Blevio v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.

39 F.3d 1, 1994 WL 566325
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedOctober 24, 1994
Docket94-1318
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 39 F.3d 1 (Blevio v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blevio v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 39 F.3d 1, 1994 WL 566325 (1st Cir. 1994).

Opinion

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.

Ms. Marjorie Blevio (“Blevio”) brought a declaratory judgment action, as administra-trix of the estate of her thirteen-year-old son Noah Blevio, against Aetna Casualty & Surety Company (“Aetna”) and Royal Insurance Company of America, Inc. (“Royal”), to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties under two motor vehicle underinsurance policies. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The disposition of these motions turned on the issue of whether, under the law of Connecticut, two insurers, who each provide underinsured motorist coverage to a party injured in an accident, can each set off in full, from the limits of their coverage, the amount of the recovery obtained from the party legally responsible for the accident. The district court found that each insurer was not entitled to set off the recovery from the tortfeasor in full, but rather that the two insurers could only deduct the amount of the recovery from the aggregated underinsured motorist coverage limits. 844 F.Supp. 849. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

The parties do not dispute the material facts of this case. Noah Blevio died on August 9, 1991, from fatal injuries sustained when he was hit by a pickup truck on June 30,1991. The combined limits of the tortfea-sors’ applicable bodily injury liability policies totalled $200,000. This amount was offered to Blevio.

In addition, Noah Blevio had underinsured motorist coverage up to $500,000 under his father’s Aetna business policy and up to $300,000 under his brother’s Royal policy. Both policies provided that their underin-sured motorist coverage shall be reduced by the amounts paid by, or on behalf of, the legally responsible party. Specifically, the uninsured motorist coverage endorsement of the Aetna Policy provides:

*2 A. Coverage

1. We will pay all sums the “insured” is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or driver of an “uninsured motor vehicle” 1 ...

D. Limit of Insurance

* * * * * *

2. Any amount payable under this coverage shall be reduced by:

b. All sums paid by or for anyone who is legally responsible....

The uninsured motorist coverage provisions of the Royal policy provide:

A. We will pay compensatory damages which an “insured” is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an “uninsured motor vehicle” because of “bodily injury,”

1. Sustained by an “insured,” and
2. Caused by an accident....

In addition, the endorsement attached to the Royal policy, entitled “Amendment of Policy Provisions — Connecticut,” provides:

II. Uninsured Motorists Coverage 2

Part C is amended as follows:

******

E. The Limit of Liability provision is replaced by the following:

Limit of Liability

The limit of liability shall be reduced by all sums:

1. Paid because of the “bodily injury” by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally responsible....

The parties do not dispute that the legally responsible parties were underinsured and that the underinsured motorist coverage provided under Aetna’s and Royal’s policies are applicable to Blevio’s claims. Nor do the parties dispute that Aetna and Royal are entitled to a setoff by virtue of the existence of the legally responsible parties’ liability payment. Rather, the only issue is the extent to which liability insurance payments made on the tortfeasor’s behalf can be set off. Blevio contends that Aetna and Royal can only share one $200,000 setoff equal to the amount that Blevio will actually collect from the tortfeasors. Both Aetna and Royal claim, however, that they are each entitled to deduct the tortfeasors’ $200,000 liability payment in order to give full effect to their separate underinsurance setoff provisions, thereby reducing the aggregate underinsurance coverage available to Blevio from $800,-000 to $400,000. 3

B. Procedural History

Blevio filed a declaratory judgment action on June 11, 1993, asking that the district court determine the extent to which Aetna and Royal are entitled to set off the limits of the available bodily injury liability coverage from the underinsured motorist coverage of their respective policies. Blevio then filed a “Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment.” Aetna and Royal cross-moved for summary judgment.

After a hearing, the district court entered judgment for Blevio. The district court advised Aetna and Royal, however, that because, at the time, no Connecticut appellate court had directly addressed the issue, and a split of authority existed between two Connecticut Superior Court decisions that had addressed the issue, it would certify the issue presented to the Supreme Court of Connecticut upon their request. Aetna and Royal then filed an “Ex Parte Motion for Certifica *3 tion of Question of Law.” The district court vacated the judgment in favor of Blevio, and allowed certification to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The Supreme Court of Connecticut declined the certification request. On February 24,1994, the district court then entered final judgment in favor of Blevio and against Aetna and Royal. Aetna and Royal now appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

Our review of the district court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary. Alan Corp. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 339, 341 (1st Cir.1994). Where, as here, the parties do not dispute the facts upon which coverage is allowed or denied under an insurance policy, and the existence or amount of coverage depends solely upon a construction of the policy, a question of law is presented. Id. at 342 (citing Atlas Pallet, Inc. v. Gallagher, 725 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.1984)). Therefore, like other questions of law, we are not bound by the district court’s interpretation of the policy. Alan Corp., 22 F.3d at 342.

The parties do not dispute that Connecticut law applies. In interpreting Connecticut law, we are bound by intermediate appellate state court decisions construing state law unless we are convinced that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 1782, 18 L.Ed.2d 886 (1967); Ground Air Transfer, Inc. v. Westates Airlines, Inc.,

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Bluebook (online)
39 F.3d 1, 1994 WL 566325, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blevio-v-aetna-casualty-surety-co-ca1-1994.