Majority: DANA, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.
Concurrence: SAUFLEY, C.J.
Dissent: CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, and ALEXANDER, JJ.
Dissent: ALEXANDER, J.
LEVY, J.
[¶ 1] This case requires us to address the unique nature of investigatory records held by a government prosecutor and the circumstances in which those records must be disclosed pursuant to Maine’s Freedom of Access Act (FOAA), 1 M.R.S.A. §§ 401-410 (1989 & Supp.2004).
[¶ 2] Blethen Maine Newspapers requested Maine’s Attorney General to disclose investigative records related to allegations of sexual abuse by eighteen deceased Roman Catholic priests. The Attorney General ultimately denied the request based on his conclusion that “disclosure of the investigative records relating to the deceased priests would ‘constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’ within the meaning of 16 M.R.S.A. § 614 [ (Supp.2004) ] of the Criminal History Record Information Act.” Blethen sought judicial review of the Attorney General’s decision pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B, and the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Studstrup, J.) vacated the Attorney General’s denial of the request and ordered full disclosure of the records. We affirm the court’s judgment to the extent that it ordered the disclosure of the records, but conclude that the court should have also ordered the records redacted so as to eliminate the names and other identifying information of the living persons who are cited in the records. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings so that the records will be subject to redaction before their disclosure.
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶ 3] Blethen, the publisher of several Maine newspapers, filed a FOAA request with the Attorney General in June 2002 seeking records pertaining to the Attorney General’s investigation of alleged sexual [526]*526abuse by eighteen deceased priests. FOAA prescribes that, “[ejxcept as otherwise provided by statute, every person has the right to inspect and copy any public record.” 1 M.R.S.A. § 408(1) (Supp.2004). It also provides that “[rjecords that have been designated confidential by statute” are an exception to the definition of “public records” and are not subject to disclosure. 1 M.R.S.A. § 402(3)(A) (Supp.2004).
[¶ 4] The Attorney General denied Blethen’s request, having concluded that the records were exempt from disclosure under FOAA because they were confidential pursuant to the Criminal History Record Information Act, 16 M.R.S.A. §§ 611— 622 (1983 & Supp.2004). The Act provides, in pertinent part:
Reports or records that contain intelligence and investigative information and that are prepared by, prepared at the direction of or kept in the custody of a ... county[,J ... criminal justice agency ... [or] the Department of the Attorney General ... are confidential and may not be disseminated if there is a reasonable possibility that public release or inspection of the reports or records would:
A. Interfere with law enforcement proceedings; or
C. Constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.J
16 M.R.S.A. § 61400(A), (C).
[¶ 5] The Attorney General concluded that release of the records would both interfere with law enforcement proceedings and constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of the victims, the deceased priests, and the priests’ families and congregations.1 In response, Blethen suggested that the State redact portions of the records, noting that “[i]t would defeat the purposes of the right to know law if an otherwise public record could be withheld merely because some portion of that record is appropriately confidential.” The Attorney General denied this request as well.
[¶ 6] Blethen sought judicial review of the Attorney General’s action by filing an appeal with the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B. The court affirmed the Attorney General’s decision in part, finding that disclosure of information contained in the records might affect ongoing investigations and that, pursuant to section 614(1)(A), it was reasonably possible that disclosure of the information would interfere with law enforcement proceedings. The court did not determine whether there was a reasonable possibility that disclosure would also constitute an “unwarranted in[527]*527vasion of personal privacy” pursuant to section 614(1)(C), but retained jurisdiction of the matter. The court ordered the State to report “the status of the documents in question for law enforcement purposes” to it and Blethen in six months so that it could revisit the privacy question once the ongoing investigations were concluded.
[¶ 7] The Attorney General subsequently reported to the court and Blethen that the investigations would no longer be negatively affected by disclosure of the records related to the deceased priests. However, the Attorney General requested that the parties be afforded the opportunity to brief the second issue: whether the records remained confidential pursuant to section 614(l)(C)’s “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” exception.
