YOUNG, C.J.
Plaintiff appeals by leave the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Associated Builders & Contractors v City of Lansing.1 Plaintiff claims that the city of Lansing’s Ordinance 206.18(a) is unconstitutional under this Court’s 1923 decision Attorney General ex rel Lennane v Detroit2 and is an unlawful usurpation of state power. The Court of Appeals majority disagreed and ruled that subsequent changes to state law had caused Lennane to be “superseded.” The Court of Appeals erred by exceeding its powers for refusing to follow a decision from this Court that both applied and had not been overruled. Even so, we now take this opportunity to overrule Lennane because subsequent constitutional changes3 have undercut its viability. We therefore vacate the Court of Appeals’ decision but affirm the result for the reasons stated below.
[181]*181FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant, city of Lansing, enacted an ordinance requiring contractors working on city construction contracts to pay employees a prevailing wage. The ordinance states in relevant part:
No contract, agreement or other arrangement for construction on behalf of the City and involving mechanics and laborers, including truck drivers of the contractor and/or subcontractors, employed directly upon the site of the work, shall be approved and executed by the City unless the contractor and his or her subcontractors furnish proof and agree that such mechanics and laborers so employed shall receive at least the prevailing wages and fringe benefits for corresponding classes of mechanics and laborers, as determined by statistics compiled by the United States Department of Labor and related to the Greater Lansing area by such Department.[4]
Plaintiff, a trade association, filed suit against Lansing, arguing that the ordinance is unconstitutional because municipalities do not have the authority to adopt laws regulating the wages paid by third parties, even where the relevant work is done on municipal contracts paid for with municipal funds. Plaintiff relies primarily on this Court’s 1923 Lennane decision, which held that, under this state’s 1908 Constitution, the city of Detroit could not enact an essentially analogous ordinance and related city charter provision.5 In response, defendant argued that the legal landscape, particularly the ratification of a new constitution in 1963, had changed so radically that Lennane was no longer relevant in determining the question at hand. The trial court granted summary disposition to plaintiff, ruling that Lennane made it clear that the regu[182]*182lation of wages was a matter of state, not municipal, concern under the Michigan Constitution6 and the Home Rule Act,7 though it did take note of Lennane’s “archaic nature.”
The Court of Appeals panel reversed the lower court in a published, split decision.8 Although the panel majority stated that its opinion “neither overrule[s] Lennane nor deviate [s] from the rule of stare decisis,”9 the majority nevertheless ruled that changes in the legal landscape had, in fact, rendered Lennane obsolete and inapplicable. The panel stated that “the founda[183]*183tion upon which Lennane stood has been rejected by our Supreme Court.”10 One judge dissented, arguing that the majority was unlawfully striking down a decision by this Court because Lennane had never been overruled—either implicitly or explicitly—or rendered inapplicable. The dissenting opinion stated:
[T]he Court’s conclusion in Lennane that this is a matter of state concern has never been overruled. Therefore . .. defendant’s powers ... do not extend to this ordinance until and unless the Supreme Court revisits its conclusion in Lennane, or the Legislature explicitly grants cities the power to adopt prevailing wage ordinances.[11]
This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo both questions of constitutional law and a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.12
ANALYSIS
We take this opportunity to overrule Lennane. Len-nane’s conception of municipal power may or may not have been well-grounded in Michigan’s 1908 Constitution and the legal landscape of the time, but it is certainly incongruent with the state of our law as reflected in our current Constitution. We therefore conclude that Lennane has no continuing viability in light of the adoption of our 1963 Constitution.
