SHEPARD, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment which allowed damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff-respondent Brown brought the action against the Fritzes, from whom she purchased real property, for misrepresentation of title, misrepresentation of the condition of the property, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Daniel Manning was also joined as a defendant, in order to clear title to the property in question. Following trial by jury, title was quieted in plaintiff and she was awarded damages, both for the misrepresentation of the condition of the property prior to the sale and for negligent infliction of emotional distress. We reverse as to the only issue on appeal, that being the award of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Although many of the facts were hotly contested, since plaintiff prevailed at trial, we view the case in the light most favorable to her. Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 604 P.2d 51 (1979); Matter of Estate of Webber, 97 Idaho 703, 551 P.2d 1339 (1976).
Brown was interested in buying a residence property in the vicinity of Hailey, Idaho. In the- company of a realtor, she viewed the Fritz property in the Fritzes’ absence. Brown and the realtor returned the following day while the Fritzes were at the residence. Defendant Fritz then displayed the property to Brown and made several representations relating to the insulation, the number of septic tanks, and the boundary lines of the property. Brown relied upon these representations and upon those made in the listing agreement, including that the lot size was 7.3 acres. Brown subsequently purchased the house for $105,000.
Following Brown’s taking possession of the residence, a large number of defects became apparent, indicating to Brown that Fritz had misrepresented the condition of the property. Among the more serious defects were the faulty design and the malfunction of the sewage system, which caused raw sewage to accumulate beneath the house and which, because of the winter weather, could not be immediately remedied. Also, shortly after Brown occupied the property, defendant Manning approached her and informed her that, prior to the Brown purchase, Fritz had sold roughly two of the 7.3 acres to Manning.
There is no question but that Brown felt required to spend approximately $10,000 to repair the deficiencies of the property. There is also no question but that Brown felt compelled to dispose of the property. She sold that portion to which she could give clear title for approximately $150,000, and she signed a contract with the new purchaser to sell the two acres in dispute for $25,000, once title could be cleared.
Brown brought an • action against the Fritzes and Manning for damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, for breach of contract, for negligent infliction of emotional distress, for punitive damages, and to quiet title in herself to the disputed two acres.
During trial, the district judge ruled that the plaintiff’s evidence was not sufficient [359]*359to warrant submission to the jury of plaintiffs claim for punitive damages. Hence, the jury was not instructed as to punitive damages and the special verdict form contained no provision for an award of punitive damages. Although plaintiff has cross-appealed on other issues, there is no assertion of error regarding this withholding of the punitive damage claim from the jury. Also at trial, plaintiff stipulated that she was making no claims against Manning for punitive damages or damages for infliction of emotional distress. Hence, the action as it related to Manning involved only the quieting of title to the property and is not on appeal.
In response to the court’s questions on the special verdict form, the jury found in favor of plaintiff Brown in the quiet title action and awarded her damages from Fritz on that claim in the amount of $625. The jury also found in favor of Brown on her claim against defendant Fritz of misrepresentation, and the jury set those damages at $2,100. Finally, the jury found that there had been negligent infliction of emotional distress by.the Fritzes, and it awarded damages therefor in the amount of $15,000.
As earlier stated, defendants-appellants Fritzes’ sole assertion of error is the award of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The tort of infliction of emotional distress and the elements necessary to such a cause of action have been the subject of several recent cases before this Court, and these cases illustrate some disagreement among the Court’s membership.
In Summers v. Western Idaho Potato Processing, 94 Idaho 1, 479 P.2d 292 (1970), Summers, an employee of defendant, was injured when part of her clothing became entangled in some machinery. She received workmen’s compensation for that injury and then brought an action in effect for emotional distress arising from her clothing’s having been torn off and her having been left nude before her fellow employees. The Court, in a cursory opinion, held that her recovery for physical injuries was barred by the workmen’s compensation law and that, if she was seeking to recover for purely emotional trauma, unaccompanied by injury, there was no common law right of recovery.
In Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980), the Court, as then constituted, was presented with a jury award of damages for breach of contract, an additional award for emotional distress, and a still additional award of punitive damages. On appeal, the Court reversed the damage awards for both emotional distress and punitive damages. There has been criticism of the Hatfield decision, see Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 906, 665 P.2d 661, 670 (1983) (Bistline, J., concurring); Rasmuson v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 102 Idaho 95, 101, 625 P.2d 1098, 1104 (1981) (Bistline, J. specially concurring). It seems clear that the Hatfield opinion, insofar as the law of punitive damages is concerned, has been superseded by subsequent cases. See Cheney v. Palo Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 665 P.2d 661 (1983). Nevertheless, we deem it desirable, since only one member of the Court sat in Hatfield, to clearly adhere to or to overturn the Hatfield decision, insofar as it relates to damages for emotional distress.
Hatfield dealt with both the intentional infliction of emotional distress as a tort, and the tort of. negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Court held that, even assuming that physical or constructive impact was not required for a successful suit for damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, this tort “is generally held to lie only in the presence of outrageous intentional conduct on the part of the defendant ...,” and there was no indication in Hatfield of such “level of outrageousness.” 100 Idaho at 849-850, 606 P.2d at 953-954.
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SHEPARD, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment which allowed damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff-respondent Brown brought the action against the Fritzes, from whom she purchased real property, for misrepresentation of title, misrepresentation of the condition of the property, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Daniel Manning was also joined as a defendant, in order to clear title to the property in question. Following trial by jury, title was quieted in plaintiff and she was awarded damages, both for the misrepresentation of the condition of the property prior to the sale and for negligent infliction of emotional distress. We reverse as to the only issue on appeal, that being the award of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Although many of the facts were hotly contested, since plaintiff prevailed at trial, we view the case in the light most favorable to her. Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 604 P.2d 51 (1979); Matter of Estate of Webber, 97 Idaho 703, 551 P.2d 1339 (1976).
Brown was interested in buying a residence property in the vicinity of Hailey, Idaho. In the- company of a realtor, she viewed the Fritz property in the Fritzes’ absence. Brown and the realtor returned the following day while the Fritzes were at the residence. Defendant Fritz then displayed the property to Brown and made several representations relating to the insulation, the number of septic tanks, and the boundary lines of the property. Brown relied upon these representations and upon those made in the listing agreement, including that the lot size was 7.3 acres. Brown subsequently purchased the house for $105,000.
Following Brown’s taking possession of the residence, a large number of defects became apparent, indicating to Brown that Fritz had misrepresented the condition of the property. Among the more serious defects were the faulty design and the malfunction of the sewage system, which caused raw sewage to accumulate beneath the house and which, because of the winter weather, could not be immediately remedied. Also, shortly after Brown occupied the property, defendant Manning approached her and informed her that, prior to the Brown purchase, Fritz had sold roughly two of the 7.3 acres to Manning.
There is no question but that Brown felt required to spend approximately $10,000 to repair the deficiencies of the property. There is also no question but that Brown felt compelled to dispose of the property. She sold that portion to which she could give clear title for approximately $150,000, and she signed a contract with the new purchaser to sell the two acres in dispute for $25,000, once title could be cleared.
Brown brought an • action against the Fritzes and Manning for damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, for breach of contract, for negligent infliction of emotional distress, for punitive damages, and to quiet title in herself to the disputed two acres.
During trial, the district judge ruled that the plaintiff’s evidence was not sufficient [359]*359to warrant submission to the jury of plaintiffs claim for punitive damages. Hence, the jury was not instructed as to punitive damages and the special verdict form contained no provision for an award of punitive damages. Although plaintiff has cross-appealed on other issues, there is no assertion of error regarding this withholding of the punitive damage claim from the jury. Also at trial, plaintiff stipulated that she was making no claims against Manning for punitive damages or damages for infliction of emotional distress. Hence, the action as it related to Manning involved only the quieting of title to the property and is not on appeal.
In response to the court’s questions on the special verdict form, the jury found in favor of plaintiff Brown in the quiet title action and awarded her damages from Fritz on that claim in the amount of $625. The jury also found in favor of Brown on her claim against defendant Fritz of misrepresentation, and the jury set those damages at $2,100. Finally, the jury found that there had been negligent infliction of emotional distress by.the Fritzes, and it awarded damages therefor in the amount of $15,000.
