Ellington, Judge.
Vito J. Bruscato, in his capacity as the guardian of Victor Bruscato, appeals from the order of the Superior Court of DeKalb County, which granted summary judgment to Victor Bruscato’s psychiatrist, Derek Johnson O’Brien, M.D., in this medical malpractice case.1 The superior court concluded that Bruscato’s malpractice claims were barred either by the application of the “impact rule” or on public policy grounds. For the following reasons, we reverse.
To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. On appeal of a [453]*453grant of summary judgment, this Court reviews the evidence de novo to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists or whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(Citations omitted.) Boggs v. Bosley Med. Institute, 228 Ga. App. 598, 599 (492 SE2d 264) (1997).
So viewed, the record reveals the following. O’Brien began treating Victor Bruscato, a then 38-year-old, mentally ill patient with a history of violence, in January 2001. O’Brien reviewed Bruscato’s treatment records, which revealed that Bruscato’s mental illness manifested in childhood and that he had been diagnosed over the course of his life with mental retardation, organic mood disorder, pervasive developmental disorder, schizophrenia, a nonspecified psychotic disorder, pedophilia, and intermittent explosive disorder. Bruscato had expressed homicidal thoughts toward his parents, and he had physically assaulted them and others, including a hospital employee and a young girl. He had also experienced auditory hallucinations that commanded him to kill people or to molest girls.
When O’Brien began treating Bruscato, Bruscato had been living with his parents for almost two years. Before that, he had been living in a group home operated by the Gwinnett-Rockdale-Newton Community Service Board (“CSB”), but he had been removed from the home because of the risk that he might sexually assault a girl. Bruscato’s expert witness opined that his elderly parents were ill-equipped to manage a severely mentally-ill adult and were “strong-armed” into taking him home. While at home, Bruscato continued receiving outpatient treatment from the CSB. Bruscato’s expert witness opined that the medications the CSB staff administered to Bruscato controlled his violent behavior and sexual impulses. O’Brien knew that, because Bruscato was potentially dangerous, the CSB required his parents to monitor him continuously.
In late May 2002, O’Brien ordered that two of Bruscato’s medications, Zyprexa and Luvox, be discontinued for six weeks to rule out the possibility that Bruscato might be developing neuro-leptic malignancy syndrome (“NMS”). O’Brien’s own expert witness opined that, if Bruscato had NMS, which the expert believed he did not, the proper procedure would be to hospitalize him. He also opined that withholding Bruscato’s medications for that period to rule out the possibility of NMS, which is very rare, was not medically justified.
According to a family friend, about two-and-a-half weeks after Bruscato stopped taking Zyprexa and Luvox, he began having nightmares, panic attacks, and bouts of heavy sweating. He also started hearing voices telling him to kill, and he became increasingly [454]*454hostile toward his parents. On July 22, O’Brien met with Bruscato briefly and noted that he spoke rapidly, seemed excited, and was feeling angry at women. O’Brien, however, did not make any changes to Bruscato’s treatment plan. On August 11, Bruscato scrawled a “prayer note,” stating: “[I] need prayer big time devil tormenting me.” O’Brien opined in his deposition that the letter “could convey psychosis.” On August 14, a friend visiting Bruscato’s home observed him rocking back and forth on his bed, pleading for the voices in his head to leave him alone. A nurse, who also visited on the same day, noted that Bruscato was argumentative, was expressing thoughts about sexual fantasies and dreams, and was generally irritable.
On August 15, Bruscato crushed his mother’s skull with a battery charger and stabbed her 72 times, killing her. When questioned by the arresting officers, Bruscato said that he killed his mother and that he knew it was wrong, but that the devil had told him to do it. After Bruscato was jailed, the assistant director of prison mental health services wrote Bruscato’s criminal defense attorney. She advised him that, when Bruscato was arrested, he had been “non-compliant with his anti-psychotic medications,” and, during his intake assessment, he had reported auditory hallucinations that were “persecutory in nature,” that he had trouble controlling his impulses, and that he had very poor insight into his situation, asking “what member of his family would become his new mother.” Bruscato wondered whether his mother could be “brought back to life.” After reintroducing Zyprexa into Bruscato’s medication regimen, the director noted that he became “compliant” and that his condition “improved steadily.” Although Bruscato was indicted for his mother’s murder in 2002, he was found to be incompetent to stand trial. As of the date of the trial court’s summary judgment order in the instant case, Bruscato has been residing at Central State Hospital, where he had been committed.
