Blaffer v. State

31 S.W.2d 172, 1930 Tex. App. LEXIS 797
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 2, 1930
DocketNo. 7309.
StatusPublished
Cited by39 cases

This text of 31 S.W.2d 172 (Blaffer v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blaffer v. State, 31 S.W.2d 172, 1930 Tex. App. LEXIS 797 (Tex. Ct. App. 1930).

Opinion

*173 McClendon, c. j.

Suit by the state to recover a tract oí land in the Humble oil field, in Harris county, upon the theory of a vacancy between senior surveys on the north and junior surveys on the south, the latter calling for the south lines and corners of the former. Appellants Blaffer et al., who will be referred to as defendants, and others not parties to the' appeal held title to the land upon the adverse theory to the state's claim of vacancy. Appellants Tomey, Goldman, Perkins, and Helm, who will be referred to as cross-acting defendants, claimed portions of the land, Tomey under patent and Goldman under application to purchase from the state, and the two latter under mineral right filings. The state contested the validity of their claims and sought to annul them.

The land sued for lies north of the larger Ruhl, Charles, Williams, smaller Ruhl, and Dunman 160-aere surveys, the north lines of which call for the senior surveys Vickers (sometimes called Vickins), Marshall, Stevenson (originally Simonds), R. Dunman; and • Strange. The trial court denied the state’s contention'with reference to the south line of the Vickers, Marshall, and Stevenson surveys, locating that line as coincident with the north line of the Charles and larger Ruhl; and sustained the state’s contention with reference to the land lying west of the Charles and south • of the Stevenson, R. Dunman, and Strange, as located by the court. The decree was without prejudice to the rights of Perkins to obtain mineral permits. Otherwise the claims of cross-acting defendants were disallowed; and the patent of Tomey annulled. Both defendants and cross-acting defendants have appealed; but there is no appeal from that portion of the judgment denying recovery of the lands within the lines, as ■fixed by the court, of the Stevenson, Marshall and Vickers surveys.

For convenience of reference we here insert: “Map showing the surveys in controversy as located according to the respective contentions of Plaintiff and Defendants and showing the vacancy as located by the Court. The heavy, solid lines depict Defendants’ locations; the broken lines running north and south show Plaintiff's east and west lines of the senior surveys; the hachured lines show the vacancy as claimed by the State, and the shaded area delineates- the Vacancy as located by the Court.”

*174 Primarily tlie case is one of boundary, the appeal involving the true location of the south corners and 'south, east, and west lines of the Strange and R. Dunman surveys. In final analysis the whole case rests upon the true location of the southeast corner of the R. Dunman. This corner is described in the original field notes as “a stake in a pond from which a pine mk. A. bears South 30 E. 12 var-,as and a gum mk. D bears south 12 W. 9 varas.” This corner has always been recognized as being in a pond south of the Atasco-cita road, from which, eoncededly, the junior surveys beginning with the Charles were laid out. The contention of the state and finding of the trial court was that the true southeast corner of the Dunman is in a pond north of •the Atascocita road 440 varas north and 230 varas west of the recognized pond corner south of the road, at a point where deputy surveyor Allen claimed to have found the original bedring trees in Í904; ‘ and that the calls in the junior for the lines and comers of the senior surveys were mistakes.

The trial court filed elaborate findings of fact upon which its judgment is rested. These' findings are attacked by defendants both as a matter of law and factually in every respect in which they are in conflict with defendants’ theory of the proper location of the lines and corners involved.

We have reached the conclusion that the evidence both as a matter of law and factually establishes the southeast corner of the R. Dunman in the pond south of the Atasco-cita road; and that there is therefore no vacancy between the senior and junior surveys.

Due no doubt to the great value of the property involved an extraordinary amount of investigation has been made extending to every particle of evidence which might conceivably have bearing even in the remotest degree upon the controversy. The result has been an extended trial in the court below, a record of unusual length (some 4,000 pages; and briefs in proportionate volume (approximately 1,500 pages). We shall not attempt to follow the various contentions and arguments of counsel. This would serve no useful purpose; would lead far afield from the real issues involved; and would extend ’beyond proper bounds what must needs be an opinion of unusual length. We shall confine ourselves to what we regard the controlling fact issues in the case, and an examination and discussion of the several specific findings of the trial court upon which its holding upon the boundary issue is rested.

The Jones, J. Dunman labor, Strange, R. Dunman, and Simonds (later surveyed as 'the Stevenson) were located in March, 1838, by deputy district surveyor J. W. Henderson. According to their calls they were surveyed in the order named, each survey calling for the northeast corner of that immediately to the west as its initial comer. No date is given for the Strange and Simonds surveys; the other three are dated; R. Dunman, March 10, 1838; Jones, March 15, 1838; J. Dunman labor, March 16, 1838. The Marshall and the Vickers were also surveyed in March, 183S, but by Green Q. Taylor, district surveyor. Marshall calls for Simonds and Vickers for Marshall. These are eoncededly junior to the Simonds. Including the Dunman labor in the Strange, each of the six surveys from the Jones to the Vickers calls for a third of a league and has a called width of 1,444 varas. By taking the called differences in lengths of the common lines of the Jones, Strange, Dun-man, and Stevenson, the south line of the Strange would be 510 varas south of the south line of the Jones, and 225 varas south of the south line of the Dunman, which in turn would be 520 varas south of the south line of the Stevenson.

By adopting the south pond comer (defendants’' theory) the west line of the Strange below the Jones (which we will call the Jones-Strange jog) is increased from 303 varas (defendants’ estimate) to 423 varas (the court’s finding) in excess of its 510-vara call. On the other hand, by adopting the north pond corner and the lines and corners fixed by the court to conform therewith, the east line of the Strange below the Dunman (Strange-Dunman jog) is increased from 225 to 272 varas or 47 varas in excess of its call; and the Dunman east line below the Stevenson (Dunman-Stevenson jog) is reduced from 520 to 70 varas or 450 varas under its call. It is around these discrepancies that the controversy largely revolves.

The first twenty items of the court’s findings of fact cover the boundary issue and are:

“1. The court finds that in the year 1838, J. W. Henderson Deputy District Surveyor of Harris County, Texas, surveyed the John ©rown Jones, the Joseph Dunman Labor, the James Strange, and the Robert Dunman surveys consecutively in the order named. The court further finds that the surveyor called for teach of the surveys to begin at the northeast comer of the preceding survey after he had surveyed the John Brown Jones, which the court finds was the first survey of this series made by J. W. Henderson.
⅛.

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Bluebook (online)
31 S.W.2d 172, 1930 Tex. App. LEXIS 797, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blaffer-v-state-texapp-1930.