ROSE, Justice.
Defendants, members of the Board of Trustees of Weston County School District No. 1, in their official capacity, and A. L. Albert, individually, appeal from the judgment of the Sixth Judicial District Court, which reinstated the plaintiff as a teacher in the District with back pay and other benefits, and awarded him compensatory damages and attorney’s fees. In addition to his petition for review of his termination, plaintiff ásked damages in tort against the Board for malicious interference with his opportunity to pursue his professional career, and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C., § 1983,1 against Albert, the Superintendent of the District, for attempting to deprive plaintiff of his teaching career on the basis of constitutionally impermissible • reasons. These consolidated appeals concern the propriety of every aspect of the judgment below.
We will affirm the district court judgment, which reversed the School Board’s decision terminating the plaintiff, and which judgment also awarded damages and attorney’s fees against Albert under the applicable federal statutes. We will reverse the judgment against the Board.
When the issue of his termination arose, plaintiff, David L. Holso, was a continuing contract teacher in his eighth year as an English teacher in the District. On March 12,1975, the Board met in regular session to discuss contract renewals, with plaintiff’s principal, Glenn Gregson, who presented a favorable evaluation of the plaintiff and recommended that he be retained. In spite of this, the members of the School Board and Superintendent Albert questioned plaintiff’s performance as a teacher, particularly in the areas of his classroom discipline, his student grading, and his personal health problems. The Board directed Greg-son to make a further evaluation of plaintiff and certain other teachers. Gregson [1012]*1012testified at the plaintiff’s termination hearing and at trial that he had received the impression that the Board was “out to get” Mr. Holso. On the morning of March 13, Gregson conveyed this impression to Holso, explaining that the Board was upset with his relationship with a female teacher, as well as his classroom discipline, and was also concerned about Mr. Holso’s personal health problems. Later that morning, plaintiff and Gregson met with Superintendent Albert to discuss the complaints and there is conflicting evidence concerning the substance of this discussion. Plaintiff testified that Albert specifically commented on plaintiff’s relationship with another teacher, saying that he (Albert) had observed plaintiff’s automobile parked overnight in front of the female teacher’s home during the 1974 Christmas vacation. Plaintiff further testified that the conversation had to do with plaintiff’s health, as well as his failure to turn in a requested course outline. All of these matters will be discussed in greater detail later in the opinion. Mr. Holso further testified that Albert said he wasn’t interested in Holso’s explanations, and if he insisted on a termination hearing there wouldn’t be a school in the country that would offer him a teaching job after Albert got through with him. Albert denied that he discussed plaintiff’s purported immorality, or that he threatened plaintiff. He insisted that the reason he pursued plaintiff’s termination was because Gregson had changed his mind and was urging that Holso be fired. Gregson consistently denied this and testified that he had never recommended plaintiff’s termination.
On the afternoon of March 13, Albert and Gregson met with the attorney for the School Board, which meeting culminated in the mailing of a letter to plaintiff, the substance of which was that Albert was recommending plaintiff’s termination to the Board for the following reasons:
“1. Your physical handicap and your neglect of the care of your health which results in (a) an unusual number of absences from the classroom; (b) an inability to work up to your potential after your return from absences and when your health is neglected.
“2. Insubordination including but not limited to (a) failure to follow directions in the preparation and coordination of outlines of course contents; (b) failure to hold meetings as directed; (c) failure to attend meetings or contribute to meetings when you do attend.
“3. Other conduct that constitutes good and just cause for termination.”
Concerning the general allegation of other “good and just cause,” Albert testified at the termination hearing that plaintiff’s alleged immorality was included as one of the significant reasons for his recommendation. Also included — as is disclosed by the Board’s findings — was an allegation that plaintiff’s grading of students was questionable.
Due to the rumors which had circulated concerning the termination proceedings initiated against him, plaintiff, on April 3rd, spent portions of several class periods answering student’s questions and explaining his understanding of the grounds for his termination. Although testimony at the hearing varied as to the amount of time spent in such discussions and on the question of whether plaintiff initiated the discourse, none of the students who testified thought plaintiff had attempted to solicit student support. Superintendent Albert was notified of the class discussions by a board member. After investigation by the school attorney, Albert, on April 6, ordered plaintiff’s suspension pending the outcome of the termination proceedings.
