OPINION BY
STEVENS, J.:
¶ 1 This is an appeal from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County granting summary judgment in favor of Suzanne Bombar, Upright Materials Handling, Inc. (Upright), and First Insurance Center, Inc. (First Insurance Center) and against Appellant West American Insurance Company (West American)1 in an amount totaling $12,008,854.54. On appeal, West American contends (1) the trial court erred in interpreting the commercial insurance contract as covering the bodily injury sustained by Ms. Bombar; (2) the trial court erred in denying West American’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of bad faith; (3) the trial court erred in granting Ms. Bombar’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of bad faith; (4) the trial court erred in granting First Insurance [81]*81Center’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing West American’s cross-claim for contribution and/or indemnity; (5) the trial court awarded damages which were excessive, unfounded, and miscalculated; and (6) West American’s appeal was timely and from a final order.2 We affirm.
¶2 The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows:
On March 15, 1995, Suzanne Bombar, an employee of Lord Label, Inc., [hereinafter Lord Label] located in Dunmore, Pennsylvania, was struck and severely injured by a forklift while at work. [Ms.] Bombar sustained extensive injuries to her right leg which eventually led to amputation. At the time of the accident, the forklift, which struck [Ms. Bombar], was operated by another employee of Lord Label who drove it in reverse through a plastic curtained opening that obstructed the operator’s view.
The forklift was manufactured by Linde, Inc., a German Company, and shipped to Baker, Inc., a subsidiary of Linde, Inc. Baker, who in turn, sold the forklift to Upright ..., in Avoca, Pennsylvania. Upright is in the business of selling such industrial equipment and servicing the same. Lord Label purchased the forklift used the day of the accident from Upright without a backup alarm or strobe light which engages when the forklift is driven in reverse. The forklift was shipped from the manufacturer to Upright without a manufacturer’s backup alarm installed.
The forklift was later equipped with an after-market backup alarm by an employee of Upright upon Lord Label’s request. Due to the annoyance of the alarm’s sound, the evidence indicated that the alarm was intentionally disconnected by Lord Label employees on several occasions including the date on which the accident occurred. There was also evidence that the wiring got caught on structures at Lord Label causing it to disconnect as well. The alarm and strobe light were both battery powered. The manner in which the alarm was installed allowed the wires to be exposed on the outside of the forklift nine frame near the roll-bar. Upright’s agent simply mounted the alarm by wrapping the wires around the outside of the roll bar rather than passing the wire through the center of the roll bar as intended by the manufacturer. Upright had been called several times to reinstall the alarm before the accident occurred. There was a factual dispute as to whether the alarm wires were intentionally disconnected or whether they caught and were pulled off during normal operations due to the wires’ exterior mounting.
In March of 1994, Upright purchased an insurance policy from First Insurance Center, an agency who used Ohio Casualty Insurance Company [hereinafter Ohio Casualty], as an underwriter. The insuring Agreements states it will pay damages that the insured may be legally obligated to pay because of “bodily injury” or property damage in which the policy applies. (See Commercial General Liability Coverage Form, p. 1). Furthermore, the insurer will hold the right to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking such damages under the application of the insurance policy. (See [82]*82Commercial General Liability Coverage Form, p. 1). Yet, the insurer will not pay sums that the insured may be obligated to pay or defend suits that encompass a matter to which the insurance policy does not apply. (See Commercial General Liability Coverage Form, p. 1). Additionally, under the business owner’s section of the policy lays a specific Endorsement No. CG 21041185 labeled “Exclusion-Products-Completed Operations Hazard” exception, whereby the insurer will not cover the insured for “bodily injury” or “property damage” which occurs away from the premises the insured owns or rents and arises out of “your product” or “your work.” (See Commercial General Liability Coverage Form, p. 5).
After the accident involving the forklift truck, the principals of Upright, Patrick Conflitti and Arthur Watkins, met with Matt Alferio, the owner of First Insurance Center, and notified him of the accident. During that meeting, Mr. Alferio told Mr. Conflitti and Mr. Watkins that no insurance coverage was available. At that time, First Insurance Center did not notify its underwriter, Ohio Casualty ... of the accident Upright had reported involving the forklift truck. Subsequently, Upright purchased “products competed hazard coverage.”
On May 24, 1996, Suzanne Bombar filed a complaint against both Baker, Inc. and Upright including claims in strict liability and negligence. Upon service of process, Upright took the complaint to its attorney, Ralph P. Carey, Esquire, who entered a defense. In April 1999, during discovery proceedings, a request was made upon Upright to produce a copy of its insurance policy and in turn, Upright referred the request to First Insurance [Center], First Insurance [Center] denied coverage due to the “Products and Completed Operations Exclusion” by a letter sent to Upright.
In June 1999, Bombar sent a copy of the Complaint to Ohio Casualty who later notified [Ms. Bombar], by letter dated June 30, 1999, that there was no coverage due to the exclusion. This letter was never sent to the insured.
