Brown v. Bi-Lo, Inc.

581 S.E.2d 836, 354 S.C. 436, 2003 S.C. LEXIS 138

• Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Decided: June 9, 2003
• Docket: 25662
• Status: Published

Opinions

Justice BURNETT:

We granted a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ decision in Brown v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 341 S.C. 611, 535 S.E.2d 445 (Ct.App.2000). We reverse.

FACTS

' Petitioner Sherry Brown (Employee) sustained a compensable injury while working for Respondent Bi-Lo, Inc., (Employer). After Employee’s surgery, Employer agreed to continue to provide medical treatment. Several years later, a question arose whether medical treatment sought by Employee for subsequent falls was related to the work injury and, thus, whether Employer was required to pay for the medical treatment. Employee filed a Form 50 requesting a hearing to obtain medical treatment.

Employer hired a rehabilitation nurse to contact Employee’s treating physicians regarding the nature of her condition and cause of her falls. Employee’s attorney wrote a letter to the nurse warning her not to discuss Employee’s condition with Employee’s treating physicians and threatening legal action if she did not comply. Employee’s attorney wrote similar letters to Employee’s treating physicians, advising them not to engage in ex parte communications with Employer or Employer’s workers’ compensation carrier.

Employer complained to the Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission). The Commission ordered Employee’s attorney to “cease and desist from obstructing contact, including contact involving ex parte communications, meetings, correspondence, and/or answering questions in written and oral form, between the treating physician and the defendant’s representatives.”

ISSUE

Did the Court of Appeals err by affirming the Commission’s order requiring Employee’s counsel to cease and desist from seeking to limit contact between Employer’s representatives and Employee’s health care providers?

DISCUSSION

The South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act)¹ requires physicians provide employers and/or their representatives with pertinent information regarding the treatment of a compensation claimant.² South Carolina Code Ann. § 42-15-95 (Supp.2002) specifically provides:

All existing information compiled by a health care facility, as defined in Section 44-7-130, or a health care provider licensed pursuant to Title 40 pertaining directly to a workers’ compensation claim must be provided to the insurance carrier, the employer, the employee, their attorneys or the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Commission, within fourteen days after receipt of written request. A health care facility and a health care provider may charge a fee for the search and duplication of a medical record, ... The facility or provider may charge a patient or the patient’s representative no more than the actual cost of reproducing an X-ray ... If a treatment facility or physician fails to send the requested information within forty-five days after receipt of the request, the person or entity making the request may apply to the commission for an appropriate penalty payable to the commission, not to exceed two hundred dollars.

(emphasis added); see 25A S.C. Ann. Reg. 67-1301(A)(Supp.2002) (“[a] medical practitioner or treatment facility shall furnish upon request all medical information relevant to the employee’s complaint of injury to the claimant, the employer, the employer’s representative, or the Commission____”).

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Charleston County Sch. Dist. v. State Budget and Control Bd., 313 S.C. 1, 437 S.E.2d 6 (1993). If a statute’s language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear meaning “the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.” Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000).

Section 42-15-95 contemplates the disclosure of existing written records and documentary materials. The statute refers to the exchange of “existing information,” “medical record[s],” and “X-ray[s]” after receipt of a written request. Moreover, it provides a penalty if the facility or physician fails to “send” information as requested. This language indicates the General Assembly’s clear intent to require health care providers and facilities to forward existing written records and documents. The statute does not authorize other “ex parte”³ methods of communication between an insurance carrier, employer, or their representatives and the claimant’s health care provider. Of course, insurance carriers and employers may obtain additional information through approved methods of discovery. See § 42-8-160 (providing for taking of depositions in workers’ compensation actions). Likewise, employer representatives may speak with the claimant’s health care provider provided they obtain the claimant’s permission.⁴

We recognize the Court generally gives deference to an administrative agency’s interpretation of an applicable statute or its own regulation. Brown v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health and Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 560 S.E.2d 410 (2002). Nevertheless, where, as here, the plain language of the statute is contrary to the agency’s interpretation, the Court will reject the agency’s interpretation. Id.; Richland County School Dist. Two v. South Carolina Dept. of Educ., 335 S.C. 491, 517 S.E.2d 444 (Ct.App.1999).

We agree with the Court of Appeals that permitting employers and their representatives to speak and/or communicate directly with physicians may, in some instances, promote “swift and sure compensation,” which is one goal of the Act.⁵ Nevertheless, workers’ compensation is a creature of statute. As such, we are bound to strictly construe the terms of the statute and to rely on the General Assembly to amend the statute where necessary. See Wigfall v. Tideland Utilities, Inc., Op. No. 25628, 354 S.C. 100, 110, 580 S.E.2d 100, 105 (2003) (because Act provides compensatory system in derogation of common law rights, Court must strictly construe the statute and leave it to the General Assembly to amend and define any ambiguities).

For these reasons, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. S.C.Code Ann. § l-23-380(A)(6) (Supp.2002) (court may reverse decision if substantial rights of appellant have been prejudiced because agency conclusions are affected by error of law).

REVERSED.

TOAL, C.J., MOORE and WALLER, JJ., concur. PLEICONES, J., dissenting in a separate opinion.

1 . S.C.Code Ann. § 42-1-10 et. seq. (1985).

2 . The Act specifies that facts communicated to or otherwise learned by a physician during the course of treatment are not privileged. S.C.Code Ann. § 42-15-80.

3 . We use the term "ex parte communication” because that was the term used by the Commission. However, die exchange of information sought here by Employer is not an "ex parte communication.” Black’s Law Dictionary 597 (7th ed.1999) (ex parte communication is defined as "prohibited communication between counsel and the court when opposing counsel is not present.”).

4 . Our analysis is supported by similar decisions in North Carolina holding that policy considerations of patient privacy, physician-patient confidences, and the adequacy of formal discovery methods render ex parte communications between an employee’s treating physician and employer representatives improper. Burchette v. East Coast Millwork Dist., Inc., 149 N.C.App. 802, 562 S.E.2d 459 (2002); Salaam v. North Carolina Dep’t of Transp., 122 N.C.App. 83, 468 S.E.2d 536 (1996), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted 345 N.C. 494, 480 S.E.2d 51 (1997). Other jurisdictions hold similarly. Hydraulics, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 329 Ill.App.3d 166, 263 Ill.Dec. 679, 768 N.E.2d 760 (2002); Linton v. City of Great Falls, 230 Mont. 122, 749 P.2d 55 (1988) rev’d on other grds. Anderson v. Hammer, 252 Mont. 73, 826 P.2d 931 (1992); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Woodard, 461 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.Civ.App.1970).

5 . See Parker v. Williams and Madjanik, Inc., 275 S.C. 65, 70, 267 S.E.2d 524, 526 (1980).