[184]*184The 1908 Constitution read in relevant part:
Under such general laws, the electors of each city and village shall have power to frame, adopt, and amend its charter,. .. and, through its regularly constituted authority, to pass all laws and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, subject to the Constitution and general laws of this state.[13]
Interpreting this constitutional provision, the Len-nane Court held that the regulation of wages paid to third-party employees working on municipal construction contracts was exclusively a matter of “state,” not “municipal,” concern.14 Quoting liberally from a 1919 case, Kalamazoo v Titus,15 the Lennane Court stated:
“The charter provision, the ordinance, the argument made for the city, indeed, the suit itself, reflect a popular interest in, and, we conceive, a popular misunderstanding about, the subject of home rule, so-called, in cities. There is apparent a widely spread notion that lately, in some way, cities have become possessed of greatly enlarged powers, the right to exercise which may come from mere assertion of their existence and the purpose to exercise them. Whether these powers are really inherent in the community, but their exercise formerly was restrained, or are derived from a new grant of power by the State, or may be properly ascribed to both inherent right and to a new grant, are questions which do not seem to bother very much the advocates of the doctrine that they in any event exist. On the other hand, there is expression of grave doubt whether, in the view of the law, there has been any [185]*185enlargement or extension of the subjects of municipal legislation and control or of the powers of cities except as those subjects and powers are specifically enumerated and designated in the Constitution itself and in the home rule act.” [16]
By quoting Titus at such length, the Lennane Court appears to have been posing itself a question: under the 1908 Constitution, what, exactly, are the default powers of municipalities? Do municipalities have all powers relating to local concerns that are not expressly denied, or can they wield only those powers expressly and explicitly granted? In concluding that a municipality’s powers did not include the power to enact laws regulating the wages paid to third-party employees working on municipal construction contracts, the
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YOUNG, C.J.
Plaintiff appeals by leave the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Associated Builders & Contractors v City of Lansing.1 Plaintiff claims that the city of Lansing’s Ordinance 206.18(a) is unconstitutional under this Court’s 1923 decision Attorney General ex rel Lennane v Detroit2 and is an unlawful usurpation of state power. The Court of Appeals majority disagreed and ruled that subsequent changes to state law had caused Lennane to be “superseded.” The Court of Appeals erred by exceeding its powers for refusing to follow a decision from this Court that both applied and had not been overruled. Even so, we now take this opportunity to overrule Lennane because subsequent constitutional changes3 have undercut its viability. We therefore vacate the Court of Appeals’ decision but affirm the result for the reasons stated below.
[181]*181FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant, city of Lansing, enacted an ordinance requiring contractors working on city construction contracts to pay employees a prevailing wage. The ordinance states in relevant part:
No contract, agreement or other arrangement for construction on behalf of the City and involving mechanics and laborers, including truck drivers of the contractor and/or subcontractors, employed directly upon the site of the work, shall be approved and executed by the City unless the contractor and his or her subcontractors furnish proof and agree that such mechanics and laborers so employed shall receive at least the prevailing wages and fringe benefits for corresponding classes of mechanics and laborers, as determined by statistics compiled by the United States Department of Labor and related to the Greater Lansing area by such Department.[4]
Plaintiff, a trade association, filed suit against Lansing, arguing that the ordinance is unconstitutional because municipalities do not have the authority to adopt laws regulating the wages paid by third parties, even where the relevant work is done on municipal contracts paid for with municipal funds. Plaintiff relies primarily on this Court’s 1923 Lennane decision, which held that, under this state’s 1908 Constitution, the city of Detroit could not enact an essentially analogous ordinance and related city charter provision.5 In response, defendant argued that the legal landscape, particularly the ratification of a new constitution in 1963, had changed so radically that Lennane was no longer relevant in determining the question at hand. The trial court granted summary disposition to plaintiff, ruling that Lennane made it clear that the regu[182]*182lation of wages was a matter of state, not municipal, concern under the Michigan Constitution6 and the Home Rule Act,7 though it did take note of Lennane’s “archaic nature.”
The Court of Appeals panel reversed the lower court in a published, split decision.8 Although the panel majority stated that its opinion “neither overrule[s] Lennane nor deviate [s] from the rule of stare decisis,”9 the majority nevertheless ruled that changes in the legal landscape had, in fact, rendered Lennane obsolete and inapplicable. The panel stated that “the founda[183]*183tion upon which Lennane stood has been rejected by our Supreme Court.”10 One judge dissented, arguing that the majority was unlawfully striking down a decision by this Court because Lennane had never been overruled—either implicitly or explicitly—or rendered inapplicable. The dissenting opinion stated:
[T]he Court’s conclusion in Lennane that this is a matter of state concern has never been overruled. Therefore . .. defendant’s powers ... do not extend to this ordinance until and unless the Supreme Court revisits its conclusion in Lennane, or the Legislature explicitly grants cities the power to adopt prevailing wage ordinances.[11]
This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo both questions of constitutional law and a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.12
ANALYSIS
We take this opportunity to overrule Lennane. Len-nane’s conception of municipal power may or may not have been well-grounded in Michigan’s 1908 Constitution and the legal landscape of the time, but it is certainly incongruent with the state of our law as reflected in our current Constitution. We therefore conclude that Lennane has no continuing viability in light of the adoption of our 1963 Constitution.