Subsequent to a hearing before the Board, commencing April 17, the suspension of April 6 was approved and plaintiff was terminated, based on the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
“1 — The illnesses of David E. Holso (diabetes and ileostomy) interfere with his professional responsibility in the classroom and cause him to be absent from classes for substantial periods of time. On the occasions of his absences, he has failed to notify the principal’s office and [1013]*1013the absences result in inattention to school work by the students. Mr. Holso has not carefully observed his diet and has on occasion not carefully controlled his diabetic condition. Mr. Holso failed to follow the direction of the principal that he notify the principal’s office each time he found it necessary to leave his room during a class period.
“2 — Mr. Holso failed to complete and hand in a specific assignment of work required by his superior, Mrs. Betty Shur-ley. He was reminded to do so on several occasions at meetings by Mrs. Shurley and by his principal, Glenn Gregson. The assignment was the preparation of a class outline or syllabus which was to be a significant part of a booklet designed to coordinate the curriculum of English classes from kindergarten through 12th grade in Newcastle schools. Mr. Holso did not complete or hand in this work until six days after his notice of termination was given and after the booklet was assembled without his work. Mr. Holso admitted that he failed to cooperate with the head of the English department and failed to hold a high school English teachers meeting that he was directed to hold. The failure to hold the meeting was not excused by any facts shown.
“3 — Mr. Holso’s grading is questionable and the record of the grades he has given shows an excessive number of D’s and F’s over the last seven years, all of which indicates that his teaching is inadequate.
“A teacher’s right to grade any particular paper or student as the teacher sees fit to do should not be limited but Mr. Holso’s grading, when studied over the last seven years, shows such an unusually excessive number of F’s and D’s that it indicates that he has been and is an inadequate teacher.
“4 — On April 3, 1975, David E. Holso spent the major part of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th period classes talking to his students in those classes about the specific grounds for his termination. The discussions were initiated by him and were not initiated by questions from the students. In his second period class he also initiated the discussion but spent less time talking about the matter. On April 3, 1975, although no specific charge of immorality had been made in the notice of termination, he injected that problem into the discussion he initiated with the students.”
“CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“1 — Mr. Holso’s illness and his failure properly to care for his health interfered with his performance in the classroom to the extent that it is good and sufficient cause for his termination.
“2 — Mr. Holso, because of his failure to perform specific assignments of his superiors, his failure to cooperate and his failure to hold a meeting as directed by his superior and his failure to notify the principal’s office each time it was necessary for him to leave his classroom was insubordinate and such insubordination is sufficient cause for his termination.
“3 — The record of the grades Mr. Holso has given over the last seven years shows an unusually excessive number of F’s and D’s and it indicates that he is and has been an inadequate teacher and that fact is good and sufficient cause for terminating his contract.
“4 — Mr. Holso’s actions in the classroom on April 3, 1975, constituted unprofessional conduct and were not necessary to control or teach his students. His actions were good and sufficient cause to remove him from the classroom and suspend him for the remainder of the year. To place him back in the classroom after his students have had to testify in his proceeding would, in this particular case, not be in the best interest of the students. We approve the suspension of David E. Holso that was made on April 6, 1975.”
Confronted with the district court’s judgment reversing the Board’s decision, and awarding plaintiff damages, we will consider the following issues:
1. Whether the Board’s decision to terminate and suspend plaintiff was supported by substantial evidence;
2. Whether the district court erred in finding tort liability on the part of the Board;
[1014]*10143. Whether the district court erred in finding that Albert had violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
4. Whether the district court erred in assessing damages and attorney’s fees against Albert.
“GOOD CAUSE” FOR TERMINATION
When contemplating appeals pertaining to the termination of a continuing contract teacher, this court is committed to the view that not only must there be “good cause” and substantial evidence in support of the charges, but, in addition, the facts to sustain such charges must bear reasonable relationship to the teacher’s fitness or capacity to perform his duties in that position. Powell v. Board of Trustees of Crook County School District No. 1, Wyo., 550 P.2d 1112, 1119. See, Monahan v. Board of Trustees of Elementary School District No. 9, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235, 237; and Roush v. Sweetwater County School District No. 1, Wyo., 497 P.2d 540, 542. In Board of Trustees, Laramie County School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, Wyo., 549 P.2d 1161, we addressed a situation where the district court had reversed a school board’s determination, and we held
“ ‘. . . that the only direct items of evidence against him, all of which were admitted to, and corrected, by him, were so trivial and so remote from the date of the hearing that they did not justify termination, and that to base termination on those incidents would be oppressively harsh; . . .’” 549 P.2d at 1177.