Deposition testimony indicates that Ohio Casualty ... was fully aware of the accusations made against the insured upon receipt of Bombar’s Complaint but throughout the entire proceedings the insurance agents’ attempts to investigate the claim were only cursory, at best. The local claims manager conceded that he made the decision to inform [Ms. Bombar’s] counsel that there would be no coverage provided to Upright due to the exclusion. (See Plaintiffs Exhibit D., D.T. Culotta). Mr. Klatt, the local adjuster, was given instructions by the local manager to obtain statements from the owners of Upright by contacting its counsel, Ralph Carey, Esquire. Apparently, Klatt only scheduled a meeting and retained statements from one of the insured. Klatt remained the adjuster for four months, and then reassigned. The matter was next referred to Don Osbourne. Mr. Osbourne made several attempts to schedule a meeting with the owners of Upright by mail; three of these letters were misaddressed. Os-bourne contacted the Law Offices of Ralph Carey on a monthly basis by phone. During one of these phone conversations, Mr. Osbourne was informed that mediation was in progress and that the matter most likely was going to trial. Yet, Ohio [Casualty] never issued a Reservation of Rights letter to Upright during this time, nor did it notify Upright that its coverage was denied in writing, or enter a defense. It has been noted [83]*83that neither Upright nor its counsel ever made 'written demands for a defense on Ohio [Casualty] in the instant suit.
On January 19, 2001, a jury returned a verdict against Upright in negligence for $1,800,000.00. Upright appealed the action to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which was later abandoned upon [Ms. Bombar’s] motion to mold the verdict to include delay damages. The verdict was ultimately molded to $2,393,458.65.
On March [12], 2001, Upright filed the present Declaratory Judgment Action claiming that Ohio Casualty should have defended it during the course of the initial action and that Ohio [Casualty] should indemnify it for the verdict, and pay damages for alleged bad faith in handling the claim. [The insurance policy at issue was sold to Upright by First Insurance Center as agents for Ohio Casualty]. Original plaintiff, Suzanne Bombar, filed a Petition to Intervene as the real Party in interest, [and her petition] was granted by Order [entered] on April 29, 2002. The Intervenor Complaint was filed [on] May 24, 2002, [in which Ms. Bombar argued Upright was covered by the commercial liability policy at issue.]. On October 18, 2002, Suzanne Bombar was assigned all rights that Upright may have under its policy of liability insurance by Ohio Casualty.
Trial Court Opinion filed 1/19/05 at 1-5. See Trial Court Opinion filed 12/30/05 at 3-9 (additional discussion of the facts and procedural history).
¶ 3 On February 21, 2002, First Insurance Center filed a motion for summary judgment as to Upright’s complaint for declaratory judgment. Therein, First Insurance Center alleged, inter alia, that despite its agent’s recommendation, Upright did not purchase the products and completed operations coverage, which would have created a duty to defend and indemnify, because such was too expensive. First Insurance Center argued that, since it recommended the appropriate coverage in this case, that being the products and completed operations coverage, and such was specifically refused by Upright’s president and treasurer (Mr. Conflitti and Mr. Watkins), First Insurance Center had no duty to defend or indemnify.
¶ 4 On April 8, 2004, Ms. Bombar filed a motion for summary judgment against Ohio Casualty alleging (1) the products and completed operations hazard exclusion is inapplicable to the instant accident, (2) the insurer breached its duty to defend Upright, (3) the insureds cooperated with the insurer in handling the claim and the insurer suffered no prejudice from any late notice of the claim, and (4) the insurer acted with bad faith. On April 8, 2004, Ms. Bombar filed a motion for summary judgment against First Insurance Center alleging, inter alia, that Mr. Alferio, who was First Insurance Center’s agent, breached a fiduciary duty, which was owed to Upright, when he failed to properly describe the scope and nature of the insurance coverage purchased by Upright. Ms. Bombar alleged that Upright’s rejection of the products and completed operations coverage was due to Mr. Alferio’s faulty and incomplete explanation of the available coverages and Mr. Alferio breached his fiduciary duty in failing to timely notify Ohio Casualty of Upright’s insurance claims.
¶ 5 On April 12, 2004, Ohio Casualty filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the insurance policy did not cover the accident at issue, it was untimely notified of the accident, and it did not act in bad faith.
¶ 6 On May 14, 2004, the matter proceeded to oral argument, during which Ms. Bombar withdrew any and all claims, in-[84]*84eluding her motion for summary judgment, as it related to First Insurance Center. N.T. 5/14/04 at 3-8.
