Trefethen v . Liberty Mutual 11-CV-225-SM 05/31/13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Margaret Trefethen, Plaintiff
v. Case N o . 11-cv-225-SM Opinion N o . 2013 DNH 081 Liberty Mutual Group, Inc., Defendant
O R D E R
Plaintiff, Margaret Trefethen, brings this action against
her former employer, Liberty Mutual Group, claiming it unlawfully
terminated her employment and then coerced her into signing a
release of claims. She says the release is unenforceable, and
she seeks damages for alleged acts of discrimination and wrongful
termination. Liberty Mutual moves for summary judgment on each
of Trefethen’s claims, as well as on each of its own
counterclaims.
Contemporaneous with the issuance of this order, the court
has issued its decision in a related case involving Liberty
Mutual. See Bryant v . Liberty Mutual Group, Inc., 2013 DNH 77
(D.N.H. May 3 1 , 2013). The claims raised in this case, as well
as the arguments advanced to invalidate the release, are
substantially similar to those advanced in Bryant. In fact,
Trefethen and Bryant are represented by the same counsel. While some of the background facts in the two cases obviously differ,
those factual differences are not material. Because the
governing legal principles, as well as the court’s reasoning, are
the same, they need not be repeated at length in this decision.
For the reasons set forth below, as well as those discussed
more fully in Bryant, Liberty Mutual’s motion for summary
judgment is granted with respect to each of Trefethen’s claims.
Liberty Mutual’s counterclaims are, however, dismissed as moot.
Standard of Review
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must
“view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party
opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in
that party’s favor.” Griggs-Ryan v . Smith, 904 F.2d 1 1 2 , 115
(1st Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record
reveals “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). In this context, “a fact is ‘material’ if it
potentially affects the outcome of the suit and a dispute over it
is ‘genuine’ if the parties’ positions on the issue are supported
by conflicting evidence.” Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v . Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 199-200 (1st
Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
2 Background
Trefethen worked for Liberty Mutual for about 16 months in
the early 1980’s and returned in 2001. During the course of her
employment, she received several promotions. By 2008, she had
risen to the position of Treasury Services Specialist in the Cash
Controls Unit. But, she says that upon her promotion to that
position, Liberty Mutual began making “unreasonable and
impossible demands” on her. Plaintiff’s Memorandum (document n o .
31-1) at 2 . And, says Trefethen, her supervisor began to
question whether she had the “energy and ability” to perform her
job - language Trefethen suggests was code for age-related
discrimination. Id. As a result of the job-related stress,
Trefethen says she developed shingles, was out of work for a
period of time, and filed a Workers’ Compensation claim. Yet,
she says, “[e]ven after learning that Trefethen had shingles due
to stress, [her supervisor] continued to insist that Trefethen
handle an impossible work load.” Id.
In March of 2009, Trefethen’s direct supervisor left (or was
fired by) the company and Trefethen was told that she would be
assuming even greater job responsibilities. She claims Liberty
Mutual “continued to simply increase [her] work load so she
couldn’t possibly keep up.” Id. at 3 . In August of 2009,
Trefethen received a verbal warning based upon Liberty Mutual’s
3 perception that she was not adequately performing her job. In a
subsequent meeting with a representative of the human resources
department, Trefethen claims she was told that, in essence, the
company was setting in motion a plan to fire her. She says she
learned that the company’s plan would unfold as follows. In the
wake of the verbal warning, she would inevitably receive a
written warning in 30 days. Then, 30 days later, she would be
put on probation and, 30 days after that, her employment would be
terminated. Trefethen Deposition (document n o . 30-5) at 9 1 . She
claims she understood (although she admitted that no one
specifically told her) that “the die was cast at that point” and
there was no opportunity for her to improve or otherwise avoid
being fired. Id. at 91-92.
After she received the warning about her performance,
Trefethen worked toward meeting the demands that had been placed
upon her. But, she says she soon realized that she had been
tasked with meeting unreasonable expectations and was incapable
of doing s o . Then, at some point in September of 2009, she says
the human resources representative informed her that she had
three options: first, she could simply quit, but that would
preclude her from collecting unemployment benefits; second, she
could wait for what she believed was inevitable disciplinary
action, after which she assumed she would be discharged for cause
4 - again, precluding her from receiving unemployment benefits; o r ,
finally, she could enter into a “mutual separation agreement”
with Liberty Mutual. The advantage of such an agreement was that
she would be eligible to receive unemployment benefits, as well
as severance benefits. See id. at 9 4 . She told the human
resources representative that she would think about it and
discuss her options with her husband. Id.