Bruscato’s expert witness opined that when O’Brien
abruptly terminated [Bruscato’s] Zyprexa, not only was this a violation of the standard of care required of Dr. O’Brien, it resulted in the imposition of chemical changes in [Brusca-to’s] brain. Those chemical changes in turn produced adverse physical responses in [Bruscato’s] brain and ultimately in his body.
The expert stated that Bruscato’s mental illness was not merely emotional or behavioral, but neurological — “a medical disorder.” The expert further opined that the chemical changes that resulted from withholding medication caused Bruscato to “decompensate” [455]*455and experience the return of the most severe symptoms of his medical disorder, including auditory command hallucinations, agitation, and hostility. The expert concluded that O’Brien’s treatment “manifested gross negligence and a disregard of the consequences of leaving a historically violent and potentially psychotic patient un-medicated,” which ultimately led to Bruscato’s killing his mother while in a psychotic state.
1. Bruscato contends the trial court erred when it granted O’Brien’s motion for summary judgment based upon a finding that he “failed to establish an injury for which the law provides recovery,” and entered judgment in favor of O’Brien on all counts of the complaint. Specifically, Bruscato argues that the court erred in characterizing his claim for damages arising prior to the attack on his mother as a claim for “[mjental distress and anguish” and concluding that, because Bruscato had suffered no physical injury or pecuniary loss prior to the attack, he was barred from recovering for the “negligent infliction of emotional distress” by the so-called “impact rule.”2 We agree.
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Ellington, Judge.
Vito J. Bruscato, in his capacity as the guardian of Victor Bruscato, appeals from the order of the Superior Court of DeKalb County, which granted summary judgment to Victor Bruscato’s psychiatrist, Derek Johnson O’Brien, M.D., in this medical malpractice case.1 The superior court concluded that Bruscato’s malpractice claims were barred either by the application of the “impact rule” or on public policy grounds. For the following reasons, we reverse.
To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. On appeal of a [453]*453grant of summary judgment, this Court reviews the evidence de novo to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists or whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(Citations omitted.) Boggs v. Bosley Med. Institute, 228 Ga. App. 598, 599 (492 SE2d 264) (1997).
So viewed, the record reveals the following. O’Brien began treating Victor Bruscato, a then 38-year-old, mentally ill patient with a history of violence, in January 2001. O’Brien reviewed Bruscato’s treatment records, which revealed that Bruscato’s mental illness manifested in childhood and that he had been diagnosed over the course of his life with mental retardation, organic mood disorder, pervasive developmental disorder, schizophrenia, a nonspecified psychotic disorder, pedophilia, and intermittent explosive disorder. Bruscato had expressed homicidal thoughts toward his parents, and he had physically assaulted them and others, including a hospital employee and a young girl. He had also experienced auditory hallucinations that commanded him to kill people or to molest girls.
When O’Brien began treating Bruscato, Bruscato had been living with his parents for almost two years. Before that, he had been living in a group home operated by the Gwinnett-Rockdale-Newton Community Service Board (“CSB”), but he had been removed from the home because of the risk that he might sexually assault a girl. Bruscato’s expert witness opined that his elderly parents were ill-equipped to manage a severely mentally-ill adult and were “strong-armed” into taking him home. While at home, Bruscato continued receiving outpatient treatment from the CSB. Bruscato’s expert witness opined that the medications the CSB staff administered to Bruscato controlled his violent behavior and sexual impulses. O’Brien knew that, because Bruscato was potentially dangerous, the CSB required his parents to monitor him continuously.
In late May 2002, O’Brien ordered that two of Bruscato’s medications, Zyprexa and Luvox, be discontinued for six weeks to rule out the possibility that Bruscato might be developing neuro-leptic malignancy syndrome (“NMS”). O’Brien’s own expert witness opined that, if Bruscato had NMS, which the expert believed he did not, the proper procedure would be to hospitalize him. He also opined that withholding Bruscato’s medications for that period to rule out the possibility of NMS, which is very rare, was not medically justified.
