Matter of Estate of Webber

551 P.2d 1339, 97 Idaho 703, 1976 Ida. LEXIS 342
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 13, 1976
Docket11849
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 551 P.2d 1339 (Matter of Estate of Webber) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Estate of Webber, 551 P.2d 1339, 97 Idaho 703, 1976 Ida. LEXIS 342 (Idaho 1976).

Opinion

McFADDEN, Chief Justice.

Arthur L. Webber died October 13, 1971. His widow, contestant-respondent, Ruth E. Webber, petitioned for letters of administration alleging that her husband had died intestate. Petitioner-appellant, Jessie Nail Smith, petitioned the court to admit to probate as a holographic will a greeting card sent to her by Arthur. After a court trial, the district court entered judgment denying probate to the will and Jessie Nail Smith appealed. The primary issue raised by this appeal is whether there was sufficient competent evidence to support the district court’s finding that Arthur Webber lacked the requisite testamentary intent when he wrote the message contained in the greeting card. This court affirms the district court’s finding and the judgment entered.

The card which the petitioner sought to admit to probate was a greeting card which Arthur had sent to her. On the card’s front page was a printed verse:

“Like Bees without HONEY
“A Dove with no COO . . .
“A Rose with no FRAGRANCE”

This verse was concluded on the inside pages of the card—

*705 “That’s Me Without You!”

On the same inside pages, these words, handwritten in pencil, appeared:

“For,
“Mrs. Jessie Nail. S.”

On the back page of the card, again handwritten in pencil, were these words:

“Aug 1, 1969
“I bid this world goodbye
“I leave my land to you,
[s] Arthur Webber”

By her petition, the petitioner asserts that that this card is a holographic will duly executed with testamentary intent by which Arthur intended to devise all the real property which he owned to the petitioner upon his death. The district court ruled that the card was not a valid holographic will as required by I.C. § 14-304 (repealed S.L. 1971, Ch. Ill, § 3), finding that the purported will was not wholly in the handwriting of the decedent and that the decedent did not execute the writing with testamentary intent.

On appeal, the petitioner makes numerous assignments of error, some of which are relevant to the question of whether the district court erred in its ruling that Arthur Webber did not execute the writing with testamentary intent. Because of our disposition of the appeal, this opinion will focus upon the issue of testamentary intent.

The ultimate resolution of this appeal turns upon the evidence presented to the district court. However, before these facts can be discussed, the legal principles applicable to the issue of testamentary intent expressed in a holographic will must be reviewed. I.C. § 14-304 provides:

“Olographic wills. — An olographic will is one that is entirely written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator or testatrix (who may be either married or unmarried). It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of this state and need not be witnessed.” Repealed, S.L.1971, Ch. Ill, § 3.

The district court found I.C. § 14-304 to be applicable to the case at bar because the date of the purported will, the date of decedent’s death, and the date of the petition for probate of the will were all prior to the effective date of S.L.1971, Ch. Ill, § 3, which repealed I.C. § 14-304. This finding was not assigned as error.

This court has held that I.C. § 14-304 requires that a holographic will must be entirely written, dated and signed with testamentary intent by the hand of the testator. White v. Conference Claimants Endowment Com’n, 81 Idaho 17, 336 P.2d 674 (1959); Estate of Hengy, 53 Idaho 515, 26 P.2d 178 (1933). The test of the testamentary character of an instrument “is not the testator’s realization that it is a will, but his intention to create a revocable disposition of his property, to accrue and take effect only upon his death, and passing no present interest”. Estate of Hengy, 53 Idaho 515, 519, 26 P.2d 178, 179 (1933), quoting Nichols v. Emery, 109 Cal. 323, 41 P. 1089, 1091 (1895). See, 1 Page on Wills, § 5.6 (1960). The question of testamentary intent is a question of fact for the trier of fact to be determined according to the particular facts of the case. See, In re Goan’s Estate, 83 Idaho 568, 366 P.2d 831 (1961); In re Heazle’s Estate, 74 Idaho 72, 257 P.2d 556 (1953). If the instrument is ambiguous on its face as to an expression of testamentary intent, then extrinsic evidence of the maker’s intent is admissible on the question of testamentary intent. 1 Page on Wills, § 5.16 (1960). See, White v. Conference Claimants Endowment Com’n, 81 Idaho 17, 336 P.2d 674 (1959). See also, In Re Estate of Cook, 96 Idaho 48, 524 P.2d 176 (1974).

At this lengthy trial, considerable evidence was introduced on the question of Arthur’s testamentary intent. Prior to the deaths of his parents, Arthur, who had never married at this time, lived and worked upon the family farm which was located near Grangeville. His mother died in 1955 and his father had predeceased her. Upon his mother’s death, Arthur received the bulk of the approximately 1000 acre family farm. However, his sister, Mary Graham, *706 received a joint interest with Arthur in approximately 100 acres of the farm.

Following his mother’s death, Arthur was very lonely and sought the company of the petitioner, Jessie Nail Smith, who was not married at that time. During the period from March, 1955, to the summer of 1957, Arthur frequently visited the petitioner who was then living in the town of Grange-ville; he saw her as frequently as two or three times a week. While he was seeing her, Arthur gave Jessie several presents of sentimental value to him, including two rings, a wall plaque, an antique wood stove, cuff links, and quilts. He often suggested marriage to the petitioner but the petitioner did not ever agree to marry Arthur. She suggested that Arthur should s'ee the contestant, Ruth Webber, as Ruth wanted to get married. Finally, in the summer of 1957, Jessie stopped seeing Arthur.

Arthur began seeing Ruth in the fall of 1957, and they were married February 14, 1958. Also, in the fall of 1958, Jessie married her present husband, Justin Smith, and moved to his ranch on the isolated Joseph Plains some fifty miles distant from Grangeville.

Jessie testified that after her marriage to Justin Smith, she saw Arthur on four occasions prior to his death in 1971.

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Bluebook (online)
551 P.2d 1339, 97 Idaho 703, 1976 Ida. LEXIS 342, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-estate-of-webber-idaho-1976.