¶ 7 On January 19, 2005, the trial court filed an order granting Ms. Bombar’s motion for summary judgment as to Ohio Casualty. Specifically, the trial court concluded (1) the insurance policy at issue covers the underlying accident involving Ms. Bombar, (2) Ohio Casualty is hable for the entire amount of the jury’s verdict in the underlying action, including interest at the rate of 3% above the prime rate of interest from the date the claim was made, (3) the court awarded punitive damages against Ohio Casualty with attorney’s fees and costs, and (4) the court awarded compensatory damages to the insured, Upright. The order provided that damages, fees, and costs would be decided at a future hearing. The trial court also denied Ohio Casualty’s motion for summary judgment.
¶ 8 On February 7, 2005, First Insurance Center filed a second motion for summary judgment alleging, inter alia, that, in its answer with new matter to the original declaratory complaint, Ohio Casualty included a cross-claim against First Insurance Center. First Insurance Center averred that it was liable for neither the compensatory nor punitive damages assessed against Ohio Casualty, and therefore, First Insurance Center sought summary judgment as it related to Ohio Casualty’s cross-claim.3 On March 16, 2005, the parties filed a stipulation indicating that West American was being incorrectly referred to as Ohio Casualty, and the caption was amended accordingly.
¶ 9 The matter proceeded to' a hearing on June 15, 2005, following which the trial court filed an opinion and order on December 30, 2005, indicating (1) First Insurance Center’s motion for summary judgment is granted, (2) West American’s motion for summary judgment is denied4 and West American is liable to Ms. Bombar for the entire jury verdict and delay damages totaling $2,393,458.65, plus interest of $1,513,260.00, (3) West American is liable for punitive damages in an amount of four times the compensatory damages awarded by the jury’s verdict, equaling $7,200,000.00, (4) West American is liable to Upright for compensatory damages in the amount of $700,000.00, (5) West American is liable to Upright for attorney’s fees and costs totaling $91,212.50, and (6) West American is liable to Ms. Bombar for attorney’s fees and costs for prosecution of a bad faith claim in the amount of $110,923.39. The total verdict rendered by the trial court in its December 30, 2005 order totaled $12,008,854.54 against West American.
¶ 10 On January 9, 2006, West American filed a post-trial motion, and Ms. Bombar filed a response indicating that post-trial motions were not appropriate as it related to the summary judgment proceedings. On January 30, 2006, West American filed a notice of appeal to this Court, which was docketed at 224 MDA 2006.
¶ 11 The trial court subsequently filed an order and amended order denying West American’s post-trial motion and specifically indicating judgment was entered against West American as set forth in the trial court’s December 30, 2005 order. West [85]*85American filed a notice of appeal to this Court from the order and amended order. The appeals were docketed at 431 MDA 2006 and 519 MDA2006.5
¶ 12 Thereafter, Ms. Bombar filed motions to quash all three of West American’s appeals to this Court, and West American filed a motion to consolidate the appeals. By order entered on May 22, 2006, this Court denied Ms. Bombar’s motion to quash the appeal docketed at 224 MDA 2006 without prejudice for her to raise the issue before this panel, granted Ms. Bom-bar’s motions to quash the appeals docketed at 431 and 519 MDA 2006, and denied West American’s motion to consolidate as moot.
¶ 13 In her appellate brief, Ms. Bombar has renewed her argument that West American’s appeal, docketed at 224 MDA 2004, should be quashed. Specifically, Ms. Bombar argues West American should have filed a timely appeal from the trial court’s January 19, 2005 order, which granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. Bombar and declared the rights of the parties as it related to the insurance contract. We conclude the trial court’s January 19, 2005 order was interlocutory and West American properly appealed from the trial court’s December 30, 2005 order.
¶ 14 “Generally, orders that affirmatively or negatively declare the rights of a party are final and immediately appeal-able in declaratory judgment actions.” Cresswell v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., 820 A.2d 172, 176 n. 2 (Pa.Super.2003) (citation omitted).6 However, this Court has held that “[a]l-though the [Declaratory Judgment] Act provides that the declaration shall have the ‘force and effect of a final judgment or decree,’ [a] partial adjudication does not become appealable merely because it is cast in the form of a declaratory judgment.” Moore Motors, Inc. v. Beaudry, 775 A.2d 869, 870 (Pa.Super.2001) (quotation omitted). Moreover,
As a general rule, an order dismissing some but not all counts of a multi-count complaint is interlocutory and not ap-pealable. In adhering to this policy, the courts have sought to avoid piecemeal litigation. This Court has held that an appeal will not lie from an order granting partial summary judgment.
Bolmgren v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 758 A.2d 689, 690-691 (Pa.Super.2000) (citations omitted).
