Boland v. United States

169 Ct. Cl. 145, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 47, 1965 WL 8256
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJanuary 22, 1965
DocketNo. 556-58
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 169 Ct. Cl. 145 (Boland v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Boland v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 145, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 47, 1965 WL 8256 (cc 1965).

Opinion

Laramoee, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff served on active duty as a Reserve officer in the Navy from 1941 to 1946. He was released from active duty, not by reason of physical disability, on January 11,1946. In this action he seeks disability retired pay from the date of his release from active duty. In his petition, plaintiff merely alleges that he is entitled to this retired pay. However, he [147]*147did apply to the Board for Correction of Naval Records, requesting that his records be corrected to show that he was entitled to retired pay from the date of his release from active duty. Testimony was taken before the commissioner of this court concerning the question of arbitrariness and/or illegality of the Correction Board’s decision which was adverse to plaintiff. Plaintiff’s brief is premised on the fact that the Correction Board erred. Defendant on brief has answered plaintiff’s contention and maintains that the Correction Board’s decision was correct. Consequently, in this opinion, we will treat the claim as one based on an alleged erroneous decision of the Correction Board.

Plaintiff’s first contention in his brief is that at the time he was discharged he should have been sent before a retiring board. Nothing in the petition suggests any arbitrary action in this connection, and plaintiff cites no authority for this claim. Moreover, the first time this contention appears is in plaintiff’s brief wherein he states that at the time he was physically examined for release he reported his history of myoclonic seizures, etc., and was advised by the Naval Medical Officer to submit his claim to the Veterans Administration. He did not identify the officer, and defendant was given no opportunity to refute the statement. Under these circumstances, probably the testimony should not have been received. Boraiko v. United States, 146 Ct. Cl. 814, 817 (1959). This contention raises issues of fact to which the defendant has not had an opportunity to address itself. Under the circumstances, plaintiff’s belated attempt to raise this issue should not be allowed. However, in any event, plaintiff cannot predicate his cause of action on alleged arbitrary action by defendant occurring 13 years before his petition was filed, since such a cause of action would be barred by our 6-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1958 Ed.).

Furthermore, in a letter written to the Veterans Administration on October 27, 1946, plaintiff described his conversation with the Navy doctor, as follows:

In October of 1945 I was given my discharge examination at which time I asked the doctor for advice and treatment. I was told that nothing was evident in the' examination and to file a physical disability . claim [148]*148through the Red Cross office in the Discharge center, which I did.

Plaintiff made no application to appear before a retiring board, and under the circumstances above outlined we find no substance in this claim. Moreover, plaintiff was subsequently given a hearing — the one before the Correction Board, which he now attacks.

The Correction Board, after reviewing and considering plaintiff’s Veterans Administration and Navy medical records, the documents submitted by plaintiff, and the advisory opinions of the Disability Review Board and the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, denied plaintiff’s application. This court has held that unless plaintiff shows “by cogent and clearly convincing evidence” that such determinations are arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by substantial evidence, it will not upset the determination of the military departments. See John A. Furlong v. United States, 153 Ct. Cl. 557, 563.

Thus, the question we are here confronted with is whether in fact there was substantial evidence to support the Correction Board’s findings.

In this case there is a dispute as to whether plaintiff’s muscular tics are caused by a phychoneurotic condition or by an epileptic condition. Several private doctors who had examined plaintiff since his release from active duty in 1946 have expressed the opinion that plaintiff is suffering from “petit mal epilepsy.” The Veterans Administration which has been examining plaintiff continuously since his release, at first diagnosed his condition as “psychoneuroses — hysterical type — mild, manifested by muscular spasms.” Later, the Veterans Administration’s doctor concluded that plaintiff was suffering from “epilepsy, grand mal.” Still later, the Veterans Administration, after an examination by another Veterans Administration doctor in 1950, diagnosed plaintiff’s condition as conversion reaction rather than epilepsy.1

[149]*149Since the above-mentioned examination in 1950, plaintiff has undergone various neuropsychiatric examinations, and the result reached has always been in accord with the 1950 diagnosis. The Veterans Administration has continued to follow that diagnosis.

Dr. Stevens, a neuropsychiatrist, who first examined plaintiff in 1959, more than 13 years after his release from active duty, diagnosed that plaintiff was suffering from “reading myoclonic epilepsy,” which is the type of seizure precipitated principally by reading, although the neurological examination which he gave plaintiff was negative and the electroencephalogram which he performed was also negative. At trial, he testified that the onset of this condition was in 1943 and disqualified plaintiff for active duty in 1946. However, he also testified that he did not know the criteria used by the Navy in 1946 in determining whether an officer was incapacitated for active duty.

The other doctor who testified for plaintiff, Dr. Stephenson, and who had never examined plaintiff, stated that from his examination of the records the weight of the evidence supported a diagnosis of epilepsy and that plaintiff should have been retired for physical disability. However, Dr. Stephenson testified he was not a neurologist and had never treated an epileptic. Moreover, he admitted that the Navy standards for 1945 and 1946 did not provide that a man with epilepsy would be incapacitated for active duty.

Opposed to this, Dr. Gilíes, a lieutenant in the Navy Medical Corps, who was the head of the Department of Neurology at the National Naval Medical Center, testified that the Veterans Administration’s diagnosis of plaintiff’s condition as “conversion reaction” was correct. He also testified that whether or not plaintiff’s condition at the time of release was epilepsy or conversion reaction, the condition did not incapacitate him for active duty at the time. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that during the years 1945 and 1946 the criterion used by the Navy to determine whether an officer was incapacitated for active duty was whether his physical condition was such that it did not permit his performance of the duties of his office in a reasonable manner. No disease or injury was considered incapacitating per se, [150]*150and the fact that an individual was suffering from epilepsy, whether grand mal or petit mal, or from conversion reaction, was not in and of itself a sufficient basis to declare that the individual was incapacitated for active duty.

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Bluebook (online)
169 Ct. Cl. 145, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 47, 1965 WL 8256, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boland-v-united-states-cc-1965.