We set out the appropriate standards for reviewing such decisions in Spiegel, and they, therefore, need not be repeated here.
In the instant case, the district court entered the following findings:
“1. That the finding that Plaintiff’s illnesses (diabetes and ileostomy) interfered with his professional responsibility in the classroom and caused him to be absent from his classes for substantial periods of time is not supported by substantial evidence.
“2. As to the finding that Plaintiff’s actions in regard to Mrs. Shurley constitute insubordination, it is questionable whether the actions listed constitute insubordination, and in any event, the actions listed are not such as to constitute good cause for termination of Plaintiff’s continuing contract.
“3. That the finding that Plaintiff’s grading was questionable is not supported by substantial evidence and to terminate his contract without further facts would be arbitrary.
“4. That in regard to the finding that Plaintiff discussed his. termination with students on April 3, 1975, this was a difficult time for both Plaintiff and the School District and whether Plaintiff’s statements were in response to questions from students or not, there is no evidence that his statements in any way harmed the students or damaged their education and under all of the circumstances, Plaintiff’s actions do not constitute good cause to terminate or suspend him.”
HEALTH
The testimony before the Board was that on only two occasions — one, one and one-half years, and the other two and one-half years, prior to the hearing — had plaintiff’s health interfered with his classroom duties. The School District Rules provide that each year a teacher is granted ten days’ sick leave, and plaintiff never exceeded this limit. The evidence was that plaintiff had left his classroom unattended for brief periods to take care of his ileostomy. Plaintiff’s doctor testified that plaintiff’s severe diabetic condition was under pretty good control. We must agree with the trial court that these trivial incidents do not establish cause for the termination and, therefore, do not support the finding of the Board. Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, supra.
GRADING
Exhibits compiled by Superintendent Albert disclosed that plaintiff historically gave more D and F grades than would appear on a normal probability curve. No [1015]*1015grade analysis was made for the 1974-1975 school year — which immediately preceded the non-renewal of plaintiff’s contract. The school district has no formal grading policy, nor was the plaintiff ever told to grade “on the curve.” Cause for termination cannot be established by proof of the violation of standards that do not exist. Again, we agree with the district court’s conclusion. We will return to this area when discussing the § 1983 action against Superintendent Albert.
CLASS DISCUSSION
We have already set forth most of the evidence concerning this allegation. In addition to the circumstances that these discussions did take place, there was uncon-tradicted testimony before the Board, by the substitute who filled in for the plaintiff after his suspension, that no adverse impacts were observed in the plaintiff’s classes. Furthermore, several other teachers testified that the plaintiff’s approach— in responding to rumors — was not necessarily inappropriate. We must sustain the district court’s finding. The incident is too trivial and detached from the teacher’s ability and fitness to perform his duties. Powell v. Board of Trustees, supra; Monahan v. Board of Trustees, supra; Roush v. Sweetwater County School District, supra; and Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, supra.
INSUBORDINATION
We have taken this allegation out of order because the Board places its greatest reliance to justify the termination on this charge. We are here concerned with essentially two incidents — both involving the plaintiff’s superior in the English Department, Mrs. Betty Shurley. The first, and most important, incident relates to plaintiff’s failure to timely submit a class outline. All English teachers were requested to turn in these outlines by October 25, 1974, but Mr. Holso failed to do so until March 19, 1975, and testified at the Board hearing that he had simply forgotten about the assignment. Mrs. Shurley testified that she was not too concerned about Mr. Holso’s lack of attention to the problem until January, 1975, at which time she wished to compile the outlines into book form. Mrs. Shurley notified other teachers in January to turn in their outlines, but did not make this request of the plaintiff. She did, however, contact Gregson and Albert and they asked Mr. Holso to turn in the assignment.
