BRUNO INDEPENDENT LIVING AIDS, INC. v. Acorn Mobility Services Ltd.

301 F. Supp. 2d 914, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24605, 2003 WL 23200386
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMarch 4, 2003
Docket02-C-0391-C
StatusPublished

This text of 301 F. Supp. 2d 914 (BRUNO INDEPENDENT LIVING AIDS, INC. v. Acorn Mobility Services Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
BRUNO INDEPENDENT LIVING AIDS, INC. v. Acorn Mobility Services Ltd., 301 F. Supp. 2d 914, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24605, 2003 WL 23200386 (W.D. Wis. 2003).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

CRABB, District Judge.

This is a civil action in which plaintiff Bruno Independent Living Aids, Inc. contends that defendants Acorn Mobility Services Ltd. and Acorn Stairlifts, Inc. infringed its U.S. Patent No. 5,230,405, which is directed to a stairway chairlift device that transports disabled individuals up and down a staircase. In addition, plaintiff contends that defendants sold their product below cost in violation of the Antidumping Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72, and engaged in deceptive advertising in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). Defendants filed a counterclaim, seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of the ’405 patent. Jurisdiction is present. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a) and 1331.

*918 The case is presently before the court for a ruling on the construction of certain elements within claims 5, 9, 10 and 15 of the ’405 patent. A hearing on the construction of the claims was held on January 31, 2003. Defendants filed a motion to file a reply brief in support of their proposed claim construction. The motion will be granted.

Taking into consideration the ’405 patent, the prosecution history and the arguments made by the parties in their briefs and at the hearing, I construe (1) “seat assembly” as excluding swivel housing 254 and bracket 242 in claims 5, 9 and 10, and as including these two components in claim 15; (2) “wherein said flange is rigidly secured to said seat assembly” to mean flange section 212 is bolted to bracket 242, which is welded to swivel housing 254 into which swivel tube 266 fits coaxially; (3) “tongue section” to mean a projecting strip that may, but need not, resemble or suggest a human tongue; (4) “proximate to said front edge of said bracket” to mean that swivel tube 266 must be located off-center (in the forward direction) relative to the seat, proximate to the front edge of bracket 262 and capable of mating with the swivel mounting bracket, which must be located “proximate to the front of said carriage unit”; and (5) “angular adjustment arm” to mean tongue section 206, intermediate brace 214 and horizontal flanges 212. In addition, the following phrases invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6:(1) “means for fixedly securing said arm to said seat assembly”; (2) “motor means operatively engaging said rail”; (3) “angular adjustment means to preselectively set said cushion in a horizontal position irrespective of the angular orientation of said rail” in claim 9; (4) “means for mounting said seat assembly to said carriage unit”; (5) “means for pivoting said arm relative to said carriage unit”; (6) “means for locking said arm in a fixed angular relation to said carriage unit”; and (7) “means for selectively locking the seat assembly in a preselected position.” In contrast, the following two phrases do not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6:(1) “angularly adjustable mounting-means to compensate for the angular orientation of the rail”; and (2) “angular adjustment means to preselectively set said cushion in a horizontal position irrespective of the angular orientation of said rail” in claim 10.

OPINION

A. Canons of Claim Construction

Infringement analysis begins with construction of the claims at issue. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), aff'd. 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). It is a legal determination to be made by the court. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. “It is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history.” Id. Construction of the disputed terms begins with the language of the claims themselves. Generally, “all terms in a patent claim are to be given their plain, ordinary and accustomed meaning to one of ordinary skill in the relevant art.” Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2001). Moreover, “unless compelled to do otherwise, a court will give a claim term the full range of its ordinary meaning as understood by an artisan of ordinary skill.” Id.

In many instances, however, a court must proceed beyond the bare language of the claims and examine the patent specification. The specification serves an important role in arriving at the correct claim construction because it is in the *919 specification that the patentee provides a written description of the invention that allows a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. In particular, the specification must be consulted because “patent law permits the patentee to choose to be his or her own lexicographer by clearly setting forth an explicit definition for a claim term that could differ in scope from that which would be afforded by its ordinary meaning.” Rexnord, 274 F.3d at 1342; Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (“a paten-tee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the special definition of the term is clearly stated in the patent specification or file history”). Although the patent specification does not broaden or narrow the invention, which is specifically laid out in the patent’s claims, the specification may be used to interpret what the patent holder meant by a word or phrase in the claim. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed.Cir.1988); see also Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582 (when term is not specifically defined in claims, it is necessary to review specification to determine whether inventor uses term inconsistently with its ordinary meaning).

After considering the claim language and the specification, a court may consider the final piece of intrinsic evidence, the patent’s prosecution history. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. “[Statements made during the prosecution of a patent may affect the scope of the invention.” Rexnord, 274 F.3d at 1343.

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301 F. Supp. 2d 914, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24605, 2003 WL 23200386, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bruno-independent-living-aids-inc-v-acorn-mobility-services-ltd-wiwd-2003.