Elder, X,
dissenting.
The majority finds that the Supreme Court’s holding in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), and this Court’s holding in Winfield v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 1049, 421 S.E.2d 468 (1992) (en banc), require that we affirm the judgment of the trial court. As one of the six members of this Court forming the majority in Winfield, and one of three panel members in two unanimous cases in which we have Anther refined Winfield, Broady v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 281, 429 S.E.2d 468 (1993), and Carter v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 118, 428 S.E.2d 34 (1993), I disagree.
I.
The holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), requires a three-step process for evaluating claims that a prosecutor has used peremptory challenges in a manner violative of the Equal Protection Clause:
First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for [565]*565striking the jurors in question. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59 (citations omitted). It is clear that “ ‘[t]he trial court’s decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal.’ ” Winfield, 14 Va. App. at 1049, 421 S.E.2d at 469 (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364). Furthermore, we will not overturn that finding “ ‘unless ... its determination was clearly erroneous.’ ” Winfield, 14 Va. App. at 1050, 421 S.E.2d at 469 (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369).
The question is “[ujnder what circumstances does such a criterion [one closely tied to race] cease being race-neutral and become a surrogate for impermissible racial biases.” United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 1992). The language of Batson makes clear that peremptory strike cases are to be decided on the particular facts of each case. 476 U.S. at 96-98. The majority in this case fails to note the significant factual distinctions between this case and Winfield and Hernandez. In both Winfield and Hernandez, the prosecutors’ explanations were found to be race-neutral. Here, I would conclude that the prosecutor’s reasons clearly ceased to be race-neutral and became “a surrogate for impermissible racial biases.”
A. Race Neutrality in Winfield, Hernandez and Broady
In Winfield, the prosecutor struck one African-American woman because she admitted that she knew the defendant. The other three peremptory strikes of African-American women were based on the prosecutor’s decision made the previous night when he reviewed the venire list “before he had any knowledge of their race.” Winfield v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. 446, 448, 404 S.E.2d 398-99 (1991). These facts are similar to those in Hernandez, where the prosecutor “did not know which jurors were Latinos.” 500 U.S. at 369-70. The prosecutor in Winfield further explained that he made his decisions based on the listed occupations of these persons, which he thought indicated a limited level of education. 12 Va. App. at 452, 404 S.E.2d at 402. Whether the prosecutor’s correlation of employment and education was accurate or a legitimate basis for selecting a jury was not the issue. Clearly, obtaining a well-educated jury is a permissible goal and one that is facially race-neutral. In Winfield, all of the prosecutor’s stated reasons for making the peremptory strikes were facially race-[566]*566neutral representations. In Winfield, defense counsel did not make any representations or offer any evidence to rebut the prosecutor’s articulated facially race-neutral representations. The trial judge found the prosecutor’s explanation credible in Winfield, and under the facts of that case, we found no legal basis upon which to overturn that finding on appeal.
In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. ... [E]valuation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies “peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.”
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985)).
In Broady v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 281, 429 S.E.2d 468 (1993), the defense attorney called the trial court’s attention to the fact that the articulated facially race-neutral reason for peremptory strikes was being applied exclusively to African-Americans. There, we said that “after the Commonwealth has asserted a facially race-neutral reason to strike but has only struck jurors of one race and the reason asserted for the strike is equally applicable to other members of the venire of a different race, the reason asserted is not a satisfactory race-neutral explanation for the Commonwealth’s strikes.” Id. at 285, 429 S.E.2d at 471. “[W]hen it is further demonstrated that facially nonracial reasons are applied systematically to blacks but not whites, the Commonwealth has not overcome the presumption that the strikes were racially motivated.” Id. (citing Reynolds v. Benefield, 931 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1991)).
B. Race Neutrality and Judicial Notice in Buck
I agree with the majority that, based on the defense attorney’s failure to clearly establish on the record any pretextual basis for the strike of the African-American woman, the trial judge’s finding that the strike of that venireman was race-neutral is supported by credible evidence. However, the prosecutor’s articulated reasons for striking the African-American male raise other issues that should be reviewed by this Court. The prosecutor explained his reason for that strike as follows:
[567]*567Yes, sir, because he came into the court with the other jurors and appeared not to be dressed for the occasion. He came in wearing a Virginia State Varsity jacket; he has a Petersburg address.4 Living in that part of the county, Petersburg has a significant drug problem. Based on his appearance and the address location, 1 thought he would be tolerant of this kind of offense.
