MANSFIELD, Circuit Judge:
At issue upon this appeal is the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance of the incorporated Village of Belle Terre, New York, which prohibits groups of more than two (2) unrelated persons, as distinguished from traditional families consisting of any number of persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, from occupying a residence in an area zoned for “one-family” occupancy. We hold that since the discriminatory classification is unsupported by any rational basis consistent with permissible zoning law objectives, it transgresses the Equal Protection Clause. The district court’s decision denying preliminary injunctive relief against, enforcement of the ordinance is reversed.
Plaintiffs Edwin and Judith Dickman, owners of a house in Belle Terre, a suburban municipality with approximately 700 residents occupying some 220 homes in Suffolk County, New York, have rented their six-bedroom, single-family residence for occupancy to plaintiffs Bruce Boraas, Anne Parish and Michael Truman, all students at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, located seven or eight miles away, and to three other students attending the same university who are not parties to the instant action. The premises were originally leased on or about December 31, 1971, by plaintiff Truman as lessee for a term ending May 31, 1973, at a month[809]*809ly rental of $500. Plaintiff Boraas later became a co-signer of the lease on the same terms.
None of the six student occupants is related. Each occupies one of the six bedrooms and pays a portion of the rent. The six are organized and function as a single housekeeping unit insofar as they use the common cooking facility, dine together and share housekeeping, “yard” chores, and a “house” checking account from which disbursements for necessary household expenses are made. It is conceded that all of the occupants have behaved in a responsible manner, and no immoral conduct on their part is suggested. Four of them are pursuing graduate studies in sociology at Stony Brook.
Plaintiffs assert that before leasing the Belle Terre residence from the Dick-mans they looked extensively for alternatives to traditional dormitory living, which admittedly are available. Conventional apartment rentals, when available, however, were found to be beyond their means, and a cooperative housing arrangement was considered by them to be pleasant, convenient, promotive of scholarly exchange, and within their pocketbooks.
The Village of Belle Terre, which consists of approximately 220 homes, is zoned exclusively for residence in one-family dwellings.1 A “family” is defined as:
“One or more persons related by blood, adoption or marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit ... a number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.” The Building Zone Ordinance of the Village of Belle Terre, Art. I, § D-1.35a (June 8,1970).
To enforce the zoning code the ordinance further provides:
“Each violation of this ordinance shall constitute disorderly conduct. . . . [Persons] shall be liable for and pay a penalty not exceeding One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 60 days or by both such fine and imprisonment. A separate and distinct offense shall be deemed committed on each day during or on which a violation occurs or continues.” Building Zone Ordinance of the Village of Belle Terre, Art. VIII, Part 4, § M-1.4a(2) (Oct. 17, 1971).
On June 8, 1972, Boraas and Truman were denied residents’ beach passes because the ordinance allegedly considered them “illegal residents.”2 On July 19, 1972, the Dickmans, the owners-lessors, were served with a summons returnable before the Village Justice on July 28, 1972. However, because the Village Code required a 48-hour notice of violation, which had not been complied with, the summons was withdrawn. On July 31, 1972, the Dickmans were served with the required “Order to Remedy Violations” which notified plaintiffs that failure to remedy the condition might subject them to liability commencing on August 3, 1972.
On August 2, 1972, plaintiffs commenced an action in the district court under the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against appellees, [810]*810who are the Mayor and Trustees of Belle Terre, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against enforcement of the ordinance and a declaratory judgment invalidating as unconstitutional the prohibition against residential occupancy by more than two persons “not related by blood, adoption, or marriage.”3 Jurisdiction was grounded on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1343, and 2201. Pending a hearing on the constitutional issues, Judge Dooling issued a temporary restraining order.
Following a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, Judge Dooling on September 20 issued a 40-page decision and order denying the motion for a preliminary injunction and upholding the validity of the ordinance. A temporary restraining order was continued for five days to enable plaintiffs to seek a stay pending appeal, which was granted by this Court on September 27, and thereafter extended to the date of our decision and mandate.