¶ 15 In the case sub judice, Ms. Bombar sought relief in the form of a declaratory judgment. However, she also raised a bad faith claim and sought damages with regard thereto. "While the trial court’s January 19, 2005 order declared the insurance policy covered the accident and indicated punitive damages would be assessed against West American for bad faith, the trial court’s order did not determine the amount of damages related to Ms. Bom-bar’s bad faith claim until it filed its December 30, 2005 order.7 Therefore, we [86]*86conclude this case is akin to Cresswell, supra, Moore Motors, Inc., supra, and Bolmgren, supra since all claims related to Ms. Bombar’s complaint were not decided until December 30, 2005. As such, we deny Ms. Bombar’s motion to quash West American’s appeal, and we shall proceed to the issues presented to this Court by West American.8
¶ 16 We have enunciated our standard of review for appeals from the grant of summary judgment as follows:
Pennsylvania law provides that summary judgment may be granted only in those cases in which the record clearly shows that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party has the burden of proving that no genuine issues of material fact exist. In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the trial court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. Thus, uncontroverted allegations in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions of record, and submitted affidavits demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In sum, only when the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ, may a trial court properly enter summary judgment.
As already noted, on appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we must examine the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. With regard to questions of law, an appellate court’s scope of review is plenary. The Superior Court will reverse a grant of summary judgment only if the trial court has committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law based on the facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing and consideration.
Cresswell, 820 A.2d at 177 (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original).
¶ 17 West American first argues the trial court erred in failing to find the commercial insurance policy at issue excludes coverage for the type of claim made by Ms. Bombar. West American specifically argues that Ms. Bombar’s bodily injury arose from Upright’s product or work, and therefore, Ms. Bombar’s injury was included in the products and completed operations hazard exclusion. Since Ms. Bombar’s injury was excluded from insurance coverage, West American argues it had no duty to defend or indemnify Upright, and therefore, summary judgment should have been granted in its favor and against Ms. Bombar and Upright. In response, Ms. Bombar contends that Ms. Bombar’s injuries arose from an Upright’s employee’s negligent disconnection of the forklift’s backup alarm, and an injury arising from this type of accident (negligent failure to warn or provide instructions) is covered by the insurance policy and not included in the products and completed operations hazard exclusion. Essentially, at issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law in interpreting the commercial insurance policy at issue.
It is well established that an insurer need only defend an insured in a claim if [87]*87the insurance contract provides coverage for a suit of that nature. To decide whether a duty to defend exists, the court must compare the allegations in the complaint with the provisions of the insurance contract and determine whether, if the complaint allegations are proven, the insurer would have a duty to indemnify the insured.
Keystone Spray Equipment, Inc. v. Regis Ins. Co., 767 A.2d 572, 574 (Pa.Super.2001) (citation omitted).
In the event that the complaint alleges a cause of action which may fall within the coverage of the policy, the insurer is obligated to defend_The duty to defend exists until such time when it is determined that the claim is confined to a recovery that the policy does not cover.
Unionamerica Ins. Co. v. J.B. Johnson, 806 A.2d 431, 433-484 (Pa.Super.2002) (citations omitted).
When interpreting the provisions of an insurance policy, we are guided by the following: The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that is properly reviewable by the court ... In construing the policy we are mindful that ‘[pjolicy clauses providing coverage are interpreted in a manner which affords the greatest possible protection to the insured... .The insured’s reasonable expectations are the focal point in reading the contract language.” .... Our object, as is true in interpreting any contract, is of course, to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the written instrument ... Where a provision of a policy is ambiguous, the policy is to be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer, the drafter of the agreement. ... Where, however, the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that language.
Dorohovich v. West American Ins. Co., 403 Pa.Super. 412, 589 A.2d 252, 256 (1991) (quotation and citation omitted). See Cresswell, supra.
¶ 18 In the case sub judice, the commercial insurance contract provided, in relevant part:
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury”... to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking damages for “bodily injury” ... to which this insurance does not apply.
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[We will] [p]ay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured becomes legally obligated as damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, at any time resulting therefrom sustained by any person and caused by accident.
¶ 19 Regarding exclusions, the commercial insurance policy specifically stated, in several areas, that the insurance does not apply to bodily injury included within the “produets-completed operations hazard.” The policy defined the “products-completed operations hazard” as follows:
“Products-completed operations hazard”:
a. includes all “bodily injury” and “property damage” occurring away from premises you own or rent and arising out of “your product” or “your work” except
1. Products that are still in your physical possession; or
[88]*882. Work that has not yet been competed or abandoned. However, “your work” will be deemed completed at the earliest of the following times:
(a) When all of the work called for in your contract has been completed.
(b) When all of the work to be done at the job site has been completed if your contract calls for work at more than one job site.
(c) When that part of the work done at a job site has been put to its intended use by any person or organization other than another contractor or subcontractor working on the same project.
Work that may need service, maintenance, correction, repair or replacement but, which is otherwise complete, will be treated as completed.
(emphasis added).
¶ 20 The contract specifically defines “your product” and “your work” as follows:
“Your Product” means:
a. Any goods or products, other than real property, manufactured, sold, handled, distributed or disposed of by:
(1) You;
(2) Others trading under your name; or
(3) A person or organization whose business or assets you have acquired; and
b. Containers (other than vehicles), materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such goods or products.