Subsequently, Trefethen contacted human resources and asked
how she would go about pursuing the mutual separation agreement.
She learned that she would be eligible for severance benefits if
she signed an agreement releasing any legal claims she might have
against Liberty Mutual. Over the next few days, Trefethen
communicated (both orally and by e-mail) with representatives of
the human resources department and asked a number of questions
about the proposed mutual separation. She also asked if Liberty
Mutual would allow her to continue working through October 3 0 ,
2009, so she might reach her 10-year service anniversary - a
milestone that would allow her to receive additional benefits
upon her departure. Id. at 9 6 . Liberty Mutual agreed.
On September 2 0 , 2009, Trefethen notified Liberty Mutual
that she would like to pursue the “mutual separation” proposal,
with her final day of work being October 30 (at the same time,
5 however, Trefethen was pursuing two other job openings within the
Liberty Mutual organization). A few days later, Liberty Mutual
sent her a letter, confirming the arrangement and explaining that
she would receive payment for all accrued but unused vacation
time and personal holidays; she was eligible for insurance
benefits under COBRA; if she wished to be eligible for severance
benefits, she would have to execute a release of claims against
Liberty Mutual; and the decision to sign the release and accept
severance pay is entirely voluntary. See Letter from Valencia
Augusta to Margaret Trefethen dated September 2 3 , 2009 (document
n o . 30-8) (“Your decision to accept or reject this additional
separation consideration is entirely voluntary and will in no way
affect your receipt of the regular benefits outlined above (i.e.,
salary and vacation pay and group benefits).”
On or around October 3 0 , Trefethen received the release of
claims. Among other things, that agreement provided that she:
1. Acknowledged that, absent her signature to the agreement, she was not entitled to severance benefits;
2. Knowingly and voluntarily released any claims she might have against Liberty Mutual as of the date of the agreement, including more than 20 specifically identified state and federal statutory and common law claims;
3. Had not relied upon any representations, promises, or agreements outside of those set forth in the severance agreement itself;
6 4. Had 45 days within which to review, consider, and sign the agreement;
5. Had been advised to consult with an attorney prior to signing the agreement; and
6. Had an additional seven days after signing the agreement to rescind i t .
See Severance Agreement and General Release (“Severance
Agreement”) (document n o . 3 0 - 3 ) . She reviewed the document,
discussed it with her husband, and, on November 4 , 2009, she
signed it and returned it to Liberty Mutual. She did not rescind
the agreement within the seven-day period provided to her.
Accordingly, Liberty Mutual paid her all severance benefits to
which she was entitled. The last payment was made on February
1 2 , 2010. More than a year later - on March 2 9 , 2011 - Trefethen
brought this action against Liberty Mutual, seeking to invalidate
the Severance Agreement and obtain damages for what she claims
was the unlawful termination of her employment.
Discussion
In her seven-count complaint, Trefethen advances claims of
“constructive discharge,” wrongful termination, fraud, undue
influence, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent
misrepresentation, and “enhanced compensatory damages.” In
short, she asserts that because the Severance Agreement is not
enforceable, it does not bar her efforts to obtain compensation
7 for Liberty Mutual’s allegedly unlawful conduct surrounding her
separation from the company. But, if that contract is valid and
enforceable, it plainly bars each of her claims against Liberty
Mutual.
In support of her assertion that the Severance Agreement is
not enforceable, Trefethen raises two arguments. First, she
claims Liberty Mutual coerced her, under duress, to sign the
agreement. Consequently, she says she did not “knowingly and
voluntarily” release her legal claims against Liberty Mutual.
Next, she says she justifiably relied upon material, fraudulent
misrepresentations made to her by Liberty Mutual’s agents about
the legal scope and effect of the Severance Agreement. As a
result, says Trefethen, she was fraudulently induced to sign the
Severance Agreement and Liberty Mutual is precluded from
enforcing it against her.
In brief, the court holds that, as a matter of law,
Trefethen has not demonstrated that the Severance Agreement is
unenforceable against her on grounds that her signature was
obtained through fraud, coercion, or under duress.