In his carefully considered opinion Judge Dooling decided that he was not precluded from reaching the merits by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), its brethren, or by the anti-injunction statute, 28 U. S.C. § 2283 (1965), and that abstention was not appropriate for the reason that the New York decisional law clearly indicated that the zoning ordinance would be deemed an exercise of power granted by New York’s enabling legislation, N.Y. Village Law §§ 175, 177. See, e. g., City of Schenectady v. Alumni Association of Union Chapter, 5 A.D.2d 14, 168 N.Y.S. 2d 754 (3d Dept. 1957). Recognizing that plaintiffs had the “unquestionable right to live together in student groupings,” free from unwarranted public intrusions, just as traditional families had the right to live in areas restricted to one-family dwellings, he summarized the issue before the court as follows:
“The question ultimately posed is whether it is lawful to have a one-family dwelling zone district which excludes equally small household groups who impose no greater burdens of use on the land, the building or the surrounding than a blood-and-marriage family group on the simple and bare ground that such student groups are not families made up of husband, wife and children.” (A. 73a).
Judge Dooling concluded that the exclusionary classification could not be upheld on traditional grounds supporting zoning regulations as a valid exercise of state police power, see Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926), because it did not promote “such familiar zoning objectives as safety, adequate light and air, preservation of the land from overintensive use, avoiding crowding of the population, reduction of traffic congestion and facilitation of adequate transportation, water, sewerage, school, park and other public services.” (A. 77a). However, he decided that the ordinance represented a lawful exercise of a “legally protectable affirmative interest” in the family made up of married parents and children, i. e., the traditional “marriage-and-blood-related” families of the type presently occupying Belle Terre. Holding that the interest of such traditional families in maintaining uses of the same character in the community is a “proper zoning consideration,” he described “[s]uch zoning [as] simply another of countless statutes of bounty and protection with which the states, and all of them, and the Federal government alike aggressively surround the traditional family of parents and their children, reaching from family court laws, through laws of inheritance to tax laws.” (A. 77a).
[811]*811In reaching its decision the district court gave weight to the smallness of the Belle Terre community, the absence of similar restrictive or exclusionary classifications in some nearby communities, and the existence of dormitory facilities at Stony Brook itself. Appellants here seek reversal on the ground that the Belle Terre zoning ordinance impinges upon their constitutional rights of privacy and association.
Procedural Questions
Although we are faced at the outset with a number of procedural questions, we agree with the district court that none of them precludes consideration of the merits. Since the Belle Terre ordinance was not of state-wide applicability, the statutory requirement for consideration by a three-judge court, 28 U.S.C. § 2281, has no application.
“The court has consistently construed the section [2281] as authorizing a three-judge court not merely because a state statute is involved but only when a state statute of general and statewide application is sought to be enjoined.” Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 101, 87 S.Ct. 1544, 1548, 18 L.Ed.2d 643 (1967); see Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 48 S.Ct. 585, 72 L. Ed. 990 (1928). (Emphasis supplied.)
We further conclude that Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and its brethren,4 which held that in the absence of extraordinary circumstances threatening irreparable injury federal injunctive or declaratory relief should not issue when a prosecution is pending in a state court against the federal plaintiff, do not preclude federal equitable intervention, at least under the facts of this case. See Thoms v. Heffernan, No. 72-1013, 473 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1973); Note, Implications of the Younger Cases for the Availability of Federal Equitable Relief When No State Prosecution is Pending, 72 Colum.L.Rev. 874; Hull v. Petrillo, 439 F.2d 1184, 1186 n.1 (2d Cir. 1971). Cf. Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1971). As of August 2, 1972, the date of the initiation of the federal suit, no state case was pending; in fact no liability attached until August 3, 1972.
We are also persuaded that a justiciable controversy is presented. Neither Younger, nor Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 91 S.Ct. 758, 27 L.Ed.2d 696 (1971) , precludes a showing of such a controversy. See Thoms v. Heffernan, No. 72-1013, 473 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1973); Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1971). Here the denial of the beach passes and the service of the notice of July 28 overcome any justiciability barrier.