[¶8] After the parties’ submission of their briefs and a nontestimonial hearing, the court issued its decision in which it analyzed the records pursuant to section 614(1)(C) and concluded that they should be fully disclosed. The court found that “there may be some residual privacy interest of named victims and witnesses, but due to the manner in which this information has been handled, that interest has been reduced for purposes of balancing against the public interest in disclosure.” With respect to the deceased priests, the court concluded it need not decide whether they have any residual privacy rights because the public interest in disclosure of the records outweighs any personal privacy rights.
[¶ 9] The court concluded that the privacy interests of the alleged victims and witnesses, and the residual privacy interests of the deceased priests, if any, were exceeded by the public’s interest in disclosure of the information because it pertained to possible criminal activity and the extent to which those activities were investigated by public officials: “[A]ny residual personal privacy rights which could be claimed for those named in any capacity in the documents ... must bend to the public interest and no exceptions to release of these public documents exist under the FOAA.” The court also declined to require redaction of the names of the alleged victims and other identifying information because of “how much information would have to be taken out and the extent to which this information is likely already known, at least at a local level.” The State appeals from the judgment.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 10] The State asserts that the court erred in ordering the release of the records because there is a reasonable possibility that public disclosure will constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of the alleged victims, witnesses, and deceased priests identified in the records. Accordingly, the State contends that the records must remain confidential pursuant to 16 M.R.S.A. § 614(1)(C). We review the Superior Court’s factual findings for clear error and its determinations of law, including the construction of FOAA, de novo. Town of Burlington v. Hosp. Admin. Dist. No. 1, 2001 ME 59, ¶¶ 12, 22, 769 A.2d 857, 861, 865.
[¶ 11] Section 614(1) of the Criminal History Record Information Act, entitled “Limitation on dissemination of intelligence and investigative information,” identifies eleven categories of information excepted from FOAA’s presumption favoring disclosure.2 “Reports or records that con[528]*528tain intelligence and investigative information” are “confidential and may not be disseminated if there is a reasonable possibility that public release or inspection of the reports or records” will give rise to one or more of the exceptions set out in the statute.3 16 M.R.S.A. § 614(1).
[¶ 12] The eleven exceptions contained in section 614(1) reflect several important policy objectives. These include (1) protecting the integrity of criminal prosecutions and the constitutional right of those charged with crimes to a fair and impartial jury;4 (2) maintaining individual privacy and avoiding the harm that can result from an unjustified disclosure of sensitive personal or commercial information;5 and (3) ensuring the safety of the public and law enforcement personnel.6 Section 614(1) denotes the bounds within which public officials use and disseminate intelligence and investigative information.
[¶ 13] Our focus in the present case is on the privacy exception set forth in section 614(1)(C), which is similar to its federal counterpart in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1996), that exempts from disclosure “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes” if disclosure “could [529]*529reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Cases decided pursuant to FOIA inform our analysis of Maine’s FOAA. Campbell v. Town of Machias, 661 A.2d 1133, 1136 (Me.1995).
[¶ 14] The Superior Court employed the balancing test developed by the United States Supreme Court for applying the FOIA’s privacy exception, which requires courts to identify and then balance the private and public interests at play to determine whether disclosure will constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172, 124 S.Ct, 1570, 158 L.Ed.2d 319 (2004); United States Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth. 510 U.S. 487, 495, 114 S.Ct. 1006, 127 L.Ed.2d 325 (1994); United States Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 175, 112 S.Ct. 541, 116 L.Ed.2d 526 (1991); United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989). The disclosure of investigative records is not permitted if the invasion of personal privacy is determined to be unwarranted when weighed against the identified public interest that will be served by disclosure. Thus, we examine, in turn, (1) the personal privacy interests of the alleged victims, witnesses, and deceased priests in maintaining the confidentiality of the records sought by Blethen; (2) the public interest supporting disclosure of the records; and (3) the balancing of the private and public interests.
