STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0429
Brenda Thormodson, et al., Appellants,
vs.
Kathryn Rae Zehnder, Respondent.
Filed December 15, 2025 Affirmed Cochran, Judge
Watonwan County District Court File No. 83-CV-24-80
Joseph A. Gangi, Daniel J. Bellig, Farrish Johnson Law Office, Chtd., Mankato, Minnesota (for appellants)
Ann R. Goering, Jordan H. Soderlind, Ratwik, Roszak & Maloney, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
1. Statutory immunity under Minnesota Statutes section 260E.34(a)(1) (2024),
extends to a person who makes a mandated report under chapter 260E (2024), in good faith,
even if the report is not made immediately.
2. Statutory immunity under Minnesota Statutes section 260E.34(a)(1) extends
to a person who makes a voluntary report under chapter 260E, in good faith, regardless of
whether the person is also a mandatory reporter. 3. Good faith, for the purpose of statutory immunity under section
260E.34(a)(1), is established if the report is made without an ulterior motive, without
malice, and for a proper purpose.
OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellants sued respondent, a school paraprofessional, under Minnesota Statutes
section 260E.08(d), alleging respondent knowingly or recklessly made a false report of
child abuse or neglect against appellants. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of respondent, determining she was statutorily immune from liability under
Minnesota Statutes section 260E.34(a)(1) based on the undisputed facts. Section
260E.34(a)(1) provides that a person “making a voluntary or mandated report under this
chapter” is “immune from any civil or criminal liability that otherwise might result from
the person’s actions if the person is acting in good faith.” Because the undisputed facts
establish that respondent made a report under chapter 260E in good faith, we conclude that
the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of respondent based on the
plain language of section 260E.34(a)(1). We therefore affirm.
2 FACTS
The following facts are drawn from the record at summary judgment and are framed
in the light most favorable to appellants Brenda and John Thormodson as the nonmoving
parties. 1
The Thormodsons are the legal guardians of Brenda Thormodson’s granddaughter,
B.O., who was 17 years old during the relevant time period. B.O. has limited mobility and
requires assistance with her daily activities, including bathing and toileting. Brenda
Thormodson assisted B.O. with these activities at home. During the school day, B.O. was
assisted by respondent Kathryn Rae Zehnder, who worked as a paraprofessional at B.O.’s
school during the 2022-2023 school year.
On September 22, 2022, Zehnder contacted authorities to make a confidential report
regarding B.O. Zehnder reported both by phone and in writing on a standard reporting
form. The reporting form was captioned “Confidential Report of Suspected Child
Abuse/Neglect.” The form included a line for the nature and extent of “abuse/neglect.”
On that line, Zehnder indicated that she saw a “belt size bruise” on B.O.’s “bottom” on
September 19. There was also a line requesting the name of the “Person alleged or
suspected of abuse/neglect.” Zehnder wrote, “Parents.” The county human services
1 See Schroeder v. Simon, 985 N.W.2d 529, 535-36 (Minn. 2023) (“In evaluating a grant of summary judgment, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (quotation omitted)).
3 agency with jurisdiction opened a family assessment on September 23. 2 This assessment
was ultimately closed in November, following interviews with B.O. and John Thormodson.
After the assessment was closed, the Thormodsons sought, and the county
inadvertently provided, the identity of the reporter. 3 The Thormodsons then filed a
complaint against Zehnder asserting that Zehnder “knowingly made a false report of child
abuse/neglect against Brenda and John Thormodson.” According to the complaint,
Zehnder made a report in which she alleged she saw bruising on B.O. caused by the
Thormodsons but “none existed.” The Thormodsons later filed an amended complaint
again alleging that “Zehnder made a report of suspected child abuse/neglect” involving
bruising and “that she suspected John Thormodson and/or Brenda Thormodson of
committing the alleged child abuse/neglect against B.O.” The amended complaint alleged
that “Zehnder did not see any bruises or bruising on B.O.” and “did not make her report
for a proper purpose, as she knew the underlying factual statements supporting her report
were false.” The Thormodsons further alleged that Zehnder delayed reporting her
suspicions for three days in an attempt to “hide [the report’s] falsity.” Based on these
2 Zehnder contacted Watonwan County Human Services. The report was transferred to Brown County, where B.O. and the Thormodsons lived. 3 The name of a reporter “shall” be confidential after a maltreatment assessment or investigation is completed. Minn. Stat. § 260E.35, subd. 3(m). A confidential reporter’s name may be disclosed to the subject of the report only with the consent of the reporter “or upon a written finding by the court that the report was false and that there is evidence that the report was made in bad faith.” Id. Here, Brenda Thormodson filed suit on behalf of B.O. against Brown County seeking to compel disclosure of the reporter’s identity. Brenda Thormodson did not obtain consent or a court order to compel disclosure, but the Thormodsons saw Zehnder’s name in discovery materials provided by Brown County due to an ineffective redaction.