As earlier stated, defendants-appellants Fritzes’ sole assertion of error is the award of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The tort of infliction of emotional distress and the elements necessary to such a cause of action have been the subject of several recent cases before this Court, and these cases illustrate some disagreement among the Court’s membership.
In Summers v. Western Idaho Potato Processing, 94 Idaho 1, 479 P.2d 292 (1970), Summers, an employee of defendant, was injured when part of her clothing became entangled in some machinery. She received workmen’s compensation for that injury and then brought an action in effect for emotional distress arising from her clothing’s having been torn off and her having been left nude before her fellow employees. The Court, in a cursory opinion, held that her recovery for physical injuries was barred by the workmen’s compensation law and that, if she was seeking to recover for purely emotional trauma, unaccompanied by injury, there was no common law right of recovery.
In Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980), the Court, as then constituted, was presented with a jury award of damages for breach of contract, an additional award for emotional distress, and a still additional award of punitive damages. On appeal, the Court reversed the damage awards for both emotional distress and punitive damages. There has been criticism of the Hatfield decision, see Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 906, 665 P.2d 661, 670 (1983) (Bistline, J., concurring); Rasmuson v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 102 Idaho 95, 101, 625 P.2d 1098, 1104 (1981) (Bistline, J. specially concurring). It seems clear that the Hatfield opinion, insofar as the law of punitive damages is concerned, has been superseded by subsequent cases. See Cheney v. Palo Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 665 P.2d 661 (1983). Nevertheless, we deem it desirable, since only one member of the Court sat in Hatfield, to clearly adhere to or to overturn the Hatfield decision, insofar as it relates to damages for emotional distress.
Hatfield dealt with both the intentional infliction of emotional distress as a tort, and the tort of. negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Court held that, even assuming that physical or constructive impact was not required for a successful suit for damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, this tort “is generally held to lie only in the presence of outrageous intentional conduct on the part of the defendant ...,” and there was no indication in Hatfield of such “level of outrageousness.” 100 Idaho at 849-850, 606 P.2d at 953-954. As to the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the Court noted that courts “almost universally [360]*360require that the actions of the defendant cause some physical injury to the plaintiff which accompanies the emotional distress,” 100 Idaho at 851, 606 P.2d at 955 (emphasis added). Citing Summers, supra, the Court held that since there was no physical injury involved, the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress did not lie, and therefore, the Court reversed the damages award for that tort.
The Court in Hatfield also sought to distinguish actions “asserted in connection with the independent torts of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress,” and “claims ... asserted as part of the measure of recovery for some independent wrong perpetrated on the plaintiff by the defendant, such as a breach of contract.” 100 Idaho at 846, 606 P.2d at 950, (emphasis supplied). As to actions for breach of contract, the Court held, “As a matter of law, then, the award could be based on the breach of contract only if such harm were within the contemplation of the parties at the time they formed the contract, and if the breach were wanton or reckless.” The Court stated that the general rule from other jurisdictions is that upon a breach of contract, damages for emotional distress may be awarded “only when the breach is wanton or reckless and where ... such damages were within the contemplation of the parties at the time they formed the contract, Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 34, 156 Eng.Rep. 145 (1854), and where the breach of contract also causes physical injury.” (Emphasis added.) The Court also quoted the Restatement of Contracts § 341 (1932), indicating the necessity “that the defendant had reason to know when the contract was made that the breach would cause mental suffering for reasons other than mere pecuniary loss.” 100 Idaho at 847, 606 P.2d at 951.
The Court in Hatfield then examined the award of damages for emotional distress resulting from a breach of a contract in light of whether the contract was “commercial” or “non-commercial,” and stated, “Evidence of the commercial nature of the contract may bear upon that question, but it does not absolutely decide it. The answer will always turn on the facts of the particular case.” 100 Idaho at 847, 606 P.2d at 951. Evidently, the Court intended to indicate a distinction between “non-commercial” contracts, such as to perform a caesarean section, to bury a body, or to deliver a bride’s trousseau; and the specific contract in the case before the Court, involving an agreement to auction goods. The Court stated:
“Nor did anything about the situation surrounding the formation of the contract indicate that either party contemplated emotional distress as a result of breach. Of course, the breach of any contract which the party considers important predictably will lead to some emotional distress. Life in the competitive commercial world has at least equal capacity to bestow ruin as benefit, and it is presumed that those who enter this world do so willingly, accepting the risk of encountering the former as a part of the cost of achieving the latter. Absent clear evidence to the contrary, we will not presume that the parties to a contract such as the one before us meant to ensure each other’s emotional tranquility.” 100 Idaho at 848, 606 P.2d at 952.