“Your product” includes:
a. Warranties or representations made at any time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability, performance or use of “your product;” and
b. The providing of or failure to provide warnings or instructions.
“Your product” does not include vending machines or other property rented to or located for the use of others but not sold.
“Your work” means:
a. Work or operations performed by you or on your behalf; and
b. Materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such work or operations.
“Your work” includes:
a. Warranties or representations made at any time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability, performance or use of “your work;” and
b. The providing of or failure to provide warnings or instructions.
¶ 21 We have reviewed the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Carmen Minora and conclude it properly disposes of West American’s first issue. Trial Court Opinion filed 1/19/05 at 8-19. In essence, the trial court concluded that, under existing case law, the products and completed operations hazard as presented in this case does not apply to Ms. Bom-bar’s claims regarding the insured’s negligent failure to warn, inspect, and install with regard to the forklift’s back-up alarm.9 The trial court concluded that:
[West American’s] exclusion is identical to those referenced in the above mentioned cases. [West American’s] exclusion, as defined in the policy, was a “Products-Completed Operations Hazard” exclusion which included products and maintenance, service, repair of products occurring away from the in-[89]*89sured’s premises. Yet, under this same exclusion the insurer denied coverage for installation negligently completed by the insured, including a count for negligent failure to warn. The thrust of [Ms.] Bombar’s complaint and verdicts rests upon negligence including negligent failure to warn of defects in the alarm and negligent installation, service, and maintenance of the alarm, among other counts, and not products liability.
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In reading both the policy and the Complaint, at first glance, it may appear that coverage may not exist. Yet, as noted above in the discussion, the installation of the backup alarm by Upright was a service, but it was not completed at the time the accident occurred because the installation was both faulty and negligent, which the jury concluded and gave rise to the complained of injury.
Trial Court Opinion filed 1/19/05 at 14, 16-17.
¶22 Regarding West American’s specific averment that the cases cited by the trial court are distinguishable because the wording of the exclusion in this case contained the phrase “[t]he providing of or failure to provide warnings or instructions,” we disagree. While the insurance policy at issue refers to “failure to warn,” the warnings must still be complete in order to fall within the ambit of the exclusion. Under the policy, the operation is not completed until the work has been put to its intended use at the site by someone, other than another contractor on the same project. Here, the installation of the backup alarm’s wiring was not completed at the time of the installation of the wiring because of the negligent failure to warn, and, therefore, the operation was not complete. See Keystone Spray Equipment, Inc., supra; Eastcoast Equipment Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 207 Pa.Super. 383, 218 A.2d 91 (1966).
¶ 23 Having found no abuse of discretion or error of law, we find no merit to West American’s first argument.
¶24 West American’s second argument is the trial court erred in failing to enter summary judgment in favor of West American as to the claim of bad faith. Specifically, West American argues it had a reasonable basis for denying coverage, and therefore, Ms. Bombar did not prove bad faith by clear and convincing evidence. West American’s claim of reasonable basis is predicated upon its argument set forth supra that the commercial insurance policy excluded coverage in this case and Ms. Bombar’s underlying civil complaint did not trigger a duty to defend Upright under the terms of the policy. Moreover, West American claims that, even if it mistakenly concluded the policy provided for no coverage, it acted reasonably in light of the fact the case law in this area was “in flux.” In addition, West American points to the fact that, while First Insurance Center learned of the accident shortly after it occurred, West American did not learn of such until Ms. Bom-bar’s counsel forwarded the underlying complaint to West American’s Gary Culot-ta on May 25, 1999, and West American thereafter acted reasonably in its investigation and processing of the claim. West American avers Upright never tendered the complaint to West American in an effort to secure a defense.
We recognize that there is no common law remedy in Pennsylvania for bad faith on the part of insurers. However, the Pennsylvania Legislature has created a statutory remedy in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371 which became effective on July 1, 1990. The statute provides that:
In an action arising under an insurance policy, if the court finds that the [90]*90insurer has acted in. bad faith toward the insured, the court may take all of the following actions:
(1) Award interest on the amount of the claim from the date the claim was made by the insured in an amount equal to the prime rate of interest plus 8%.
(2) Award punitive damages against the insurer.
(8) Assess court costs and attorney fees against the insurer.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371. In the insurance context, the term bad faith has acquired a particular meaning: Insurance. “Bad faith” on part of insurer is any frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay proceeds of a policy; it is not necessary that such refusal be fraudulent. For purposes of an action against an insurer for failure to pay a claim, such conduct imports a dishonest purpose and means a breach of a known duty (i.e., good faith and fair dealing), through some motive of self-interest or ill will; mere negligence or bad judgment is not bad faith. Further, bad faith must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and not merely insinuated. Finally, to recover under a claim of bad faith, the plaintiff must show that the defendant did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy and that defendant knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of reasonable basis in denying the claim.
Terletsky v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 437 Pa.Super. 108, 649 A.2d 680, 688 (1994) (citations and quotations omitted).
