Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedJuly 18, 2024
Docket1:21-cv-00262
StatusUnknown

This text of Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A. (Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., (S.D. Ohio 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:21-cv-262

v. JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE

FIFTH THIRD BANK, N.A.,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

In this case, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (the Bureau) alleges that Fifth Third Bank, N.A., (Fifth Third) violated various federal consumer protection statutes in its dealings with its customers, mainly by opening accounts or adding products or services to existing accounts, without customer authorization, thereby causing those customers to incur fees. (Am. Compl., Doc. 73). The parties have now settled their dispute. Or, rather, they are willing to settle their dispute, contingent upon this Court’s approving a consent decree they jointly submitted. (Doc. 151). While consent decrees are a common method for resolving disputes like this, at least some courts confronted with them have nonetheless raised concerns. These concerns extend to both the court’s basic authority to enter such decrees in an otherwise-settled matter (i.e., jurisdictional concerns) and the scope of the court’s remedial authority under traditional principles of equity to enter what amounts to permanent injunctive relief. The Court, however, will not belabor those points here. That is because, in a thoughtful opinion, Judge Beaton has recently explored both issues in detail. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Ambassador Grp., LLC, 581 F. Supp. 3d 863 (W.D. Ky. 2021).

This Court echoes the concerns raised there, but it has little to add beyond the careful analysis that opinion articulates. More relevant here, the Court agrees with Judge Beaton that, whatever the merits of either the jurisdictional concerns or the remedial concerns if this Court were writing on a blank slate, the Sixth Circuit has already resolved them in binding decisions. Id. at 868, 870. On the jurisdictional front, the Sixth Circuit instructs that a court has jurisdiction to enter a consent decree in support of settlement so long as

the decree (1) “spring[s] from and serve[s] to resolve a dispute within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,” (2) “com[es] within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings,” and (3) “further[s] the objective of the law upon which the complaint was based.” Benalcazar v. Genoa Twp., 1 F. 4th 421, 425 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 510, 525 (1986)). And the Sixth Circuit has also confirmed that whether the Court should actually issue

a permanent injunction (which is what a consent decree amounts to) is largely guided by traditional equitable principles, under which the Court is to determine “whether the decree is fair, adequate, and reasonable, as well as consistent with the public interest.” Lexington Ins., 581 F. Supp. 37 at 870 (quoting United States v. Lexington- Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t, 591 F.3d 484, 489 (6th Cir. 2010)). Beyond that, “the district court’s inherent power is broad and the court’s choice of remedies is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Hamilton Cnty., 937 F.3d 679, 688 (6th Cir. 2019)) (cleaned up). How do those two frameworks play out here? Start with jurisdiction. The

proposed consent decree clearly springs from and serves to resolve a dispute within this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. This action involves allegations that Fifth Third violated federal statutes that the Bureau has the authority to enforce. That suffices to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. And the parties engaged in vigorous negotiations to resolve this matter, which strongly suggests the consent decree (one of the terms they negotiated) is necessary to resolution. As to the second element, the proposed consent decree falls well within the general scope of the

case. The consent decree orders Fifth Third not to violate the very provisions that the Bureau sought to enforce against Fifth Third’s past conduct here in the future. (Doc. 151-1, #2211, 2213–14). Beyond that, it also requires Fifth Third to maintain various policies and procedures designed to serve that goal, to adopt a compliance plan along those lines, to engage in certain ongoing reporting, and to maintain various records relating to all of these actions. (Id. at #2214–17, 2221–22). That all strikes the Court

as related to the scope of the case here. Finally, the Court concludes that the terms of the consent decree also further the objective of the law. Congress presumably adopted these laws (and the Bureau, its corresponding regulations) based on the view that compliance with them would serve customers’ interests. Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFPA) § 1021, 12 U.S.C § 5511 (“The Bureau shall seek to implement and, where applicable, [to] enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and services and that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.”). Accordingly, steps

designed to ensure such compliance, or to detect non-compliance, would further those objectives. What about the propriety of the requested permanent injunctive relief (via the entry of a consent decree) as a matter of equitable principles? The types of harms alleged here—unauthorized fees—strike the Court as harms for which there is generally an adequate remedy at law. E.g., CFPA § 1055(c), 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c). But two further thoughts. First, the alleged harms are diffuse and inflicted on unknowing

customers, so a remedy at law might not be so easy after all. Second, and more importantly, the interest the Bureau’s suit seeks to advance is its own separate regulatory interest in preventing such violations in the first instance. True, the statute makes civil penalties available for violations, which means the Bureau could wait for the harm to occur and to seek a remedy on the back end. But those civil penalties do not really “remedy” the regulatory interest in preventing such harms up

front. Beyond that, at least one of the statutes under which the Bureau proceeds here, the CFPA, specifically authorizes the Bureau to seek “equitable relief including a permanent or temporary injunction as permitted by law,” CFPA § 1054(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a), which demonstrates that Congress agrees that injunctive relief should be available in cases prosecuted under that statute. True, the statute’s reference to the availability of such relief does not render the other elements traditionally required to obtain injunctive relief unnecessary. See Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 144 S. Ct. 1570, 1576–77 (2024). But it certainly suggests that Congress sees the harms at issue as irreparable. And, as noted, the Court agrees. The balance of harms likewise favors

the relief, as both the Bureau and Fifth Third have agreed to it. That suggests both parties view the entire settlement as providing more benefits than harms and that relief at law will not, on its own, adequately remedy the alleged harms. Cf. McGowan v. Parish 237 U.S. 285

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Bluebook (online)
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bureau-of-consumer-financial-protection-v-fifth-third-bank-na-ohsd-2024.