A. Personal Privacy Interests
[¶ 15] The personal privacy interests protected by the privacy exception are twofold. First, an individual has an interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762, 109 S.Ct. 1468; second, an individual has an interest in controlling the dissemination of personal information. Fed. Labor Relations Auth, 510 U.S. at 500, 114 S.Ct. 1006. Intelligence and investigative information is an exception to FOAA’s general policy requiring disclosure because such information often involves sensitive personal information that may or may not have been verified by public officials. Few people wish to be publicly associated with investigations of alleged criminal conduct, whether as a perpetrator, witness, or victim. See Mack v. Dep’t of the Navy, 259 F.Supp.2d 99, 106 (D.D.C.2003) (recognizing that “individuals have a strong privacy interest in avoiding unwarranted association with alleged criminal activity”). People who are identified in criminal investigation reports have a substantial interest in keeping their identities closed to the public, regardless of how they are characterized in the record. See SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1205 (D.C.Cir.1991); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C.Cir.1990). For these reasons, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that when the subject of a law enforcement record is a private individual, the privacy interest protected by the privacy exception is at its apex. Favish, 541 U.S. at 166, 124 S.Ct. 1570; Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780, 109 S.Ct. 1468.
[¶ 16] The Superior Court concluded that the privacy rights of the alleged victims, witnesses, and priests have been dissipated or extinguished by (1) the information’s prior public disclosure; (2) the manner in which the information came into the possession of the Attorney General; and (3) the death of the priests who are the subjects of the allegations.
1. Prior Public Disclosure
[¶ 17] Three of the fourteen files submitted for in camera inspection by the court [530]*530reference the prior public disclosure of certain allegations contained in the files.7 The remaining files contain no indication of prior public disclosure, apart from the report of the allegations directly to the Diocese, a District Attorney, or the Attorney General by individuals professing knowledge of the alleged abuse.
[¶ 18] The prior public disclosure of information does not generally extinguish privacy interests in the nondisclosure of the same information organized and contained in the investigative records of a law enforcement agency. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 770, 109 S.Ct. 1468. A person’s interest in controlling the dissemination of information about oneself is an integral part of the right to privacy. Mack, 259 F.Supp.2d at 109. In Reporters Committee, the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that a personal privacy interest does not attach to an individual’s interest in keeping private a criminal “rap sheet” containing information that was already available to the public from other sources. 489 U.S. at 762-71, 109 S.Ct. 1468. “[T]he fact that an event is not wholly private does not mean that an individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the information.” Id. at 770, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 19] Here, the prior disclosure of allegations contained in two of the fourteen files detailing allegations of sexual abuse by the deceased priests does not extinguish the interests of the various individuals named in the records in controlling the separate dissemination of the information as it is organized and portrayed in the Attorney General’s investigative records.
2. The Manner in Which the Information Came into the Possession of the Attorney General
[¶ 20] The Attorney General came into possession of the information concerning the deceased priests from three sources: (1) reports made by the Diocese based on information it received from current or former church members; (2) reports made by a county prosecuting attorney based on information she received from members of the public; and (3) reports the Attorney General received directly from members of the public. As the Superior Court observed, none of the reports were made under the protection of the confessional: “[T]o the extent that the alleged victims or others working on their behalf have stepped forward and lodged their complaints, their expectation of continued privacy would be diminished to the extent that the investigation being sought would require disclosure.”
[¶ 21] The privacy interests reposed in the records are diminished to the extent the information was voluntarily reported to church and public authorities with the expectation that it would be used to investigate possible wrongdoing. Moreover, the Attorney General does not claim that any of the individuals who reported the information to authorities did so under circumstances where there was an express or implied understanding that their identity or the identity of others named in the records would remain confidential. See Keys v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 345 (D.C.Cir.1987). Accordingly, the manner in which the information was reported dissipated the privacy interests.8
[531]*5313. Privacy Interests of Deceased Persons and Their Families
[¶ 22] The Superior Court did not determine whether the deceased priests should be deemed to have a residual privacy interest in the records because of the “clear affirmative answer” it reached regarding the public interest in disclosure of the records. Before us, Blethen asserts that the privacy interests of the deceased priests named in the Attorney General’s records and their immediate family members terminated with the priests’ deaths.