According to a family friend, about two-and-a-half weeks after Bruscato stopped taking Zyprexa and Luvox, he began having nightmares, panic attacks, and bouts of heavy sweating. He also started hearing voices telling him to kill, and he became increasingly [454]*454hostile toward his parents. On July 22, O’Brien met with Bruscato briefly and noted that he spoke rapidly, seemed excited, and was feeling angry at women. O’Brien, however, did not make any changes to Bruscato’s treatment plan. On August 11, Bruscato scrawled a “prayer note,” stating: “[I] need prayer big time devil tormenting me.” O’Brien opined in his deposition that the letter “could convey psychosis.” On August 14, a friend visiting Bruscato’s home observed him rocking back and forth on his bed, pleading for the voices in his head to leave him alone. A nurse, who also visited on the same day, noted that Bruscato was argumentative, was expressing thoughts about sexual fantasies and dreams, and was generally irritable.
On August 15, Bruscato crushed his mother’s skull with a battery charger and stabbed her 72 times, killing her. When questioned by the arresting officers, Bruscato said that he killed his mother and that he knew it was wrong, but that the devil had told him to do it. After Bruscato was jailed, the assistant director of prison mental health services wrote Bruscato’s criminal defense attorney. She advised him that, when Bruscato was arrested, he had been “non-compliant with his anti-psychotic medications,” and, during his intake assessment, he had reported auditory hallucinations that were “persecutory in nature,” that he had trouble controlling his impulses, and that he had very poor insight into his situation, asking “what member of his family would become his new mother.” Bruscato wondered whether his mother could be “brought back to life.” After reintroducing Zyprexa into Bruscato’s medication regimen, the director noted that he became “compliant” and that his condition “improved steadily.” Although Bruscato was indicted for his mother’s murder in 2002, he was found to be incompetent to stand trial. As of the date of the trial court’s summary judgment order in the instant case, Bruscato has been residing at Central State Hospital, where he had been committed.
Bruscato’s expert witness opined that when O’Brien
abruptly terminated [Bruscato’s] Zyprexa, not only was this a violation of the standard of care required of Dr. O’Brien, it resulted in the imposition of chemical changes in [Brusca-to’s] brain. Those chemical changes in turn produced adverse physical responses in [Bruscato’s] brain and ultimately in his body.
The expert stated that Bruscato’s mental illness was not merely emotional or behavioral, but neurological — “a medical disorder.” The expert further opined that the chemical changes that resulted from withholding medication caused Bruscato to “decompensate” [455]*455and experience the return of the most severe symptoms of his medical disorder, including auditory command hallucinations, agitation, and hostility. The expert concluded that O’Brien’s treatment “manifested gross negligence and a disregard of the consequences of leaving a historically violent and potentially psychotic patient un-medicated,” which ultimately led to Bruscato’s killing his mother while in a psychotic state.
1. Bruscato contends the trial court erred when it granted O’Brien’s motion for summary judgment based upon a finding that he “failed to establish an injury for which the law provides recovery,” and entered judgment in favor of O’Brien on all counts of the complaint. Specifically, Bruscato argues that the court erred in characterizing his claim for damages arising prior to the attack on his mother as a claim for “[mjental distress and anguish” and concluding that, because Bruscato had suffered no physical injury or pecuniary loss prior to the attack, he was barred from recovering for the “negligent infliction of emotional distress” by the so-called “impact rule.”2 We agree.
