WILNER, J.
We shall resolve here the dilemma faced by a contractor who (1) is operating under a construction contract that requires disputes arising out of or relating to the contract to be submitted to binding arbitration, but (2) also may be entitled to a mechanics’ lien, pursuant to Maryland Code, title 9, subtitle 1 of the Real Property Article (RP), for work done or materials furnished under the contract. Can the contractor seek to assure the prospect of ultimate payment by obtaining a provisional interlocutory lien on the property without giving up its contractual right to have the merits of its claim determined through arbitration? We shall conclude that the contractor does not waive its right to compel arbitration of an arbitrable dispute merely by seeking and obtaining an interlocutory mechanics’ lien.
BACKGROUND
In November, 1999, respondent Winchester Construction Company and petitioner Diane Brendsel entered into a con[604]*604tract for the renovation of Wye Hall, a historic plantation house in Queen Anne’s County owned by Ms. Brendsel and her husband Leland.1 The contract was a “cost of the work plus a fee” contract; it called for Winchester to be reimbursed for the costs necessarily incurred in the proper performance of the work and to receive a contractor’s fee of 10% of that cost for overhead and an additional 10% for profit. The contract was a standard Abbreviated Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor, coupled with attached General Conditions, drafted by the American Institute of Architects (AIA Document A117 (1987 Ed.)). Among other things, the contract specified those costs which would be reimbursed and those which would ‘-t, required Winchester to keep detailed accounting records, and provided for progress payments and final payment.
Article 15 of the General Conditions dealt with administration of the contract. It authorized the architect, as the owner’s representative, to review and certify amounts due to the contractor, interpret and decide matters concerning performance, make initial decisions on all claims, disputes, or other matters in question, reject work that did not conform to the contract documents, and review and take action on submittals by the contractor. Although the contract identified Good Architecture as the architect, it appears that, at some point, the Brendsels also employed Gipe Associates, Inc., consulting engineers, as an additional owner’s agent.
Section 15.8 of the General Conditions called for all claims or disputes between the contractor and the owner arising out of or relating to the contract documents or the breach thereof to be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) currently in effect, unless the parties agreed otherwise, subject to initial presentation of the claim or dispute to the architect. The provision required that notice of a demand for arbitration be filed with the other party and [605]*605with the AAA “within a reasonable time after the dispute has arisen.”
The renovation work proceeded from September, 1999 through June 3, 2003. On August 1, 2002, Winchester and Ms. Brendsel signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that made a number of changes in the contract. Most of the MOU dealt with procedures respecting applications for payment. In that regard, ¶ 6 provided:
“Prior to making the final payment under the Contract, Winchester will submit its final accounting of all costs and fee charged to Brendsel under the Contract so that Brendsel’s accountants can review the information. This review will be made in 45 days, and Brendsel will pay either the requested amount or the lesser amount substantiated by the accountants within seven days after the accountants’ review. If Winchester disagrees with the amount that Brendsel has paid, the matter can be resolved by negotiation or arbitration.”
Paragraph 9 deleted ¶¶ 15.1 through 15.7 of the General Conditions, dealing with the duties of the architect, to reflect the fact that the architect had not, in fact, been involved in contract administration. That role, apparently, had been assumed by Gipe Associates. Paragraph 12 of the MOU permitted Brendsel to terminate the contract at any time for her convenience and without cause but specified that, upon such termination, Winchester would be paid for work done to the date of termination subject to appropriate offsets.
The MOU expressed the intent of the parties to execute a formal amendment to the contract reflecting the terms of the MOU and charged Ms. Brendsel with preparing such an agreement. It does not appear that any such agreement was ever prepared or signed. Both sides have treated the MOU as an effective agreement, however.
Disputes continued to surface. On January 28, 2003, an agreement was reached with respect to pending claims. Winchester was advised that Gipe had been designated as construction manager and owner’s agent on the project. The [606]*606parties agreed that Winchester’s fee would be reduced from 20% (10% overhead and 10% profit) to 10%, and that the retainage would be reduced from 10% to 5%.
On May 23, 2003, Ms. Brendsel terminated the agreement and directed Winchester to remove its personnel and equipment from the jobsite by May 30. Winchester regarded the termination as one for convenience pursuant to ¶ 12 of the MOU. In her brief, Ms. Brendsel notes that the term “convenience” does not appear in the letter of termination, which is true, but she does not contend that the termination was for any other reason. The letter stated that payment of a final invoice would be made after review of the final accounting, as provided by ¶ 6 of the MOU.
