Bungie Inc v. Elite Boss Tech Incorporated

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided May 9, 2023·No. 2:21-cv-01112·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON BUNGIE, INC., CASE NO. 2:21-cv-01112-TL Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ELITE BOSS TECH INCORPORATED, DEFAULT JUDGMENT 11020781 CANADA INC., DANIEL FAGERBERG LARSEN, ROBERT JAMES DUTHIE NELSON, CRUDEN A/K/A “LUZYPHER,” JOHN DOE NO. 4 A/K/A “GOODMAN,” YUNXUAN DENG A/K/A “YIMOSECAI,” ANTHONY ROBINSON A/K/A “RULEZZGAME,” EDDIE TRAN A/K/A “SENTIENT”, CHENZHIJIE CHEN A/K/A “CHENZHIJIE402, DSOFT, CVR 37454303, MARTA MAGALHAES A/K/A MINDBENDER A/K/A BLUEGIRL, AND JOHN DOES NO. 9- 20, Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Bungie, Inc.’s Motion for Default Judgment. Dkt. Nos. 75-1, 76-1 (sealed). Having reviewed the Motion and all supporting materials, the Court GRANTS in part the Motion, ENTERS default judgment against Defendant Daniel Fagerberg Larsen, and ENTERS a permanent injunction against Larsen on the terms set

forth in this Order. Operating out of Bellevue, Washington, Bungie develops, distributes, and owns the intellectual property rights to a video game called “Destiny 2”, which is part of its “Destiny” franchise. Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 10, 50. Bungie alleges that Larsen, a resident of Denmark, and Defendant Robert Nelson and Patrick Schaufuss1 developed, marketed, and sold “cheat” software for Destiny 2 through a website “Wallhax.com” that allowed users of Destiny 2 an unfair advantage when playing the game. Id. ¶ 1. The Court refers to the cheat as the “Wallhax cheat” and the business run by Larsen, Nelson, and Schaufuss as “Wallhax.” Bungie alleges and has provided evidence that Larsen helped develop the software code

and framework of the Wallhax cheat. See Dkt. No. 63 ¶¶ 5–8; Dkt. No. 68 ¶¶ 4–5 (sealed). Larsen worked together with Nelson and Schaufuss to develop, market, and sell the Wallhax cheat to consumers around the world. See Dkt. No. 63 ¶¶ 2–11; Dkt. No. 68 ¶ 5 (sealed); Dkt. No. 64 ¶ 14; Dkt. No. 64-13. Through a consent judgment, Nelson agreed the Wallhax cheat has been downloaded 6,765 times. Dkt. No. 29 ¶ 5. Nelson also agreed that the Wallhax cheat willfully violated Bungie’s two copyrights associated with Destiny 2—for its audiovisual work and software code. Id. ¶¶ 1–3.Nelson also agreed that the Wallhax cheat circumvented the technological measures Bungie employs to control and limit access to its Destiny 2 software, 1 The Court notes that Schaufuss was named in the initial complaint as a defendant but was dropped as a defendant in the FAC. such that each download of the Wallhax cheat constated a violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) and (b). Id. ¶¶ 4–5. The Parties agreed that judgment should be entered in the amount of $13,530,000, representing statutory damages of $2,000 for each of the 6,765 downloads. Id. ¶ 6. Defendants consented to entry of a broad

permanent injunction concerning any further copyright infringement, and Bungie withdrew all other claims. Id. ¶ 7. Bungie asserts the following claims against Larsen: (1) copyright infringement; (2) violations of the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962; (3) violations of the DMCA; (4) violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B); (5) breach of contract; (6) intentional interference with contractual relations; (7) violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”); and (8) civil conspiracy. Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 164–319. Bungie seeks entry of default judgment on all claims, asking for judgment to be entered in the amount of $17,278,305.73. This total represents the sum of: (1) $13,530,000 in statutory damages under the DMCA (Dkt. No. 76-1 at 36–38

(sealed)); (2) $466,718.90 as damages for its copyright claim, which Bungie asks to be trebled to $1,400,156.71 (id. at 38–41 (sealed)); (3) $666,666.00 in actual damages for its breach of contract, RICO, CFAA, and CPA claims, which Bungie asks to be trebled $1,999,998.00 (id. at 41–42 (sealed)); and (4) $267,887.10 in attorney fees and $80,263.92 in costs (Dkt. No. 64 ¶ 17; Dkt. No. 65 ¶ 3; Dkt. No. 76-3 ¶ 28 (sealed)). Bungie also asks for entry of a permanent injunction barring Larsen from engaging in future or further conduct that forms the basis of its claims in this action.

A. Legal Standard The Court has already found Larsen in default. Dkt. No. 35. After entry of default, the Court may enter a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). This determination is discretionary.

See Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988). “Factors which may be considered by courts in exercising discretion as to the entry of a default judgment include: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). In performing this analysis, “the general rule is that well-pled allegations in the complaint regarding liability are deemed true.” Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation and citation omitted). And “[t]he district court is not required to make detailed

findings of fact.” Id. B. Jurisdiction Before entering default judgment, the Court must assure itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. There is little doubt that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Bungie’s claims. Bungie brings claims under various federal laws, which fall within the Court’s original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Bungie’s state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The Court also finds that it has personal jurisdiction over Larsen. A valid contractual

forum selection clause to which a defendant has consented may satisfy personal jurisdiction. See Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 458 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that a forum selection clause may give rise to a waiver of objection provided the defendant agreed to be bound). Bungie has provided evidence that Larsen agreed to the terms of Bungie’s Limited Software License Agreement (“LSLA”), which required Larsen to “agree to submit to the

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