Bonilla v. People of the State of California

Opinion

Case No.: 3:24-cv-00681-JES-KSC STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA CDCR #J-48500, ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY Plaintiff, FILING FEES REQUIRED BY vs. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) AND FOR

CLAIM PURSUANT TO PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) Defendant. Plaintiff Steve Wayne Bonilla, currently incarcerated at California Medical Facility in Vacaville, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff is a serial litigant, and seeks to have his 1988 Alameda County criminal judgment and death sentence in Case No. C-02-0636 MHP declared “void.” (See Compl. at 7.) Bonilla claims he was arrested without probable cause and falsely imprisoned as the result of a malicious prosecution. (Id. at 3.) / / / I. Failure to Pay Filing Fee or Request IFP Status All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a failure to pay the entire fee only if the Plaintiff seeks and the court grants him leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an] IFP application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the fee[s] [a]re paid.”). “While the previous version of the IFP statute granted courts the authority to waive fees for any person ‘unable to pay[,]’ … the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act] amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: under the current version of the IFP statute, ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.’” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)). Section 1915(b) “provides a structured timeline for collecting this fee.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)-(2)). Therefore, to proceed IFP, prisoners must “submit[] an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets [they] possess[,]” as well as “a “certified copy of the[ir] trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for … the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (2). Using this financial information, the court “shall assess and when funds exist, collect, … an initial partial filing fee,” which is “calculated based on ‘the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account’ or ‘the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account’ over a 6-month term; the remainder of the fee is to be paid in ‘monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015). / / / Bonilla has neither paid the $405 filing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) nor submitted a properly supported Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Therefore, his case cannot proceed. See Andrews, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051; Hymas, 73 F.4th at 765. And while the Court would typically grant Bonilla leave to file an IFP Motion, he has abused that privilege so many times in the past he is precluded from doing so now unless he faced “imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time of filing. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “A negative consequence that may impact a prisoner who files [] frivolous complaint[s] is a restriction on his ability to file future cases without prepaying filing fees.” Harris v. Mangum, 863, F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2017). Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three “strikes,” i.e., prior civil cases or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim, “cannot proceed IFP.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). Bonilla is one of those prisoners, and he makes no plausible allegations of imminent danger here. See In re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the dismissal of 34 pro se civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011 alone, which were dismissed “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim for relief under § 1983.”); id. at *3 n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights action.” (citing In re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal at 6:23-7:19.)). II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) Even if Bonilla paid the full filing fee or were eligible to proceed IFP, however, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, also enacted as part of the PLRA, requires sua sponte dismissal of prisoner complaints like his, or any portions of them, which are “frivolous, malicious,” those that “fail[ ] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or those that “seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 538‒39 (2015). Section 1915A(a) “mandates early review—‘before docketing [] or [] as soon as practicable after docketing’—for all complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.’” Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016). The mandatory screening provisions of § 1915A apply to all prisoners, no matter their fee status, who bring suit against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. See, e.g., Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446‒47 (9th Cir. 2000). “On review, the court shall … dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint,” if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). “The purpose of § 1915A is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.”’ Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). As noted above, Bonilla seeks to vacate his state criminal judgment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He may not. For state prisoners wishing to challenge to the validity of a criminal conviction or sentence, a habeas corpus action is the sole federal remedy. The United States Supreme Court has long held that a § 1983 suit cannot be used as “a collateral attack on [an individual’s] conviction[.]” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994). Heck and its progeny reaffirm that “a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or duration of his confinement.’” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)). Simply put, “[r]elease from penal custody is not an available remedy under the Civil Rights Act.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 479; Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) “[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy to attack the legality of [a] conviction or sentence....”); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (“There is no question that Heck bars ... claims that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest ... and brought unfounded criminal charges.”’). For these reasons, the Court finds that Bonilla’s Complaint also fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted and is therefore subject to sua sponte dismissal without leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that a § 1983 complaint barred by Heck may be dismissed for failure to state a claim when the pleading as a whole “present[s] an ‘obvious bar to securing relief.’’’). “[T]he PLRA /expressly authorize[s] the district court to dismiss [a] complaint [barred by Heck] for failure to state a claim at any time even when ... the legal basis for the dismissal [is raised] o[n] its own accord.” Hebrard v. Nofziger, 90 F.4th 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 2024). Dismissal of the complaint without leave to amend is appropriate if, as is true in Bonilla’s case, “amendment would be futile.” Carrico v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). Conclusion and Order Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this civil action based on Plaintiffs failure to pay the $405 civil filing and administrative fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) and for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1). Leave to amend is DENIED and the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close the file. Dated: April 19, 2024 “i 95 Soar Sur], . United States District Judge

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