Winchester submitted applications for payment in June and July and a final application on August 13, 2003, showing a gross balance due of $815,877. Brendsel’s initial response was to obtain new counsel who, in September, wrote to counsel for Winchester asking for certain additional information and documents and suggesting a meeting to resolve any matters in dispute. At that point, it was not clear that there was any dispute; counsel was collecting information and presumably Brendsel’s accountants were reviewing the pending applications for payment. In his letter of September 30, 2003, counsel enclosed a Tolling Agreement that tolled and suspended “[a]ll deadlines provided in either the Agreement or the MOU, as well as any statutory or common law limitation and common law laches ... until five (5) business days after written notice of either party’s withdrawal from this Tolling Agreement is delivered to the other party.” Through counsel, Winchester signed the Tolling Agreement.
RP § 9-105 requires that a petition to establish a mechanics’ lien be filed within 180 days “after the work has been finished or the materials furnished.” The work was completed, at the latest, by June 3, 2003. Discussions continued throughout the Fall of 2003, without resulting in either an acceptance of Winchester’s claim and payment or a rejection of the claim. Concerned that the statutory time for filing a [607]*607petition for mechanics’ lien was (1) getting close, and (2) might be regarded as jurisdictional or preclusive in nature, rather than as a mere statute of limitations that could be waived or tolled by agreement of the parties, counsel for Winchester, on November 14, 2003, filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County to establish a mechanic’s lien. The petition alleged that Winchester furnished work, labor, and materials from September, 1999, through June 3, 2003, and that $815,877 remained due and payable.
Winchester obviously regarded the petition as a protective measure; counsel continued to send both provisional lien releases and additional documents to counsel for Brendsel, and negotiations continued. At that point, Brendsel was still seeking additional information and it was as yet unclear whether, or to what extent, the application for final payment would ultimately be rejected. Not until December 10, 2003, did Brendsel, through a letter from counsel, reject in full Winchester’s claim. The letter acknowledged a net balance owing under the contract of $604,565 but claimed credits against that balance of $871,872 for overcharges and construction defects, leaving a net balance due to Brendsel. Rather than “initiating an action on behalf of Ms. Brendsel,” however, counsel suggested a meeting to resolve the matter. Counsel for Winchester responded, questioning some assertions, denying others, and indicating that he needed more time to respond in full.
In the meanwhile, on December 11, the court filed a memorandum requesting that Winchester supplement its petition with, or explain the absence of, an allegation that the improvement of Brendsel’s property represented at least 15% of the value of the property and that it furnish statements of the nature and kind of work done or materials provided. Where the work involves improvements to a building (as opposed to the erection of a new building), RP § 9-102 permits a mechanics’ lien only if the building is improved to the extent of 15% of its value, and RP § 9-105(a) and Md. Rule 12-302(b) require the petition to allege the kind of work done or the kind and amount of materials furnished.
[608]*608Faced with the court’s request and Brendsel’s clear rejection of Winchester’s claim, Winchester, on January 9, 2004, filed an amended petition to establish and enforce a mechanics’ lien. The amended petition added the averments requested by the court, and, in addition to requesting the establishment of a lien, asked for “a stay of proceedings after an interlocutory lien is established pending the outcome of an arbitration proceeding between the parties hereto.” On January 30, the court directed Brendsel to show cause on or before March 8, why a lien should not be granted.
Brendsel responded with an answer denying that any amount was due to Winchester and a two-count counterclaim seeking damages of “at least $1,000,000.” Tracking the allegations in her December 10 letter, Brendsel claimed both overcharging and defective work on Winchester’s part.
Neither the amended complaint nor the counterclaim sufficed to terminate discussions and negotiations between counsel. Letters were exchanged, and, on February 11, 2004, counsel met. On March 5, contemporaneously with Brendsel’s answer and counterclaim, the parties filed a consent motion to postpone the scheduled hearing on Winchester’s request for an interlocutory mechanics’ lien. The motion noted that, with the ability to conduct some limited discovery, planned to be completed by June 15, 2004, certain issues regarding charges for work done by subcontractors might be resolved. Brendsel agreed not to object to an interlocutory lien being established in the amount of $815,877 during the discovery period, and the parties expressly agreed “that neither this Consent Motion nor their activities during the Discovery Period, nor the issuance of the interlocutory lien order proposed hereunder, shall prohibit or waive any party’s right to proceed in arbitration, or to object thereto, to the same extent as if this Motion had not been filed and the actions proposed hereunder had not been taken.”