[¶23] We have not previously considered whether the privacy interests protected by section 614(1)(C) continue after a person’s death. The two federal circuit courts of appeals that have considered this issue in connection with the FOIA have reached different conclusions. Compare Campbell v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 33 (D.C.Cir.1998) (concluding that deceased persons have “reputational interests and family-related privacy expectations [that] survive death”), with McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1261 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that deceased persons have “no privacy interest subject to invasion by disclosure”). More recently, the United States Supreme Court recognized in Favish that the relatives of a deceased person may invoke their own interest in personal privacy in connection with the FOIA’s personal privacy exception: “[W]e think it proper to conclude from Congress’ use of the term ‘personal privacy’ that it intended to permit family members to assert their own privacy rights against public intrusions long deemed impermissible under the common law and in our cultural traditions.” 541 U.S. at 167,124 S.Ct. 1570.9
[¶ 24] Our in camera inspection of the records reveals that the passage of time has substantially dissipated or extinguished the privacy interests of the deceased priests, if any, and of their relatives. The length of time from both the alleged misconduct by the priests and their deaths is measured in decades, not years. The median number of years since the priests’ deaths is twenty-five, and the average number of years since the acts of alleged abuse exceeds forty. The earliest acts of abuse are alleged to have occurred in the 1930s, and the most recent acts of abuse are alleged to have occurred not later than 1983.
[¶25] The disclosure of allegations that might damage a deceased person’s reputation and adversely affect the peace of mind of his or her family in the years immediately following death will have considerably less effect many years later. As measured by the passage of time from both the deaths of the priests and the alleged acts of abuse, any residual privacy interests of the deceased priests and their immediate [532]*532family members in this case are, at most, minimal. Accordingly, we need not separately determine whether the deceased priests have privacy interests within the ambit of section 614(1)(C) that survive their deaths.
4. Conclusions Regarding Privacy Interests
[¶ 26] The privacy interests of the living individuals named in the Attorney General’s records are substantial based on the sensitive nature of the events described in the records. Although these interests were not diminished by the prior public disclosure of some of the allegations, the manner in which the information was reported to church and public officials diminished any expectation of continued privacy in the information. In addition, the passage of time has largely extinguished the residual privacy interests of the deceased priests, if any, and of their immediate family members.
B. Public Interest in Disclosure
[¶ 27] The Superior Court concluded that the public’s interest in disclosure of information pertaining to possible criminal activity by the deceased priests and how the allegations were investigated exceeded the privacy interests of the alleged victims and witnesses, and any residual privacy interests of the deceased priests. In its complaint, Blethen asserted that it “has been engaged in ongoing investigation[s] into allegations of sexual abuse by members of the catholic clergy in the State of Maine” and that “there is great public interest in disclosure of the scope and extent of alleged sexual abuse by the clergy-”
[¶ 28] With respect to the FOIA, a possible invasion of privacy is warranted only if disclosure will advance its central purpose. “[W]hether disclosure ... is warranted must turn on the nature of the requested document and its relationship to the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny[,] ... rather than on the particular purpose for which the document is being requested.” Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (quotation marks omitted). This standard is known as the “central purpose” doctrine. See Christopher P. Beall, Note, The Exaltation of Privacy Doctrines Over Public Information Law, 45 DUKE L.J. 1249, 1258 (1996).
