Brien Volpe v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company

802 F.2d 1, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 29335
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedSeptember 4, 1986
Docket86-1035
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 802 F.2d 1 (Brien Volpe v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brien Volpe v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 802 F.2d 1, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 29335 (1st Cir. 1986).

Opinion

BREYER, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Prudential) appeals from the district court’s declaratory judgment that it must provide liability coverage for its insured, Carolyn Blondeau, for an accident claim made against her by Brien Volpe. Prudential also appeals the district court’s award to Blondeau of attorneys’ fees for the declaratory judgment action. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s decision as to coverage but we reverse its decision about attorneys’ fees.

I.

Volpe and Blondeau are fellow plaintiffs in the declaratory judgment now on appeal but are opponents in a pending tort action in federal court in New Hampshire. Volpe, a passenger in a vehicle driven by David Federichi, was injured in a collision with a Chevrolet Camaro driven by Tommy Briggs and formally owned by, and registered to, *2 Tommy’s father, Frank Briggs. At the time of the accident, Blondeau was a passenger in the Camaro. Volpe alleges that Blondeau negligently entrusted the Camaro to Tommy Briggs, then her boyfriend, whom she knew to be a reckless and dangerous driver.

Volpe and Blondeau brought this declaratory judgment action to determine their rights under an “easy reading” insurance policy issued to Blondeau by Prudential. Prudential denied Blondeau coverage for Volpe’s claim, citing the following paragraph:

You’re insured while using a car you don’t own. Relatives living in your household are insured while using a passenger car or trailer which is owned by someone else or any organization when it is reasonable to expect that the owner has given permission to use it and it is used in the way intended by the owner. This non-owned passenger car or trailer has the same coverages as any one of your cars. But there is no coverage for cars regularly used by you or such relatives.

(Emphasis added.) Prudential acknowledged that Blondeau was using the Briggs’ car when she was merely a passenger, but it argued that Blondeau “regularly used” the Briggs’ car and that she therefore fell within the exclusion quoted in the last sentence.

The district court, after considering the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, did not decide whether or not the underlined phrase deprived Blondeau of coverage. Instead the court accepted a different argument that Volpe had made to show coverage. Volpe quoted a paragraph contained in a section on “losses we won’t pay for.” The paragraph is titled “cars for hire” and says:

We won’t pay for any accident that happens while a car this part covers is being used as a taxi or car for hire. You’re covered, though, if you’re responsible for an accident while you’re a passenger in a car you don’t own.

The court read the second sentence of the “cars for hire” paragraph in light of New Hampshire’s policy of construing ambiguities against the insurer. It found that the sentence could reasonably be interpreted to provide coverage for Blondeau when she is responsible for an accident while a passenger in any car she doesn’t own, including Briggs’ car. The court therefore ordered Prudential to defend Blondeau in the underlying tort action brought by Volpe. It also held that Blondeau was entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to New Hampshire Rev.Stat.Ann. § 491:22-b (1983). Prudential has appealed.

II.

We agree with the district court that in New Hampshire “an ambiguous insurance policy will be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.” Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of New Hampshire-Vermont, 120 N.H. 764, 771, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980). We also agree with its conclusion regarding coverage. We are not able to agree with the court, however, (nor have we agreed among ourselves) about whether the sentence to which the court pointed is ambiguous. While one of us is in substantial agreement with the district court’s construction of the policy, two of us believe that the position of the sentence in a paragraph entitled “cars for hire” would prevent any reasonable person from thinking that the sentence affirmatively extends coverage beyond what the remaining paragraphs of the policy provide. See Appendix. The purported ambiguity arises only if the sentence is read out of context, disregarding its place in the policy as a whole. We hesitate to push the insurance industry toward spelling out each qualification every time a policy mentions a qualified term — as we might do by insisting that the second sentence here say “in a taxi or car for hire you don’t own.” Unnecessary verbiage interferes with easy reading no less than ambiguity, and we ought not gratuitously to encourage it.

Our views concerning the existence of ambiguity make no legal difference in *3 this case, however, for we conclude on other grounds that Prudential must provide coverage. The parties agree that Blondeau’s policy insures her while “in someone else’s car” unless the car is one she or her relatives “regularly used.” On the basis of the record, even if we read it in a light most favorable to Prudential, Early v. Eastern Transfer, 699 F.2d 552, 554 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 824, 104 S.Ct. 93, 78 L.Ed.2d 100 (1983); Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47 L.Ed.2d 754 (1976), the “regular use” exception does not apply.

Some form of the “regular use” exclusion is commonly found in automobile insurance policies. It implicitly recognizes that:

a policy which would give to an insured who simply took out a policy on a single owned car, coverage on any number of cars not owned by him, but furnished for his regular use, just as if he owned them, would be ruinous to an insurance company____ [Wjhere more than one owned automobile is included, as a rule the insurance premium is larger.

Globe Indemnity Co. v. Teixeira, 230 F.Supp. 451, 455 (D.Hawaii 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.1965). The exclusion therefore protects the insurer from multiple exposure to liability for which the insured pays only one premium. See United Services Automobile Ass’n v. Couch, 643 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tenn.Ct.App.1982); Kenilworth Ins. Co. v. Cole, 587 S.W.2d 93, 100 (Mo.Ct.App.1979). Its purpose and effect

is to give coverage to the insured while engaged in the only infrequent or merely casual use of an automobile other than the one described in the policy, but not to cover him against personal liability with respect to his use of another automobile which he frequently uses or has the opportunity to do so.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
802 F.2d 1, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 29335, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brien-volpe-v-prudential-property-and-casualty-insurance-company-ca1-1986.