[184]*184The 1908 Constitution read in relevant part:
Under such general laws, the electors of each city and village shall have power to frame, adopt, and amend its charter,. .. and, through its regularly constituted authority, to pass all laws and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, subject to the Constitution and general laws of this state.[13]
Interpreting this constitutional provision, the Len-nane Court held that the regulation of wages paid to third-party employees working on municipal construction contracts was exclusively a matter of “state,” not “municipal,” concern.14 Quoting liberally from a 1919 case, Kalamazoo v Titus,15 the Lennane Court stated:
“The charter provision, the ordinance, the argument made for the city, indeed, the suit itself, reflect a popular interest in, and, we conceive, a popular misunderstanding about, the subject of home rule, so-called, in cities. There is apparent a widely spread notion that lately, in some way, cities have become possessed of greatly enlarged powers, the right to exercise which may come from mere assertion of their existence and the purpose to exercise them. Whether these powers are really inherent in the community, but their exercise formerly was restrained, or are derived from a new grant of power by the State, or may be properly ascribed to both inherent right and to a new grant, are questions which do not seem to bother very much the advocates of the doctrine that they in any event exist. On the other hand, there is expression of grave doubt whether, in the view of the law, there has been any [185]*185enlargement or extension of the subjects of municipal legislation and control or of the powers of cities except as those subjects and powers are specifically enumerated and designated in the Constitution itself and in the home rule act.” [16]
By quoting Titus at such length, the Lennane Court appears to have been posing itself a question: under the 1908 Constitution, what, exactly, are the default powers of municipalities? Do municipalities have all powers relating to local concerns that are not expressly denied, or can they wield only those powers expressly and explicitly granted? In concluding that a municipality’s powers did not include the power to enact laws regulating the wages paid to third-party employees working on municipal construction contracts, the Len-nane Court appears to have chosen the latter answer.
This conclusion finds no support in the 1963 Constitution. Article 7, § 22 of the 1963 Constitution provides:
Under general laws the electors of each city and village shall have the power and authority to frame, adopt and amend its charter, and to amend an existing charter of the city or village heretofore granted or enacted by the legislature for the government of the city or village. Each such city and village shall have power to adopt resolutions and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, property and government, subject to the constitution and law. No enumeration of powers granted to cities and villages in this constitution shall limit or restrict the general grant of authority conferred by this sectionl17-1
Explaining these highlighted changes, the Address to the People states:
[186]*186This is a revision of Sec. 21, Article VIII, of the present [1908] constitution and reflects Michigan’s successful experience with home rule. The new language is a more positive statement of municipal powers, giving home rule cities and villages full power over their own property and government, subject to this constitution and lawf[18]
The 1963 Constitution also contained a new provision, Article 7, § 34:
The provisions of this constitution and law concerning counties, townships, cities and villages shall be liberally construed in their favor. Powers granted to counties and townships by this constitution and by law shall include those fairly implied and not prohibited by this constitution.[19]
If it was ever the case, we conclude that, given the newly added language that expresses the people’s will to give municipalities even greater latitude to conduct their business, there is simply no way to read our current constitutional provisions and reach the conclusion that “there is . . . grave doubt whether. . . there has been any enlargement or extension of the subjects of municipal legislation and control or of the powers of cities except as those subjects and powers are specifically enumerated and designated in the Constitution [187]*187itself and in the home rule act.”20 Under our current Constitution, there is simply no room for doubt about the expanded scope of authority of Michigan’s cities and villages: “No enumeration of powers granted to cities and villages in this constitution shall limit or restrict the general grant of authority conferred by this section.”21 Moreover, these powers over “municipal concerns, property and government” are to be “liberally construed.”22 In contrast, the Lennane Court briefly interpreted the more limited language in the 1908 Constitution—granting cities and villages the right to “pass all laws and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns”—decided upon a narrow conception of local authority, and declared, with scant analysis, that a prevailing wage law similar to this one was exclusively a matter of “state concern.”