4 allegations, the Thormodsons asserted that the report was “knowing[ly] or recklessly false”
and that Zehnder “did not make her report in good faith, but in bad faith and with malice.”
Following discovery, the Thormodsons moved for summary judgment. The
Thormodsons argued that Zehnder knowingly made a false report of child abuse based on
their contention that “Zehnder did not see, and could not have seen, [a bruise on B.O.’s
body] because it is undisputed that no bruise existed.” They also argued that Zehnder acted
recklessly by not reporting immediately and by accusing the Thormodsons of causing
bruising.
Zehnder filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. She argued that the
undisputed evidence establishes that she acted in good faith when she made the report and
“is immune by operation of statute.” According to Zehnder, she was helping B.O. after a
shower when she saw what she believed was a bruise on B.O.’s buttocks on September 19.
Zehnder described the bruise as “a few inches” in length and approximately the width of a
belt strap. Zehnder also testified in her deposition that, on September 20, the following
day, she saw the bruise again while helping B.O. get dressed.
In her memorandum of law, Zehnder further argued that the Thormodsons failed to
bring forth any evidence establishing that Zehnder knowingly or recklessly made the report
in bad faith “beyond their own subjective beliefs and suspicions.” Zehnder emphasized
that the evidence shows that, as an educator, Zehnder had mandated-reporting duties as
prescribed by chapter 260E. Zehnder sought advice from a colleague regarding whether
she needed to file a report with authorities, but did not discuss the details of what she had
observed. The colleague told Zehnder that she should report if she felt like she needed to
5 do so and suggested that Zehnder speak to the school counselor. On September 22,
Zehnder sought advice from the school counselor about how to make a mandated report.
The school counselor explained the process to Zehnder and provided her with a phone
number and a written form. After receiving guidance from the school counselor, Zehnder
called the designated authorities to make a verbal report and submitted the written form to
the authorities that same day. Zehnder had not previously made a report to authorities as a
mandatory reporter.
Following a hearing, the district court granted Zehnder’s motion for summary
judgment. The district court concluded that Zehnder was statutorily immune as a
mandatory reporter under Minnesota Statutes section 260E.34(a)(1) because Zehnder
“acted in accordance with the law mandating her to report any observations she made in
regard to the welfare of the child.” The district court further determined that the
Thormodsons had not presented evidence giving rise to a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Zehnder acted in bad faith or recklessly and knowingly filed a false report. The
district court emphasized that “[t]he law does not require that the reporter . . . be able to
substantiate the concern or have directly witnessed an act of maltreatment before raising
concern in the form of a report.” The district court further noted that the Thormodsons’
subjective beliefs that Zehnder acted in bad faith were “not enough to give rise to a genuine
issue of material fact.” Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor
of Zehnder and judgment was entered against the Thormodsons.
The Thormodsons appeal.
6 ISSUES
1. Does Minnesota Statutes section 260E.34(a)(1) extend immunity to a person
who makes a report under chapter 260E, in good faith, even if the report is not made
immediately?
2. Did the Thormodsons produce evidence that created a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Zehnder acted in good faith in making a report under chapter
260E?
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party shows, by citing to specific parts
of the record, including depositions, documents, affidavits, admissions, and interrogatory
answers, that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01, 56.03(a). “A genuine issue of
material fact exists when there is sufficient evidence regarding an essential element [of a
claim] to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions.” St. Paul Park Refin.
Co. v. Domeier, 950 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). “[O]n a motion
for summary judgment, the facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts
must be resolved in [the nonmoving party’s] favor.” Staub v. Myrtle Lake Resort,
964 N.W.2d 613, 620 (Minn. 2021) (emphasis omitted). “Any doubt as to whether issues
of material fact exist is resolved in favor of the party against whom summary judgment
was granted.” Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995). On appeal, we
“review [a] grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether there are genuine
issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law.”
7 Minnesota Laws. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw & Bryant L. Off. PLLC, 19 N.W.3d 206, 215
(Minn. App. 2025) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 17, 2025). “[W]e may
affirm a grant of summary judgment if it can be sustained on any grounds.” Doe v.
Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 163 (Minn. 2012).
Before turning to our analysis, we begin with a summary of Minnesota Statutes
chapter 260E, the Reporting of Maltreatment of Minors Act (RMMA). Minn. Stat.
§§ 260E.01-.39 (2024). 4 The RMMA’s purpose is “to protect children whose health or
welfare may be jeopardized through maltreatment.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.01. Maltreatment
is defined to include neglect, physical abuse, “substantial child endangerment,” “threatened
injury,” and “mental injury.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.03, subd. 12. “The stated intention of the
Legislature in enacting this provision” is to “protect children and promote child safety” and
“make the home, school, and community safe for children by promoting responsible child
care in all settings, including through the reporting of child maltreatment,” among other
purposes. State v. Martens, 18 N.W.3d 752, 758 (Minn. 2025) (quoting Minn. Stat.
§ 260E.01); see also Radke, 694 N.W.2d at 797 (noting that the express public policy of
4 Prior to 2020, the RMMA was codified at Minnesota Statutes section 626.556 (2018), and was also referred to as the Child Abuse Reporting Act (CARA). Compare Jepsen as Tr. for Dean v. County of Pope, 966 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Minn. 2021) (referring to section 626.556 (2010) as RMMA), with Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Minn. 2005) (referring to section 626.556 (2004) as CARA). In 2020, the legislature made several amendments and recodified the RMMA as chapter 260E. See Jepsen, 966 N.W.2d at 475 n.1 (citing 2020 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 2, art. 7, at 866, 1080, 1120). The prior version had an immunity provision that used the same operative language as the current version in the RMMA. Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 4(a)(1) (2018) (stating that “any person making a voluntary or mandated report” was “immune from any civil or criminal liability that otherwise might result from their actions, if they [we]re acting in good faith”).
8 Minn. Stat. § 626.556, the precursor to chapter 260E, was to protect “uniquely vulnerable
persons” who cannot protect themselves).
The RMMA includes provisions covering both mandatory reporters and voluntary
reporters. Mandatory reporters must “immediately” report maltreatment to designated
authorities if they “know[] or ha[ve] reason to believe a child is being maltreated” or has
been maltreated within the preceding three years. Minn. Stat. § 260E.06, subd. 1(a).
Among those individuals who are mandated to report under the RMMA are professionals
and their delegates “engaged in the practice of . . . education.” Id., subd. 1(a)(1). The
RMMA also provides that “[a]ny person may voluntarily report” to designated authorities
“if the person knows, has reason to believe, or suspects a child is being or has been
maltreated.” Id., subd. 2.
A “report” is defined within the RMMA as “any communication received by the
local welfare agency, police department, county sheriff, or agency responsible for child
protection pursuant to this section that describes maltreatment of a child and contains
sufficient content to identify the child and any person believed to be responsible for the
maltreatment, if known.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.03, subd. 19. Mandatory reporters who fail
to report may be criminally liable under the RMMA, while both mandatory reporters and
voluntary reporters may be civilly liable for knowingly or recklessly making a false report.
Minn. Stat. § 260E.08(a), (d).
But reporters are statutorily immune from liability if they act in good faith. Minn.
Stat. § 260E.34(a)(1). Specifically, the RMMA provides that “a person making a voluntary
or mandated report under this chapter” is “immune from any civil or criminal liability that
9 otherwise might result from the person’s actions if the person is acting in good faith.” Id.
In other words, the RMMA grants immunity from liability for reporting if two conditions
are met: (1) the person makes a report under chapter 260E, and (2) the person does so in
good faith. Id.
Returning to our analysis, the district court determined that Zehnder was entitled to
summary judgment because section 260E.34(a)(1) granted immunity to Zehnder. On
appeal, the Thormodsons advance two arguments for reversal. First, they contend that
Zehnder is not immune under section 260E.34(a)(1) as a matter of law because Zehnder
did not immediately report and therefore her report does not qualify as a mandated report
“under this chapter” within the meaning of the immunity provision. Second, they assert
that even if “Zehnder’s untimely report does not foreclose immunity,” there are genuine
issues of material fact as to whether Zehnder acted in good faith when she made her report.
We address each argument in turn.
I. A person who makes a mandated report under chapter 260E in good faith is entitled to statutory immunity, even if the report is not made immediately.
