Mallett, J.
The present case involves the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation. We hold that the bureau has jurisdiction and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
The Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation addressed the current dispute on a brief stipulation of facts that Willie Boyd was an Illinois resident, that he entered into a contract of employment in Michigan, that while executing his duties pursuant to the contract he sustained a personal injury and died in Indiana, and that the injury and death arose out of and in the course of his employment.
[517]*517Boyd’s widow filed a petition for benefits with the bureau. The magistrate dismissed the claim for want of jurisdiction, and the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal, which this Court then granted. 441 Mich 931 (1993).
II
Section 845 of the workers’ compensation act grants extraterritorial jurisdiction to the Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation over claims resulting from injuries that occur outside Michigan.
The bureau shall have jurisdiction over all controversies arising out of injuries suffered outside this state where the injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of injury and the contract of hire was made in this state. Such employee or his dependents shall be entitled to the compensation and other benefits provided by this act. [MCL 418.845; MSA 17.237(845).]
In addition, the act broadly defines employees covered by the act.
Every person performing service in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of an employer at the time of the injury, provided the person in relation to this service does not maintain a separate business, does not hold himself or herself out to and render service to the public, and is not an employer subject to this act. [MCL 418.161(l)(d); MSA 17.237(161)(l)(d).]
Juxtaposed against these statutory provisions is Roberts v IXL Glass Corp, 259 Mich 644; 244 NW 188 (1932), the landmark case interpreting an [518]*518earlier version of § 845 and enunciating the Michigan rule of law regarding extraterritoriality. In Roberts, the plaintiff contracted for employment in Michigan with a resident corporation. However, he resided, performed all services, and received his injury outside Michigan. The defendant argued that the statutory requirement1
2of residency in the state at the time of the injury limited the jurisdiction of the industry accident board and, for that reason, the board lacked jurisdiction.
This Court disagreed, and concluded that the claimant was entitled to compensation even though he was not a Michigan resident.
[W]e are satisfied that the reasonable construction and the one necessary to carry out the legislative intent appearing from the whole act is that it covers nonresident as well as resident employees in those cases wherein the contract of employment is entered into in this State with a resident employer.[2]
The Court interpreted the jurisdictional provision in pari materia with the respective statutory provisions broadly defining the term “employee”3 and [519]*519setting forth the scope of the statute’s coverage.4
[Defendant’s] contention [regarding residency] would come with much, if not controlling, force if it were not in conflict with other portions of the statute. It is quite significant that this recital as to the employee being a resident at the time of injury was embodied by the amendment in the procedural part (part 3) of the act only; but was not inserted in the part of the act (part 1) which defines and fixes the rights and liabilities of employers and employees. . . . Further, the quoted portion of section 6[5] seems conclusive of the fact that the original enactment was intended to cover "all employees” regardless of residence or the locus of the accident. [Roberts, supra at 647.]
This Court further noted that the statute expressly provided for compensation to the dependents of a fatally injured employee regardless of the residence of the dependents. "As a matter of legislative policy it would be quite inconsistent”6 to deny compensation to an injured employee because he was a nonresident, while awarding compensation to the dependents of a fatally injured employee regardless of residence.
At the time this Court decided Roberts, the workers’ compensation act was elective, that is, an employer was not automatically subject to the act’s provisions. However, the Legislature [520]*520amended the act in 1943, making it compulsory.7 Shortly after the 1943 amendment, this Court addressed the jurisdictional provision of the act but failed to mention Roberts. See Cline v Byrne Doors, Inc, 324 Mich 540; 37 NW2d 630 (1949); Daniels v Trailer Transport Co, 327 Mich 525; 42 NW2d 828 (1950). The omission of Roberts from the analyses of those cases is fathomable; Cline and Daniels are distinguishable from Roberts in that they involved claims for additional benefits under the act after the employee first obtained compensation from the state where the injury occurred.
Some time later, in Austin v W Biddle Walker Co, 11 Mich App 311; 161 NW2d 150 (1968), the Court of Appeals reaffirmed Roberts. Austin was a Kentucky resident who contracted in Michigan with a Michigan corporation. Austin worked for a brief period in Michigan, but was transferred to Kentucky, where he sustained an injury. The wcab found that because the contract of employment was entered into in Michigan, the board had jurisdiction pursuant to Roberts. The Court of Appeals affirmed and concluded that statutory amendments making the act compulsory had no eifect on the holding in Roberts.8 Judge Levin dissented because of his disagreement with the majority’s emphasis on the place of contracting. Nonetheless, he persuasively asserted that strict adherence to the residency requirement in § 845 is neither warranted nor desirable.