It is further settled that the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 22835 does not bar enjoining future state court proceedings, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22, (1965); see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), and that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutes a congressionally carved out exception to the anti-injunction statute. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972).
Finally, we agree with Judge Dooling that absention is not warranted. We are not here confronted with a situation where state court resolution of an unclear state statute might obviate the [812]*812necessity to decide federal constitutional questions. See Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). It is unlikely that New York courts would find Belle Terre’s zoning ordinance ultra vires the state enabling legislation, N.Y. Village Law, §§ 175, 177 (McKinney 1966), since similar zoning classifications grounded on the concept of “natural families” have been sustained. See, e.g., City of Schenectady v. Alumni Association of Union Chapter, 5 A.D.2d 14, 168 N.Y.S.2d 754 (3d Dept. 1957). Moreover, as Judge Dooling noted:
“In the present case a state court decision holding that the ordinance, construed as the village has construed it, was beyond the authority granted to the village by the New York Village Law, could apparently be based only on the argument that to hold otherwise would impose on the Village Law an unconstitutional interpretation. Any unresolved question of the state law detectable here is, therefore, the federal question differently stated.” Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 438-439, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971).
The Merits
Turning to the merits, it is undisputed that the Belle Terre zoning ordinance restricts appellants in the exercise of their rights with respect to the use of land in the Village and that it is discriminatory and unequal to the extent that, while traditional families of more than two members may occupy a one-family dwelling, groups of more than two unrelated individuals (sometimes described as “voluntary” families)' are prohibited from doing so. The basic issue before us is whether this unequal legislative classification violates the Equal Protection Clause.
In approaching that issue we start on the premise that almost every local zoning ordinance represents a restriction upon citizens’ freedom of action in the exercise of otherwise lawful and constitutional rights with respect to the use of their land, whether it be in the operation of a business or the construction of a home. Where such regulations represent a valid exercise of delegated state police power and are designed to promote or protect the public health, safety or welfare, the individual’s right must give way to the particular concern of the community, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926); Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325, 47 S.Ct. 594, 71 L.Ed. 1074 (1927); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed. 842 (1928); cf. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 57 S.Ct. 868, 81 L.Ed. 1245 (1937).
The right of an individual or of a group, related or otherwise, to live together does not necessarily guarantee complete freedom as to the location, construction, or living conditions, without regard to reasonably based zoning laws. In enacting zoning legislation the local authorities are vested with broad discretion. Ordinarily a court will intervene to declare a zoning ordinance to be a denial of due process only where it cannot be supported by a substantial public interest. Traditionally it may be justified by showing that it is related to such matters as safety, population density, adequacy of light and air, noise and necessity for traffic control, transportation, sewerage, school, park and other public services. More recently, promotion of the aesthetic aspects of a town has been upheld as a legitimate zoning objective, e.g., United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964).
From the very outset of its consideration of the constitutionality of local zoning laws, which were then attacked under the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court laid down a basic principle:
“The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and, other questions aside, [813]*813such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188, 48 S.Ct. 447, 448, 72 L.Ed. 842 (1928).
To the requirement that zoning laws satisfy due process, as thus enunciated by Euclid and its brethren, there must be added the important condition that they not discriminate in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. While some inequalities may be tolerated, Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 90 L.Ed. 563 (1955), a law which might otherwise be upheld as a valid exercise of police power will be struck down where it classifies on the basis of impermissible criteria, such as race. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct. 1627, 18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967); Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010, 91 S.Ct. 1256, 28 L.Ed.2d 546 (1971).
Turning to the present case, appellants urge that since the Belle Terre ordinance impinges upon constitutionally protected rights and interests characterized by them as “fundamental,” i.e., their rights of privacy, of association and of travel, as well as their freedom to live with whom they please, cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), the challenged legislation must be struck down for the reason that it is not shown to be supportable by a “compelling state interest.” See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). Appellees, on the other hand, argue that if, upon judicial hypothesis, any state of facts might be conceived of which would indicate a rational zoning basis for the ordinance, it must be sustained. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911), 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). They suggest that since the ordinance might conceivably be justified as a measure designed to curb population density and excessive rental costs, or to preserve the traditional family character of the neighborhood, it must be upheld.