The Thormodsons first argue that the immunity conferred under Minnesota Statutes
section 260E.34(a)(1) to mandatory reporters extends only to mandatory reporters who
make a report “immediately,” which is defined by the RMMA to mean “as soon as possible
but in no event longer than 24 hours.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.03, subd. 9 (defining
“immediately”); see also Minn. Stat. § 260E.06, subd. 1(a) (requiring mandatory reporters
to “immediately report” information). This is an argument regarding the scope of the
10 statutory-immunity provision, which presents a question of law that appellate courts review
de novo. J.E.B. v. Danks, 785 N.W.2d 741, 752 (Minn. 2010).
We reject the Thormodsons’ argument regarding the scope of immunity for two
reasons. We first conclude that, under the plain language of section 260E.34(a)(1), a
mandatory reporter is immune from liability for a mandated report made in good faith to
the proper authorities even if not made immediately. And second, we conclude that a
mandatory reporter may make a voluntary report, which also triggers immunity under
Minnesota Statutes section 260E.34(a)(1).
A. Section 260E.34(a)(1) extends statutory immunity to mandatory reporters even if they do not immediately make a report.
The Thormodsons contend that Zehnder’s failure to report her suspicions to
authorities within 24 hours of first observing the bruise on B.O. precludes her report from
being a “mandated report under [chapter 260E]” and consequently she is not statutorily
immune from liability under Minnesota Statutes section 260E.34(a)(1). 5 In response,
Zehnder argues that this interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the statute and
the “clear public purpose” of the RMMA, which is to protect children. We agree with
Zehnder.
Resolution of this question requires us to interpret the statute. “[T]he overarching
goal” of statutory interpretation is to “effectuate the Legislature’s intent in enacting the
5 The Thormodsons’ argument regarding whether Zehnder’s report qualifies as a “mandated report under this chapter” for purposes of section 260E.34(a)(1) is limited to their legal argument regarding the timing of the report. They raise no further arguments that Zehnder’s report does not otherwise qualify as a “mandated report under this chapter.” The only other argument raised relates to whether Zehnder acted in good faith.
11 statute.” 328 Barry Ave., LLC v. Nolan Props. Grp., LLC, 871 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn.
2015). “The plain language of the statute is our best guide to the Legislature’s intent.”
Rodriguez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 931 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. 2019). Thus,
“[i]f the meaning of the statute is clear, the plain language of the statute controls.”
328 Barry, 871 N.W.2d at 749.
The plain language of the immunity statute, section 260E.34(a)(1), provides in
relevant part that, “a person making a voluntary or mandated report under this chapter” is
immune from liability that might otherwise result from reporting if the person was “acting
in good faith.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.34(a)(1). The Thormodsons argue that the phrase
“under this chapter” as used in section 260E.34(a)(1) should be construed narrowly to grant
immunity to a mandatory reporter only when that person makes a report “immediately.”
In support of their argument, they note that mandatory reporters are required by section
260E.06(a) to report “immediately” to designated authorities if the reporter knows or has
reason to believe a child is being maltreated. As noted above, the term “immediately” as
used in chapter 260E means “as soon as possible but in no event longer than 24 hours.”
Minn. Stat. § 260E.03, subd. 9. The Thormodsons contend that if a mandated report is not
made immediately, then the mandated report is not made “under this chapter” for purposes
of section 260E.34(a)(1) and the reporter is not statutorily immune from liability for their
actions. We are not persuaded.
The Thormodsons’ argument focuses on the timing of a mandated report made
under chapter 260E, not whether the mandated report itself was made “under this chapter.”
There is no language in section 260E.34(a)(1) that limits immunity for mandatory reporters
12 solely to mandated reports made “immediately.” Rather, the language of section
260E.34(a)(1) provides a general grant of immunity to “a person making a voluntary or
mandated report under this chapter” provided “the person is acting in good faith.” Minn.
Stat. § 260E.34(a)(1). The phrase “under this chapter” is not defined in chapter 260E, but
the phrase has been interpreted broadly by the supreme court in other contexts to mean
pursuant to the chapter. See, e.g., In re Civ. Commitment of Swope, 26 N.W.3d 275, 281,
283, 285-86 (Minn. 2025) (holding that habeas corpus and mandamus petitions constituted
proceedings under Minnesota Statutes chapter 253B for the purpose of the appointed-
counsel statute; noting that dictionary definitions of “under” include, among others,
“pursuant to,” “subject to,” or “required by”). And a report made to the proper authorities
by a mandatory reporter who knows or has reason to believe a child is being maltreated is
a report made pursuant to or subject to chapter 260E, even if it is not made immediately.