Upon that consent motion, the court, on March 8, 2004, entered an interlocutory mechanics’ hen in favor of Winchester in the amount of $815,877 and declared that neither the [609]*609consent motion, discovery conducted during the discovery period, nor that order would prohibit or waive the right of any party to proceed in arbitration, or object thereto. The same day, Brendsel filed an amended answer and counterclaim. Winchester answered the counterclaim, asserting among other defenses, that the counterclaim was subject to arbitration.
During the discovery period allowed in the consent motion and order, Brendsel took the deposition of two subcontractors but conducted no other discovery. It does not appear that Winchester conducted any discovery. On June 16, 2004—the day after the discovery period ended—Brendsel filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to liability under her counterclaim for over-charging. Winchester responded with a petition to compel arbitration and stay all further judicial proceedings, contending that, through its motion for partial summary judgment, Brendsel was seeing a ruling on the merits of its counterclaim, which was subject to arbitration. On July 6, Brendsel filed an opposition to the petition to compel arbitration, averring that Winchester had waived its right to arbitration by seeking a mechanics’ lien and failing to provide written notice of a demand for arbitration within a reasonable time after the dispute had arisen.
Following a hearing two weeks later, the court granted the petition to compel arbitration, ruling that, under the totality of the circumstances, Winchester had not waived its right to arbitration. The order compelled arbitration of “all the disputes between [the parties] in connection with this Mechanics’ Lien action including the Counter-Claim filed herein” and stayed all proceedings in the matter “pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding.” Brendsel noted an appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment (Brendsel v. Winchester, 162 Md.App. 558, 875 A.2d 789 (2005)), and we granted certiorari to consider the issue noted. We shall affirm.
DISCUSSION
There is no dispute that ¶ 15.8 of the General Conditions created a valid agreement to submit the claims made by [610]*610both Winchester and Brendsel to arbitration, and that such an agreement is enforceable under both the Federal Arbitration Act (U.S.Code, title 9) and the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act (Maryland Code, title 3, subtitle 2 of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article) (CJP). Because there is no significant difference between the two statutes relevant to this case, we shall, for convenience, apply the State law. CJP, § 3-207 provides that, if a party to an enforceable arbitration agreement refuses to arbitrate, the other party may file a petition in a circuit court to order arbitration. If the opposing party denies the existence of an arbitration agreement, the court shall proceed expeditiously to determine if the agreement exists, and if the court finds that the agreement does exist, “it shall order arbitration.” Section 3-209 requires further that a court stay any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration if a petition or order to arbitrate has been filed. If the issue subject to arbitration is severable, the court may order the stay with respect only to that issue.
The only defense to Winchester’s petition to compel arbitration offered to this Court is that, by seeking an interlocutory mechanics’ lien and answering Brendsel’s counterclaim, Winchester waived its right to arbitrate the dispute arising from the contract documents. Brendsel asks us to adopt a per se rule that the mere seeking of an interlocutory lien constitutes a waiver of arbitration without regard to any other fact or circumstance and without regard to Winchester’s actual intent. Along with most courts that have been so importuned, we shall decline that request.
We have long recognized that, because the right to arbitration pursuant to the Federal or Uniform Arbitration Act arises from contract, it may be waived like most other contractual rights. We have also made clear, however, specifically with respect to waiver of a contractual right to arbitrate disputes, that waiver “involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case” and that the intention to waive “must be clearly established and will not be inferred from equivocal acts or language.” Gold Coast Mall v. Larmar Corp., 298 Md. 96, 109, 468 A.2d 91, 98 (1983); Chas. [611]*611J. Frank, Inc. v. Assoc. Jewish Ch., 294 Md. 443, 449, 450 A.2d 1304, 1306-07 (1982). See also Questar v. Pillar, 388 Md. 675, 687, 882 A.2d 288, 294-95 (2005); Canaras v. Lift Truck Services, Inc., 272 Md. 337, 360-61, 322 A.2d 866, 878-79 (1974); BarGale Indus. v. Robert Realty, 275 Md. 638, 643-44, 343 A.2d 529, 533 (1975).
