1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHANNON ANDRE BRYANT, Case No.: 25-cv-0724-AJB (KSC) CDCR #BV-8320, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 v. (1) GRANTING MOTION TO 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, and 15 WARDEN GUZMAN, CHIEF DEPUTY 16 WARDEN ESQUIEL, CAPTAIN (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH HOPPER and PLANT OPERATOR LEAVE TO AMEND PURSUANT TO 17 BEATTY, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b) 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 Plaintiff Shannon Andre Bryant, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a civil 22 rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a Motion to proceed in forma 23 pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF Nos. 1-2.) Plaintiff alleges that while playing basketball at 24 Centinela State Prison in Imperial, California, he stepped on a crack and sprained his ankle 25 due to the Defendants’ negligent maintenance of the basketball court. (See id. at 3.) 26 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 27 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 28 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 1 $405, consisting of a $350 statutory fee plus an additional administrative fee of $55, 2 although the administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. 3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee 4 Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 5 prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). Section 7 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a “certified copy of 8 the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period 9 immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 10 King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the 11 Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account 12 for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six 13 months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has insufficient assets. See 28 U.S.C. 14 § 1915(b)(1)&(4); Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016). Prisoners who proceed IFP 15 must pay any remaining balance in “increments” or “installments,” regardless of whether 16 their action is ultimately dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)&(2); Bruce, 577 U.S. at 84. 17 Plaintiff’s prison certificate shows he had an average monthly balance of $258.46 18 and average monthly deposits of $257.43 for the six months preceding the filing of this 19 action, and an available balance of $73.12. (ECF No. 4 at 4.) The Court GRANTS 20 Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and assesses an initial partial filing fee of $51.69. 21 Plaintiff remains obligated to pay the $298.31 balance of the filing fee required by 28 22 U.S.C. § 1914 pursuant to the installment payment provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 23 II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 24 A. Standard of Review 25 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a pre-Answer 26 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court 27 must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, 28 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 1 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 3 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of § 1915A is to ensure that the targets of frivolous or 4 malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 5 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quote marks omitted). 6 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 7 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 8 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 9 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 10 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the 11 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”) Rule 12 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 13 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), 14 quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Detailed factual 15 allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 16 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “Determining whether a 17 complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 18 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 19 possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me 20 accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. 21 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who, 22 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” 23 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHANNON ANDRE BRYANT, Case No.: 25-cv-0724-AJB (KSC) CDCR #BV-8320, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 v. (1) GRANTING MOTION TO 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, and 15 WARDEN GUZMAN, CHIEF DEPUTY 16 WARDEN ESQUIEL, CAPTAIN (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH HOPPER and PLANT OPERATOR LEAVE TO AMEND PURSUANT TO 17 BEATTY, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b) 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 Plaintiff Shannon Andre Bryant, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a civil 22 rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a Motion to proceed in forma 23 pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF Nos. 1-2.) Plaintiff alleges that while playing basketball at 24 Centinela State Prison in Imperial, California, he stepped on a crack and sprained his ankle 25 due to the Defendants’ negligent maintenance of the basketball court. (See id. at 3.) 26 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 27 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 28 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 1 $405, consisting of a $350 statutory fee plus an additional administrative fee of $55, 2 although the administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. 3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee 4 Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 5 prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). Section 7 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a “certified copy of 8 the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period 9 immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 10 King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the 11 Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account 12 for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six 13 months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has insufficient assets. See 28 U.S.C. 14 § 1915(b)(1)&(4); Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016). Prisoners who proceed IFP 15 must pay any remaining balance in “increments” or “installments,” regardless of whether 16 their action is ultimately dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)&(2); Bruce, 577 U.S. at 84. 17 Plaintiff’s prison certificate shows he had an average monthly balance of $258.46 18 and average monthly deposits of $257.43 for the six months preceding the filing of this 19 action, and an available balance of $73.12. (ECF No. 4 at 4.) The Court GRANTS 20 Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and assesses an initial partial filing fee of $51.69. 21 Plaintiff remains obligated to pay the $298.31 balance of the filing fee required by 28 22 U.S.C. § 1914 pursuant to the installment payment provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 23 II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 24 A. Standard of Review 25 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a pre-Answer 26 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court 27 must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, 28 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 1 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 3 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of § 1915A is to ensure that the targets of frivolous or 4 malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 5 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quote marks omitted). 