The mention of the Virginia State varsity jacket clearly refers to the venireman’s connection to a university whose student body is predominately African-American. See Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (E.D. Va.), aff’d sub nom. Board of Visitors of the College of William & Mary v. Norris, 404 U.S. 907 (1971).
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Elder, X,
dissenting.
The majority finds that the Supreme Court’s holding in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), and this Court’s holding in Winfield v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 1049, 421 S.E.2d 468 (1992) (en banc), require that we affirm the judgment of the trial court. As one of the six members of this Court forming the majority in Winfield, and one of three panel members in two unanimous cases in which we have Anther refined Winfield, Broady v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 281, 429 S.E.2d 468 (1993), and Carter v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 118, 428 S.E.2d 34 (1993), I disagree.
I.
The holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), requires a three-step process for evaluating claims that a prosecutor has used peremptory challenges in a manner violative of the Equal Protection Clause:
First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for [565]*565striking the jurors in question. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59 (citations omitted). It is clear that “ ‘[t]he trial court’s decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal.’ ” Winfield, 14 Va. App. at 1049, 421 S.E.2d at 469 (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364). Furthermore, we will not overturn that finding “ ‘unless ... its determination was clearly erroneous.’ ” Winfield, 14 Va. App. at 1050, 421 S.E.2d at 469 (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369).
The question is “[ujnder what circumstances does such a criterion [one closely tied to race] cease being race-neutral and become a surrogate for impermissible racial biases.” United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 1992). The language of Batson makes clear that peremptory strike cases are to be decided on the particular facts of each case. 476 U.S. at 96-98. The majority in this case fails to note the significant factual distinctions between this case and Winfield and Hernandez. In both Winfield and Hernandez, the prosecutors’ explanations were found to be race-neutral. Here, I would conclude that the prosecutor’s reasons clearly ceased to be race-neutral and became “a surrogate for impermissible racial biases.”
A. Race Neutrality in Winfield, Hernandez and Broady
In Winfield, the prosecutor struck one African-American woman because she admitted that she knew the defendant. The other three peremptory strikes of African-American women were based on the prosecutor’s decision made the previous night when he reviewed the venire list “before he had any knowledge of their race.” Winfield v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. 446, 448, 404 S.E.2d 398-99 (1991). These facts are similar to those in Hernandez, where the prosecutor “did not know which jurors were Latinos.” 500 U.S. at 369-70. The prosecutor in Winfield further explained that he made his decisions based on the listed occupations of these persons, which he thought indicated a limited level of education. 12 Va. App. at 452, 404 S.E.2d at 402. Whether the prosecutor’s correlation of employment and education was accurate or a legitimate basis for selecting a jury was not the issue. Clearly, obtaining a well-educated jury is a permissible goal and one that is facially race-neutral. In Winfield, all of the prosecutor’s stated reasons for making the peremptory strikes were facially race-[566]*566neutral representations. In Winfield, defense counsel did not make any representations or offer any evidence to rebut the prosecutor’s articulated facially race-neutral representations. The trial judge found the prosecutor’s explanation credible in Winfield, and under the facts of that case, we found no legal basis upon which to overturn that finding on appeal.
In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. ... [E]valuation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies “peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.”
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985)).
In Broady v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 281, 429 S.E.2d 468 (1993), the defense attorney called the trial court’s attention to the fact that the articulated facially race-neutral reason for peremptory strikes was being applied exclusively to African-Americans. There, we said that “after the Commonwealth has asserted a facially race-neutral reason to strike but has only struck jurors of one race and the reason asserted for the strike is equally applicable to other members of the venire of a different race, the reason asserted is not a satisfactory race-neutral explanation for the Commonwealth’s strikes.” Id. at 285, 429 S.E.2d at 471. “[W]hen it is further demonstrated that facially nonracial reasons are applied systematically to blacks but not whites, the Commonwealth has not overcome the presumption that the strikes were racially motivated.” Id. (citing Reynolds v. Benefield, 931 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1991)).