“Three elements are essential to establish a medical malpractice claim: the doctor’s duty to his patient; the doctor’s breach of that duty through the failure to exercise the requisite degree of skill and care; and an injury proximately caused by the doctor’s failure.” (Citations omitted.) Haughton v. Canning, 287 Ga. App. 28 (2) (650 SE2d 718) (2007). OCGA § 51-1-27, which pertains to actions for medical malpractice, provides: “A person professing to practice surgery or the administering of medicine for compensation must bring to the exercise of his profession a reasonable degree of care and skill. Any injury resulting from a want of such care and skill shall be a tort for which a recovery may be had.” (Emphasis supplied.) The statute clearly provides that a compensable injury may result from a physician’s failure to properly administer medicine, and we have held that whether drugs were administered properly is a medical question involving professional judgment and skill. See Williams v. Alvista Healthcare Center, 283 Ga. App. 613, 615-616 (1) (a) (642 SE2d 232) (2007); Shirley v. Hosp. Auth. of Valdosta/Lowndes County, 263 Ga. App. 408, 409-410 (1) (587 SE2d 873) (2003).
Bruscato asserts that O’Brien, his psychiatrist, breached his duty of care to him when he misdiagnosed him with possible NMS, negligently altered his medication regimen as a result thereof, and [456]*456negligently monitored his physical, mental, and emotional status while he withdrew from the medications. Bruscato avers that, as a result of O’Brien’s medical malpractice, he suffered these injuries: he “decompensated” to the point where he experienced auditory command hallucinations telling him to kill, he succumbed “to a state of profound mental confusion ... to the extent that [he] was deprived of any ability to control his violent impulses,” he experienced the “reemergence of his underlying psychosis,” and he suffered a psychotic break with reality, during which he killed his mother. Further, in opposition to O’Brien’s motion for summary judgment, Bruscato’s expert witness opined that, when O’Brien abruptly discontinued Bruscato’s medication, Bruscato experienced chemical changes in his brain and, ultimately, his body that affected him physiologically.
Pretermitting whether the injuries that Bruscato alleges he suffered as a result of O’Brien’s professional negligence were physical, psychological, or both, we conclude that the question is irrelevant to Bruscato’s medical malpractice claim. We conclude that the medical malpractice statute, which provides that “any injury” resulting from the breach of a physician’s duty is a compensable injury, is not limited by the application of the “impact rule.” In reaching this conclusion, we have considered the underlying purposes of applying the “impact rule” to causes of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress and conclude that there is no rational basis for applying the rule to causes of action sounding in medical malpractice.
It is beyond dispute that “emotional distress” is a normal, even expected, part of life and can be caused by an almost infinite array of factors or a combination of those factors. Further, a person’s perception of his or her “emotional distress” is subjective and difficult to prove or to disprove, as is the causal connection between a defendant’s allegedly negligent act or omission and the emotional distress. Thus, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that, “[i]n a claim concerning negligent conduct, a recovery for emotional distress is allowed only where there is some impact on the plaintiff, and that impact must be a physical injury.” (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Lee v. State Farm &c. Ins. Co., 272 Ga. 583, 584 (I) (533 SE2d 82) (2000).3 “[T]he current Georgia impact rule has three elements: (1) a physical impact to the plaintiff; (2) the physical impact causes physical injury to the plaintiff; and (3) the physical [457]*457injury to the plaintiff causes the plaintiffs mental suffering or emotional distress.” Id. at 586 (I).
There are three policy reasons traditionally given for having the impact rule and denying recovery for emotional distress unrelated to physical injuries. First, there is the fear[ ] that[,] absent impact, there will be a flood of litigation of claims for emotional distress. Second, [there] is the concern for fraudulent claims. Third, there is the perception that, absent impact, there would be difficulty in proving the causal connection between the defendant’s negligent conduct and claimed damages of emotional distress. . . . [T]he benefits of an impact rule are plain in that it provides a brighter line of liability and a clear relationship between the plaintiff’s being a victim of the breach of duty and compens-ability to the plaintiff.
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id. at 587 (II).4 Consequently, the impact rule is an appropriate measure to be applied in cases involving the negligent infliction of emotional distress to bystanders or third parties who are not physically impacted by the defendant’s negligence and whose injuries are not a foreseeable result of such negligence. See id. at 589 (Hunstein, J., concurring specially) (endorsing a foreseeability rule as preferable to the “regressive” impact rule). Without the impact rule (or some related concept, such as foreseeability) to limit potential claimants and to prevent frivolous lawsuits, a defendant’s single act of negligence could result in his or her having to defend against claims by a multitude of bystanders for their alleged emotional distress.
