Douglas Rega v. United States

263 F.3d 18, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19173, 2001 WL 965047
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedAugust 27, 2001
DocketDocket 00-2287
StatusPublished
Cited by44 cases

This text of 263 F.3d 18 (Douglas Rega v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Douglas Rega v. United States, 263 F.3d 18, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19173, 2001 WL 965047 (2d Cir. 2001).

Opinion

WINTER, Circuit Judge:

The government appeals from Judge Stanton’s order vacating the convictions and sentence of petitioner Douglas Rega, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Rega v. United States, No. 96 Civ. 2728, 2000 WL 356403 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.6, 2000) (“Rega II”). The district court concluded that Rega did not receive the constitutionally required effective assistance of counsel because his attorney prevented him from testifying on his own behalf. See Rega v. United States, No. 84 CR. 63, 1999 WL 20889, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.19, 1999) (“Rega J”). The district court further concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the failure to testify adversely affected the outcome of Rega’s trial. See Rega II, 2000 WL 356403, at *3.

We hold that there is no reasonable probability that Rega’s testimony would have altered the outcome of his trial. Accordingly, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

Rega and twenty-three co-defendants were charged with violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)-(d), and various other federal laws through their involvement in the activities of a racketeering enterprise known as the DeMeo Crew, a component of the Gambino organized crime family. Rega was also charged with various substantive offenses that need not be detailed.

Rega’s alleged role in the enterprise was to supply the DeMeo Crew with pornographic films, which the Crew then sold for a large profit. The government further alleged that Rega paid the DeMeo Crew to kill his uncle, Fred Todaro, who also was in the pornography business, because of a dispute over the building in *20 which they duplicated films. According to the government, Rega had Todaro killed to gain control of the building, which could at the time be profitably converted into apartments.

After a sixteen-month trial before Judge Broderick, 1 Rega was convicted on all counts. In October 1989, Judge Broderick sentenced Rega to forty years’ imprisonment. On direct appeal, we affirmed Rega’s conviction. See United States v. DiNome, 954 F.2d 839 (2d Cir.1992); United States v. DiNome, 954 F.2d 839 (2d Cir.1992) (unpublished summary order) (rejecting Rega’s claims that evidence was improperly admitted and legally insufficient, counsel was ineffective, and government’s remarks during summation were prejudicial).

In 1996, Rega filed the present petition alleging, inter alia, that his counsel refused to let him testify and therefore provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 2 Relying primarily on affidavits submitted by Rega’s trial counsel, Judge Stanton concluded that Rega was not adequately informed of his right to testify. 3 See Rega I, 1999 WL 20889, at *5-6. Initially, the district court also held that Rega had not shown that he had been prejudiced by this omission because, by his own description, his testimony would either have duplicated evidence admitted at trial or was otherwise insufficient to affect the outcome of the trial. See id. at *6-11. However, the court denied the petition without prejudice, allowing Rega to submit additional papers with regard to the probability that his testimony would have altered the result. See id. at *11. Rega thereafter amplified his proposed testimony. Based on the new submission, the district court decided that Rega had shown a reasonable probability that, had he testified, he would have been acquitted. See Rega II, 2000 WL 356403, at *1.

The district court found that Rega’s testimony would have undermined the government’s case in five specific ways that we discuss in detail infra, and that “[o]ne cannot assess with certainty the degree to which cross-examination would have impeached Rega’s defense.” Id. at *2. The court acknowledged that defense counsel believed that it was highly inadvisable for Rega to testify because his testimony would open the door for the government to introduce Rega’s previous conviction for pornography and audiotapes of conversations between Rega and his mother in which Rega repeatedly expressed his hostility to Todaro along with threats to harm him. The district court found that the pornography conviction would not have been “mortal to Rega’s defense,” id., because Rega explained that he was convicted only because he was the film laboratory manager and that he had no knowledge of the nature of the films duplicated. As to the tapes, the district court concluded that “[t]he jury may see them as merely an *21 extravagant, private blowing-off of steam." Id. The court therefore granted the petition. See id. at *3

This appeal followed. We granted a stay of the district court's order pending appeal.

DISCUSSION

A defendant in a criminal case has the constitutional right to testify on his own behalf, see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-51, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987), and we have held that a "trial counsel's duty of effective assistance includes the responsibility to advise the defendant concerning the exercise of this constitutional right," Brown, v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 74 (2d Cir.1997). To bring a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, however, a defendant must show not only counsel's deficient performance, but slso a reasonable probability that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.")

We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error, see Flores v. Demskie, 215 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1029, 121 S.Ct. 606, 148 L.Ed.2d 517 (2000); Zovluck v. United States, 448 F.2d 339, 341 (2d Cir.1971), and its decision to grant the petition de novo, see Mask v. McGinnis, 233 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir.2000), petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W.

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Bluebook (online)
263 F.3d 18, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19173, 2001 WL 965047, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/douglas-rega-v-united-states-ca2-2001.