B. Race Neutrality and Judicial Notice in Buck
I agree with the majority that, based on the defense attorney’s failure to clearly establish on the record any pretextual basis for the strike of the African-American woman, the trial judge’s finding that the strike of that venireman was race-neutral is supported by credible evidence. However, the prosecutor’s articulated reasons for striking the African-American male raise other issues that should be reviewed by this Court. The prosecutor explained his reason for that strike as follows:
[567]*567Yes, sir, because he came into the court with the other jurors and appeared not to be dressed for the occasion. He came in wearing a Virginia State Varsity jacket; he has a Petersburg address.4 Living in that part of the county, Petersburg has a significant drug problem. Based on his appearance and the address location, 1 thought he would be tolerant of this kind of offense.
The mention of the Virginia State varsity jacket clearly refers to the venireman’s connection to a university whose student body is predominately African-American. See Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (E.D. Va.), aff’d sub nom. Board of Visitors of the College of William & Mary v. Norris, 404 U.S. 907 (1971). It is clear from the context of the prosecutor’s statement that he was not referring merely to the fact that this venireman was wearing a varsity jacket, as opposed to other apparel that the prosecutor may have deemed more appropriate for the occasion. If that were the case, there would have been no need to refer to Virginia State University. The further reference (although incorrect) to the venireman’s address as Petersburg as a reason to believe that he would be tolerant of “this kind of offense” must be viewed in light of the fact that the population of the City of Petersburg is more than seventy percent African-American. 1990 U.S. Census Population by Race, U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau.
Although the racial composition of Virginia State University and the City of Petersburg was not brought out by defense counsel and is not otherwise reflected in the record, it is manifestly appropriate for trial and appellate courts to take judicial notice of such matters. Although it is trial courts that ordinarily take judicial notice of matters, the Virginia Supreme Court has regularly taken judicial notice of “whatever ought to be generally known within the limits of [its] jurisdiction.” Vaughan v. Town of Galax, 173 Va. 335, 342-43, 4 S.E.2d 386, 389 (1939) (quoting Redd v. Supervisors of Henry County, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 695, 709 (1879)); see also Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 570, 572, 125 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1962) (“[T]he trial court could, and this court will, properly take judicial notice of the fact that the city of Norfolk is in this Commonwealth”); West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 281, 192 S.E. 881, 885 (1937) (Courts take cognizance of public and social developments); Omohundro v. Palmer, 158 Va. 693, 697, 164 S.E. 541, 543 (1932) (taking judicial [568]*568notice of the fact that the distance between Louisa Court House and Goochland County is relatively short). Appellate and trial courts routinely take judicial notice of census figures to determine the racial make-up of various populations. See Craig v. Alabama State Univ., 451 F. Supp. 1207, 1208-09 (M.D. Ala. 1978), aff’d, 614 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 862 (1980); Goins v. Allgood, 391 F.2d 692, 697 (5th Cir. 1968); Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 317 F. Supp. 555, 566 (E.D. Va. 1970); Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96, 108 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
Even aside from the clear legal precedent, to contend that “it is not generally known within the limits of Chesterfield County” that the populations of Virginia State University and the City of Petersburg are predominantly African-American is to ignore reality. An appellate court cannot ignore what it “ought to know,” nor can we allow a trial court to do so.
The trial judge found that the peremptory strikes were made “for reasons for trial tactics,” that “race was not a consideration,” and that the strikes were “reasonably made.” However, as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit emphasized in United States v. Bishop,
the role of the trial judge in assessing the prosecutor’s motive only kicks in once a race-neutral justification has been offered. Here, as we have explained, the justification was tainted by impermissible generalizations regarding racial groups and their environment. The trial judge’s credibility determinations therefore are not in question. We need not reach the issue whether the prosecutor’s explanation was honest or merely a sham; rather, we conclude that, even assuming it was sincere, the government’s explanation is not sufficient to satisfy Batson because “a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation.”
959 F.2d 820, 827 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360) (other citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Bishop is persuasive as applied to this case.
C. The Majority;s Misapplication of Hernandez
The majority’s reliance on Hernandez appears to be misplaced due to the significant distinctions between the two cases. In Hernandez,
[t]he prosecutor ... offered a race-neutral basis for these peremptory strikes. As explained by the prosecutor, the challenges rested [569]*569neither on the intention to exclude Latinos or bilingual jurors. . . . The prosecutor’s articulated basis for these challenges divided potential jurors into two classes: those whose conduct during voir dire would persuade him they might have difficulty in accepting the translator’s rendition of Spanish-language testimony and those potential jurors who gave no such reason for doubt.
