1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No.: 3:21-cv-00387-BAS-LL CDCR #J-48500, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 vs. (1) DENYING MOTION TO 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
15 AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) AMALIA MEZA, Judge, et al., (ECF No. 2) 16 Defendants. 17 AND
18 (2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 19 FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE REQUIRED BY 20 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 21 22 Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, proceeding pro se, and currently incarcerated at San 23 Quentin State Prison, has filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bonilla 24 names six California State Superior Court Judges as Defendants, claiming they participated 25 in a conspiracy to deprive him of due process “in a plot to murder him under the color of 26 law.” (See “Compl.,” ECF No. 1 at 1.) Bonilla asks that this Court void his conviction in 27 Alameda County Superior Court Case No. H-12210-A for lack of subject matter 28 jurisdiction as a “legal nullity.” (Id. at 3.) 1 Bonilla did not prepay the filing fee required to commence a civil action; instead, he 2 has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 3 (See ECF No. 2.) 4 5 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 6 A. Standard of Review 7 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 8 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Bonilla, however, “face 9 an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 10 filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915(a)(3)(b), Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison 12 Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to 13 proceed IFP: 14 . . . if [a] [prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United 15 States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails 16 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 17 18 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 19 provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). 20 “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 21 Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 22 “Cervantes”) (stating that under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought 23 unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). 24 The objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous 25 prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 26 1997). “[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both 27 before and after the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311. 28 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 1 || were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 2 || Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 3 styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 4 || prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 5 || When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 6 || dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 7 || the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” □□□ 8 || Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 9 || F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). “When... presented with multiple claims within a single 10 || action,” however, courts may “assess a PLRA strike only when the case as a whole is 11 || dismissed for a qualifying reason under the Act.” Hoffman v. Pulido, 928 F.3d 1147, 1152 12 Cir. 2019) (citing Washington v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th 13 || Cir. 2016)). 14 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit 15 any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he faces “imminent 16 || danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051- 17 ||52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation 18 || that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.”). 19 20 B. Discussion 21 As a required preliminary matter, the Court has reviewed Bonilla’s pleading, and 22 || finds it does not contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger 23 || of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 24 |/U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Instead, Bonilla claims he is being falsely imprisoned and seeks to void 25 || his Alameda County Superior Court judgment because a federal grand jury subpoena “was 26 never made part of the court record” or “entered on the docket as an exhibit.” (See Compl. 27 2-3, 5.) Claims of false imprisonment are “not the sort of serious physical injury 28 ||contemplated by the in forma pauperis statute.” Langston v. White, No. 2:19-CV-1168 DB
1 P, 2019 WL 3326181, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 3, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2 No. 2:19-CV-1168-KJM-DBP, 2019 WL 3318529 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2019) (citing Smith 3 v. Baldwin, No. 18-cv-1503-NJR, 2018 WL 3993629, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2018); 4 Berryhill v. Oklahoma, No. CIV-13-1370-W, 2014 WL 679111, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 30, 5 2014). 6 While Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 7 demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in 8 some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 9 satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. 10 at 1120. That is true here.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No.: 3:21-cv-00387-BAS-LL CDCR #J-48500, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 vs. (1) DENYING MOTION TO 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
15 AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) AMALIA MEZA, Judge, et al., (ECF No. 2) 16 Defendants. 17 AND
18 (2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 19 FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE REQUIRED BY 20 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 21 22 Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, proceeding pro se, and currently incarcerated at San 23 Quentin State Prison, has filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bonilla 24 names six California State Superior Court Judges as Defendants, claiming they participated 25 in a conspiracy to deprive him of due process “in a plot to murder him under the color of 26 law.” (See “Compl.,” ECF No. 1 at 1.) Bonilla asks that this Court void his conviction in 27 Alameda County Superior Court Case No. H-12210-A for lack of subject matter 28 jurisdiction as a “legal nullity.” (Id. at 3.) 1 Bonilla did not prepay the filing fee required to commence a civil action; instead, he 2 has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 3 (See ECF No. 2.) 