8 I. Knowing and Voluntary Release of Claims.
Unlike the plaintiff in Bryant, Trefethen does not advance
any claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), as amended by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act,
29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (“OWBPA”). Nevertheless, because the OWBPA
was enacted to ensure that an employee’s release of employment-
related claims is made both knowingly and voluntarily, a brief
discussion of that statute (and why the Severance Agreement meets
each of its requirements) is probably useful.
In 1990, Congress enacted the OWBPA to resolve a split among
the circuits over how to properly determine when an employee’s
waiver of rights under the ADEA was knowing and voluntary. See
American Airlines, Inc. v . Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d 1 1 1 , 117
(1st Cir. 1998). Under the OWBPA, for an employee’s waiver of
ADEA claims to be “knowing and voluntary,” the release must meet
certain minimum requirements:
1. It must be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the employee signing the release, or the average individual eligible to participate;
2. It must identify the claims being released and specifically reference the ADEA;
3. It must not purport to encompass claims that may arise after the date of signing;
4. The employer must provide consideration for the release above and beyond that to which the employee would otherwise already be entitled;
9 5. The employee must be advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing the agreement;
6. The employee must be given at least 21 days to consider signing the release (that period is extended to 45 days if the incentive is offered to a group or class of employees); and
7. The release must allow the employee to rescind the agreement for up to 7 days after signing.
See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A)-(G).
In this case, Liberty Mutual plainly drafted the Severance
Agreement with the requirements imposed by the OWBPA in mind.
Not surprisingly, then, it meets each of those requirements. See
Bryant, 2013 DNH 77 at 10-12. See also Pallonetti v . Liberty
Mutual, 2011 WL 519407, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1 1 , 2011) (concluding
that a substantially similar (if not identical) severance
agreement and general release drafted by Liberty Mutual met the
requirements of the OWBPA). The Severance Agreement is written
in plain, easily understood language. It expressly,
unambiguously, and unmistakably discloses that, by signing i t ,
Trefethen is forever waiving her right to bring any then-accrued
claims against Liberty Mutual, including a non-exhaustive list of
more than 20 specifically-identified state and federal causes of
action. Then, in all capital letters, immediately above
Trefethen’s signature, the Severance Agreement clearly provides
that:
10 EMPLOYEE ALSO UNDERSTANDS THAT BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, EMPLOYEE WILL BE WAIVING EMPLOYEE’S RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL LAW TO BRING ANY CLAIMS THAT EMPLOYEE HAS OR MIGHT HAVE AGAINST LIBERTY MUTUAL.
EMPLOYEE HAS 45 DAYS TO CONSIDER THIS AGREEMENT. LIBERTY MUTUAL ADVISES EMPLOYEE TO CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY (AT EMPLOYEE’S EXPENSE) PRIOR TO SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT. . . . EMPLOYEE’S SIGNATURE BELOW CONSTITUTES EMPLOYEE’S ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN SO ADVISED, THAT EMPLOYEE HAS READ THE AGREEMENT, THAT EMPLOYEE FULLY UNDERSTANDS ITS TERMS, AND THAT EMPLOYEE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY AGREES TO BE BOUND BY I T .
Id. at 4 .
The fact that the Severance Agreement complies with each of
the stringent requirements of the OWBPA certainly supports
Liberty Mutual’s assertion that Trefethen knowingly and
voluntarily released all of her employment-related claims, in
exchange for the severance benefits she received (and retained).
II. Coercion, Duress, and Undue Influence.
Like the plaintiff in Bryant, Trefethen says Liberty Mutual
forced her to choose from three options: allow the disciplinary
process against her to proceed and face inevitable discharge for
cause; voluntarily quit; or agree to the “mutual separation”
proposed by Liberty Mutual and sign the Severance Agreement. See
Trefethen Deposition at 9 4 . Because she believed two of those
choices were unpalatable, she asserts that Liberty Mutual coerced
11 her, under duress, into electing the third option: signing the
agreement and releasing her claims. See id. at 115-17, 122. For
that reason, she says the Severance Agreement is unenforceable.
She is incorrect.