We therefore conclude that the plain language of section 260E.34(a)(1) does not limit the
RMMA’s grant of immunity for mandated reports under chapter 260E to reports made
within a specific period of time as argued by the Thormodsons.
To construe the statute otherwise and read a time limitation into it would be
inconsistent with its plain language. If the legislature had intended to impose a time
limitation on a reporter’s eligibility to receive immunity, it would have included such
language in section 260E.34(a)(1). It did not do so. And it is well-established that courts
“cannot add language to a statute; rather, [they] must apply the plain language of the statute
as written.” Firefighters Union Loc. 4725 v. City of Brainerd, 934 N.W.2d 101, 109
(Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted); see also Green Giant Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue,
13 534 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn. 1995) (“We will not supply that which the legislature
purposefully omits or inadvertently overlooks.”).
Although not necessary to our plain-language analysis, we note that our
interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the RMMA: “to protect children whose
health or welfare may be jeopardized through maltreatment.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.01. Our
interpretation fulfills the underlying purpose of the statute by encouraging reports to “make
the home, school, and community safe for children.” Id.
Moreover, the facts here showcase the risk of reading a time limitation into section
260E.34(a)(1) for mandatory reporters. Zehnder testified at her deposition that, although
she received training on the school’s mandated-reporter policy, she had never before made
a report under this policy. For that reason, Zehnder sought advice from an experienced
colleague on September 19 about how to proceed after observing what she believed was a
bruise on B.O. According to her colleague, Zehnder was “shook up” and asked if she
needed to make a report. Zehnder’s colleague did not know whether Zehnder’s concerns
rose to the level of requiring a mandated report and suggested that Zehnder speak with the
school counselor. Zehnder sought out the school counselor but had difficulty locating her
because the counselor “was out of [her] office a lot that week.” Zehnder found the
counselor on September 22 and discussed how to make a report. Zehnder then made a
report the same day after receiving direction from the counselor. To deny statutory
immunity to an individual making a report in this situation would be inconsistent with the
purpose of the statute to encourage reporting to “protect children and promote child safety.”
Id.
14 We acknowledge the Minnesota Supreme Court’s statement that “statutorily created
immunity should be construed narrowly.” Bol v. Cole, 561 N.W.2d 143, 147 (Minn. 1997).
In Bol, the supreme court considered the breadth of statutory immunity under a previous
version of the statute. Id. at 145-48. The mandatory reporter, a psychologist, reported an
incident of suspected abuse to the appropriate reporting authority but then also shared the
report with the child’s mother. Id. at 145. The alleged abuser sued the reporter for
defamation. Id. The version of the RMMA in effect at the time provided immunity from
liability for reports made to the appropriate authorities of suspected child abuse if the
reporter acted “in good faith.” Id. at 147. The supreme court narrowly construed this grant
of immunity to only those reports that complied with the statute. Id. Consequently, the
supreme court concluded that, while a report made to “the local welfare agency, police
department, or sheriff” was within the scope of the immunity provision, a report made to a
child’s parent was not. Id.; see also J.E.B., 785 N.W.2d at 753 (reiterating the holding in
Bol that the reporting statute did not grant immunity to reporters “who disclose potentially
defamatory information to third parties”).
Bol is distinguishable from the case presented here. Bol concerned a mandatory
reporter’s report to a third party. The supreme court’s holding reinforced the principle that
a reporter is immune for a report made to the proper authorities. Bol, 561 N.W.2d at 147.
Here, it is uncontested that Zehnder made her report to the proper authorities, and there are
no allegations that she disclosed confidential information to a third party. Zehnder
acknowledged that she spoke with a colleague about whether to make a report. But
Zehnder presented evidence demonstrating, and the Thormodsons do not contest, that she
15 did not discuss the details of her observations with this colleague. This undisputed fact
distinguishes the present case from Bol, in which the reporter sought to expand immunity
to include sharing confidential information with the child’s parent, which was not protected
under the reporting statute. Id. at 145, 147. Zehnder is not attempting to expand immunity
here, as the reporter did in Bol. Rather, Zehnder is seeking immunity for making a report
to the proper authorities. Given this factual distinction, Bol does not persuade us to reverse.
Based on the plain language of the statute, and consistent with the clear legislative
intent to protect the most vulnerable members of society, we hold that statutory immunity
under section 260E.34(a)(1) extends to a person who, in good faith, makes a mandated
report under chapter 260E, even if the report is not made immediately. Accordingly, the
district court did not err in determining that the timing of Zehnder’s report did not foreclose
summary judgment in favor of Zehnder as a person making a mandated report under
chapter 260E.