We have not previously dealt directly with the precise issue now before us, although in Frederick Contr. v. Bel Pre Med., 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975) and Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 386 Md. 412, 872 A.2d 735 (2005), we made pronouncements that clearly lead to our holding here. In Frederick Contr., we held that an owner did not waive its right to arbitrate a contractor’s claim against it by failing to demand arbitration prior to the contractor, under an earlier version of our mechanics’ lien law, obtaining a provisional mechanics’ lien. We concluded that the demand was timely and that further judicial proceedings to foreclose the lien were to be stayed pending the arbitration.2
[612]*612In Walther, second mortgage borrowers filed a class action lawsuit against their mortgagor claiming violations of Maryland’s Secondary Mortgage Loan Law. The mortgage contained an arbitration clause, and the mortgagor’s assignee filed a petition to compel arbitration and to dismiss the class action suit. The defendant averred as well that, in a disclosure agreement, the plaintiffs had waived their right to a class action suit and a jury trial. In response, the plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that, by raising the waiver issues, the defendant had sought a ruling on the merits and had thereby waived its right to arbitration. The Circuit Court rejected that defense and entered an order compelling arbitration, which we affirmed. In doing so, we observed:
“[T]he circuit court’s . .. order included no final judgment on any issue that might be subject to arbitration. Thus, Sovereign Bank attained no determination on any of the issues in dispute. Sovereign Bank’s actions did not constitute a repudiation of the Disclosure Agreement’s arbitration provision but, in light of the fact that petitioners seemed intent to avoid arbitration, rather amount to a continued affirmative step in further pursuit of an adjudication by arbitration of the parties’ dispute. Accordingly, the results of Sovereign Bank’s petition was neither a waiver of the right to arbitration nor of any of the issues that might be subject to arbitration.”
[613]*613Id. at 449, 872 A.2d at 757. We anticipated in Walther one aspect of the issue now before us—whether “where (1) one party to an agreement containing a valid arbitration clause reserves the right to seek a judicial remedy that only a court can provide, such as foreclosure or a mechanics’ lien, (2) the party opts for that remedy, (3) a contract defense is asserted by the other party to liability, and (4) that party demands arbitration of the dispute, the court, on motion and pursuant to §§ 3-207 and 3-209 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article or the counterpart provisions in the Federal Arbitration Act, would be required to stay the judicial proceedings and direct that dispute to be resolved in arbitration.” Id. at 449-50, n. 13, 872 A.2d at 757-58, n. 13. We found it unnecessary to resolve that issue in Walther.
To implement our general view that an intention to waive arbitration is not to be inferred from ambiguous conduct, but must be clear and unequivocal, we need to examine the nature and role of mechanics’ liens and the manner in which they may be obtained. Until our decision in Barry Properties v. Fick Bros., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976), a mechanics’ lien was created and attached to the property automatically, as soon as work was performed or materials were supplied, and it lasted, even without the filing of a claim, until the expiration of 180 days after the work was finished or the materials were furnished. Id. at 19, 353 A.2d at 225-26; see also RP (1974) § 9-105(e). To maintain the lien thereafter, the contractor had to file a claim with the clerk of the Circuit Court, who would then list the claim on a special mechanics’ lien docket. RP § 9-105(a) and (b). The extended lien would expire one year from the date the claim was filed unless, during that period, either the claimant sued to enforce it or the owner or other interested person sued to compel the claimant to prove its validity. RP § 9-106. It was in that proceeding that the court would determine the validity of the claim, if it was contested.
That was the legal construct when Frederick Contr. v. Bel Pre Med., supra, was decided. In that case, the contractor filed its claim and promptly filed a complaint to enforce it, [614]*614thereby triggering the adjudicatory proceeding. The owner’s demand for arbitration, filed after the complaint to enforce the lien but before any proceeding on that complaint, was held not to be waived because it was not filed prior to the contractor’s complaint to enforce its lien.
In Barry Properties, based on four then-recent Supreme Court decisions striking down on due process grounds laws that allowed the imposition of a lien against property without an opportunity for a prior hearing, we held that the existing mechanics’ lien law was unconstitutional. We concluded that, because the law allowed prejudgment seizures without notice, a prior hearing, or other sufficient safeguards, it was incompatible with the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and what is now Art. 24 of the Md. Declaration of Rights.