[¶ 29] In Reporters Committee, the United States Supreme Court held that the public interest in disclosure of the criminal records of an organized crime figure did not warrant the invasion of privacy that would result. 489 U.S. at 780, 109 S.Ct. 1468. The focus is “on the citizens’ right to be informed about ‘what their government is up to.’ ” Id. at 773, 109 S.Ct. 1468. “That purpose ... is not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency’s own conduct.” Id. The Court concluded that, because “the basic purpose of the [FOIA is] to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny,” a request that is directed at information about the persons who are the subjects of files rather than at information about the government’s “own conduct” is not within the sphere of the public interest protected by the FOIA. Id. at 774, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 30] More recently, the Court held in Favish that when the privacy exception is applicable, the party seeking disclosure of information must establish two elements: “First, the citizen must show that the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one, an interest more specific than having the information for its own [533]*533sake. Second, the citizen must show the information is likely to advance that interest. Otherwise, the invasion of privacy is unwarranted.” 541 U.S. at 172, 124 S.Ct. 1570. The Court did not, however, “in this single decision attempt to define the reasons that will suffice, or the necessary nexus between the requested information and the asserted public interest that would be advanced by disclosure.” Id. at 172-73, 124 S.Ct. 1570. Instead, it specifically held:
In the case of photographic images and other data pertaining to an individual who died under mysterious circumstances, the justification most likely to satisfy [the privacy exemption’s] public interest requirement is that the information is necessary to show the investigative agency or other responsible officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance of them duties.
Id. at 173, 124 S.Ct. 1570. Further, the Court added, “the requester must produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.” Id. at 174,124 S.Ct. 1570.
[¶ 31] Maine’s FOAA, like the FOIA, is intended to address the public’s right to hold the government accountable.10 There is, however, no basis in the text of FOAA or the public policy it implements to cause us to engraft Favish’s requirement of evi-dentiary proof of governmental impropriety to justify the public disclosure of photographic images of a corpse onto a request for written investigative records involving events that occurred many years ago. The Favish standard focuses on the unique and important privacy interest embodied in our “cultural tradition acknowledging a family’s control over the body and death images of the deceased [that] has long been recognized at common law.” 541 U.S. at 168,124 S.Ct. 1570. The Court recognized the personal stake of family members “in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased.” Id. In contrast, the records requested in this case involve allegations of abuse alleged to have occurred twenty to seventy years ago. The threat of the unwarranted public exploitation of grieving family members that was central to the outcome in Favish is not present here.
[¶ 32] FOAA’s central purpose of ensuring the public’s right to hold the government accountable would be unnecessarily burdened if we adopted Favish’s evidentia-ry requirement for purposes of a case such as this, involving a request for •written investigative records concerning events that occurred two or more decades ago. Maine’s FOAA directs that it is to “be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies as contained in the declaration of legislative intent.” 1 M.R.S.A. § 401 (1989). The public’s interest in knowing what its government is up to surely extends beyond the specific concern of governmental impropriety considered in Favish. The records sought by Blethen are necessary for the public to understand why the Attorney General exercised his discretion not to pursue criminal prosecutions in connection with the sexual abuse allegations. An informed citizenry has no less of an interest in information that might document governmental efficiency or effectiveness than it does in information documenting governmental negligence or malfeasance. Absent [534]*534the unique cultural and familial interests confronted in Favish, the public’s interest in knowing what its government is up to encompasses a broader universe of concerns than simply the possibility of governmental wrongdoing.
[¶ 33] We conclude that, under the circumstances presented by this case, the central purpose doctrine’s two-pronged formulation provides the proper standard for determining whether Blethen has established a public interest that warrants an invasion of personal privacy. Accordingly, we must ask whether Blethen has demonstrated that the public interest is a significant one and whether the information sought is likely to advance that interest.
[¶ 34] Blethen asserts in its complaint the existence of a “crisis as a result of allegations of sexual abuse of children and young people by some priests and bishops.” It cites the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People as having recognized that “ ‘secrecy has created an atmosphere that has inhibited the healing process, and, in some cases, enabled sexually abusive behavior to be repeated.” ’ Blethen claims that the information it seeks is directly associated with “great public interest in the disclosure of the scope and extent of alleged sexual abuse by the clergy,” and that the information pertains to investigations conducted by the Attorney General and one or more District Attorneys. The Attorney General has not taken issue with any of these representations, either before the Superior Court or before us.