To invalidate a contract on the basis of duress, “a party
must show that it involuntarily accepted the other party’s terms,
that the coercive circumstances were the result of the other
party’s acts, that the other party exerted pressure wrongfully,
and that under the circumstances the party had no alternative but
to accept the terms set out by the other party.” In re Yannalfo,
147 N.H. 5 9 7 , 599 (2002) (citation omitted). Because she says
she needed to preserve her ability to receive unemployment
benefits, Trefethen asserts that she had no alternative but to
accept Liberty Mutual’s proposed “mutual separation agreement.”
That, she says, amounted to unlawful coercion and/or duress,
sufficient to invalidate the Severance Agreement. It did not.
That Trefethen was presented with difficult choices
surrounding her separation from Liberty Mutual - particularly
given her desire to receive both severance and unemployment
benefits - does not amount to coercion, nor does it mean that she
executed the Severance Agreement under duress. The financial
stress associated with the loss of a job is not, without more,
12 sufficient to warrant the conclusion that an employee was acting
under duress or a legal incapacity when she executed a release of
claims. See Melanson v . Browning-Ferris Indus., 281 F.3d 2 7 2 ,
277 (1st Cir. 2002). “To hold otherwise would be to make it
virtually impossible for employers and employees to enter into
binding settlements of employment disputes occasioned by job
losses, lay-offs and the like.” Id.
Moreover, like the plaintiff in Bryant, even if Trefethen
had been able to establish that she signed the Severance
Agreement under duress, she likely forfeited her ability to void
the agreement on that ground by “failing to seek a remedy based
on duress within a reasonable time after executing the [Severance
Agreement].” Vasapolli v . Rostoff, 39 F.3d 2 7 , 35 n.5 (1st Cir.
1994) (citations omitted). See also Keshishian v . CMC
Radiologists, 142 N.H. 1 6 8 , 173 (1997) (“While a contract that is
the product of duress is voidable, it is well settled that a
party cannot treat a contract as binding and as rescinded at the
same time. A contract made under duress will be deemed ratified
if the aggrieved party fails to repudiate the agreement within a
reasonable time after the duress has dissipated.”) (citations and
internal punctuation omitted).
13 For the foregoing reasons, as well as those discussed in
Bryant, the Severance Agreement is neither void nor voidable on
grounds that Liberty Mutual coerced Trefethen to sign i t . Nor is
that agreement unenforceable on grounds that Trefethen was under
duress when she signed i t .
III. Fraud in the Inducement.
Finally, like the plaintiff in Bryant, Trefethen claims the
Severance Agreement is not enforceable against her because she
reasonably relied upon fraudulent misrepresentations made by
agents of Liberty Mutual about the scope and legal effect of that
contract. Notwithstanding the plain language of the Severance
Agreement, she says Liberty Mutual’s agents assured her that she
was not waiving her right to bring the sort of claims she
advances in this case. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 5
(“Trefethen was specifically told by [Liberty Mutual’s agents]
that by signing the Severance Agreement she was not giving up any
of her rights to bring a claim and that the language only
protected Liberty if they did no wrong but that she could still
sue Liberty if they violated any of her rights.”). Perhaps not
surprisingly, Liberty Mutual denies that any such representations
were made.
14 But, assuming Liberty Mutual’s agents made such
representations, it is not entirely clear that Trefethen actually
relied upon them. For example, when questioned about the
specific language in the Severance Agreement discussing the
waiver of any claims against Liberty Mutual, Trefethen responded
as follows:
Question: Did you understand that you were, in fact, giving up all the claims that were enumerated in that column?
Answer: Yes. I also understand that I was coerced into signing.
Question: N o , just answer my question.
Answer: Okay.
Question: Did you understand that you were giving up all the claims that are enumerated in that column?
Answer: Yes.
Trefethen Deposition at 107. See also, id. at 112 (explaining
that she did not seek clarification of what she claims was
ambiguous language in the Severance Agreement because she did not
trust the human resources representative - at least implying that
she was unlikely to rely upon any representations made by that
person). Nevertheless, even if Trefethen did actually rely upon
those alleged fraudulent misrepresentations, such reliance was,
as a matter of law, unjustifiable.