But the wages paid to employees of contractors working on municipal contracts have a self-evident relationship to “municipal concerns, property, and government” if those words are even reasonably, if not liberally, construed. Those wage rates concern how a municipality acts as a market participant, spending its own money on its own projects.23 If a municipality has [188]*188broad powers over local concerns, it certainly has the power to set terms for the contracts it enters into with third parties for its own municipal projects—including provisions relating to the wages paid to third-party employees. This way, the municipality controls its own money and presumably expresses its citizens’ preference as to what those who work on public projects should be paid. We see nothing in these municipal aims that falls outside the ambit of Article 7, § 22 of the 1963 Constitution.24
Furthermore, Lennane’s holding appears to rest on an implicit dichotomy: if something is a matter of “state concern,” it cannot also be a matter of “local concern.”25 But this binary understanding does not comport with the plain language of the 1963 Constitution, which grants cities and villages broad powers over “municipal concerns, property and government” whether those powers are enumerated or not. The relevant constitutional language does not state that a matter cannot be a “municipal concern” if the state might also have an interest in it.26 While a binary [189]*189understanding of state and local governmental power might have been common 100 years ago,27 the ratifiers of the 1963 Constitution do not appear to have worked under the same apprehension—instead, we are left with their words: “The provisions of this constitution and law concerning counties, townships, cities and villages shall be liberally construed in their favor.”28
Thus, if Lennane’s holding was ever on firm constitutional ground, it no longer had sound footing after the people ratified the 1963 Constitution. We agree with the Court of Appeals majority that subsequent changes in the law have undercut Lennane’s foundations.29 Accordingly, we conclude that “changes in the [190]*190law ... no longer justify the questioned decision.”30 Nor do we believe that any reliance interests affected by this Court’s overruling Lennane caution against our analysis. Reliance interests, while important to the rule of stare decisis, must fall to the wayside when this Court is addressing actual changes in the text of our [191]*191constitutions. We therefore declare that Lennane has no continuing viability and repudiate its conception of municipal authority in light of the ratification of the 1963 Constitution. The rule in Lennane—that city and village governments may not enact ordinances or charter provisions governing the wages paid to third-party employees working on municipal construction contracts—is overruled.
Nonetheless, we also agree with Court of Appeals dissent’s following assessment of the binding nature of Lennane before the instant decision:
[T]he Court’s conclusion in Lennane that this is a matter of state concern has never been overruled. Therefore, even if we apply a “liberal construction” to defendant’s powers, they do not extend to this ordinance until and unless the Supreme Court revisits its conclusion in Lennane, or the Legislature explicitly grants cities the power to adopt prevailing wage ordinances.[31]
While it is inarguable that developments over the past century have undercut the foundation upon which Lennane stood, its holding was never explicitly superseded by the ratifiers of the 1963 Constitution or by the Legislature, nor was it overruled by this Court. The Court of Appeals is bound to follow decisions by this Court except where those decisions have clearly been overruled or superseded32 and is not authorized to [192]*192anticipatorily ignore our decisions where it determines that the foundations of a Supreme Court decision have been undermined.33 Thus, while we agree with the result of the Court of Appeals’ decision, we disapprove of its usurpation of this Court’s role under our Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Lennane, whatever its merits when it was decided, has been undercut by the adoption of the 1963 Constitution. We therefore overrule Lennane. Under our Constitution, cities and villages may enact ordinances relating to “municipal concerns, property and government,” including ordinances and charter provisions regulating the wages paid to third-party employees working on municipal construction contracts, “subject to the constitution and law.”34
The Court of Appeals erred, however, by disregarding precedent from this Court that has not been clearly overruled by the Court or superseded by subsequent legislation or constitutional amendment. “[I]t is the Supreme Court’s obligation to overrule or modify case law if it becomes obsolete, and until this Court takes such action, the Court of Appeals and all lower courts [193]*193are bound by that authority.”35 Because of this error, we vacate the Court of Appeals’ decision but affirm the result, for the reasons stated above.
Markman, McCormack, Viviano, Bernstein, and Larsen, JJ., concurred with YOUNG, C.J.