Hence, we suggest the Court’s opinion in Hatfield could be read as suggesting several alternative grounds for the disallowance of damages for emotional distress under the circumstances of that case.
In Rasmuson v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 102 Idaho 95, 625 P.2d 1098 (1981), the Court had for consideration, among other matters, a cause of action for “damages for infliction of emotional suffering caused by the negligent bad faith and reckless trust management” of the defendant. Summary judgment on that cause of action was granted in favor of the defendant. The Court therein, citing Hatfield, stated, “The evidence of emotional distress in the case before us, standing unrefuted and [361]*361viewed most favorably to plaintiff, compels us to hold as a matter of law that the distress was not sufficiently severe to have justified preclusion of summary judgment on this issue.” 102 Idaho at 101, 625 P.2d at 1104. It appears that such decision was rendered because there did not exist “extreme conduct,” but the Court, citing the decision of the trial court, noted, “Mental suffering in the tort field is one thing. In the fiduciary and economic field, it is quite another.” 102 Idaho at 101, 625 P.2d at 1104.
In Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 682 P.2d 1282 (1984), the Court of Appeals was presented with the issue of a damage award for mental anguish resulting from the sellers’ breach of a contract for the sale of commercial property. The damages for “intentional infliction of emotional distress” could have been held to arise either from the sellers’ breach of the contract or from conduct of the sellers which was independent of the contract. The Court held, citing Hatfield, that “[a]n action for intentional infliction of emotional distress will lie only where there is extreme and outrageous conduct coupled with severe emotional distress ... Severe emotional distress may be shown either by physical manifestation of the distress or subjective testimony.” (Emphasis added.) The Court apparently excluded “physical manifestation” as a necessary element of the tort. As to severe emotional distress, the Court cited Restatement Second of Torts § 46, Comment j (1965), and concluded that the award of damages had to be overturned, since the conduct of the plaintiff was not of the "required severity.” The Court stated, “Liability, however, only results when these reactions are so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” 106 Idaho at 741, 682 P.2d at 1288.
We now turn to the facts of the instant case, viewed in the light most favorable to the respondent. The Fritzes sold to Brown a residential property and Fritz fraudulently misrepresented certain features of the property, causing pecuniary damage to Brown. The Fritzes had previously sold a portion of that same property to Manning, and, although the Fritzes asserted at trial that such duplication of sale was inadvertent, the jury was free to believe, and we must assume, that such duplication of sale was done knowingly and deliberately. When Brown learned the true condition of the property and of the claim of Manning to a portion of it, she suffered severe emotional distress which manifested itself in physical symptoms, including the need for substantial hospitalization. Although it was argued at trial that Brown’s physical distress resulted from previous longstanding physical ailments, the jury was free to hold against the defendants on that theory, and we must assume that it did so.
The facts of the instant case thus present somewhat unique circumstances as contrasted with previous cases. Here, there are physical manifestations of the emotional distress. However, those physical manifestations are not contemporaneous with the acts of the defendant, but occur later as a result of emotional distress admittedly caused by defendants’ acts.
Regardless of how the relationship between Brown and defendant Fritzes is viewed, it is clear that any damage, pecuniary or emotional, which fell upon Brown resulted from the negotiations for and the consummation of a contract to convey real property. The damage did not result from an “independent” tort involving a physical or a constructive contact between two parties who were not in a contractual relationship. It did not involve the harassment of another or the libeling or slandering of another. The actions of Manning in asserting to Brown his ownership of a part of the property must be disregarded, since Brown acquiesced in the dismissal of any action she may have had against Manning, except insofar as it related to the quieting of title to the property.
The distinction is far from clear, in the Idaho law, between an action based upon [362]*362breach of contract and an action for tortious breach of contract. Suffice it to say at this point that our allowance of an action such as the instant case, for damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from a breach of a contract, can do little except muddy the already murky waters.
