OPINION
WALKER, Chief Justice.
These consolidated appeals come to us from convictions for the felony offenses of Burglary of a Habitation and Aggravated Sexual Assault (three counts). Following its guilty verdicts on all three counts of Aggravated Sexual Assault and the Burglary charge, the jury assessed appellant’s punishment for each of the four offenses at confinement for life in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and, in each case, a fine of $10,000. The jury also made an affirmative finding of the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon by appellant during the commission of the offenses. The judgments indicate that the sentences are to run concurrently. Although appellant raises five points of error on appeal, our discussion of appellant’s first point will be dispositive of the causes before us.
We note at the outset that appellant does not complain of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. Indeed, although both parties correctly characterize this case as being circumstantial in nature, we have not been presented with such strongly incriminating evidence in quite some time. Appellant presents us with his first point of error as follows:
The trial court erred in admitting evidence of appellant’s sexual proclivities and practices pursuant to Rule 404(b), Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence.
The evidence of these “proclivities and practices” was elicited by the State, over appellant’s strenuous objection, from appellant’s ex-wife, C.S. This occurred as the State cross-examined Ms. S. during appellant’s case-in-chief. Ms. S.’s testimony was as follows:
Q. (the State) Ms. [S.], you are aware already of what we’re about to go into and I apologize. I know this might be embarrassing, but I think I need to ask you this. During the course of your relationship with Terry Joe Bishop, did he like to engage from time to time in anal intercourse?
A. (Witness) Yes, sir.
Q. During the course of your relationship in order to satisfy himself, did Terry Joe Bishop ever ask you or require you to perform sexual acts such as fondling on yourself?
A. Yes, sir.
MR. SPEERS (the State): Pass the witness.
MR. GLENN (for appellant): Nothing further, Your Honor.
MR. SPEERS: Excuse me. I have one more question, Your Honor.
[433]*433THE COURT: All right.
(BY MR. SPEERS:)
Q. Was Terry Joe Bishop during the course of your relationship capable of performing sexually for an extended period without ejaculating?
A. Yes, sir.
MR. SPEERS: I will pass the witness now.
MR. GLENN: I pass the witness, Your Honor.
The record reflects that prior to the admission of the above testimony before the jury, a hearing took place out of the jury’s presence in which appellant’s counsel objected to the admission of the testimony based upon his understanding of the law of relevance under Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 404(b),1 as well as the fact that the testimony, even if relevant, should be excluded as more prejudicial than probative, citing Rule 403. The State responded that Ms. S.’s testimony did not consist of an “extraneous offense” as contemplated by Rule 404(b); that the testimony was admissible as “character evidence;” that because the key issue in the case was identity and that appellant’s defense raised the possibility of another man having committed the crimes, that the State was allowed to “rebut” such evidence to show that appellant committed the crimes against the victim; and that Ms. S.’s testimony was clearly relevant, and therefore admissible, under Rule 401.
Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence 401, 403, and 404(b) provide the following:
Rule 401: “Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 403: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 404(b): Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided, upon timely request by the accused, reasonable notice is given in advance of trial of intent to introduce in the State’s case in chief such evidence other than that arising in the same transaction.
It is virtually conceded by both parties that the sole issue in the trial was the identity of the perpetrator of the brutal acts committed against the victim. The victim testified that an unknown perpetrator entered her house without her permission during the early morning hours of September 6, 1990, threatened her life and the lives of her children, and sexually assaulted her orally, vaginally, and anally at knife-point for approximately one to one and one-half hours without ejaculating, and in a very violent and brutal manner. The victim also testified that at one point during the attack, the perpetrator forced her to masturbate herself in order to show him what made her feel good. The victim, however, could not identify the perpetrator as he wore some sort of stocking over his face and no lights were turned on in the victim’s house at any time during this predawn attack.
With regard to the relevance of the testimony complained of by appellant, we find that based upon the record before us the testimony was relevant. The fact that direct evidence of appellant having perpetrated the crimes in question was totally lacking at the end of the State’s case-in-chief, and the fact that appellant’s defense raised the issue of a person named “Stringer” as the perpetrator, caused Ms. S.’s testimony to be relevant under Rule 401 as it had the tendency to make the existence of a fact [434]*434(appellant as the attacker) more probable than it would have been without it. However, although relevant, Rule 404(b) provides that such evidence is not admissible in order to show that an accused acted in conformity with extraneous “crimes, wrongs, or acts.” Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 872, 386 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (opinion on rehearing). Rule 404(b) has been interpreted as permitting such evidence of extraneous acts of an accused to be admitted where, among other things, the identity of the perpetrator is at issue, because such evidence is relevant beyond its tendency to prove the character of a person to show that he acted in conformity therewith. Id. at 387. Montgomery provides, however, that such "identity” extraneous act evidence is admissible subject to the trial court’s discretion to exclude it if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice as required under Rule 403. Id.