The second incident involved a request by Mrs. Shurley of the plaintiff, asking that he call and hold an English meeting in November, 1974, at which time Mrs. Shurley planned to be away from the school. Plaintiff attempted to comply with this assignment but was unable to do so because of scheduling conflicts encountered by the other teachers.
Principal Gregson testified at the Board hearing that he was aware of a conflict between plaintiff and Mrs. Shurley, but felt it went back to a difference in educational philosophy. Mrs. Shurley and Mr. Holso were conscious of their differences, and, on March 11, 1975, they met with Gregson to discuss and attempt to resolve them. As a result of the meeting, Mrs. Shurley related at the Board hearing that even though the plaintiff had not fully cooperated with her, some progress had been made in establishing rapport, and she had not actively sought Mr. Holso’s termination.
“Insubordination,” as a ground for suspension, dismissal or termination under § 21-7-110, W.S.1977 [§ 21.1-160, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp.], is, as yet, an undefined term.2 Other courts have embraced the following definition:
“ . . ‘constant or continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct or implied order, reasonable in nature, and given by and with proper authority.’ ” Ray v. Minneapolis Board of Education, Special School District No. 1, 295 Minn. 13, [1016]*1016202 N.W.2d 375, 378, citing Shockley v. Board of Education, 51 Del. 537, 541, 149 A.2d 331, 334, reversed on other grounds, 52 Del. 237, 155 A.2d 323.
Certain jurisdictions have held that “insubordination” includes a willful refusal of a teacher to obey reasonable rules and regulations. State Tenure Commission v. Madison County Board of Education, 282 Ala. 658, 213 So.2d 823, 834. The better-reasoned decisions place emphasis on the presence of a persistent course of willful defiance. See, e. g., Fernald v. City of Ellsworth Superintending School Committee, Me., 342 A.2d 704, 708; and Johnson v. United School District Joint School Board, 201 Pa.Super. 117, 191 A.2d 897, 901. . See, generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 83, “Dismissal of Teachers — ‘Insubordination’ ” (1977). We embrace these definitions and concepts. To constitute insubordination as a cause for termination, it must be established that the teacher embarked upon a persistent course of willful defiance.
We agree with the district court that — applying the accepted definitions of “insubordination” — there is no substantial evidence of misconduct in this respect. We have before us two isolated incidents of a failure to carry out a superior’s request, arising from at most a lack of communication which had improved by the time the Board held its hearing. There was no substantial evidence of a persistent course of conduct characterized by willful defiance.
The district court properly ordered plaintiff’s reinstatement with back pay and benefits.
BOARD’S LIABILITY IN TORT
Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages because of the Board’s malicious interference with his professional career. Liability, according to the plaintiff, arises from the Board’s alleged action in seeking to carry out Albert’s threat made when he told the plaintiff:
“When I get through with you there won’t be a school in the country that will offer you a teaching job.”
The gravamen of this cause of action — -as set out in plaintiff’s brief — is the “unlawful tortious interference by a third person with the right of another to dispose of his labor.” [Emphasis supplied]
Appropriately labeled, plaintiff is seeking relief for “interference with prospective advantage,” as opposed to “interference with contractual relations.” Prosser, Law of Torts, §§ 129 and 130 (4th Ed. 1971). These separate causes of action tend to merge, except that the latter is aimed at the protection of the “probable expectancies” of life, such as future contractual relations. Prosser, supra, § 130, at 950. The Court of Appeals of Washington, in Olson v. Scholes, 17 Wash.App. 383, 563 P.2d 1275, 1279-1280, summarized the elements of such actions— while at the same time implicitly indicating how the actions arise from common foundations — as follows:
“ . . . The theory advanced is that stated in Restatement of Torts § 766 (1939), as follows:
“. . . [0]ne who, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely causes a third person not to
(a) perform a contract with another, or
(b) enter into or continue a business relation with another
is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby.