The Legislature responded immediately by revising the law to provide a bifurcated approach that satisfied the Court’s due process concern but did not require full litigation of a contractor’s claim in order to obtain a provisional lien. No longer does a lien arise automatically from the doing of the work or provision of materials, without notice or opportunity for a hearing, but a contractor can obtain an interlocutory lien without having to litigate in full the merits of its claim. To obtain a lien, the contractor must file a petition in the Circuit Court within 180 days after the work was finished or the materials furnished. RP § 9-105. If, from the petition and any exhibits attached to it, the court concludes that there is a reasonable ground for the lien to attach, it enters an order directing the owner to file an answer showing cause why the lien should not attach, and setting a date for a hearing. That is what the court did in this case. Based on the owner’s response (or failure to respond), RP § 9-106 and Md. Rule 12-304 give the court three options:
(1) if the evidence before the court shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that a lien should attach [615]*615as a matter of law, it shall enter a final order establishing the lien in the amount not in dispute;3
(2) if the evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the petitioner has failed as a matter of law to establish its right to a lien, it shall enter a final order denying the lien;
(3) if the court determines that the lien should not attach (or not attach in the amount claimed) as a matter of law but that there is probable cause to believe that the petitioner is entitled to a lien, the court shall enter an interlocutory order that (i) establishes the lien, (ii) describes the boundaries of the land and buildings to which it attaches, (iii) states the amount of the claim for which probable cause is found, (iv) specifies the amount of bond that the owner may file to have the lien released, (v) may require the claimant to file a bond and, if so, sets the amount, and (vi) assigns a date for trial of all matters at issue in the action.
This construct can create the basis for a waiver. If, pursuant to a contractor’s petition and an owner’s response, neither side seeking to have the matter resolved by arbitration, the court proceeds to determine as a matter of law either that the contractor is entitled to a final lien or that it is not entitled to a lien, both sides would be bound by that determination and could not later complain that there was an arbitrable dispute. Similarly if, in lieu of ruling one way or the other as a matter of law, the court sets the matter for trial and the parties proceed with trial or with significant preparation for trial, they would be deemed to have waived any right to arbitration and would be bound by the ultimate judicial determination. When the parties and the court do not proceed to that point, however, and the contractor makes clear that it is merely seeking an interlocutory lien and desires to have any dispute as to the merits of the claim reserved for resolution [616]*616through arbitration, it does not, through that limited action alone, waive its right to arbitration. In that situation, which is the one now before us, the court is not being asked to resolve the merits of the claim. An interlocutory lien is imposed only when there are issues of fact in dispute that cannot and are not resolved at that stage of the proceeding.
Viewed in that context, an interlocutory mechanics’ lien is in the nature of a provisional remedy, not much different than an interlocutory injunction or attachment sought to maintain the status quo so that the arbitration proceeding can have meaning and relevance, and the predominant view throughout the country is that the availability of such remedies by a court is permitted by the Federal and Uniform Arbitration Acts and is not inconsistent with the right to enforce an arbitration agreement. See Salvucci v. Sheehan, 349 Mass. 659, 212 N.E.2d 243 (1965); Teradyne Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.1986); Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch, 910 F.2d 1049 (2nd Cir.1990); Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1948 (4th Cir.1985); RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Associates, Inc., 858 F.2d 227 (5th Cir.1988); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Salvano, 999 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1993); Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Dutton, 844 F.2d 726 (10th Cir.1988).
The focus of those cases was on preserving the status quo—preventing one party from taking some action that could effectively frustrate the arbitration proceeding. That is the focus here as well.4 Often, the only security that a contractor [617]*617has for enforcing an arbitral award and collecting what the arbitrator declares is owed is the mechanics’ lien. As the Court of Special Appeals pointed out in Caretti, Inc. v. Colonnade Ltd., 104 Md.App. 131, 137, 655 A.2d 64, 67 (1995), cert. denied, 339 Md. 641, 664 A.2d 885 (1995), “to defer consideration of even an interlocutory order establishing a lien could ... leave the claimant unprotected for a considerable period of time.” Other creditors can easily jump in with judgments or other liens that would achieve priority over any lien that the claimant may ultimately obtain and leave the claimant out in the cold.5 For a classic example of that, see Residential Indus. Loan Co. v. Weinberg, 279 Md. 483, 369 A.2d 563 (1977). The Caretti court found no impediment to the court’s “proceeding under Real Prop, art., § 9-106(b)(3) to hold a probable cause hearing, upon a finding of probable cause— which is far less than adjudicating the merits of the dispute—■ from establishing an interlocutory lien, and then staying trial on the merits in favor of arbitration.” Id. at 138, 655 A.2d at 67.
