Home/Court of Appeals of Texas/Strong v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corporation

Strong v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corporation

405 S.W.2d 351, 1966 Tex. App. LEXIS 2154
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 23, 1966
Docket142
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 405 S.W.2d 351 (Strong v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Strong v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corporation, 405 S.W.2d 351, 1966 Tex. App. LEXIS 2154 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966).

Opinion

OPINION

NYE, Justice.

This is a vacancy suit. Appellant filed suit in the District Court of Hidalgo County, *354 Texas alleging that there is in existence vacant and unsurveyed public free school land constituting a vacancy within the meaning of Article 5421c, Vernon’s Ann.Civ. St. The proceedings in the district court were instigated by the appellant following the order of the Texas Land Commissioner who had determined that “no vacancy” existed on the lands in question. The Commissioner appointed a licensed state land surveyor in accordance with the law to survey the land in question. At the hearing before the Commissioner, no evidence was allowed except that of the appointed surveyor who testified and filed numerous exhibits. One plat was filed by the surveyor at the request of the Commissioner, which showed no vacancy.

The appellant in his original petition named as defendants, Delhi-Taylor Oil Corporation, 1224 additional other defendants, the United States of America, Jerry Sadler, Commissioner of the General Land Office of the State of Texas, and the unknown heirs, stockholders, beneficial interest-holders in the property and lands described, etc. Some, but not all of the defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was controverted by the appellant. After the hearing on defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and after entertaining both oral argument and written briefs, the court announced that it had considered the exhibits filed therewith, and those in opposition thereto, including the depositions and affidavits on file, and determined that the plaintiff’s alleged cause of action was as a matter of law without merit as against all defendants, movants and non-movants alike. The plaintiff has perfected his appeal to this court.

Appellant’s basic contention in this case is: that the east line of Porcion 72 and the west line of Los Torritos Grant was not contiguous and that vacant land exists between such lines. Appellant also contends that a vacancy exists between the north line of Porcion 72 and the south line of the R. J. Swearingen Tract to the north. Appellant’s first point is that the trial court erred in granting appellees’ (defendants) motion for summary judgment because there was evidence before the court of the existence of vacant lands between the east line of Porcion 72 and the west line of Los Tor-ritos Grant. The lands in question, although at one time were in Cameron County, are situated in Hidalgo County.

None of the original monuments on the ground to Porcion 72 and none of the original monuments to the grants which surround this porcion, including the location of the Rio Grande River in 1767 can be found today. Appellant admits that all of these monuments of the original surveys have disappeared except as to the beginning point of the 1767 survey of Porcion 72 which he contends that the state appointed surveyor Byron L. Simpson has located by following the footsteps of the original surveys from the calls contained in the original field notes of 1767. Basically, it is appellant’s contention that because no patent has ever issued to Porcion 72, those claiming title under the original Spanish grant of Porcion 72 are necessarily limited to the evidence of the Spanish grant of Porcion 72 as surveyed in 1767. Insofar as a determination of the boundary lines of Porcion 72 is concerned, appellant argues and the appellees agree, that the only legal relevant inquiry is the location of such grant as surveyed by the Spanish surveyors in 1767. Surveyor Simpson has attempted to locate Porcion 72 by course and distance from where he contends the beginning point was in the original survey in the year 1767, and by such construction he locates Porcion 72 in such a manner as to create a vacancy between Porcion 72 and Los Torritos Grant to the east. (See Plat 3.) 1

*355

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Bluebook (online)
405 S.W.2d 351, 1966 Tex. App. LEXIS 2154, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/strong-v-delhi-taylor-oil-corporation-texapp-1966.