Bungie Inc v. Veterancheats.com

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided April 27, 2023·No. 2:21-cv-01114·Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 10 11 BUNGIE, INC., a Delaware corporation, CASE NO. 2:21-cv-01114-TL 12 Plaintiff, AMENDED ORDER ON MOTION v. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT 13 MIHAI CLAUDIU-FLORENTIN, an AGAINST DEFENDANT CLAUDIU- 14 individual, d/b/a FLORENTIN VETERANCHEATS.COM, et al., 15 Defendants. 16

17 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Bungie, Inc.’s Motion for Default 18 Judgment against Defendant Mihai Claudiu-Florentin. Dkt. Nos. 37 (sealed), 38 (public). Having 19 reviewed the Motion, the Court GRANTS the Motion in part, ENTERS default judgment, and 20 PERMANENTLY ENJOINS Claudiu-Florentin on the terms specified below. 22 Operating out of Bellevue, Washington, Bungie develops, distributes, and owns the 23 intellectual property rights to a video game called “Destiny 2.” Dkt. No. 18 ¶¶ 1, 8. Bungie 24 alleges that Claudiu-Florentin, a resident of Romania, developed and sold cheat software that 1 “hacks” the Destiny 2 software to allow players a competitive advantage against other players in 2 violation of Bungie’s software license agreement (“LSLA”). Id. ¶¶ 3–4. Claudiu-Florentin used 3 his website, Veterancheats.com, to market and sell the hack.1 Id. ¶¶ 33–37. Bungie alleges that 4 the VeteranCheats Hack infringes on four copyrights: (1) Destiny 2 code (a literary work),

5 registration No. TX 8-933-655; (2) Destiny 2: Beyond Light (a literary work) registration No. 6 TX 8-933-658; (3) Destiny 2 (audiovisual work) registration PA 2-282-670; and (4) Destiny 2: 7 Beyond Light (audiovisual work) registration PA 2-280-030. Id. ¶ 21. Bungie also alleges that 8 Claudiu-Florentin has used copyrighted imagery from Destiny 2 to sell the VeteranCheats Hack 9 without Bungie’s authorization. Id. ¶ 44. And Bungie alleges that the VeteranCheats Hack 10 breaches the LSLA and contains measures intended to avoid, bypass, and impair Bungie’s 11 technological measures that control access to the copyrighted works at issue in this case. 12 Id. ¶¶ 48–49. 13 Bungie asserts the following claims against Claudiu-Florentin: (1) copyright 14 infringement; (2) violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”); (3) breach of

15 contract; (4) intentional interference with contractual relations; and (5) violations of the 16 Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”). Id. ¶¶ 53–102. Bungie seeks entry of default 17 judgment on all claims, asking for judgment to be entered in the amount of $12,059,912.98. This 18 represents the sum of: (1) $11,696,000 in statutory damages under the DMCA; (2) $146,662.28 19 in actual damages for copyright infringement; and (3) $217,250.70 in attorneys’ fees and costs. 20 Bungie also asks for entry of a permanent injunction barring Claudiu-Florentin from engaging in 21 future or further conduct that forms the basis of its Copyright Act and DMCA claims in this 22 action. 23

24 1 The Court refers to Claudiu-Florentin’s hack as the VeteranCheats Hack. 1 Bungie alleges that notwithstanding its anti-cheating efforts, the VeteranCheats Hack has 2 caused it harm by diminishing the enjoyment of the game for those not cheating and reducing its 3 potential revenue from in-game sales to players. Id. ¶¶ 29–32, 42, 49–51. Bungie’s Deputy 4 General Counsel, James Barker, also explains the nature of its anti-cheat circumvention efforts

5 and the “minimum of $2,000,000 on game security staffing and software” that it has expended to 6 combat the VeteranCheats Hack and other cheating devices of Destiny 2. Dkt. No. 38-1 ¶¶ 1, 6, 7 10, 17–25, 36. Through a subpoena of Stripe, Inc., Bungie obtained transactional data associated 8 with VeteranCheats which Barker avers shows 5,848 separate transactions of the VeteranCheats 9 Hack that produced $146,662.28 in sales revenue to Claudiu-Florentin from November 2020 to 10 July 2022. Id. ¶ 33. 12 A. Legal Standard 13 The Court has already found Claudiu-Florentin in default. Dkt. Nos. 25, 26, 29. After 14 entry of default, the Court may enter a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). This

15 determination is discretionary. See Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 16 (9th Cir. 1988). “Factors which may be considered by courts in exercising discretion as to the 17 entry of a default judgment include: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits 18 of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at 19 stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the 20 default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of 21 Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th 22 Cir. 1986). In performing this analysis, “the general rule is that well-pled allegations in the 23 complaint regarding liability are deemed true.” Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906

24 1 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation and citation omitted). And “[t]he district court is not required to make 2 detailed findings of fact.” Id. 3 B. Jurisdiction 4 Before entering default judgment, the Court must assure itself that it has subject matter

5 jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. 6 There is little doubt that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Bungie’s claims. 7 Bungie brings claims under various federal laws, which fall within the Court’s original 8 jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). The Court has supplemental 9 jurisdiction over Bungie’s state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 10 The Court also finds that it has personal jurisdiction over Claudiu-Florentin. A valid 11 contractual forum selection clause to which a defendant has consented may satisfy personal 12 jurisdiction. See Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 458 (9th Cir. 13 2007) (noting that a forum selection clause may give rise to a waiver of objection provided the 14 defendant agreed to be bound). Bungie has provided evidence that Claudiu-Florentin agreed to

15 the terms of Bungie’s LSLA, which required Claudiu-Florentin to “agree to submit to the 16 personal jurisdiction of any federal or state court in King County, Washington.” Dkt. 17 No. 18 ¶ 13. The Court accepts as true that Claudiu-Florentin agreed to these terms, given the 18 well-pleaded allegations in the Amended Complaint. And the additional evidence submitted 19 strongly suggests that Claudiu-Florentin had to have agreed to the LSLA in order to develop and 20 refine the VeteranCheats Hack. Dkt. No. 38-1 ¶¶ 18–19. 21 C. Eitel Factors Favor Default Judgment 22 The Court reviews the Eitel factors to assess whether default judgment should be entered 23 and in what specific amounts. The seven Eitel factors weigh in favor of entry of default judgment

24 1 in Bungie’s favor. But the Court finds that the judgment shall not be entered as to all claims or in 2 the full amount Bungie requests. 3 1. Factor One: Prejudice to Bungie 4 Without entry of default judgment Bungie will be prejudiced. Bungie has attempted to

5 litigate this case and vindicate its rights under federal and state law against Claudiu-Florentin.

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