With respect to appellants’ contention that the rights invoked by them should be classified as “fundamental,” we note that the interests thus identified by the Supreme Court have been few in number. They include the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), the right to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966), and the right to the essential facilities for prosecution of a criminal appeal, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). Despite vigorous efforts to extend the characterization into other fields, including exclusionary zoning,6 the list of so-called “fundamental” rights has not been expanded. At its last term the Supreme-Court declined to classify as “fundamental” the right to housing, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 92 S.Ct. 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972), and reaffirmed its similar views with respect to welfare payments, Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81, 92 S.Ct. 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 231 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970).
Unquestionably the rights claimed by appellants are important. Certainly they are more personal and basic in na[814]*814ture than those of commercial interests of the type under consideration in Lindsley, supra, and McGowan, supra. On the other hand, this case does not present us with discrimination against racial minorities or the poor. Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 Yale L.J. 61 (1971); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968). Nor does the present case fit snugly into any of the other categories recognized as requiring application of the compelling state interest test. Despite the incidental effects of the Belle Terre ordinance, we are not here dealing with a “suspect” classification such as race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967), or alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971), or with a law directed against a right of association sought as a means of political expression or action, e. g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed.2d 1488 (1958); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1969); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 80 S.Ct. 412, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960), or as a means of obtaining access to the courts, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963).
It may be that the underlying purpose of the Belle Terre statute is to regulate the intimate moral behavior of its residents within their “zone of privacy,” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), and that its effect has been to curb the right to travel of those who wish to live in Belle Terre. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 617, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). Belle Terre, however, claims that these are not purposes of its zoning law. Fortunately we do not have to decide whether there has been an infringement of the right of privacy or travel because we believe that we are no longer limited to the either-or choice between the compelling state interest test and the minimal scrutiny permitted by the Lindsley-McGowan formula. Faced recently with the issue under similar circumstances the Supreme Court appears to have moved from this rigid dichotomy, sometimes described as a “two-tiered” formula,7 toward a more flexible and equitable approach, which permits consideration to be given to evidence of the nature of the unequal classification under attack, the nature of the rights adversely affected, and the governmental interest urged in support of it. Under this approach the test for application of the Equal Protection Clause is whether the legislative classification is in fact substantially related to the object of the statute. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-455, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971), see James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140-141, 92 S.Ct. 2027, 32 L.Ed.2d 600 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 723-730, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-176, 92 S.Ct. 1396, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972). This approach is suggested by language of Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920), and of a distinguished commentary, e. g., Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal.L.Rev. 341, 344-353, 365-368 (1949). If the classification, upon review of facts bearing upon the foregoing relevant factors, is shown to have a substantial relationship to a lawful objective and is not void for other reasons, such as overbreadth, it will be upheld. If not, it denies equal protection.
“A classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon [815]*815some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’ Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920). The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced by the operation of §§ 15-312 and 15-314.
* * * * * *
“The crucial question, however, is whether § 15-314 advances that objective in a manner consistent with the command of the Equal Protection Clause. We hold that it does not.” Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971).
In thus being required to focus on the actual rationality of the legislative means under attack, we are asked to do what courts are historically suited to do —apply the law to factual contexts rather than accept one hypothetical legislative justification to the exclusion of others that represent the true rationale of the classification.8 This more realistic judicial scrutiny in cases in which the compelling state interest test is not invoked serves to render the Equal Protection Clause effective rather to permit all but egregious inequalities to go unchecked, as was sometimes the case under the minimal scrutiny test. This approach is particularly appropriate in eases of the present type, where individual human rights of groups as opposed to business regulations are involved. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938); Tussman & tenBroek, supra at 373.