[¶ 35] Blethen’s assertions establish a direct nexus between the records sought and a substantial governmental activity involving a matter of great importance to an informed citizenry. The public interest sought to be advanced is significant because the request is not for information for its own sake, nor for information associated with an isolated case. Rather, the information is sought for the sake of evaluating a comprehensive investigation undertaken by the government in response to an alleged pattern of conduct that spans several decades involving the sexual abuse of children by members of the clergy. In addition, the information sought by Blethen is likely to advance that public interest, as demonstrated by the fact that the records were the basis for the Attorney General’s decision not to initiate criminal prosecutions.11 We conclude, as did the Superior Court, that Blethen’s request satisfies the requirement of a substantial public interest that may warrant the invasion of personal privacy.
C. Balancing of the Private and Public Interests
[¶ 36] The Superior Court concluded, in effect, that any residual personal privacy rights that could be claimed by those named in the documents sought by Blethen are nominal and “must bend to the public interest.” The court declined to redact the names of living persons and other identifying information because of “how much information would have to be taken out and the extent to which this information is likely already known, at least at a local level.” We have concluded that although the privacy rights of the deceased priests and their families are, at most, minimal, the residual personal privacy rights of the living individuals named in [535]*535the records persist, albeit tempered by the manner in which the information was reported to public and church officials.
[¶37] An additional analytical step is required in evaluating the privacy interests of the living individuals named in the records. If all identifying information concerning such individuals can be redacted from the records prior to disclosure and redaction does not prevent the public interest in disclosure from being fully realized, the privacy interests of the living individuals in the redacted documents become greatly reduced. The effectiveness of redaction of the records in this case was suggested by Blethen in the body of its complaint: “[Information directly identifying alleged victims can be redacted consistent with the Law Court’s interpretation of the FOAA.” Before us, Blethen supports the Superior Court’s decision not to require redaction, but also acknowledges that “[l]imited redaction, if necessary, is an eminently appropriate alternative to complete non-disclosure in this case given the extraordinary public interests.”
[¶ 38] Maine courts can require redaction of records in connection with FOAA requests. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 2000 ME 126, ¶ 11 n. 4, 754 A.2d 353, 357 (stating that “we have held that protected information can be excised from a document to allow that document to be disclosed”). Blethen does not allege, nor has it been demonstrated, that the identification of the individuals named in the records, other than the deceased priests, is required to fulfill the public interest asserted in support of disclosure.
[¶ 39] The Superior Court ultimately decided against the redaction of the records sought by Blethen for two reasons: a lot of information would have to be taken out of the records, and some of the identifying information may have previously been publicly disclosed. The degree of “cutting and pasting” required to redact documents cannot justify bypassing redaction unless it is demonstrated to be truly impractical or onerous. The records at issue consist of eighty-two pages, and the elimination of the names and all identifying information (e.g., places of residence; names of family members, friends, treatment providers, and others; addresses; and phone numbers) associated with the persons named in the records, other than the deceased priests, is neither impractical nor onerous. In addition, for the reasons stated earlier, the prior public disclosure of several of the allegations does not vitiate the need to protect the privacy rights of the individuals named in the records through redaction if that can be achieved without undermining the public interest served by disclosure.
[¶ 40] Accordingly, we conclude that the public interest in the disclosure of the records is substantial and that the public interest supporting disclosure can be realized even with the redaction of all identifying information regarding the persons identified in the records other than the deceased priests. On balance, the identified public interest exceeds the privacy interests associated with the records once they are redacted. We therefore affirm the court’s determination that the records requested by Blethen should be disclosed, but we vacate that portion of its decision that decided against redaction of the records prior to their disclosure. This matter is remanded for the entry of a new judgment that provides for disclosure of the records after redaction of the names and other identifying information of persons named in the records other than the deceased priests.
The entry is:
[536]*536Judgment affirmed in part, and vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.