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OPINION
WALKER, Chief Justice.
These consolidated appeals come to us from convictions for the felony offenses of Burglary of a Habitation and Aggravated Sexual Assault (three counts). Following its guilty verdicts on all three counts of Aggravated Sexual Assault and the Burglary charge, the jury assessed appellant’s punishment for each of the four offenses at confinement for life in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and, in each case, a fine of $10,000. The jury also made an affirmative finding of the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon by appellant during the commission of the offenses. The judgments indicate that the sentences are to run concurrently. Although appellant raises five points of error on appeal, our discussion of appellant’s first point will be dispositive of the causes before us.
We note at the outset that appellant does not complain of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. Indeed, although both parties correctly characterize this case as being circumstantial in nature, we have not been presented with such strongly incriminating evidence in quite some time. Appellant presents us with his first point of error as follows:
The trial court erred in admitting evidence of appellant’s sexual proclivities and practices pursuant to Rule 404(b), Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence.
The evidence of these “proclivities and practices” was elicited by the State, over appellant’s strenuous objection, from appellant’s ex-wife, C.S. This occurred as the State cross-examined Ms. S. during appellant’s case-in-chief. Ms. S.’s testimony was as follows:
Q. (the State) Ms. [S.], you are aware already of what we’re about to go into and I apologize. I know this might be embarrassing, but I think I need to ask you this. During the course of your relationship with Terry Joe Bishop, did he like to engage from time to time in anal intercourse?
A. (Witness) Yes, sir.
Q. During the course of your relationship in order to satisfy himself, did Terry Joe Bishop ever ask you or require you to perform sexual acts such as fondling on yourself?
A. Yes, sir.
MR. SPEERS (the State): Pass the witness.
MR. GLENN (for appellant): Nothing further, Your Honor.
MR. SPEERS: Excuse me. I have one more question, Your Honor.
[433]*433THE COURT: All right.
(BY MR. SPEERS:)
Q. Was Terry Joe Bishop during the course of your relationship capable of performing sexually for an extended period without ejaculating?
A. Yes, sir.
MR. SPEERS: I will pass the witness now.
MR. GLENN: I pass the witness, Your Honor.
The record reflects that prior to the admission of the above testimony before the jury, a hearing took place out of the jury’s presence in which appellant’s counsel objected to the admission of the testimony based upon his understanding of the law of relevance under Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 404(b),1 as well as the fact that the testimony, even if relevant, should be excluded as more prejudicial than probative, citing Rule 403. The State responded that Ms. S.’s testimony did not consist of an “extraneous offense” as contemplated by Rule 404(b); that the testimony was admissible as “character evidence;” that because the key issue in the case was identity and that appellant’s defense raised the possibility of another man having committed the crimes, that the State was allowed to “rebut” such evidence to show that appellant committed the crimes against the victim; and that Ms. S.’s testimony was clearly relevant, and therefore admissible, under Rule 401.
Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence 401, 403, and 404(b) provide the following:
Rule 401: “Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 403: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 404(b): Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided, upon timely request by the accused, reasonable notice is given in advance of trial of intent to introduce in the State’s case in chief such evidence other than that arising in the same transaction.
It is virtually conceded by both parties that the sole issue in the trial was the identity of the perpetrator of the brutal acts committed against the victim. The victim testified that an unknown perpetrator entered her house without her permission during the early morning hours of September 6, 1990, threatened her life and the lives of her children, and sexually assaulted her orally, vaginally, and anally at knife-point for approximately one to one and one-half hours without ejaculating, and in a very violent and brutal manner. The victim also testified that at one point during the attack, the perpetrator forced her to masturbate herself in order to show him what made her feel good. The victim, however, could not identify the perpetrator as he wore some sort of stocking over his face and no lights were turned on in the victim’s house at any time during this predawn attack.
With regard to the relevance of the testimony complained of by appellant, we find that based upon the record before us the testimony was relevant. The fact that direct evidence of appellant having perpetrated the crimes in question was totally lacking at the end of the State’s case-in-chief, and the fact that appellant’s defense raised the issue of a person named “Stringer” as the perpetrator, caused Ms. S.’s testimony to be relevant under Rule 401 as it had the tendency to make the existence of a fact [434]*434(appellant as the attacker) more probable than it would have been without it. However, although relevant, Rule 404(b) provides that such evidence is not admissible in order to show that an accused acted in conformity with extraneous “crimes, wrongs, or acts.” Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 872, 386 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (opinion on rehearing). Rule 404(b) has been interpreted as permitting such evidence of extraneous acts of an accused to be admitted where, among other things, the identity of the perpetrator is at issue, because such evidence is relevant beyond its tendency to prove the character of a person to show that he acted in conformity therewith. Id. at 387. Montgomery provides, however, that such "identity” extraneous act evidence is admissible subject to the trial court’s discretion to exclude it if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice as required under Rule 403. Id. In the instant case, therefore, the question we must answer is whether Ms. S.’s testimony, although clearly admissible under Rule 401 and the “identity” exception of Rule 404(b), was nevertheless inadmissible under Rule 403 and the standards announced in Montgomery and relevant case law.
