1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No.: 3:20-cv-2266-DMS-LL CDCR #J-48500, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 vs. 1) DENYING MOTION TO 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
15 AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) JUDGE AMALIA L. MEZA, et al., [ECF No. 16] 16 Defendants. 17 AND
18 2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 19 FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1914(a) 21
22 23 24 25 Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at 26 San Quentin State Prison has filed a civil action. On November 24, 2020, the Court 27 dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to pay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. 28 Section 1914(a) and/or to file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 1 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a) and granted Plaintiff thirty days leave in which to pay the 2 filing fee or file a complete motion to proceed IFP. (See ECF No. 2, at 2-3.) On 3 December 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) which becomes 4 the operative pleading. (See ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff later filed a Motion to Proceed IFP 5 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a) on January 4, 2021. (See ECF No. 16.) 6 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 7 A. Standard of Review 8 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. 9 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners, like Plaintiff, however, 10 “face an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount 11 of a filing fee,” in “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3)(b), Williams 12 v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform Act 13 (“PLRA”) amended Section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP: 14 . . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 15 appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 16 grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 17 imminent danger of serious physical injury. 18
19 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 20 provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). 21 “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 22 Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 23 “Cervantes”) (stating that under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought 24 unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes 25 rule . . . .”). The objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing 26 frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 27 (9th Cir. 1997). “[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims 28 1 dismissed both before and after the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311. 2 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, 3 which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state 4 a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the 5 district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 6 action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 7 (9th Cir. 2008). When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a 8 strike, the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the 9 central question is whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or 10 failure to state a claim.’” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) 11 (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). “When . . . presented with 12 multiple claims within a single action,” however, courts may “assess a PLRA strike only 13 when the case as a whole is dismissed for a qualifying reason under the Act.” Hoffman v. 14 Pulido, 928 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Washington v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s 15 Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016)). 16 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by Section 1915(g) 17 from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show he is facing 18 “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 19 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting Section 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a 20 plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ 21 at the time of filing.”). 22 B. Discussion 23 As a preliminary matter, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s FAC and finds that it 24 does not contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest that he “faced ‘imminent danger 25 of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 26 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 27 While Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 28 demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in 1 some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 2 satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. 3 at 1120. That is true here. 4 Based on the dockets of many court proceedings available on PACER,1 this Court 5 finds that Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, identified as CDCR #J-48500, while 6 incarcerated, has had dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds 7 that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 8 granted. See In re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) 9 (noting Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the 10 dismissal of 34 pro se civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011 alone, 11 which were dismissed “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim 12 for relief under § 1983.”); id.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No.: 3:20-cv-2266-DMS-LL CDCR #J-48500, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 vs. 1) DENYING MOTION TO 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
15 AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) JUDGE AMALIA L. MEZA, et al., [ECF No. 16] 16 Defendants. 17 AND
18 2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 19 FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1914(a) 21
22 23 24 25 Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at 26 San Quentin State Prison has filed a civil action. On November 24, 2020, the Court 27 dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to pay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. 28 Section 1914(a) and/or to file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 1 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a) and granted Plaintiff thirty days leave in which to pay the 2 filing fee or file a complete motion to proceed IFP. (See ECF No. 2, at 2-3.) On 3 December 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) which becomes 4 the operative pleading. (See ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff later filed a Motion to Proceed IFP 5 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a) on January 4, 2021. (See ECF No. 16.) 6 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 7 A. Standard of Review 8 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. 9 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners, like Plaintiff, however, 10 “face an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount 11 of a filing fee,” in “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3)(b), Williams 12 v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform Act 13 (“PLRA”) amended Section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP: 14 . . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 15 appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 16 grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 17 imminent danger of serious physical injury. 18
19 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 20 provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). 21 “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 22 Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 23 “Cervantes”) (stating that under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought 24 unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes 25 rule . . . .”). The objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing 26 frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 27 (9th Cir. 1997). “[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims 28 1 dismissed both before and after the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311. 2 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, 3 which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state 4 a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the 5 district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 6 action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 7 (9th Cir. 2008). When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a 8 strike, the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the 9 central question is whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or 10 failure to state a claim.’” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) 11 (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). “When . . . presented with 12 multiple claims within a single action,” however, courts may “assess a PLRA strike only 13 when the case as a whole is dismissed for a qualifying reason under the Act.” Hoffman v. 14 Pulido, 928 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Washington v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s 15 Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016)). 16 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by Section 1915(g) 17 from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show he is facing 18 “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 19 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting Section 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a 20 plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ 21 at the time of filing.”). 22 B. Discussion 23 As a preliminary matter, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s FAC and finds that it 24 does not contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest that he “faced ‘imminent danger 25 of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 26 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 27 While Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 28 demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in 1 some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 2 satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. 3 at 1120. That is true here. 4 Based on the dockets of many court proceedings available on PACER,1 this Court 5 finds that Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, identified as CDCR #J-48500, while 6 incarcerated, has had dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds 7 that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 8 granted. See In re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) 9 (noting Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the 10 dismissal of 34 pro se civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011 alone, 11 which were dismissed “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim 12 for relief under § 1983.”); id. at *3 (“The following five actions are DISMISSED without 13 prejudice and without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief may 14 be granted: Bonilla v. Superior Court of Alameda County, C 11-6306; Bonilla v. Alameda 15 County District Attorney’s Office, C 11-6307; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12- 16 0026; Bonilla v. Cullen, C 12-0027; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0206.”); 17 id. at *3 n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 18 § 1915(g), he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights action.” 19 (citing In re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal at 20 6:23-7:19)). 21 Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated far more than 22 the three “strikes” permitted by Section 1915(g), and he fails to make any plausible 23
24 25 1 A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United States v. Author Servs., 804 F.2d 1520, 26 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial 27 system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias, 508 F.3d at 1225 (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson 28 1 || allegation that he faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed 2 case, he is not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 3 || 1055; Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (noting that 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g) “does not 4 || prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history 5 || of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see 6 || also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to 7 || proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”). 8 Conclusion and Orders 9 For the reasons set forth above, 10 1. The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 16) as barred 11 by 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g); 12 2. DISMISSES this action based on Plaintiffs failure to pay the civil filing fee 13 required by 28 U.S.C. Section 1914(a); 14 3. CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would not be taken in good 15 faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3); and 16 4. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close this file. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 || Dated: January 20, 2021 19 ns my. L4\ Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 20 United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28