Bryant v. Liberty Mutual Group, Inc.

2013 DNH 142

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: October 24, 2013
• Docket: 11-CV-217-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

Bryant v . Liberty Mutual Group, Inc. 11-CV-217-SM 10/24/13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Terry Bryant, Plaintiff

v. Case N o . 11-cv-217-SM Opinion N o . 2013 DNH 142 Liberty Mutual Group, Inc., Defendant

O R D E R

Apparently believing that plaintiff’s claims in this case

were unacceptably weak, Liberty Mutual filed a motion for

sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

That motion is denied.

The imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 is reserved for

cases in which a party or an attorney makes arguments for an

“improper purpose,” advances “frivolous” claims, or asserts

factual allegations without “evidentiary support” or the “likely”

prospect of such support. See, e.g., Citibank Global Mkts., Inc.

v . Rodriguez Santana, 573 F.3d 1 7 , 32 (1st Cir. 2009). See also

CQ Int’l C o . v . Rochem Int’l, Inc., USA, 659 F.3d 5 3 , 60 (1st

Cir. 2011). This is not such a case.

Bryant’s substantive discrimination claims against Liberty

Mutual were hardly facially meritless. Rather, they were barred because the Severance Agreement and General Release she signed

proved to be enforceable. The parties and the court necessarily

focused on her efforts to invalidate that agreement, not reaching

the merits of the underlying discrimination claims. While her

efforts to overcome the contractual bar ultimately proved

unavailing, Bryant’s arguments were not so weak, or frivolous, or

lacking in factual or legal support as to warrant the imposition

of sanctions under Rule 1 1 . See generally Young v . City of

Providence, 404 F.3d 3 3 , 39-40 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[C]ourts ought

not invoke Rule 11 for slight cause; the wheels of justice would

grind to a halt if lawyers everywhere were sanctioned every time

they made unfounded objections, weak arguments, and dubious

factual claims.”). Nor is there evidence that those arguments

were advanced for an improper purpose or that counsel conducted a

culpably inadequate investigation prior to filing suit. And, of

course, Liberty Mutual is not entitled to an award of sanctions

under Rule 11 simply because some of Bryant’s claims proved

unsuccessful. See, e.g., Protective Life Ins. C o . v . Dignity

Viatical Settlement Partners. L.P., 171 F.3d 5 2 , 58 (1st Cir.

1999).

What saved Liberty Mutual from having to defend its

allegedly discriminatory conduct before a civil jury in this case

was the court’s determination that the Severance Agreement was,

2 as a matter of law, enforceable against Bryant. In reaching that

conclusion, the court determined that Bryant was sufficiently

well-educated and sophisticated to render her reliance on the

(alleged) fraudulent misrepresentations made by Liberty Mutual’s

human resources representative unreasonable as a legal matter.

See Bryant v . Liberty Mut. Group, Inc., 2013 DNH 077 at 24-26

(D.N.H. May 3 1 , 2013). In other words, had she been less well-

educated or sophisticated, Bryant might well have prevailed in

her attempts to invalidate the Severance Agreement.

Viewed in that light, it is plain that her efforts to

invalidate the Severance Agreement on grounds of fraudulent

inducement were not frivolous — particularly given that other

former employees of Liberty Mutual contemporaneously made similar

assertions that they, too, had received and relied upon similar

fraudulent misrepresentations from Liberty’s agent. See Stevens

v . Liberty Mut. Group, Inc., 2013 DNH 104 (D.N.H. July 2 9 , 2013);

Trefethen v . Liberty Mut. Group, Inc., 2013 DNH 081 (D.N.H. May

3 1 , 2013). Indeed, Bryant’s assault upon the enforceability of

the Severance Agreement was no more “frivolous” or “unsupported”

or “baseless” than Liberty Mutual’s decidedly weak counterclaims

(on which the court awarded summary judgment in favor of Bryant).

3 Conclusion

Bryant’s legal arguments supportive of her view that the

Severance Agreement was unenforceable on grounds of fraudulent

inducement were consistent with existing law, there was adequate

factual support for at least some of the arguments she pressed,

and there was no evidence that those arguments were advanced for

an improper purpose.

Defendant’s Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions (document n o . 73)

is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe Jnited States District Judge

October 24, 2013

cc: John E . Lyons, Jr., Esq. Douglas J. Hoffman, Esq. Martha Van Oot, Esq. Debra W Ford, Esq. K. Joshua Scott, Esq.