It is now 35 years since Roberts was decided. Whatever may have been the legislative intention at the time of adoption of the residency require[521]*521ment (CL 1948, § 413.19 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.193]), it would be inappropriate at this late date to attempt to breathe new life into a statutory provision which was aborted so long ago. If the legislature desired to insist on a residency requirement, it could have done so at any time within the last 35 years; it was inferentially invited to do so in Roberts, p 649.[9]
Despite the continued vitality of Roberts as recognized in Austin, the Court of Appeals has begun to interpret § 845 in contravention of Roberts. In Wolf v Ethyl Corp, 124 Mich App 368; 335 NW2d 42 (1983), the plaintiff was hired in Michigan by a Virginia corporation. Following a transfer to and while working in New York, the plaintiff resided in Connecticut.
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Mallett, J.
The present case involves the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation. We hold that the bureau has jurisdiction and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
The Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation addressed the current dispute on a brief stipulation of facts that Willie Boyd was an Illinois resident, that he entered into a contract of employment in Michigan, that while executing his duties pursuant to the contract he sustained a personal injury and died in Indiana, and that the injury and death arose out of and in the course of his employment.
[517]*517Boyd’s widow filed a petition for benefits with the bureau. The magistrate dismissed the claim for want of jurisdiction, and the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal, which this Court then granted. 441 Mich 931 (1993).
II
Section 845 of the workers’ compensation act grants extraterritorial jurisdiction to the Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation over claims resulting from injuries that occur outside Michigan.
The bureau shall have jurisdiction over all controversies arising out of injuries suffered outside this state where the injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of injury and the contract of hire was made in this state. Such employee or his dependents shall be entitled to the compensation and other benefits provided by this act. [MCL 418.845; MSA 17.237(845).]
In addition, the act broadly defines employees covered by the act.
Every person performing service in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of an employer at the time of the injury, provided the person in relation to this service does not maintain a separate business, does not hold himself or herself out to and render service to the public, and is not an employer subject to this act. [MCL 418.161(l)(d); MSA 17.237(161)(l)(d).]
Juxtaposed against these statutory provisions is Roberts v IXL Glass Corp, 259 Mich 644; 244 NW 188 (1932), the landmark case interpreting an [518]*518earlier version of § 845 and enunciating the Michigan rule of law regarding extraterritoriality. In Roberts, the plaintiff contracted for employment in Michigan with a resident corporation. However, he resided, performed all services, and received his injury outside Michigan. The defendant argued that the statutory requirement1
2of residency in the state at the time of the injury limited the jurisdiction of the industry accident board and, for that reason, the board lacked jurisdiction.
This Court disagreed, and concluded that the claimant was entitled to compensation even though he was not a Michigan resident.
[W]e are satisfied that the reasonable construction and the one necessary to carry out the legislative intent appearing from the whole act is that it covers nonresident as well as resident employees in those cases wherein the contract of employment is entered into in this State with a resident employer.[2]
The Court interpreted the jurisdictional provision in pari materia with the respective statutory provisions broadly defining the term “employee”3 and [519]*519setting forth the scope of the statute’s coverage.4
[Defendant’s] contention [regarding residency] would come with much, if not controlling, force if it were not in conflict with other portions of the statute. It is quite significant that this recital as to the employee being a resident at the time of injury was embodied by the amendment in the procedural part (part 3) of the act only; but was not inserted in the part of the act (part 1) which defines and fixes the rights and liabilities of employers and employees. . . . Further, the quoted portion of section 6[5] seems conclusive of the fact that the original enactment was intended to cover "all employees” regardless of residence or the locus of the accident. [Roberts, supra at 647.]
This Court further noted that the statute expressly provided for compensation to the dependents of a fatally injured employee regardless of the residence of the dependents. "As a matter of legislative policy it would be quite inconsistent”6 to deny compensation to an injured employee because he was a nonresident, while awarding compensation to the dependents of a fatally injured employee regardless of residence.
At the time this Court decided Roberts, the workers’ compensation act was elective, that is, an employer was not automatically subject to the act’s provisions. However, the Legislature [520]*520amended the act in 1943, making it compulsory.7 Shortly after the 1943 amendment, this Court addressed the jurisdictional provision of the act but failed to mention Roberts. See Cline v Byrne Doors, Inc, 324 Mich 540; 37 NW2d 630 (1949); Daniels v Trailer Transport Co, 327 Mich 525; 42 NW2d 828 (1950). The omission of Roberts from the analyses of those cases is fathomable; Cline and Daniels are distinguishable from Roberts in that they involved claims for additional benefits under the act after the employee first obtained compensation from the state where the injury occurred.