B. The RMMA does not prohibit a mandatory reporter from making a voluntary report under the RMMA.
Even assuming we were to agree with the Thormodsons’ argument that Zehnder’s
report is not “a mandated report under [chapter 260E]” because it was not made
immediately, we would still conclude that section 260E.34(a)(1) grants statutory immunity
to Zehnder as a person making a voluntary report provided the undisputed facts show the
report was made in good faith. This is because the plain language of section 260E.34(a)(1)
grants immunity not just to persons making mandated reports but also to persons making
voluntary reports under chapter 260E in good faith. Minn. Stat. § 260E.34(a)(1).
16 Voluntary reports under the RMMA are governed by section 260E.06,
subdivision 2. That section provides that “[a]ny person may voluntarily report” to the
proper authorities “if the person knows, has reason to believe, or suspects a child is being
or has been maltreated.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.06, subd. 2 (emphasis added). The voluntary-
reporting provision, like the provision governing mandated reports, encompasses reports
made when the “person knows” or “has reason to believe a child is being maltreated.” Id.,
subds. 1-2. The voluntary-reporting provision also encompasses reports made when the
person “suspects” maltreatment of a child. Compare id., subd. 1(a) (requiring reporting by
a mandated reporter “who knows or has reason to believe” a child was maltreated), with
subd. 2 (permitting a voluntary report by “[a]ny person” who “knows, has reason to believe,
or suspects” maltreatment). Additionally, the provision governing voluntary reports does
not require a report to be made “immediately” or include any time restriction. Id., subd. 2.
Consequently, even assuming Zehnder’s report is not “a mandated report under
[chapter 260E]” because it was not made immediately, Zehnder’s report qualifies as a
voluntary report because she made the report to the proper authorities and a voluntary
report may be made by “any person.” See id., subds. 1-2. There is no language in section
260E.06 precluding a mandatory reporter from making a voluntary report. Id. Similarly,
nothing in section 260E.34(a)(1) precludes a mandatory reporter from receiving statutory
immunity if the person makes a voluntary report under section 260E.06, subdivision 2.
Minn. Stat. § 260E.34(a)(1). Rather, as discussed above, section 260E.34(a)(1) grants
immunity to “a person making a voluntary or mandated report under this chapter” “if the
person is acting in good faith.” Id.
17 We therefore hold that statutory immunity under section 260E.34(a)(1) extends to a
person who makes a voluntary report under chapter 260E, in good faith, regardless of
whether the person is also a mandatory reporter. And, for the reasons discussed above, we
conclude that there is no disputed issue of material fact that Zehnder made a “voluntary or
mandated report” within the meaning of section 260E.34(a)(1). We next consider whether
there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the report was made in good faith.
II. Good faith under the RMMA is established if a report is made without ulterior motive, without malice, and for a proper purpose.
The Thormodsons argue there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether
Zehnder acted “in good faith” when she made the report, requiring reversal of the grant of
summary judgment. We disagree.
“A person making a voluntary or mandated report under” chapter 260E is “immune
from any civil or criminal liability that otherwise might result” from making the report “if
the person is acting in good faith.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.34(a)(1). Zehnder bears the burden
of showing that she is statutorily immune. See J.E.B., 785 N.W.2d at 746 (providing that
the party asserting immunity bears the burden of “establish[ing] all of the requisite facts”
entitling the party to immunity).
The RMMA does not define “good faith.” See Minn. Stat. § 260E.03 (providing
definitions for purposes of chapter 260E). But, in J.E.B., the supreme court interpreted the
phrase “good faith” as used in a previous version of the RMMA. 785 N.W.2d at 745-46
(citing Minn. Stat. § 626.556 (2008)). Like the current version of the RMMA, the previous
version granted immunity to a “person making a voluntary or mandated report” if the
18 person was “acting in good faith.” Compare Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 4 (cited in
J.E.B.), with Minn. Stat. § 260E.34(a)(1). Because the current RMMA statutory-immunity
provision uses the same operative language as the prior version, we turn to J.E.B. for
guidance regarding the meaning of “good faith.” See Minn. Stat. § 645.37 (2024) (“When
a law is repealed and its provisions are at the same time reenacted in the same or
substantially the same terms by the repealing law, the earlier law shall be construed as
continued in active operation.”); see also Mankato Citizens Tel. Co. v. Comm’r of Tax’n,
145 N.W.2d 313, 317 (Minn. 1966) (noting that “a revision of an existing statute
is presumed not to change its meaning, even if there be alterations in the phraseology,
unless such intention to change the law clearly appears from the language of the revised
statute” (quotation omitted)).