The above-stated policy concerns, however, are not present in medical malpractice cases, because such cases require a physician-patient relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff. See OCGA § 51-1-27; Haughton v. Canning, 287 Ga. App. at 28 (2). Consequently, there is no question to be resolved regarding the [458]*458emotional impact of the defendant’s alleged negligence on third parties or bystanders, nor is there concern about a “flood of litigation” arising from such negligence. Further, the concern about avoiding fraudulent or frivolous lawsuits is already addressed by the strict pleading requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1. See Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123, 124 (416 SE2d 102) (1992) (“The purpose of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 is to reduce the number of frivolous malpractice suits being filed[.]”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Finally, once the plaintiff obtains an expert affidavit to support his or her claim that the defendant violated the applicable professional standards (pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1), and presents evidence of “[a]ny injury resulting from a want of such care and skill” (pursuant to OCGA § 51-1-27), determinations regarding the existence and extent of the plaintiffs injuries and whether the defendant’s negligence caused those injuries are generally questions for the jury to resolve.5 See Pruette v. Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp., 295 Ga. App. 335, 338 (1) (671 SE2d 844) (2008) (“questions regarding proximate cause are undeniably a jury question and may only be determined by the courts in plain and undisputed cases. Furthermore, in the summary judgment context, the nonmoving party is not required to produce evidence demanding judgment for that party, but only to present evidence which raises a material issue of fact.”) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Jones v. Abel, 209 Ga. App. 889, 895-896 (3) (434 SE2d 822) (1993) (evidence that the plaintiff was distracted from his business and suffered from depression as the result of his psychiatrist’s malpractice was sufficient to send the issue of proximate cause and damages to the jury). Therefore, the trial court erred in applying the impact rule in this medical malpractice case.
2. Bruscato contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to O’Brien on Bruscato’s claims for damages occurring at. the time he attacked his mother and thereafter on the basis that “[t]he public policy of Georgia bars any recovery for a cause of action by a person who has committed an illegal act, where the plaintiff depends upon the illegal act to establish his case.” The trial court characterizes Bruscato’s lawsuit as a “claim brought by a psychiatric patient against his .. . psychiatrist for failing to prevent the patient from committing murder.” Finding Bruscato’s conduct “unlawful and wrongful” and assuming that all of Bruscato’s post-attack damages flowed from his illegal act, the court concluded [459]*459that, as a matter of public policy, Bruscato’s claims were “clearly barred.” This was error for several reasons.
Bruscato’s claims for damages are not limited to those which flow from the act of killing his mother. Bruscato’s complaint seeks damages for medical malpractice, which is based upon O’Brien’s actions and which encompasses damages flowing from O’Brien’s alleged negligent medical treatment, including, for example, the physical and emotional injuries Bruscato experienced as a result of the ongoing deprivation of his medication. Thus, even if Bruscato is characterized as an intentional “wrongdoer,” his status as such would not be a bar to his recovering for those damages that are not attributable to the alleged immoral or illegal act.
Further, under Georgia law, “a person does not become an outlaw and lose all rights by doing an illegal act.” (Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Adams v. Smith, 129 Ga. App. 850, 852 (3) (201 SE2d 639) (1973). In this case, no court has adjudicated the issue of Bruscato’s mental competence or sanity at the time he committed the crime. He was, however, found incompetent to stand trial,6 and he has yet to be tried for the crime for which he was indicted. Moreover, should Bruscato later be found competent to stand trial, a jury may yet find him not guilty.7 Because Bruscato has not been found guilty of the murder of his mother, he is presumed innocent. OCGA § 16-1-5. Thus, because no court has entered a judgment finding Bruscato legally responsible for his mother’s murder and because the issue of his mental competence at the time of the crime has been disputed, a jury issue exists as to whether Bruscato had the requisite mental capacity to commit murder.