Turning to the question of whether the Belle Terre ordinance may be sustained upon application of the foregoing principles, we start by examination of the sole ground upon which it was upheld by the district court, namely the interest of the local community in the protection and maintenance of the prevailing traditional family pattern, which consists of occupancy of one-family houses by families based on consanguinity or legal affinity. In our view such a goal fails to fall within the proper exercise of state police power. It can hardly be disputed — and the district court so found — that the ordinance has the purpose and effect of permitting existing inhabitants to compel all others who would take up residence in the community to conform to its prevailing ideas of lifestyle, thus insuring that the community will be structured socially on a fairly homogeneous basis. Such social preferences, however, while permissible in a private club, have no relevance to public health, safety or welfare. See Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971); City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill.2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966); cf. Moreno v. U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, 345 F.Supp. 310 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court) (per McGowan, Cir. J.), prob. [816]*816jur. noted, 409 U.S. 1036, 93 S.Ct. 526, 34 L.Ed.2d 485 (1972).
The effect of the Belle Terre ordinance would be to exclude from the community, without any rational basis, unmarried groups seeking to live together, whether they be three college students, three single nurses, three priests, or three single judges. Although local communities are given wide latitude in achieving legitimate zoning needs, they cannot under the mask of zoning ordinances impose social preferences of this character upon their fellow citizens. To permit such action would be to invite, upon similar guise, zoning laws that would restrict occupants to those having no more than two children per family, those employed within a given radius, those earning a minimum income, or those passing muster after interview by a community “Admissions Committee.” While such selective exclusion may be practiced by private institutions, it cannot be tolerated on the part of a governmental body such as Belle Terre, which is bound to serve the public.
Even assuming arguendo that a social predilection in the form of entrenched traditional family units constituted a valid zoning objective, we fail to find a shred of rational support for the means used here to achieve that end. It is not suggested that appellants or unrelated groups functioning as a single housekeeping unit, endanger the health, safety, morals or welfare of existing residents of the community. The most that can be said is that they differ from existing residents solely because of lack of blood or marriáge ties.
Appellees urge that regardless whether social preferences may or may not form a valid basis for upholding the ordinance, it should nevertheless be sustained on the ground that it has a rational basis in traditionally recognized zoning objectives. It is suggested, for instance, that the ordinance is justified as a means of controlling population density. This contention is based on the assumption that the number of related persons in the conventional family unit (husband, wife, brothers, sisters, children, nephews, uncles, grandparents) tends to be “self-limiting,” whereas in the absence of a regulation limiting the number of unrelated occupants, the “voluntary” family can be limitless in size. Another argument advanced by appellees is that the ordinance might avoid escalation of rental rates, which would price traditional families out of the market, since it is possible that unrelated groups would be willing to pay higher rentals than would consanguineal families. We are further asked to speculate that “voluntary” families would pose greater parking, traffic and noise problems than would traditional families and that there would be a greater degree of transiency on the part of the former than the latter, thus weakening the stability of the community.
If some or all of these hypothesized objectives were supportable, some form of such ordinance might conceivably be upheld as a valid exercise of state police power. Upon the record before us, however, we fail to find a vestige of any such support. To theorize that groups of unrelated members would have more occupants per house than would traditional family groups, or that they would price the latter out of the market or produce greater parking, noise or traffic problems, would be rank speculation, unsupported either by evidence or by facts that could be judicially noticed. We are here constrained to adhere to Judge Dooling’s observation that “Such a restricted zoning district might well be all but impossible to justify if it had to be strictly justified by its service of such familiar zoning objectives as safety, adequate light and air, preservation of the lands from overintensive use, avoiding crowding of the population, reduction of traffic congestion and facilitation of adequate transportation, water, sewerage, school, park and other public services.”
“In terms of permissible zoning objectives, a group of persons bound together only by their common desire to operate a single housekeeping unit, [817]*817might be thought to have a transient quality that would affect adversely the stability of the neighborhood, and so depreciate the value of other property. An ordinance requiring relationship by blood, marriage or adoption could be regarded as tending to limit the intensity of land use. And it might be considered that a group of unrelated persons would be more likely to generate traffic and parking problems than would an equal number of related persons.