In J.E.B., the supreme court considered the scope of the immunity provision and
whether there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether a reporter acted in
good faith when filing a report of suspected abuse to authorities. 785 N.W.2d at 750-51.
The supreme court noted that the statutory scheme in the RMMA “protects a good faith
reporter with statutory immunity . . . , while subjecting a malicious reporter who
‘knowingly or recklessly makes a false report’ to liability.” Id. at 749. The supreme court
emphasized that, “[g]enerally speaking, good faith is a matter of subjective intent.” Id. To
ascertain the meaning of the phrase “good faith” as used in the RMMA, the supreme court
looked to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defined “good faith” in part as “[a] state of mind
consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, [and] (2) faithfulness to one’s duty or
obligation.” Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 762 (9th ed. 2009)). And the supreme
19 court noted that courts from other states “have utilized this common understanding of ‘good
faith’ when interpreting the requirement in the context of immunity under their states’
child-abuse-reporting statutes.” Id.
On this basis, the supreme court concluded that the “common understanding of
‘good faith’ should apply within the context of [the RMMA].” Id. at 750. And it explained
that, “[u]nder this standard, the relevant question is whether the reporter honestly believed
she had a duty to report.” Id. at 749 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, “a report made
without an ulterior motive, made without malice and made for a proper purpose would be
a report made in good faith.” Id. at 750. The supreme court further clarified that a reporter
acting in good faith will be immune even if she is negligent or exercises bad judgment. Id.;
see also Rosati v. Pine County, 460 F. Supp. 3d 846, 862 (D. Minn. 2020) (“Minnesota
courts construe good faith liberally so as to encourage people to come forward with reports
without fear of reprisal.” (quotation omitted)). 6 But “filing a report that is knowingly or
recklessly false will defeat a showing of good faith.” J.E.B., 785 N.W.2d at 749. Such a
report necessarily is made with malice and without a proper purpose. See id. at 749-50;
see also Riley v. Jankowski, 713 N.W.2d 379, 398 (Minn. App. 2006) (stating that malice
includes defamatory statements made “with knowledge that the publication was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied
(Minn. July 19, 2006).
6 A federal decision interpreting Minnesota law is not binding precedent, but the decision may have persuasive value. Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 330 (Minn. 2000).
20 Because the current statutory-immunity provision in the RMMA includes the same
“good faith” requirement as the prior version and maintains the same purpose of protecting
reporters who make a good-faith report of suspected or known maltreatment, we conclude
that the phrase “good faith” as used in section 260E.34(a)(1) has the same meaning as in
the prior version at issue in J.E.B. Based on the supreme court’s interpretation of the phrase
“good faith” from J.E.B., we hold that good faith, for the purpose of statutory immunity
under section 260E.34(a)(1), is established if the report is made without an ulterior motive,
without malice, and for a proper purpose. We next apply that holding to the facts of this
case.
Our analysis of whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to Zehnder’s
good faith when she made her report hinges on Zehnder’s subjective purpose for making a
report to the authorities after observing what she believed was a bruise on B.O. See J.E.B.,
785 N.W.2d at 749. Zehnder testified in her deposition that she made the report because
she was “doing [her] job” and believed it was her responsibility to report signs of child
abuse or neglect. She explained that she waited a few days to report because she had never
filed a report before and wanted to be sure she was “doing the right thing.” Zehnder’s
counsel asked her why she reported her observations, given that she did not know the cause
of B.O.’s bruise. Zehnder responded, “I was worried about the child.” Zehnder’s
testimony supports a determination that she acted in good faith because she “honestly
believed she had a duty to report.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Further, nothing in the record contradicts Zehnder’s testimony that her motive was
to fulfill her responsibilities and help the child. Zehnder’s colleague testified that Zehnder
21 seemed “all shook up” when seeking advice. The school counselor described Zehnder as
“worried,” “nervous,” and “unsure of . . . what steps she needed to take.” The counselor
stated that she did not believe Zehnder would make a false maltreatment report because
she seemed “sincere and genuine” and the counselor did not “have any reason to believe
that she was lying or made this up.” We conclude that, for purposes of summary judgment,
Zehnder adduced sufficient evidence to meet her burden of showing that she is statutorily
immune.
