instruction to Bidders provides: “The price bid under Item 1 shall include compensation for backfilling to the original surface of the ground. The quantity of embankment to be paid for under Item 2 shall be the actual volume filled, measured in place at the conclusion of the work. The amount of embankment shall be determined in the following manner: — Cross sections of the site shall be taken before any work is done and again at the completion of the work.

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Bluebook (online)
9 A.2d 396, 336 Pa. 411, 1939 Pa. LEXIS 530, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burke-v-allegheny-county-pa-1939.