The tort as defined in the Restatement is divided into two parts: (a) dealing with the cause of action arising when a third person induces a breach of contract, and (b) dealing with the cause of action which arises when a third person induces one person not to enter into a contract with another. The first subsection deals with present relationships, and the second with future relationships. The elements of the tort have been stated as:
(1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy;
(2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interfe-ror;
[1017]*1017(3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and
(4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted.
See King v. Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974); Scymanski v. Dufault, 80 Wash.2d 77, 491 P.2d 1050 (1971); Corinthian Corp. v. White & Bollard, Inc., 74 Wash.2d 50, 442 P.2d 950 (1968), and Calbom v. Knudtzon, 65 Wash.2d 157, 396 P.2d 148 (1964), inter alia.”
See, also, 45 Am.Jur.2d, Interference, §§ 50 and 51; and 86 C.J.S. Torts § 43.
These theories, however, do not apply to actions between parties to an existing contract — they lie only against outsiders who interfere with the contractual expectancies of others. Olson v. Scholes, supra. An employer-employee relationship existed at the time of the alleged tortious acts, and, therefore, no recovery against the Board can be based upon the tort theory of interference with prospective advantage. We hold that the district court erred in entering a judgment against the Board on the basis of this theory.
Indeed, we have said that a judgment will be affirmed on any legal ground appearing in the record. P & M Cattle Co. v. Holler, Wyo., 559 P.2d 1019, 1024, inter alia. We are unable, however, to find any such grounds in this case. See, Durst v. School District No. 2 of Niobrara County, 39 Wyo. 442, 273 P. 675, which precludes recovery of damages to the business reputation or for mental suffering by a wrongfully discharged school teacher. See generally, 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 216. We reach no decision with respect to the propriety of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action against the Board, since that issue was not raised below.3
ALBERT’S LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
All parties apparently concede, and we agree, that the courts of this state have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over civil-rights actions filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Endress v. Brookdale Community College, 144 N.J.Super. 109, 364 A.2d 1080, 1092; and McClanahan v. Cochise College, 25 Ariz.App. 13, 540 P.2d 744, reh. den. 25 Ariz.App. 233, 542 P.2d 426. See, also Brody v. Leamy, 90 Misc.2d 1, 393 N.Y.S.2d 243, 247-257.
Albert contends, however, that since he had no statutory power to terminate the plaintiff, his conduct cannot come within the state action envisioned by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the root of Albert’s argument is the belief that he is entitled to the defense, consisting of a qualified, good-faith immunity, announced in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214. Defendant Albert’s contention is without merit to the extent that it emphasizes his statutory duties as definitive of the parameters of his liability. On the contrary, we find that § 1983 is concerned with the degree of participation in a deprivation of constitutional rights. An individual’s status as a school superintendent does not, in itself, protect his or her activities in the context here considered. See, e. g., Endress v. Brookdale Community College, supra, at 1095; Stoddard v. School District No. 1, Lincoln County, Wyoming, D.Wyo., 429 F.Supp. 890, 894; Aumiller v. University of Delaware, D.Del., 434 F.Supp. 1273; and Smith v. Losee, 10 Cir., 485 F.2d 334, 344, cert. den. 417 U.S. 908, 94 S.Ct. 2604, 41 L.Ed.2d 212.
We proceed, then, to the two pivotal issues with respect to the superintendent’s liability under § 1983, which can be said to be:
[1018]*10181. Whether Albert’s recommendation of termination was predicated, at least in part, on constitutionally impermissible reasons?
2. Whether Albert was entitled to the qualified, good-faith immunity defense?
We hold that the district court correctly answered the first question in the affirmative. The record clearly discloses evidence to the effect that plaintiffs alleged immorality was a significant reason for Albert’s recommendation. As stated in Stoddard v. School District No. 1, supra:
“ . . . The right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy is a fundamental constitutional right, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969), and such right of privacy embraces the right of an individual to attend church or not, to determine his or her own physical proportions, and to determine with whom he or she will associate. . ” 429 F.Supp., at 892.