15 Under New Hampshire law, fraud in the inducement is a valid
defense to a contract action and can be raised to void a
contract. See, e.g., Nashua Trust C o . v . Weisman, 122 N.H. 3 9 7 ,
400 (1982). But, as the party seeking to invalidate the
Severance Agreement on grounds of fraudulent inducement,
Trefethen bears a substantial burden: she “must establish that
the other party made a representation with knowledge of its
falsity or with conscious indifference to its truth with the
intention to cause another to rely upon i t . In addition, the
party seeking to prove fraud must demonstrate justifiable
reliance.” Van Der Stok v . Van Voorhees, 151 N.H. 679, 682
(2005) (citing Snierson v . Scruton, 145 N.H. 7 3 , 77 (2000))
(emphasis supplied).
The standard of justifiable reliance “is not that of
ordinary care, but an individual standard, based upon
[plaintiff’s] own capacity and knowledge.” Smith v . Pope, 103
N.H. 555, 559 (1961). It i s , in short, a subjective standard,
rather than an objective “reasonable person” standard.
Consequently, Trefethen’s educational level, intelligence,
experience in the business world, and common sense are all
relevant in determining whether reliance was justified. As the
United States Supreme Court has observed:
16 [The] contrast between a justifiable and reasonable reliance is clear: “Although the plaintiff’s reliance on the misrepresentation must be justifiable, this does not mean that his conduct must conform to the standard of the reasonable man. Justification is a matter of the qualities and characteristics of the particular plaintiff, and the circumstances of the particular case, rather than of the application of a community standard of conduct to all cases.”
Field v . Mans 516 U.S. 5 9 , 70-71 (1995) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 545A, comment b ) . See also Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 5 4 1 , comment a (“Although the recipient of a
fraudulent misrepresentation is not barred from recovery because
he could have discovered its falsity if he had shown his distrust
of the maker’s honesty by investigating its truth, he is
nonetheless required to use his senses, and cannot recover if he
blindly relies upon a misrepresentation the falsity of which
would be patent to him if he had utilized his opportunity to make
a cursory examination or investigation.”).
For purposes of addressing Liberty Mutual’s motion, the
court necessarily accepts that the human resources representative
actually made the statements Trefethen attributes to her -
statements that contradict the plain language of the Severance
Agreement. It will also assume that Trefethen truly believed
that, despite signing the Severance Agreement, she was not
releasing any of the employment-related claims she now advances
17 against Liberty Mutual. Still, Trefethen cannot, as a matter of
law, prevail on her claim of fraudulent inducement.
As the court noted in Bryant, it is difficult to imagine a
legal document that more clearly and unambiguously describes its
purpose and legal effect than the severance agreement at issue in
this case. First, as discussed above, it complies with all of
the strict requirements imposed by the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act - requirements that Congress imposed precisely to
avoid disputes like this and to ensure that any waiver of
employment-related legal claims was both knowing and voluntary.
Moreover, the Severance Agreement includes the words “general
release” in its title; it goes on to use the word “release” a
total of 19 times; the word “waive” appears five times; it
clearly provides that the employee “knowingly and voluntarily
releases and forever discharges Liberty Mutual . . . from any and
all claims, known or unknown;” it specifically lists numerous
examples of the types of claims that are being released,
including precisely the type of claims advanced by Trefethen; it
unambiguously (and in capitalized typeface) states that the
employee is being provided severance benefits in exchange for her
agreement to release any and all legal claims against Liberty
Mutual; and it makes clear that severance benefits are only
18 available if the employee signs the agreement and releases all
then-accrued legal claims.
If Trefethen’s interpretation of the Severance Agreement
were legally correct, it would have little (if any) meaning or
relevance. It i s , then, difficult to understand why she thought
Liberty Mutual was giving her severance benefits, if not in
exchange for a complete release of claims. Nor is it at all
clear why she believed Liberty Mutual was insisting that, to
receive those severance benefits, she must first execute the
agreement - an agreement that, given her interpretation of i t ,
would be essentially meaningless.