6 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 7 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 8 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 9 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 10 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the 11 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”) Rule 12 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 13 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), 14 quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Detailed factual 15 allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 16 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “Determining whether a 17 complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 18 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 19 possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me 20 accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. 21 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who, 22 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” 23 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a 24 source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights 25 elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). 26 B. Allegations in the Complaint 27 Plaintiff claims the Defendants, Warden Guzman, Chief Deputy Warden Esquiel, 28 Captain Hopper and Plant Operator Beatty, are responsible for maintaining the recreational 1 area at Centinela and negligently maintained the basketball court. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) He 2 alleges that on May 22, 2024, he stepped on a “massive crack” while playing basketball 3 and sprained his ankle. (Id.) He brings a claim for negligence against all Defendants. (Id.) 4 C. Analysis 5 Plaintiff cannot state a federal constitutional claim arising solely on negligence. See 6 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (holding that the constitutional standard for 7 failure to protect a prisoner from unsafe conditions “describes a state of mind more 8 blameworthy than negligence” and “more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s 9 interests or safety.”); see also e.g. Levy v. Department of Corrections of Washington, 2013 10 WL 1855854, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 1, 2013) (finding no constitutional violation from 11 trip and fall in sprinkler hole on recreation yard); Coleman v. Sweetin, 745 F.3d 756, 764 12 & n.7 (5th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases and noting “prisoner slip-and-fall claims almost 13 never serve as a predicate for constitutional violations.”) Rather, a failure of prison 14 officials to protect an inmate from a dangerous prison condition rises to the level of a 15 constitutional violation when two requirements are met: (1) the alleged failure to maintain 16 safe conditions is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, 17 subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 18 A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk 19 to inmate health or safety by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Id. at 837. 20 Plaintiff’s allegations of negligence are insufficient to state a federal constitutional 21 violation as necessary to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Id. at 835; Devereaux, 263 F.3d 22 at 1074 (section 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 23 under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.”) If Plaintiff 24 wishes to proceed with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on his ankle sprain, he must set forth 25 facts which plausibly allege a Defendant was aware of facts from which they could draw 26 an inference that the condition of the basketball court posed a substantial risk of serious 27 injury to Plaintiff and actually drew such an inference, as opposed to simply alleging it was 28 negligently maintained. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Plaintiff must also set forth facts 1 showing he suffered a sufficiently serious injury as the result of a prison official’s 2 deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious physical harm. Id. at 834-38; see 3 also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 627 (9th Cir. 2002) (a physical injury “must be more 4 than de minimis.”) 5 To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring a negligence claim under California law, the 6 Court may “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over any supplemental state law 7 claim if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1367(c); Sanford v. Member Works, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]n the 9 usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors 10 to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to 11 exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”) Because no federal claim has 12 been stated in the Complaint, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 13 any state law negligence claim at this time. 14 D. Leave to Amend 15 In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants leave to amend. See Rosati v. 16 Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro 17 se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless it 18 is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 19 amendment.”) (internal quote marks omitted). 20 III. Conclusion and Orders 21 Good cause appearing, the Court: 22 1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP. (ECF No. 2.) 23 2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 24 Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $51.69 initial partial filing fee and collect the $298.31 25 balance of the $350 filing fee by collecting monthly payments from Plaintiff’s account in 26 an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forwarding 27 those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 28 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 1 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Jeff 2 || Macomber, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 3 ||942883, Sacramento, California 94283-0001. 4 4. DISMISSES all claims against all Defendants in the Complaint without 5 || prejudice and with leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). 6 5. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in 7 || which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted in 8 || this Order with respect to any or all other Defendants. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint 9 ||must be complete by itself without reference to his original Complaint. Defendants not 10 |/named and any claims not re-alleged in the First Amended Complaint will be considered 11 || waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 12 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.’’); 13 || Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed 14 || with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered 15 || waived if not repled.”) If Plaintiff fails to amend, the Court will dismiss this action for 16 || failure to state a claim and failure to prosecute. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 17 ||(9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his 18 || complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the 19 || entire action.”) 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: April 10, 2025
23 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28 6