We note the close parallel between allowable damages for breach of contract under the terminology of “emotional distress” and for punitive damages. In Cheney v. Palo Verdes Inv. Cory., 104 Idaho 897, 665 P.2d 661 (1983), the Court extensively reviewed the previous Idaho law relating to punitive damages. We stated:
“[W]e note that [punitive damages] are not favored in the law and therefore should be awarded only in the most unusual and compelling circumstances. They are to be awarded cautiously and within narrow limits____ An award of punitive damages will be sustained on appeal only when it is shown that the defendant acted in a manner that was ‘an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act was performed by the defendant with an understanding of or disregard for its likely consequences.’ [Citations.] The justification for punitive damages must be that the defendant acted with an extremely harmful state of mind, whether that state be termed ‘malice, oppression, fraud or gross negligence.’ ” 104 Idaho at 904-905, 665 P.2d at 668-669.
The asserted justification for damage awards for “emotional distress,” being the need to punish or to deter wrongful conduct, has been found in notions that a defendant’s conduct should not be tolerated, or that it so far deviated from a social norm that the defendant could have expected to be subjected to more than usual compensatory damages.
The decision of the Court in Cheney has been viewed as a substantial expansion of the parameters of conduct for which punitive damages may be awarded. See Bakes, J. dissenting in Cheney, 104 Idaho at 931, 665 P.2d at 695.
We hold that there is no significant, if in fact any, difference between conduct by a defendant which may be seen to justify an award of punitive damages, and conduct which may justify an award of damages for emotional distress. Justification for an award of damages for emotional distress seems to lie not in whether emotional distress was actually suffered by a plaintiff, but rather in the quantum of outrageousness of the defendant's conduct. Although a plaintiff may in fact have suffered extreme emotional distress, accompanied by physical manifestation thereof, no damages are awarded in the absence of extreme and outrageous conduct by a defendant. As has been said in Comment (d) to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965):
“ ‘The rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where some one’s feelings are hurt.’ ”
And, as Judge Magruder has stated:
“Against a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashings of temperaments incident to participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever be.” Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 1033, 1035 (1936).
We also suggest that the enormous differences that exist between individuals as to their ability to withstand mental stress, frustration, embarrassment or humiliation make next to impossible the application of a reasonableness standard as to plaintiffs whom defendants must expect to encounter [363]*363in contractual dealings. While we have stated that in tort cases a defendant must take a plaintiff as he is found, including excessive fragility and the like, we know of no such standard applicable to the psychological state of a plaintiff which a defendant might encounter.
Based upon all of the above, we hold that in Idaho, when damages are sought for breach of a contractual relationship, there can be no recovery for emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff. If the conduct of a defendant has been sufficiently outrageous, we view the proper remedy to be in the realm of punitive damages.
We emphasize that our ruling today speaks only to damages asserted for emotional distress which arise from or have their roots in the breach of a contractual relationship. We do not speak to the question of purely tortious conduct arising outside of and apart from a contractual relationship. We leave to another day the carving out of conduct which, while arising in contract, might be conclusively presumed to inflict emotional distress, e.g., mutilation of dead body, Hill v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 154 Tenn. 295, 294 S.W. 1097 (1927), or removal of a body from its casket, Boyle v. Chandler, 138 A. 273 (Del.Super.1927). See Hatfield, supra, 100 Idaho 840 at 850, 606 P.2d 944 at 954, and cases cited therein.
In the instant case, the trial judge somewhat inexplicably held that the conduct of the defendant Fritz was not so outrageous as to allow plaintiff’s case on punitive damages to go to the jury and yet at the same time apparently believed that the defendant’s conduct was outrageous enough to permit the plaintiff’s claim for damages for emotional distress to be presented to the jury. Absent that eireumstance, we would simply reverse the award of damages for emotional distress. However, since the trial judge did not at that time have the benefit, if any, of this opinion, and in justice to the parties, we reverse the award of damages for emotional distress and remand the cause for a new trial solely on the issue of punitive damages.
The foregoing disposition of the cause makes unnecessary our consideration of the cross-appeal by plaintiff-respondent, cross-appellant.
No costs or attorney’s fees on appeal.
DONALDSON, C.J., and BISTLINE and HUNTLEY, JJ, concur.