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 353. In Hernandez, the prosecutor gave a facially valid explanation as to why what appeared to have been a race or ethnic based reason — language — was race-neutral in its application. No such explanation was offered by the prosecutor in the case before this Court. In contrast, the stated reasons in this case — that the venireman was affiliated with Virginia State University and had a Petersburg address — are generic reasons with no nexus to this specific trial. If the prosecutor had shown that, by virtue of the prospective juror’s address and affiliation with Virginia State University, he had some particular knowledge or bias about this case, i.e., that he lived next door to a known drug dealer whose primary market was Virginia State University, what is facially a race-based reason would become acceptable as a race-neutral basis for making the peremptory strike. This is exactly what occurred in Hernandez.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court suggested in Hernandez, as it did in Batson, that there is no all-encompassing rule to employ in deciding these cases, but that each case must be judged on its particular facts. The Court said:
In holding that a race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge means a reason other than race, we do not resolve the more difficult question of the breadth with which the concept of race should be defined for equal protection purposes. We would face a quite different case if the prosecutor had justified his peremptory challenges with the explanation that he did not want Spanish-speaking jurors. It may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis.
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371.
[Wjhere residence is utilized as a surrogate for racial stereotypes — as, for instance, a shorthand for insensitivity to violence [in this case drug-related crimes] — its invocation runs afoul of the [570]*570guarantees of equal protection. The difference between Hernandez [and Winfield] on the one hand, and the present case on the other, is the difference between a reason — whether valid or not — and a racial stereotype. ... It is, in short, the difference between what the Constitution permits and what it does not.
Bishop, 959 F.2d at 826.
In this case, the prosecutor made no attempt to connect the prospective juror’s residence to the facts of the case. The strike was simply applied to an African-American man who was affiliated with an African-American university and whose address was allegedly in proximity to a predominantly African-American city. Because of these facts and the alleged “drug problem” the prosecutor associated with the City of Petersburg, the trial judge found the strike permissible. Unfortunately, “African-Americans, their neighborhoods, crime and violence all become amalgamated, giving rise to tenacious stereotypes — innocent and unintentional perhaps, but stereotypes nonetheless. They are and must remain unwelcome in the courtroom.” Id. at 828.1 reiterate that my position does not mean that an African-American associated with an African-American institution and living in a predominantly African-American neighborhood can never be peremptorily struck in the trial of an African-American. Quite simply, it means that in order to justify such a strike under Batson and Hernandez, there must be a specific showing of the relevance of those facts in the particular case being tried.
II.
In summary, the distinctions between Winfield and Hernandez and the present case are clear. In Winfield, the prosecutor based his strikes on what he perceived to be the educational level of the potential jurors and made that decision before he knew the race of the individuals. Defense counsel in Winfield made no attempt to establish that the reasons given were a pretext for a racially motivated strike. The trial judge found the prosecutor’s explanation credible, and nothing in the record indicated that this explanation was inherently incredible. Consequently, this Court affirmed the trial court in accordance with the long-established standard of review and the holdings of Batson and Hernandez. In Hernandez, the Supreme Court upheld the trial judge’s credibility finding regarding the peremptory strikes on what appeared to have been a race-based reason, because the prosecutor supported his [571]*571statements by questions during voir dire. These questions clearly established that, although his approach may have had a racial (ethnic) appearance, his rationale for strikes applied equally to Latinos and non-Latinos. In the case before us, by contrast, the prosecutor’s explanation for striking the male African-American venireman was that he was wearing a jacket indicating an affiliation with a predominantly African-American university and allegedly had an address in close proximity to a predominantly African-American city. Thus, no race-neutral reason was advanced for the strike of this venireman. Consequently, this case must be reversed and remanded.
My decision in this case in no way conflicts with the general principle enunciated in Winfield, i.e., that deference must be given to the trial judge’s finding regarding the credibility of the prosecutor’s stated race-neutral reason for striking a potential juror. We have never said that we will defer to the trial judge’s findings without meaningful appellate review. Perhaps in Winfield we should have drawn the distinction I have made in this opinion. However, in view of the fact that the defense attorney in that case did not challenge the prosecutor’s facially race-neutral reasons and that the trial judge chose to believe the prosecutor, we did not find it necessary to do so. Nevertheless, we have since refined and explained the proper application of Winfield in Carter and Broady, both of which support the approach taken in this dissent.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse and remand for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so advised.