Trefethen obviously recognized that the Severance Agreement
had substantial legal significance. She acknowledged that she
read it and understood that it provided 45 days within which to
review i t , an additional seven days after signing within which to
revoke her assent, and that it specifically (and in capitalized
typeface) advised her to consult legal counsel before making any
decision to sign i t . See, e.g., Trefethen Deposition at 119-22;
131-33. Trefethen is well-educated and intelligent. She holds
an Associate’s Degree in Business Administration from The
University of Southern Maine, a Bachelor’s Degree in Accounting
from Franklin Pierce University, and has been taking courses
19 toward a Master’s Degree in Organizational Leadership. She has
worked in the accounting field since 1989, and was employed at
Liberty Mutual for a number of years as an accountant - many of
those years, she worked in a senior/supervisory capacity. Given
her high level of education and substantial experience in the
business world, she must be presumed to understand the purpose of
the bargained-for exchange represented by the Severance
Agreement; in return for her waiver of all then-accrued legal
claims and the elimination of any possible employment-related
lawsuits, Liberty Mutual agreed to provide her with a valuable
benefit that she very much desired: severance benefits.
In light of all those facts, Trefethen’s asserted
interpretation of the Severance Agreement is so plainly contrary
to the clear language of the document that it i s , as a matter of
law, unreasonable. To the extent she claims to have actually
relied upon fraudulent assurances from the human resources
representative to the effect that, despite signing the agreement,
she could still bring employment-related claims against Liberty
Mutual - even claims that the Severance Agreement specifically
identifies as being waived - such reliance was patently
unjustified. See, e.g., Field, 516 U.S. at 70-71 (noting that
reliance is not “justified” when, “under the circumstances, the
facts should be apparent to one of [plaintiff’s] knowledge and
20 intelligence from a cursory glance, or [she] has discovered
something which should serve as a warning that [she] is being
deceived.”) (quoting W . Prosser, Law of Torts, § 1 0 8 , p 718 (4th
ed. 1971)). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 5 4 1 ,
comment a (“Thus, if one induces another to buy a horse by
representing it to be sound, the purchaser cannot recover even
though the horse has but one eye, if the horse is shown to the
purchaser before he buys it and the slightest inspection would
have disclosed the defect.”); Pierce v . Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 65 F.3d 5 6 2 , 569-70 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The
Illinois defense of fraudulent inducement also requires proof of
reasonable reliance, so cases discussing reasonableness in that
context are instructive to the resolution of our issue.
Fraudulent inducement is not available as a defense when one had
the opportunity to read the contract and by doing so could have
discovered the misrepresentation.”) (citation omitted).
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in
Bryant, Trefethen cannot, as a matter of law, show that she
justifiably relied upon the misleading representations allegedly
made by Liberty Mutual’s human resources representative.
Consequently, she has not borne her burden of demonstrating that
she was fraudulently induced to sign the Severance Agreement.
The Severance Agreement i s , therefore, valid and enforceable.
21 And, because Trefethen released all of the claims she seeks to
pursue in this litigation, Liberty Mutual is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on all counts in her complaint.
Conclusion
Trefethen’s assertions that the Severance Agreement is not
enforceable against her on grounds that her agreement to be bound
by that document was obtained through fraudulent
misrepresentations, duress, and/or coercion are not supported by
the record. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, as
well as those discussed at greater length in Bryant, Liberty
Mutual is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to all
claims advanced in Trefethen’s complaint.
Liberty Mutual also seeks summary judgment on its three
counterclaims: breach of contract (for having filed suit despite
having signed the Severance Agreement); unjust enrichment (for
having retained the severance benefits); and fraud (for having
allegedly signed the Severance Agreement with no intention of
actually honoring i t ) . That aspect of its motion is denied. For
the reasons discussed in Bryant, the court concludes that
Trefethen is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of
Liberty Mutual’s counterclaims and/or that such claims are now
moot. See Bryant, 2013 DNH 77 at 27-28.
22 Accordingly, Liberty Mutual’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(document n o . 30) is granted in part, and denied in part, as
follows. The motion is granted as to all counts in plaintiff’s
complaint. As to Liberty Mutual’s counterclaims, however, the
motion is denied and those claims are dismissed. In light of the
foregoing, Liberty Mutual’s Motion to Strike (document n o . 33) is
denied as moot, as are all of its pending motions in limine
(documents n o . 4 2 , 4 3 , 4 4 , 4 5 , 4 6 , 4 7 , 4 8 , 4 9 , 5 0 , and 6 1 ) .
The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with
this order and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
- ^ ^ w ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
Steven J. McAuliffe Jnited States District Judge
May 3 1 , 2013
cc: John E . Lyons, Jr., Esq. Douglas J. Hoffman, Esq. Martha Van Oot, Esq. Debra W . Ford, Esq. K. Joshua Scott, Esq.