4 5 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 6 A. Standard of Review 7 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 8 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Bonilla, however, “face 9 an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 10 filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915(a)(3)(b), Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison 12 Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to 13 proceed IFP: 14 . . . if [a] [prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United 15 States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails 16 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 17 18 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 19 provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). 20 “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 21 Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 22 “Cervantes”) (stating that under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought 23 unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). 24 The objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous 25 prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 26 1997). “[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both 27 before and after the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311. 28 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 1 || were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 2 || Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 3 styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 4 || prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 5 || When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 6 || dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 7 || the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” □□□ 8 || Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 9 || F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). “When... presented with multiple claims within a single 10 || action,” however, courts may “assess a PLRA strike only when the case as a whole is 11 || dismissed for a qualifying reason under the Act.” Hoffman v. Pulido, 928 F.3d 1147, 1152 12 Cir. 2019) (citing Washington v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th 13 || Cir. 2016)). 14 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit 15 any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he faces “imminent 16 || danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051- 17 ||52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation 18 || that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.”). 19 20 B. Discussion 21 As a required preliminary matter, the Court has reviewed Bonilla’s pleading, and 22 || finds it does not contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger 23 || of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 24 |/U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Instead, Bonilla claims he is being falsely imprisoned and seeks to void 25 || his Alameda County Superior Court judgment because a federal grand jury subpoena “was 26 never made part of the court record” or “entered on the docket as an exhibit.” (See Compl. 27 2-3, 5.) Claims of false imprisonment are “not the sort of serious physical injury 28 ||contemplated by the in forma pauperis statute.” Langston v. White, No. 2:19-CV-1168 DB
1 P, 2019 WL 3326181, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 3, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2 No. 2:19-CV-1168-KJM-DBP, 2019 WL 3318529 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2019) (citing Smith 3 v. Baldwin, No. 18-cv-1503-NJR, 2018 WL 3993629, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2018); 4 Berryhill v. Oklahoma, No. CIV-13-1370-W, 2014 WL 679111, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 30, 5 2014). 6 While Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 7 demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in 8 some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 9 satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. 10 at 1120. That is true here. 11 Based on the dockets of many court proceedings available on PACER,1 this Court 12 finds that Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, identified as CDCR #J-48500, while 13 incarcerated, has had dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds 14 that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 15 granted. See In re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting 16 Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the dismissal 17 of 34 pro se civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011 alone, which were 18 dismissed “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim for relief 19 under § 1983.”); id. at *3 (“The following five actions are DISMISSED without prejudice 20 and without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted: 21 Bonilla v. Superior Court of Alameda County, C 11-6306; Bonilla v. Alameda County 22 District Attorney’s Office, C 11-6307; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0026; 23
24 25 1 A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case No. 3:05-cv-00452- MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United States v. Author Services, 804 26 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 27 judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias, 508 F.3d at 1225 (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. 28 1 || Bonilla v. Cullen, C 1200027; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0206.”); id. at 2 ||*3 n.1 (‘The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 3 1915(g), he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights action.” 4 (citing Jn re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal at 6:23- 5 |}7:19.)). 6 Accordingly, because Bonilla has, while incarcerated, accumulated far more than 7 || three “strikes” permitted by § 1915(g), and he fails to make any plausible allegation that 8 || he faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed this case, he is not 9 || entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; Rodriguez, 10 || 169 F.3d at 1180 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from 11 || accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system 12 || from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 13 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of 14 || privilege and not right.”’). 15 16 ||. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS 17 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Bonilla’s Motion to Proceed IFP 18 ||(ECF No. 2) as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), DISMISSES this civil action based on 19 || Bonilla’s failure to pay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), CERTIFIES 20 || that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), 21 |}and DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the file. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 24 || Dated: March 30, 2021 □ ila a (Hipthar 25 Hon. Cynthia Bashant %6 United States District Judge 27 28 5