We begin our attempt to answer the question with a look at the case of Beets v. State, 767 S.W.2d 711 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 912, 109 S.Ct. 3272, 106 L.Ed.2d 579 (1989), one of the latest in a long line of cases that address the issue of the use of extraneous offense or misconduct in cases where identity is in dispute. The Court in Beets discussed this type of evidence as follows:
Even though the question of identity was disputed, the extraneous matter may still be inadmissible unless there are distinguishing characteristics common to both offenses such that the accused's acts are earmarked as his handiwork; his “signature” must be apparent from a comparison of circumstances in both cases. See Collazo v. State, 623 S.W.2d 647 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); see also Collins v. State, 577 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Buckner v. State, 571 S.W.2d 519 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (on rehearing); Ransom v. State, 503 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.Cr. App.1974)_ While admission of the evidence was inherently prejudicial due to the posture of the appellant, the same may be said of any such “signature” evidence which is probative of a crime for which a criminal defendant stands charged. Given the facts of the case before us, the fact that appellant raised an issue of identification during trial, and the high degree of similarity between offenses, the probative value of the extraneous evidence outweighs its prejudicial or inflammatory effect.
Beets, supra at 740-741.
Since such a degree of similarity to the point of “signature” is required when identity is the issue at bar, this, coupled with the fact that sexually related misconduct is inherently inflammatory, Montgomery, supra at 397, should cause a trial court to engage cautiously in its Rule 403 balancing test when presented with such evidence. In the instant case, an examination of Ms. S.’s testimony shows almost a total lack of anything that could be remotely considered as a “signature” of the appellant. The State’s questions were very broad-based and generalized. Terms such as “the course of your relationship,” “like to engage from time to time,” “ever ask or require you to perform sexual acts such as,” and “capable of performing sexually for an extended period of time” were, for whatever reason, used by the State in questioning Ms. S., with Ms. S.’s only response being an unelaborated, “Yes, sir.” Clearly, without any “signature”-type testimony from Ms. S., the prejudicial effect of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its probative value.
We take exception with the State’s characterization of Ms. S.’s testimony as admissible under the Rules of Criminal Evidence as evidence of appellant’s sexual habits. In citing us to Rule 406 which deals with habit and routine practices,2 the [435]*435State provides no case law interpreting the rule. We must admit that our research turned up no Texas cases in which Rule 406 was significantly discussed. We did find, however, federal case law dealing with an identical provision in the Federal Rules of Evidence.3 In Jones v. Southern Pacific R.R., 962 F.2d 447 (5th Cir.1992), the Court provides us with the following discussion of “habit” evidence:
Jones urges that the evidence was admissible under Rule 406 to show that Haley had a habit of operating trains negligently. Habit evidence is superior to character evidence because the uniformity of one’s responses to habit is far greater than the consistency with which one’s conduct conforms to character. Reyes [v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. ] 589 F.2d [791] at 794 [(5th Cir.1979)]. Evidence of habit is not lightly established, however. To offer evidence of a habit, a party must at least demonstrate a “regular practice of meeting a particular kind of situation with a specific type of conduct.” Id. In Reyes, we held that four prior convictions for public intoxication spanning a three and one-half year period were of insufficient regularity to rise to the level of habit evidence.
Jones, supra at 449.
In the instant case, the record reflects that Ms. S.’s relationship with the appellant was one of at least eleven years. The State made no attempt to show when their sexual relationship began, the frequency of such relations, or the frequency of the specific acts in question. Jones places a reasonable burden on the proponent of such “habit” evidence. We find no evidence in the statement of facts that “habit” was one of the purposes for which the State offered Ms. S.’s testimony, but even if it was, the State failed to meet the burden placed upon it as discussed in Jones.
Finally, we also take exception to the State’s assertion that appellant “wrongly described the sexual practices in the testimony at issue as evidence of an ‘extraneous offense,’ ‘extraneous misconduct,’ and as the ‘crime, wrong, or act’ described in Rule of Evidence 404(b).” The State contends that there is no evidence of a violation of the penal statutes or misconduct being committed because “anal intercourse between husband and wife, asking your wife to fondle herself, and being able to perform sexually for more than an hour without ejaculating are neither ‘extraneous offenses,’ nor ‘misconduct,’ nor ‘evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.’ ” While the State is correct in that none of the above acts engaged in between a consenting female and a consenting male are proscribed by law, TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. sec. 21.01 (Vernon 1989) defines “any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person” as “deviate sexual intercourse.” (emphasis ours). Thus, the State of Texas still officially considers consensual, heterosexual anal intercourse as abnormal. Such an act would certainly rise to the level of at least “misconduct” by Penal Code standards.