Some time later, in Austin v W Biddle Walker Co, 11 Mich App 311; 161 NW2d 150 (1968), the Court of Appeals reaffirmed Roberts. Austin was a Kentucky resident who contracted in Michigan with a Michigan corporation. Austin worked for a brief period in Michigan, but was transferred to Kentucky, where he sustained an injury. The wcab found that because the contract of employment was entered into in Michigan, the board had jurisdiction pursuant to Roberts. The Court of Appeals affirmed and concluded that statutory amendments making the act compulsory had no eifect on the holding in Roberts.8 Judge Levin dissented because of his disagreement with the majority’s emphasis on the place of contracting. Nonetheless, he persuasively asserted that strict adherence to the residency requirement in § 845 is neither warranted nor desirable.
It is now 35 years since Roberts was decided. Whatever may have been the legislative intention at the time of adoption of the residency require[521]*521ment (CL 1948, § 413.19 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.193]), it would be inappropriate at this late date to attempt to breathe new life into a statutory provision which was aborted so long ago. If the legislature desired to insist on a residency requirement, it could have done so at any time within the last 35 years; it was inferentially invited to do so in Roberts, p 649.[9]
Despite the continued vitality of Roberts as recognized in Austin, the Court of Appeals has begun to interpret § 845 in contravention of Roberts. In Wolf v Ethyl Corp, 124 Mich App 368; 335 NW2d 42 (1983), the plaintiff was hired in Michigan by a Virginia corporation. Following a transfer to and while working in New York, the plaintiff resided in Connecticut. The plaintiff subsequently sustained injuries in a work-related car accident in New York and filed for disability benefits in Michigan. The wcab concluded that the plaintiff’s nonresidence in Michigan at the time of the accident precluded jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed and held that the clear and unambiguous language of § 845 requires both that the injured employee be a resident of Michigan at the time of injury and that the employment contract was consummated in Michigan.
We find that the case of Roberts v IXL Glass Corp, 259 Mich 644; 244 NW 188 (1932), which can be read as suggesting a different result, is not applicable to today’s modern mandatory workers’ compensation scheme. . . . The present statutory scheme has been made mandatory and has been revised and refined. Being bound not to usurp legislative power, see Const 1963, art 3, § 2; Michigan Harness Horsemen’s Ass’n [v Racing Comm’r, 123 Mich App 388; 333 NW2d 292 (1983)], we must [522]*522apply the clear legislative mandate of the modern act’s jurisdictional provisions![10]
The Court then retreated from announcing a new bright line rule by limiting the holding to the facts in that case, because "[q]uestions of residency, dual residency or temporary domicile to perform contractual employment must await case-by-case interpretation.” Wolf, supra at 370.
A few years later, the Court of Appeals followed Wolf in a similar case. In Hall v Chrysler Corp, 172 Mich App 670; 432 NW2d 398 (1988), reconsideration den 432 Mich 931 (1989), the plaintiff was hired in Michigan and later accepted a transfer to Delaware. While working and residing in Delaware, the plaintiff alleged a disabling personal injury and filed for benefits. The wcab dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Because of the different nature of the 1912 Workers’ Compensation Act, the Wolf Court held the Roberts decision to be inapplicable to the plain language of the Michigan wdca. We agree with the reasoning contained in the Wolf decision and find that a person must be a resident of the state at the time of the injury and be subject to the terms of an employment contract entered into in Michigan.[11]
III
Wolf and Hall indicate that Roberts is no longer controlling because of amendments made in the workers’ compensation act after Roberts was decided. Specifically, those cases suggest that because [523]*523Roberts was decided at a time when the act was elective, Roberts is no longer valid. However, as the Court of Appeals noted in Austin, the relevant portion of the act has remained unchanged. The fact that the act became compulsory subsequent to Roberts is irrelevant; the requirements of § 845 have remained intact. Accordingly, Wolf and Hall may be reduced to the conclusion that Roberts is no longer valid precedent because it is "too old.”