¶25 We conclude the trial court has correctly and thoroughly discussed the particular claims raised by West American, and we rely on the trial court opinion in this regard. See Trial Court Opinion filed 1/19/05 at 19-23 (discussing Upright’s reporting of the accident to First Insurance Center and West American, and the fact First Insurance Center employees were agents of West American); 23-26 (discussing the law concerning bad faith and West American’s actions with regard thereto);10 Trial Court Opinion filed 12/30/05 at 10-15 (discussing the trial court’s legal conclusions regarding bad faith).
¶ 26 West American’s next argument is that, even assuming its motion for summary judgment on the issue of bad faith was properly granted, the trial court should not have granted Ms. Bombar’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Under the umbrella of this general claim, West American argues (1) the trial court was obligated to consider Ms. Bombar’s cross-motion for summary judgment under the same strict standard as the court considered West American’s motion for summary judgment; (2) the trial court erred in stating there is no common law remedy for bad faith; (3) the trial court erred in failing to find there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Ms. Bombar proved bad faith under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371; (4) the trial court erred in permitting Ms. Bombar to pursue damages under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371 since she did not sufficiently plead statutory bad faith in her intervenor complaint; (5) West American had a reasonable basis for denying coverage; (6) the trial court erred in concluding West American had a duty to investigate Upright’s claim; (7) the trial court erred in imputing First Insurance Center’s conduct to West American; (8) the trial court erred in relying on improper hearsay evidence; (9) the trial court erred in relying [91]*91on evidence and testimony presented in the underlying trial; and (10) the trial court erred in relying upon disputed facts concerning West American’s claims practices.
¶27 Regarding West American’s claim regarding the applicable standard, there is no evidence that the trial court did not apply the same standard to Ms. Bombar’s and West American’s motions for summary judgment, and therefore, we summarily dismiss this claim.
¶28 Regarding West American’s claim that the trial court erred in stating there is no common law remedy for bad faith, the trial court’s statement was taken directly from this Court’s opinion filed in Terletsky, supra. See Trial Court Opinion filed 1/19/05 at 23. In any event, West American has not indicated how the result would have been different in this case had the trial court recognized a common law remedy for bad faith.
¶29 Regarding West American’s claim there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Ms. Bombar proved bad faith under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8871, West American points to the fact it denied in its answer to Ms. Bombar’s motion for summary judgment that (a) any coverage determination required factual investigation and/or West American’s actions were not in compliance with industry standards, (b) Upright’s notice of Ms. Bombar’s accident given to First Insurance Center was the equivalent of notice upon West American, (c) First Insurance Center was an agent for West American, and (d) Upright’s proffered “bad faith expert,” James Chett, was correct in his opinions as to claims handling and coverage issues. West American contends its denials created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether West American’s conduct was such as to “import a dishonest purpose” or whether West American was motivated by “self-interest or ill will.” We conclude West American’s a, b, and c claims of “genuine issues of material fact” are actually complaints about the trial court’s application of the law. The only arguable issue of “fact” is West American’s suggestion its expert, Alan Windt, disagreed with Upright’s expert, James Chett, on West American’s handling of the claim. See West American’s brief at 41. We conclude this issue is waived. Aside from citing to a page of Ms. Bombar’s motion for summary judgment and a page of West American’s response to the motion for summary judgment, West American has not developed this argument for appellate review. Such a passing reference in a seventy page appellate brief is insufficient for meaningful appellate review. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119.
¶ 30 Regarding West American’s claim that Ms. Bombar did not sufficiently plead a claim for statutory bad faith under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371, Ms. Bombar alleges West American has not properly preserved this issue in the court below. Specifically, Ms. Bombar suggests West American did not object to the alleged insufficiency of Ms. Bombar’s complaint until West American filed improper post-trial motions, and such a challenge was made untimely. West American, on the other hand, asserts it properly preserved the issue by raising it in its pre-trial damages memorandum, which was in response to the first time it was given notice that Ms. Bombar was seeking punitive damages for statutory bad faith. See West American’s Brief at 43; West American’s Reply Brief at 21.
¶ 31 We have reviewed West American’s pre-trial memorandum and find no contention that Ms. Bombar’s complaint did not sufficiently plead a claim for statutory bad [92]*92faith.11 While the memorandum raised an issue as to whether Upright properly plead in its complaint a claim for compensatory damages, there is no such argument concerning Ms. Bombar’s statutory bad faith claim. Since West American has not otherwise cited to a place in the record where it preserved this issue in the court below, we find the issue to be waived. See Pa. R.A.P. 302(a).
¶ 32 Regarding West American’s claim it had a reasonable basis for coverage, this issue has been exhaustively discussed supra, and we decline to address it further.