Moreover, the statutes the trial court and the dissent rely upon as embodying Georgia’s public policy of prohibiting wrongdoers from profiting from their crimes only prevent those who “feloniously and [460]*460intentionally” kill, OCGA § 53-1-5 (a),8 or those who commit “murder or voluntary manslaughter,” OCGA § 33-25-13,9 from sharing, respectively, in the decedent’s estate or insurance policy proceeds. Further, OCGA § 17-14-31 essentially requires those who are buying the media rights to an accused’s story to place the purchase money into an escrow account for the benefit of the victim or victims. The money is to be disbursed, however, “only if the accused person is eventually convicted or enters a plea of guilty[.]” OCGA § 17-14-31 (a) (3). Moreover, this statute makes special provision for disposition of the funds in those cases where the accused is unable to proceed to trial because of insanity or mental incompetence to stand trial. OCGA § 17-14-31 (e). Thus, if a public policy may be gleaned from these statutes, it is a policy that prohibits those who commit murder or voluntary manslaughter from profiting from the victim’s death. These statutes, however, do not impair the rights of those who kill by accident or negligence, who kill in self-defense or pursuant to any other legal justification, or who kill while legally insane. Simply admitting to having committed a homicide does not make one a wrongdoer under Georgia law.10
Further, the foreign cases upon which the trial court and the dissents rely for the proposition that Bruscato is a wrongdoer who is barred from profiting from his crime on public policy grounds are inapposite. Those cases involved plaintiffs who had been convicted of the crimes for which they claimed were the result of the defendants’ [461]*461negligence11 or who were found to have knowingly and intentionally participated in the crimes that proximately caused their injuries.12 In each of these cases, a court found that the plaintiff had the requisite criminal intent to commit the crime. Moreover, none of those cases stand for the proposition that a psychiatric patient who kills while lacking the mental capacity to form the requisite criminal intent for murder or voluntary manslaughter is barred from bringing a medical malpractice action against his psychiatrist.
However, in a series of cases involving negligence suits against psychiatrists for harm caused by their patients, either to themselves or others, this Court has recognized that a patient’s psychiatric disorder may prevent him from having the mental capacity to exercise control over his intentional behavior or, at least, from exercising a reasonable degree of care in order to prevent himself from harming others. See Brandvain v. Ridgeview Institute, 188 Ga. App. 106, 117 (3) (c) (372 SE2d 265) (1988) (“[A] patient may be so mentally ill that, as a matter of law, he is not held to exercise any degree of care for himself, and, therefore, cannot be contributorily negligent.”) (citation omitted); Swofford v. Cooper, 184 Ga. App. 50, 54 (4) (360 SE2d 624) (1987) (Because the plaintiff was psychotic when he stabbed his father, and had been declared incompetent to stand trial, “he could not have been held to the exercise of any degree of diligence.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Misfeldt v. Hosp. Auth. of Marietta, 101 Ga. App. 579, 581-584 (115 SE2d 244) (1960) (It was error for the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the hospital because the evidence of the patient’s mental illness and the reasonableness of the steps taken by the hospital to protect her from herself were disputed and for the jury.); Emory Univ. v. Lee, 97 Ga. App. 680, 702 (6) (104 SE2d 234) (1958) (physical precedent only) (“If the evidence in the case sub judice conclusively proved that the plaintiff was on the occasion when he was injured entirely bereft of reason, it is obvious that he could not have been held to the exercise of any degree of diligence.”).
As we explained in Brandvain v. Ridgeview Institute, the fact [462]*462that a patient’s illegal act was volitional does not necessarily mean that it was a rational act for which the patient alone was responsible or which relieved the physician or the hospital of its duty to the patient. 188 Ga. App. at 118-119 (3) (c). In this case, Bruscato has not been convicted of murder, nor has any court entered a judgment finding him mentally competent at the time of the crime. Further, the evidence below does not establish, as a matter of law, that Bruscato was mentally competent when he killed his mother. Brus-cato is not a “wrongdoer” whose status as such would be a bar to any of his claims. Consequently, summary judgment on this issue or any issue relating to Bruscato’s contributory negligence for causing his mother’s death is not authorized by the evidence, and, therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in O’Brien’s favor on this basis.
Judgment reversed.
Miller, C. J., Barnes, P. J., and Phipps, P J., concur. Johnson and Doyle, JJ., concur specially in part and dissent in part. Andrews, P J., dissents.