That appears to be the general view, and, indeed, a contrary view would be inconsistent with the legislative direction in RP § 9-112 that the mechanics’ lien law “is remedial and shall be construed to give effect to its purpose.” In Newman v. [618]*618Valleywood Associates, Inc., 874 A.2d 1286 (R.I.2005), the Rhode Island court, citing Caretti in its discussion, held flatly that “a party does not waive its right to arbitrate a contractual dispute, as a matter of law, by filing a notice of intention to claim a mechanic’s lien” and that “a party may proceed to arbitration after first encumbering the subject real estate with a mechanic’s lien.” Id. at 1290. The court pointed out that in Rhode Island, as in Maryland, waiver of arbitration is to be determined by the facts of the case, and, to hold that the mere filing of a claim for mechanics’ lien constitutes an automatic waiver would be inconsistent with that approach. See also La Hood v. Central Illinois Const. Inc., 335 Ill.App.3d 363, 269 Ill.Dec. 788, 781 N.E.2d 585 (2002); H.R.H. Prince, Ltc. v. Batson-Cook Co., 161 Ga.App. 219, 291 S.E.2d 249 (Ga.App. 1982); EFC Develop. Corp. v. F.F. Baugh Plumbing & H., Inc., 24 Ariz.App. 566, 540 P.2d 185 (1975). In one State where the court reached a different conclusion, the Legislature promptly overruled the decision by statute. See Young v. Crescent Development Co., 240 N.Y. 244, 148 N.E. 510 (1925) and Askovitz v. Gabay, 229 A.D. 258, 241 N.Y.S. 394 (1930).
The general rule is well-stated in Maurice T. Brunner, Filing of Mechanic’s Lien or Proceeding for its Enforcement as Affecting Right to Arbitration, 78 A.L.R.3d 1066 (1976). The annotator points out that, while acts “inconsistent with an agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration may constitute a repudiation, a breach, or waiver of the right to arbitrate,” waiver “is usually a question of fact dependent upon the intention of the party claimed to have waived his right.” Id. at 1068. That is the established Maryland view. Thus, he continues, “[i]t has been held that the mere filing of a mechanic’s lien does not in itself constitute a waiver or abandonment of rights under an arbitration clause in a construction contract unless the lienor manifests an intent to waive or abandon his rights, and the existence of such an intent depends upon the particular facts of a given case.” Id.
The record in this case not only supports the Circuit Court’s conclusion that there was no intent to waive arbitration on Winchester’s part but comes close to making any contrary [619]*619finding one that would be clearly erroneous. Winchester filed its initial petition out of concern that failure to do so within the statutory time requirement might be regarded as preclusive, notwithstanding the Tolling Agreement. This Court has not ruled on that issue, but there is language in some of our older cases, construing the earlier version of the mechanics’ lien law, that could justify that concern. Winchester made no effort to have the merits of its claim resolved by the court, but instead continued to negotiate with Brendsel in an effort to resolve any as-yet-undeclared disputes amicably. As noted, Brendsel never responded to the initial petition, which remained dormant. When the court insisted on a supplement to the petition, contemporaneously with Brendsel finally rejecting Winchester’s applications for payment and thereby creating for the first time a dispute ripe for adjudication, Winchester amended its petition to make clear that it wanted only an interlocutory lien and to ask specifically that the court stay any further proceedings on the claim in favor of arbitration. It iterated its demand for arbitration in response to Brendsel’s motion for summary judgment.
Nothing in this record indicates an intent on Winchester’s part to waive arbitration. All of its actions show the contrary. The arbitration clause, § 15.8 of the General Conditions, requires that the arbitration be in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, Rule 49(a) of which provides that “[n]o judicial proceeding by a party relating to the subject matter of the arbitration shall be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to arbitrate.”6 The consent motion itself, signed after the amended petition was filed, makes clear that the delay and the limited discovery insisted upon by Brendsel were not intended [620]*620to waive Winchester’s right to have the dispute submitted to arbitration. Filing an answer to Brendsel’s counterclaim in order to forestall the prospect of an order of default being entered on it hardly suffices to overcome Winchester’s consistent demand that the dispute be arbitrated in conformance with the contract.
The simple fact is that there is nothing inconsistent between the mere seeking of the protection of an interlocutory mechanics’ lien or taking routine and appropriate action to preclude an order of default and an intent on Winchester’s part to require that any dispute over the competing claims be submitted to arbitration. It is not an “either/or” situation. The granting of the interlocutory lien, without opposition by Brendsel, did not resolve the dispute. Adjudication of the merits of Winchester’s claim through arbitration was in no way compromised by the interlocutory lien. The parties agreed in their contract that all disputes arising from the contract documents were to be adjudicated by an arbitrator. That is what Winchester demanded, and that is what the court was obliged by both Federal and State law to implement and enforce.
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.