“But none of these observations reflects a universal truth. Family groups are mobile today, and not all family units are internally stable and well-disciplined. Family groups with two or more cars are not unfamiliar. And so far as intensity of use is concerned, the definition in the present ordinance, with its reference to the ‘respective spouses' of persons related by blood, marriage or adoption, can hardly be regarded as an effective control upon the size of family units.” City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill.2d 432, 434, 216 N.E.2d 116, 119 (1966) (per Justice Schaefer).
Even if the Belle Terre ordinance could conceivably have a legitimate zoning objective, the classification established may well be vulnerable as too sweeping, excessive and over-inclusive. See Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971); cf. Developments in the Law—Equal Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1082-1087 (1969). For instance, if it were aimed at maintaining population density at the level of traditional family units, it would not limit the number of unrelated occupants to two (2) persons per one-family dwelling, which admittedly is smaller than the size of the average family. Assuming such a purpose, a more permissive ordinance would suffice. Furthermore, such an objective could be achieved more rationally and without discrimination against unrelated groups by regulation of the number of bedrooms in a dwelling structure, by restriction of the ratio of persons to bedrooms, or simply by limitation of occupancy to a single housekeeping unit. Public and private nuisance laws should provide an adequate remedy to curb noise or other forms of pollution on the part of occupants of a dwelling, regardless of their relationship to each other.
If the objective of the ordinance were to avoid rent inflation, the simple remedy would be adoption of rent controls rather than the exclusion of a class of people from the community. Lastly, disregarding the absence of evidence to support the suggestion that the ordinance might constitute a means of controlling traffic, parking or noise, there exist a wide variety of local legislative enactments by which these objectives could be accomplished without impinging upon the rights of privacy and association of unrelated persons. If a problem of excessive automobiles existed, it could be met simply by restricting the number of cars per dwelling unit, regardless of the relationship of its occupants.
Nor are we persuaded to sustain the Belle Terre ordinance by the fact that dormitory housing is available to appellants at Stony Brook or one-family housing available in other nearby communities which have not enacted exclusionary zoning of the type here under attack. The fact that an unconstitutional ordinance is limited in geographical scope does not make it any less an abridgement of guaranteed constitutional rights. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed. 149 (1917); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943). Appellants are entitled, subject to lawful and reasonable local laws, to travel and settle down where they please. See King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1971); Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970), affirming 312 F.Supp. 692 (D.R.I.1970). If Belle. Terre is permitted to exclude appellants from its borders, other nearby communities, in the absence of a coordinated, enforceable regional plan, may be expected to do likewise. Indeed, [818]*818many already have.9 The availability of housing in another community, therefore, does not constitute a defense. Carried to its logical conclusion such an argument might, after all local communities in an entire area had adopted unjustifiable exclusionary zoning laws, relegate those discriminated against, in this age of the jet plane and superhighway, to distant regions or even to other states.
Lastly we note that in most cases similar zoning classifications have been found invalid. See City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill.2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971). In an analogous context a three-judge court has struck down a legislative classification which limited eligibility for food stamps to “related” individuals living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and excluded groups of unrelated individuals similar to appellants here. Moreno v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 345 F.Supp. 310 (D.D.C.), prob. jur. noted, 409 U.S. 1036, 93 S.Ct. 526, 34 L.Ed.2d 485 (1972). We find Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F.Supp. 908 (N.D.Cal.1970), relied on by appellees, to be unpersuasive. Although the court there upheld a similarly defined “single family” zoning ordinance under restrained equal protection scrutiny, it also found, unlike the district court here, that the ordinance was rationally related to population density control, traffic control and maintenance of lower rental rates.
Conclusion
The discriminatory classification created by the Belle Terre ordinance does not appear to be supported by any rational basis that is consistent with permissible zoning objectives. Since appellants have shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in their favor, the prerequisities for preliminary injunctive relief have been established. Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 405 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999, 89 S.Ct. 1595, 22 L.Ed.2d 777 (1969).
Accordingly the order of the district court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.