¶ 33 Regarding West American’s claim the trial court erred in concluding West American had a duty to investigate the underlying claim, we conclude the trial court did not err. West American takes issue with the trial court’s conclusions that West American “has breached its duty to investigate the claim as it provided it would do under the terms of the insurance policy,” and “made no investigation, not even to determine whether the insured would be covered should the facts asserted in the Complaint be true.” Trial Court Opinion filed 1/19/05 at 26, 19. West American argues that its only duty to “investigate” was to review “the four corners” of Ms. Bombar’s underlying civil complaint and determine whether the alleged facts required coverage under the policy. West American argues there was no other duty to “investigate.”
¶ 34 The Unfair Insurance Practices provision in the Pennsylvania Code, 31 Pa. Code § 146.6, provides the following:
§ 146.6. Standards for prompt investigation of claims. Every insurer shall complete investigation of a claim within 30 days after notification of claim, unless the investigation cannot reasonably be completed within the time. If the investigation cannot be completed within 30 days, and every 45 days thereafter, the insurer shall provide the claimant with a reasonable written explanation for the delay and state when a decision on the claim may be expected.
Moreover, in Hollock v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 842 A.2d 409, 415 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc), this Court opined that “the broad language of Section 8371 was designed to remedy all instances of bad faith conduct by an insurer, whether occurring before, during or after litigation. Therefore, we acknowledge ... that [a]n action for bad faith may also extend to the insurer’s investigative practices[.]” (quoting O’Donnell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 734 A.2d 901, 906 (Pa.Super.1999)). Implicit in Hol-lock’s holdings is the requirement that the insurer properly investigate claims prior to refusing to pay the proceeds of the policy to its insured. See Condio v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 899 A.2d 1136 (Pa.Super.2006) (holding that bad faith includes lack of good faith in investigating the facts of a complaint). Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err.
¶ 35 Regarding West American’s remaining claims that the trial court erred in granting Ms. Bombar’s motion for summary judgment on the claim of bad faith, we find West American’s issues to be waived.
[93]*93¶ 36 While West American proffered several arguments and conclusions regarding alleged trial court errors, West American failed to cite any relevant authority supporting its positions.12 See Pa.R.A.P. 2119; Burgoyne v. Pinecrest Community Association, 924 A.2d 675 (Pa.Super.2007) (indicating the failure to develop an argument with citation to and analysis of relevant authority waives the issue on appeal). This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. See id.
¶ 37 West American’s next issue is the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of First Insurance Center and dismissing West American’s cross-claim for contribution and/or indemnity. We find no relief is due.
¶ 38 In the argument portion of its brief, we note with disapproval that West American makes numerous general conclusions and invites this Court to review over one hundred pages of pleadings and transcripts in determining whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of First Insurance Center. For instance, West American states the following in brief:
First Insurance [Center] argued that it was in an “agent-principal” relationship with West American and could not be held hable unless it was negligent in the procurement of insurance, and that its acts were not the “proximate cause” of Upright’s harm. (R. 1889-1890a). West American asserted in response, in its proposed conclusions of law, that West American had a valid claim against First Insurance [Center] for contribution and/or indemnity. (R. 1895a-1912a, 1983a). Ultimately, as part of its December 30, 2005 order, the lower court granted First Insurance [Center’s] motion for summary judgment, and dismissed West American’s cross-claim for indemnity. (Appendix; R.1951a-1952a; 1960a).
The lower court erred in dismissing West American’s cross-claim against First Insurance [Center] and in finding that West American was vicariously liable in bad faith for the acts of First Insurance [Center]. Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 2252(d), a defendant has the right to assert a new matter cross-claim against another party to the case for contribution or indemnity. West American properly asserted such a cross-claim against First Insurance [Center], as the independent insurance agent of Upright. Despite being advised in 1995 of an accident claim by Upright, First Insurance [Center] did not notify West American of the accident (R. 710a; 713a-714a); advised Upright that no coverage was available, and did not notify West American that it had such a conversation. (R. 580a-581a; 588a). Further West American considered First Insurance [Center] an independent insurance agent, and not authorized to make coverage determinations on behalf of the insurer, which it clearly did. (R. 581a).
The lower court, however, disregarded those facts, which at the very least created genuine fact issues for trial as to whether or not First Insurance [Center] was West American’s “agent” for vicarious liability purposes. Instead, the [94]*94lower court issued an erroneous and unfounded ruling as to the vicarious liability of West American, and in so doing extinguished any proper basis for.relief available to West American.
West American’s Brief at 50-51 (emphasis added).
