Buckeye Incubator Co. v. Blum

17 F.2d 456, 1927 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 981
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedFebruary 14, 1927
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 17 F.2d 456 (Buckeye Incubator Co. v. Blum) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Buckeye Incubator Co. v. Blum, 17 F.2d 456, 1927 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 981 (N.D. Ohio 1927).

Opinion

WESTENHAVER, District Judge.

This suit again brings before me for consideration United States letters patent 1,262,860, issued April 16, 1918, to Samuel B. Smith. Infringement is charged of claims 1 and 2 only. Although invalidity is again urged, the defense mainly relied on is noninfringement. In Buckeye Incubator Co. v. Wolf (D. C.) 291 F. 253, this patent was fully examined, and all of its claims were held valid. Upon appeal the decree was affirmed. Wolf v. Buckeye Incubator Co. (6 C. C. A.) 296 F. 680. Since then this patent has been involved in no less than 25 lawsuits, of which some 14 were settled before hearing, and in 5 decrees for the plaintiff were rendered. In 2, noninfringement was found. Only one of these decrees has been appealed from, and the Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, has recently announced an opinion (Buckeye Incubator Co. v. Cooley, 17 F.[2d] 453) in substantial accord with that of our' own Circuit Court of Appeals.

On this hearing, the commercial history of the patented device has been brought down to date, and appears to be even more impressive. No new art of controlling importance is now presented. The only additional patents in the incubator art aré Bell, 691,837, Perkins, 798,697, and German patent issued to E. Stulik November 7, 1921. The patent last cited is for a hatching method, and has some pertinency to the method claims in is *457 sue. Neither Bell, Perkins, or Stulik, however, present any substantially new considerations touching the question of validity. Certainly nothing disclosed in them raises any doubt as to the soundness of the conclusions already reached on the question of validity. The other patents are in the heating and ventilating art, pertaining particularly to ordering and drying of tobacco and fabrics.

Proctor, 553,723, discloses an apparatus structurally quite similar to Smith, and it is quite possible that this apparatus could be reconstructed, so as to practice the Smith hatching method. It is, however, an apparatus for ordering tobacco; i. e., so treating the tobacco as to put it in a moistened condition suitable for handling. The French patent to M. Magniez, published October 13, 1903, has in fact been reconstructed by the defendant and used for hatching eggs. Its method, however, is quite different from any claimed by Smith. It is an apparatus for drying chocolate. As to these two patents, and others of like nature, it may be said, first, that they are not in an analogous, but in a wholly remote art; and, second, that reconstruction and rearrangement were necessary in order to adapt either one to hatch eggs. I do not agree that Smith’s invention is in an art so closely analogous to heating and ventilating that it is anticipated or deprived of patentable novelty by devices found in the latter art, even though' by slight changes the same might be made available to hatch eggs.

As to mechanical patents, the law is settled that prior patents are not a part of the prior art, except as to what is disclosed on their face, and that they cannot be reconstructed in the light of the invention in suit, and then used as an anticipation or to repel novelty. This is particularly true, if the pri- or patents contain no suggestion that they were designed by the maker for the performance of the functions of the patented device, and were in fact never adapted or actually used for that purpose. See Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S. 156, 161, 12 S. Ct. 825, 36 L. Ed. 658; Frey v. Marvel Auto Supply Co. (6 C. C. A.) 236 F. 916, 918; Stead Lens Co. v. Kryptok (8 C. C. A.) 214 F. 369, 375.

Moreover, the claims of Smith’s patent now in issue are for a method and process, and as to process patents a? rule somewhat different obtains. In Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 185 U. S. 403, 424, 22 S. Ct. 698, 707 (46 L. Ed. 968), it is said:

“A process patent, such as that of Jones, is not anticipated by mechanism which might with slight alterations have been adapted to carry out that process, unless, at least, such use of it would have occurred to one whose duty it was to make practical use of the mechanism described. In other words, a process patent can only be anticipated by a similar process. A mechanical patent is anticipated by a prior device of like construction and capable of performing the same function; but it is otherwise with a process patent.”

Our former conclusion as to the validity of the Smith patent, including the claims in issue, is approved. Smith made a meritorious invention. He did not found the art of incubating or hatching eggs by artificial methods. It is true, however, that the popular and prevailing type of a single chamber incubator, with a stack or series of stacks of eggs, owes its existence to his invention. The advantages and economies of this type of incubator are so great as to entitle him to a liberal range of equivalents.

Defendant uses an incubator known as the Aero, made by the Aero Incubator Company, of Springfield, Ohio. The question in this case is whether the hatching method of this apparatus is an infringement. It is an open question, now to be determined for the first time. In the former litigation, the apparatus held to infringe was an exact copy'of Smith, and it was unnecessary to determine with exactness the scope of the method claims. It was then said: “No question of invention or infringement turns on a close construction of all or any of the three claims.” It is now necessary to make this examination, and this duty will be performed independently and unembarrassed by any general language in our former opinion not called for by the facts then in issue.

A process patent is independent of the apparatus or means for practicing it. It must consist of a novel series of steps or sequences of operations, even though the operation is continuous and leads to a single result. The mere function of a machine is not patentable. Likewise a patent will not issue for a mere result. Any one is free to devise a new method to accomplish the same result, or to construct a new apparatus capable of realizing the same functions. In the present case, the result is the hatching of eggs. The function of the Smith apparatus is the maintaining of a reasonable uniformity of temperature, with an adequate supply of oxygen and moisture during the period of incubation. Any one may, if he can, get this result, or construct a device realizing these functions, provided only he does not appropriate the series or sequences of steps consti *458 tuting Smith’s hatching method, or the elements of his apparatus claims. It is defendant’s contention .that the incubator used by him does not infringe, even though it hatches eggs and maintains uniformity of temperature, with adequate moisture and oxygen, because he does not appropriate the series or sequences of the steps of Smith’s method. In so far as the apparatus claims of the Smith patent are concerned, this contention is not in dispute. No charge is made that those claims are infringed. The controversy pertains solely to the alleged appropriation of Smith’s hatching method.

In construing a method or process claim, and in determining whether it is infringed, or not, the same rules are applied as with an apparatus claim.

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Bluebook (online)
17 F.2d 456, 1927 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 981, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/buckeye-incubator-co-v-blum-ohnd-1927.