The Thormodsons have not presented any evidence to demonstrate otherwise. The
Thormodsons asserted in the amended complaint that Zehnder knowingly and recklessly
made a false report alleging that B.O. had a bruise. But, following discovery, they failed
to produce any evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
Zehnder acted in good faith when she made the report, much less demonstrating that
Zehnder made a knowingly or recklessly false report.
The Thormodsons admit that they have no evidence that Zehnder acted in bad faith,
with malice, or for an improper purpose when she made the report. During John
Thormodson’s deposition, counsel asked him what evidence he had to support the
contention that Zehnder acted in bad faith. John Thormodson could not identify any
evidence, beyond his mere assertion that Zehnder must have been acting in bad faith
because Brenda Thormodson told him B.O. did not have a bruise. John Thormodson
conceded that he did not believe that the mandated report “specifically singled [him] out
as causing the alleged harm to [B.O.].” Zehnder’s counsel inquired, “On what basis do
you claim that Ms. Zehnder acted with malice?” John Thormodson responded, “I would
22 figure that . . . she should have known by making that phone call [to the county] that
somebody’s lives were going to be affected out of it.” Brenda Thormodson likewise failed
to identify any evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on the lack of good faith.
Brenda Thormodson stated that she was not claiming that Zehnder had an “ulterior motive”
in filing the report. She did not recall why the amended complaint accused Zehnder of
acting with “malice.” And Brenda Thormodson stated that there was nothing in particular
that made her think Zehnder acted with bad intentions. Brenda Thormodson agreed that
Zehnder did not “preplan” to submit a maltreatment report, and she did not dispute
Zehnder’s statement that Zehnder reported what she perceived as a bruise because she
“didn’t know what to do.” Brenda Thormodson also did not dispute Zehnder’s statement
that she filed a report “based on concerns she ha[d] for [B.O.].”
Good faith is a subjective standard. Id. at 749. The Thormodsons’ only evidence
suggesting a lack of good faith are statements from Brenda Thormodson and B.O.’s aunt
that they did not see a bruise on B.O. But these statements—even construed as true for the
purposes of our de novo review—are insufficient to withstand summary judgment as to
whether Zehnder acted in good faith. See, e.g., id. (noting that a reporter is acting in good
faith even if the reporter exercises bad judgment); see also DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d
60, 71 (Minn. 1997) (stating that it is not sufficient for the nonmoving party to rely on
“evidence which merely creates a metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue”).
The Thormodsons failed to offer any evidence that Zehnder had an ulterior motive,
acted with malice, or made her report for an improper purpose. See J.E.B., 785 N.W.2d at
750. Indeed, John and Brenda Thormodsons’ statements during their depositions—
23 acknowledging that they had no evidence that Zehnder acted in bad faith, with malice, or
for an improper purpose—defeat their assertion to the contrary. Similarly, the
Thormodsons have presented no evidence that Zehnder knowingly or recklessly made a
false report or that she would have any reason to do so. Instead, they rely on mere
speculation. On summary judgment, a party “may not simply rest on [their] pleadings, but
must produce affirmative evidence to show an issue of material fact.” Brookfield Trade
Ctr., Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 609 N.W.2d 868, 874 (Minn. 2000). “Mere speculation,
without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.” Bob
Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben, 505 N.W.2d 323, 328 (Minn. 1993); see also
Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Minn. 2002) (requiring more than “unverified
and conclusory allegations”). In the absence of any evidence that supports the
Thormodsons’ accusation that Zehnder did not report in good faith but instead knowingly
or recklessly made a false report, we agree with the district court that there are no genuine
issues of material fact and Zehnder is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on
the basis of statutory immunity. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not
err by granting summary judgment in Zehnder’s favor and we affirm.
DECISION
Under section 260E.34(a)(1), statutory immunity extends to a person who makes a
mandated report under chapter 260E, in good faith, even if the report is not made
immediately. Statutory immunity under section 260E.34(a)(1) also extends to a person
who makes a voluntary report under chapter 260E, in good faith, regardless of whether the
person is also a mandatory reporter. Good faith is a subjective standard and is established
24 if a report is made without an ulterior motive, without malice, and for a proper purpose.
Because the plain language of the immunity provision does not articulate a time restriction
and the Thormodsons failed to present evidence to withstand summary judgment on the
question of Zehnder’s good-faith reporting, we conclude that the district court did not err
by granting summary judgment in favor of Zehnder on the basis of statutory immunity and
properly entered judgment against the Thormodsons.
Affirmed.