¶ 39 The only portion of West American’s brief which indicates any specific argument is the bolded portion of the aforementioned passage. However, the fact First Insurance did not notify West American of the accident, advised Upright there was no coverage, and did not notify West American of this conversation begs the question of whether First Insurance Center was acting as an agent of West American. That is, the specific facts pointed to by West American may raise questions as to whether First Insurance Center acted properly in treating Upright’s claim; however, West American has not explained how such facts prove or disapprove a principal-agency relationship between West American and First Insurance Center. Moreover, we have reviewed the pages cited to by West American for its argument that “West American considered First Insurance [Center] an independent insurance agent, and not authorized to make coverage determinations on behalf of the insurer, which it clearly did. (R. 581a).” While an employee of West American may have baldly asserted during the hearing that Mr. Alferio of First Insurance Center was an independent insurance agent, West American has pointed to no facts which support this ultimate conclusion, and, therefore, has failed to prove there was a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, we find no relief is due.
¶ 40 West American’s next issue is whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in awarding damages, which were excessive, unfounded, and miscalculated. Under the umbrella of this general claim, West American raises the following sub-issues: (1) The trial court erred in awarding bad faith damages under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371 since a request for such was included in neither Upright’s nor Ms. Bombar’s complaint; (2) The trial court erred in imposing and calculating punitive damages against West American; (3) The trial court erred in assessing damages for “vicarious bad faith” against West American for First Insurance Center’s actions; (4) The trial court erred in permitting improper witnesses and evidence relating to compensatory damages; and (5) the trial court erred in relying upon the speculative opinions of Upright’s witnesses in determining attorneys’ fees.
¶ 41 Initially, we conclude sub-issues one and three have been addressed supra, and we need not address the issues further.13 Moreover, we find sub-issue five to be waived since West American has set forth no relevant authority supporting its position regarding the award of attorneys’ fees. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119; Burgoyne, supra. We decline to become counsel for West American in this regard.
¶ 42 Regarding sub-issue two, West American argues the trial court should not have awarded punitive damages and the award thereof was excessive. West American specifically argues that punitive damages should not have been awarded since it did not act in bad faith. The issue of bad faith has been discussed supra, and we decline to address it further.
¶ 43 Moreover, regarding sub-issue two, West American argues the trial court should not have based its assessment of punitive damages on the total net worth [95]*95of OMo Casualty, of which West American is a subsidiary. Rather, West American argues the trial court should not have considered Ohio Casualty’s net worth in any regard and should have limited its assessment to West American’s net income from premiums, which were collected in Pennsylvania, and not its net income from premiums collected nationwide.
¶ 44 In its opinion, the trial court aptly explained why it relied on the net worth of Ohio Casualty in imposing the amount of punitive damages, and we find no error with regard thereto.14 See Trial Court Opinion filed 12/30/05 at 24-26.
¶45 Finally, regarding sub-issue two, West American suggests the trial court erred in relying on the expert testimony of Jonathan Cunitz in determining the amount of punitive damages. West American’s entire argument in this regard is as follows:
Upright’s expert, Jonathan Cunitz, testified as to the amount of punitive damages that would not interfere with the ability of the insurer to conduct normal operations, a line of questioning to which West American[’s] counsel objected on grounds that such subject matter was not in Cunitz’ report, nor was Cun-itz qualified to opine as to that subject. The lower court overruled this objection and allowed the testimony. (R. 1465a-1468a). Cunitz then gave his opinion that, “an award of as much as 10% of the pretax income of any of these entities that is deemed appropriate by the Court would not interfere with that company’s ability to conduct normal business operations.” (R. 1469a-1470a). This testimony was improper.
West American’s Brief at 55.
¶ 46 West American has failed to cite any authority for its assertion that Jonathan Cunitz offered improper expert testimony, which was outside of Mr. Cunitz’ report and for which Mr. Cunitz was not qualified. We decline to become counsel for West American on appeal and will not develop this argument for it. See Pa. R.A.P. 2119; Burgoyne, supra.
¶ 47 Regarding sub-issue five, West American argues the trial court erred in awarding Upright $700,000.00 in compensatory damages. Specifically, West American asserts (1) the trial court erred in permitting Paul Murphy, CPA to testify regarding $700,000.00 in alleged compensatory damages that were never disclosed to West American until two weeks prior to trial by way of Mr. Murphy’s report, (2) the trial court erred in permitting Sal Cognetti, Esquire, to testify since he was not identified as an expert until two weeks before trial, and (3) the trial court erred in permitting the depositions of Mr. Conflitti and Watkins to be [96]*96admitted into evidence. We find these issues to be waived.
¶ 48 Aside from baldly stating the trial court erred with regard to each evidentia-ry ruling, West American has failed to adequately develop its argument on appeal. Moreover, West American has failed to identify any authority supporting its specific arguments.15 See Pa.R.A.P. 2119. Therefore, we find sub-issue five to be waived.
¶ 49 West American’s final argument is that its appeal was timely filed and from a final order. Therefore, West American urges this Court to deny Ms. Bombar’s motion to quash. In light of our discussion supra, we find it unnecessary to address this claim further.
¶ 50 Affirmed; Motion to Quash Appeal Docketed at 224 MDA 2006 is Denied; Motion to Quash Reply Brief is Denied.
¶ 51 Judge KLEIN files a Dissenting Opinion.