The record is equally clear that the plaintiff’s grading methods were seriously questioned by Albert, even though there was no grading policy or standards in the district. As succinctly stated by the district court:
“ . . . Plaintiff could not constitutionally be terminated for use of a teaching method with which the superintendent disagreed, at least in the absence of clear prior warning that such a method was impermissible. Keefe vs. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359,362 (1st Cir.1969); Parducci vs. Ruckland, [Rutland] 316 F.Supp. 352, 356 (Mid.Dis.Ala.1970); Mailloux vs. Kiley, 323 F.Supp. 1387 (D.Mass.1971), affirmed 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir.1971); Webb vs. Lake Mills Community School District, 344 F.Supp. 791 (N.D.Iowa 1972); Sterzing vs. Ft. Bend Independent School District, 376 F.Supp. 657 (S.D.Tex.1972), affirmed 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.1974); Moore vs. Gaston County Board of Education, 357 F.Supp. 1037, 1040 (W.D. North Carolina 1973).”
Turning to the so-called immorality issue, there is ample evidence in the record from which the court could have found that plaintiff’s constitutionally protected conduct was a motivating factor in Albert’s decision to recommend termination. Plaintiff, therefore, successfully carried his burden of showing that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that such conduct was a “substantial factor” in Albert’s recommendation. See, Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471. Given the lack of other sustainable reasons for Albert’s recommendation of termination, we fail to see how Albert has sustained his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he would have reached the same decision concerning Holso’s termination in the absence of the protected conduct — as required by the Mt. Healthy case. Even if such a showing had been made, it appears that only the scope of relief would have been affected4 — and that aspect of the cause of action against Albert is not really a question.
Secondly, we find that the district court’s implicit rejection of Albert’s [1019]*1019defense of qualified, good-faith immunity was also correct. In order to qualify for this defense, Albert must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that he acted without malicious intention to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights or cause him to suffer other injury, and (2) that he did not know and reasonably need not have known that his conduct violated the constitutional rights of the party affected. Aumiller v. University of Delaware, supra, at 1307, and Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 3 Cir., 538 F.2d 53, 60-62. U.S. cert. den. The district court expressly found actual malice to have existed in Albert’s conduct— presumably based, at least in part, on his threat to the plaintiff. The record supports such a finding, thus precluding Albert’s entitlement to the defense. See, Smith v. Losee, supra. Cf. Vanderzanden v. Lowell School District No. 71, D.Ore., 369 F.Supp. 67, 75. See, also, Endress v. Brookdale Community College, supra, at 1095. Albert knew, or should have known, that the action he took would cause a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional right to privacy.
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES
Plaintiff had requested — in his action against Albert — compensatory damages for injury to his professional reputation and for pain and suffering as a result of defendant Albert’s actions. There is little question that once a constitutional violation is made out under § 1983, a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress, embarrassment and humiliation. Au-miller v. University of Delaware, supra, at 1310; Endress v. Brookdale Community College, supra, at 1097-1098; and Stoddard v. School District No. 1, supra, at 892. In appropriate cases, punitive damages are also recoverable. See, Silver v. Cormier, 10 Cir., 529 F.2d 161, 163-164; and Smith v. Losee, supra. In order to recover such damages, the plaintiff need only show (1) that he in fact suffered such damages; and (2) that defendant’s actions proximately caused plaintiff’s injury. Aumiller v. University of Delaware, supra. There is adequate evidence in the record to support plaintiff’s allegations that his opportunities to pursue his career have been substantially reduced and his confidence and relationships with others within and without.the school district have been affected by reason of Albert’s actions. We hold that the district court’s judgment against defendant Albert, in the amount of $2,500.00, should be affirmed. Since we find no liability on the part of the Board, we reverse the judgment, in the amount of $5,000.00, against its members in their official capacity.
Finally, plaintiff sought and recovered attorney’s fees against Albert, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988, as amended5, in the amount of $2,172.55. The federal act, known as the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, makes the award of fees discretionary, and has been applied retroactively to § 1983 cases pending at the time of its enactment. See, e. g., Rainey v. Jackson State College, 5 Cir., 551 F.2d 672. The district court did not abuse its discretion in making this award — particularly in light of the fact that the parties stipulated that a reasonable attorney’s fee for the entire case would be $4,345.10. We will, therefore, affirm the attorney’s fee award against Albert. For the reasons previously stated herein, the award of attorney’s fees as punitive damages against the Board is reversed.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for entry of [1020]*1020judgment which is consistent with this opinion.