At any rate, the State’s contentions miss the crux of Rule 404(b) which is an attempt to codify the longstanding rule that an accused will not be tried for being a criminal in general nor be tried on his reputation or character. The plain language of Rule 404(b) does not permit so narrow an application as the State places on it.
Having found trial error, Tex. R.App.P. 81(b)(2) requires that we examine the proceedings to determine if, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error made no contribution to the conviction. We recognize at the outset that the proper application of Rule 81(b)(2) mandates reversal unless the appellate court can reach the above referenced conclusion. Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). Furthermore, as the reviewing court, we are obligated to examine the entire record in a neutral, impartial and even-handed manner [436]*436and not in the Jackson v. Virginia4 “light most favorable to the verdict....” Harris, supra at 586. As the Harris Court points out, “A review of the evidence in this manner is necessary because, for example, an error can be harmful when it has the effect of disparaging a defense, whereas if there is no defense the error could have been harmless.” Id. Recall that appellant, in the instant case, did present a defense.
The Harris Court’s treatise-like discussion of Rule 81(b)(2) further states that the reviewing court should not determine the harmfulness of an error simply by examining whether there exists overwhelming evidence to support the appellant’s guilt, but should focus on the integrity of the process leading to the conviction. Harris, supra at 587. The Harris Court structures the inquiry as follows:
Consequently, the court should examine the source of the error, the nature of the error, whether or to what extent it was emphasized by the State, and its probable collateral implications. Further, the court should consider how much weight a juror would probably place upon the error. In addition, the Court (sic) must also determine whether declaring the error harmless would encourage the State to repeat it with impunity.
Id.
In the instant case, the source of the error was the State and its insistence on the need for Ms. S.’s testimony in the face of evidence of another possible perpetrator. The nature of the error was the admission, over timely objection, of “inherently inflammatory,” inadmissible character conformity evidence. Its emphasis by the State initially took the form of a reference made in the State’s opening argument to the jury, “He had to be drunk like the Defendant was and a real mind boggier was he also had to have the same sexual dysfunction and proclivities as the Defendant.” The error was further emphasized twice in the State’s final argument to the jury, the last words the jury heard before deliberating guilt or innocence:
(By the State) — Well, you heard what the expert said and I tell you what, we put those people on because Mr. Glenn would have put them on if he we (sic) hadn’t. We put them on exactly for the purpose of showing you that they tried everything. It was just a happenstance that because of Terry Joe Bishop’s peculiar sexual dysfunction that there was no semen evidence to be analyzed or maybe we would have had a lot easier job putting this case together.
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(By the State) — You heard from C_ R_that the perpetrator in this assault against her was able to continuously sexually assault her for something approaching an hour and a half without ever ejaculating. That is Terry Joe Bishop. I’ll call that, I think the word Tom used was “stamina” (indicates). You heard from some of things that were done to Terry Joe Bishop — I mean, to C_R_, that’s the kind of stuff that Terry Joe Bishop is into. We will just call that “sex preference” (indicates).
In addition, the record reflects that the portions of the State’s final argument where the court reporter placed the term “(indicates)” referred to the fact that the prosecutor was writing the immediately preceding word or phrase on a blackboard for the jury to see. The above indicates that the State’s emphasis on the tainted evidence was significant.
In considering how much weight a juror would probably place upon the error we are faced with the fact that there was no direct testimony of the perpetrator’s identity, so any direct evidence of some general, unen-umerated sexual practices of appellant that happened to have some similarity to the acts inflicted upon the victim cannot be said to be inconsequential.
Finally, while in no way attempting to impugn the integrity of the prosecuting attorneys throughout the State of Texas, holding such error harmless under the circumstances in the record before us could be interpreted as a signal to even the most [437]*437well-intentioned prosecutor that, given the inherent subjectivity of harmless error analysis, see, Harris, supra at 585, any alleged perpetrator of such a repulsively violent crime deserves to be prosecuted as aggressively as the “law allows.” We cannot deny nor fault this type of prosecutorial rationalization, but neither can we permit this Court to be an indirect participant in it. We conclude, therefore, that we cannot say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the erroneous admission of the testimony of Ms. S. did not lead to appellant’s conviction. Appellant’s first point of error is sustained, all of the judgments are reversed, and the causes are remanded to the trial court for a new trial or trials consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.