As the Court of Appeals repeatedly noted, it is the Supreme Court’s obligation to overrule or modify case law if it becomes obsolete, and until this Court takes such action, the Court of Appeals and all lower courts are bound by that authority. Edwards v Clinton Valley Center, 138 Mich App 312; 360 NW2d 606 (1984); McMillan v Michigan State Hwy Comm, 130 Mich App 630; 344 NW2d 26 (1983); Ratliff v General Motors Corp, 127 Mich App 410; 339 NW2d 196 (1983); Schwartz v City of Flint (After Remand), 120 Mich App 449; 329 NW2d 26 (1982), rev’d on other grounds 426 Mich 295; 395 NW2d 678 (1986). While the Court of Appeals may properly express its belief that a decision of this Court was wrongly decided or is no longer viable, that conclusion does not excuse the Court of Appeals from applying the decision to the case before it. People v Mitchell, 428 Mich 364; 408 NW2d 798 (1987). Because this Court has never overruled Roberts, it remains valid precedent. The rule of law regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction as expressed in Roberts should have been applied by the bureau in the present case.
If the allegedly "out-dated” Roberts decision is overruled by this Court, then a significant gap in coverage will exist in this state’s compensation scheme. Specifically, all Michigan employees who suffer an out-of-state injury in the course of their employment and who reside in neighboring states [524]*524will not be subject to the bureau’s jurisdiction.12 We believe that such a jurisdictional scheme is not only undesirable but also unduly restrictive. As Professor Larson notes,
In the majority of states, the local statute will be applied if the place of injury, or the place of hiring, or the place of employment relation is within the state. Two-thirds of the states will take jurisdiction of out-of-state injuries if either the place of hiring or the place of employment relation is within the state. These two factors figure in most of the other states in different combinations.[13]
Roberts remains an effective means of retaining a fair and consistent scheme for extraterritorial jurisdiction. This Court has stated that a court will not overrule a decision deliberately made unless the Court is convinced not merely that the case was wrongly decided, but also that less injury would result from overruling than from following it. Dolby v State Hwy Comm’r, 283 Mich 609; 278 NW 694 (1938). Clearly, because of the gap in [525]*525coverage that would result, overruling Roberts would cause a far greater injury than allowing Roberts to stand.
The dissent’s assertion that Roberts was wrongly decided and contrary to the plain meaning of the statute14 does not change the fact that the Legislature has acquiesced in extraterritorial jurisdiction as expressed in Roberts for over sixty years, despite numerous opportunities in the statutory history of the workers’ compensation act to amend § 845. This Court has stated that the doctrine of stare decisis applies with full force to decisions construing statutes or ordinances, especially where the Legislature acquiesces in the Court’s construction through the continued use of or failure to change the language of a construed statute. Consumers Power Co v Muskegon Co, 346 Mich 243; 78 NW2d 223 (1956).15 In Dean v Chrysler Corp, 434 Mich 655, 664; 455 NW2d 699 (1990), we stated,
When, over a period of many years, the Legislature has acquiesced in this Court’s construction of a statute, the judicial power to change that interpretation ought to be exercised with great restraint. On more than one occasion our Court has quoted with approval the statement that stare decisis "is especially applicable where the construction placed on a statute by previous decisions has been long acquiesced in by the legislature, by its continued use or failure to change the language of the statute so construed, the power to change the law as interpreted being regarded, in such circumstances, as one to be exercised solely by the [526]*526legislature.” [Consumers Power Co v Muskegon Co, 346 Mich 243, 251; 78 NW2d 223 (1956), quoting 21 CJS, Courts, § 214, pp 388-390. See also In re Clayton Estate, 343 Mich 101, 107; 72 NW2d 1 (1955)].[16]
We further noted that the principles of stare decisis are particularly applicable when the Legislature has reenacted the statutory language without change. Id. at 665. The Legislature has revised the wdca several times but has yet to take any action that would indicate its disapproval of the Roberts interpretation of § 845. Because of its failure to amend § 845, the Legislature has accepted the interpretation of that section given by this Court in Roberts as an important part of the entire workers’ compensation scheme. Thus, we believe that this Court should not disturb the Roberts interpretation.
IV
We conclude that pursuant to § 845 of the workers’ compensation act and Roberts v IXL Glass Corp, supra, the Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation shall have jurisdiction over extraterritorial injuries without regard to the employee’s residence, provided the contract of employment was entered into in this state with a resident employer. In the present case, the bureau erred in failing to find that it had jurisdiction over the [527]*527plaintiff’s claim. As a result, we remand this case to the bureau for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Cavanagh, C.J., and Levin and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Mallett, J.