Bowers v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia

378 S.E.2d 460, 259 Ga. 221

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: April 25, 1989
• Docket: 46777
• Status: Published

Opinions

Per curiam.

The only issue presented to us on this appeal is the question of the standing of the Attorney General, who brought an action against the Board of Regents to require the disclosure of certain records. The merits of the claim were not addressed, as the trial court dismissed the complaint for want of standing.

The basic issue (as to disclosure) has been resolved in favor of the Attorney General’s position by our- holding in Bd. of Regents of the University System of Ga. v. The Atlanta Journal & The Atlanta Constitution, 259 Ga. 214 (378 SE2d 305) (1989), which held that the very same records must be produced for public inspection.

In this case, we are asked to reverse the trial court on the issue of standing. But for what purpose? Our ruling in Regents leaves nothing to be decided by the trial court, and a reversal of this case most assuredly would result in a second dismissal by the trial court, this time on the ground of mootness. The existence of an actual controversy is fundamental to a decision on the merits by this court.¹ An advisory opinion on our part concerning the Attorney General’s standing to sue an executive agency of the state would be meaningless as respects the controversy over which this action was brought. See Bd. of Trustees v. Kenworthy, 253 Ga. 554, 557 (322 SE2d 720) (1984); Chastain v. Baker, 255 Ga. 432 (339 SE2d 241) (1986).

The issue of standing encompasses several important elements, including our constitution; statutes of the General Assembly, their relationship to our constitution, and to each other; the powers of the chief executive² of the state; and the powers of the Attorney General. Thus, the concerns are those of constitutional and statutory construction. And while it may be that some of the background of this controversy includes political considerations, the mere existence of a political issue does not oust the judicial system of its jurisdiction, nor relieve it from the burden of decision, when that is appropriate.³ Nonetheless, there seems to be little value in undertaking so ponderous a query when, in whatever manner it might be resolved, the inevitable result in this action will be its dismissal.

Dismissed as moot.

All the Justices concur, except Smith, J., who dissents.

1 A narrow exception to the actual controversy rule is that the question is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” This case does not fit within that exception. Certainly the standing issue is capable of repetition, but no reason appears why it would evade review. Chastain v. Baker, supra at 434. See also DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (94 SC 1704, 1707, 40 LE2d 164) (1974).

2 Because the Governor has not been made a party to this appeal, his views have not been presented to the court.

3 Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867 (41 SE2d 883) (1947); Bowen v. Griffith, 258 Ga. 162 (366 SE2d 293) (1988).