Bishop v. State

914 S.W.2d 200, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 3268, 1995 WL 762140
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 27, 1995
DocketNos. 09-94-319 CR, 09-94-320 CR
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 914 S.W.2d 200 (Bishop v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bishop v. State, 914 S.W.2d 200, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 3268, 1995 WL 762140 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

OPINION

BURGESS, Justice.

These appeals are from convictions for Burglary of a Habitation and Aggravated Sexual Assault (three counts). Terry Joe Bishop was previously convicted and the jury assessed punishment for each of the offenses at confinement for life in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a fine of $10,000, with the sentences to run concurrently. We reversed the convictions and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Bishop v. State, 837 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 1992), affd', 869 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). The reversal was based upon error in admitting evidence of Bishop’s sexual practices and proclivities. Upon retrial, a jury convicted Bishop of all offenses. The court assessed the same punishment as before.

Bishop attacks each conviction with identical points of error: the charge authorized a conviction on a theory not alleged in the indictment, the charge authorized a conviction on a lesser burden of proof than set forth in the indictment, and the evidence was insufficient.

The Alleged Charge Errors

Bishop’s objections to the charge are being made for the first time on appeal, therefore, he must demonstrate the error is so egregious that it creates a harm that deprives him of a fair and impartial trial rather than simply error that is calculated to injure his rights. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 167, 172 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

Both of Bishop’s complaints about the burglary charge point out the indictment alleged Bishop entered the victim’s habitation, without her consent, with intent to commit aggravated sexual assault, attempted and committed aggravated sexual assault, and contained the language “... and said defendant was then and there armed with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife, which in the manner of its use and intended use was capable of causing death and serious bodily injury_” His first complaint focuses on the general definition of aggravated sexual assault in the charge which delineated all the ways a sexual assault becomes aggravated. The application paragraph did not contain the phrase “and said defendant was then and there armed with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife, which in the manner of its use and intended use was capable of causing death and serious bodily injury.” Bishop argues the indictment alleged a specific manner of aggravation and the omission of that manner from the application paragraph allowed the jury to convict if they found any of the manners of aggravation under the general definition present. Thus, the jury was allowed to convict on a theory not alleged in the indictment.

Bishop’s second complaint is the failure of the application paragraph to include the indictment language: “and said defendant was then and there armed with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife, which in the manner of its use and intended use was capable of causing death and serious bodily injury” lessened the State’s burden of proof since the jury was not instructed they must find the aggravation allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.

Bishop relies upon Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) for both of these complaints. Cumbie holds it is fundamental error for the court to give a charge which permits conviction on proof different from, and sometimes less than, that required to prove the allegation in the indictment. Id. However, Almanza overruled Cumbie to the extent it held any charge error required automatic reversal. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174. Therefore, if error, an Almanza analysis is required.

In response to both complaints, the State argues that since the application paragraph concludes with the phrase: “then you will find the defendant guilty of the offense of Burglary of a Habitation as charged in the [202]*202indictment”, the jury was limited to the manner charged in the indictment and was required to find that manner beyond a reasonable doubt. Ironically, the State cites Curnbie for its position. However, no fundamental error was found in Curnbie because there was previous authority for the proposition that a charge may describe property, in a robbery charge, by reference to the indictment. The State has furnished no authority which addresses the issue in the context of Bishop’s complaint.

We conclude the failure of the court’s application paragraph to contain that language in the indictment was error. See Williams v. State, 612 S.W.2d 934 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) We must measure the actual degree of harm in light of, among other things, the entire charge, the state of the evidence, and the contested issues in the case. Resendez v. State, 860 S.W.2d 606 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1993, pet. ref'd) The only contested issue in the trial was the identity of the perpetrator. The evidence was uncontradiet-ed that the perpetrator entered the home without the consent of the victim, he placed her in fear of death, he used or exhibited the knife and he forcibly sexually assaulted the victim. Therefore, the evidence is overwhelming the perpetrator committed the offense of burglary of a habitation. The offense would have been completed simply with the intent to commit sexual assault. The charge error did not involve the identity issue, was not any comment on that issue, nor did it enlarge or lessen the State’s burden to prove Bishop was the perpetrator. Consequently, we conclude it was not such egregious error as to require a reversal. These two points of error are overruled.

Both of Bishop’s complaints about the aggravated sexual assault charge concern the general definitions or statements of law. One complaint is while the application paragraph did follow the indictment in alleging the aggravation factors of (1) placing the victim in fear of death or serious bodily injury and (2) using or exhibiting a deadly weapon, the general definition of aggravated sexual assault contained the additional means of placing a victim in fear of kidnapping. This allowed the jury to convict on a theory not alleged in the indictment Bishop’s other complaint is while the application paragraph did contain the indictment language “a person not the spouse of the defendant”, the general statement of the law regarding aggravated sexual assault did not include that necessary language.1 Where the indictment and the application paragraph contain the same requirements, there is no error if the abstract statement of the law differs. See McDuffie v. State, 854 S.W.2d 195, 221 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1993, pet ref'd); Mauldin v. State, 628 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). These two points of error are overruled.

Bishop’s Insufficiency of the Evidence Claim

Bishop argues strong suspicions and mere probabilities pointing toward the accused as the perpetrator are not sufficient to justify a conviction on circumstantial evidence. He points out in Skelton v. State, 795 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), cert. denied,

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Bluebook (online)
914 S.W.2d 200, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 3268, 1995 WL 762140, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bishop-v-state-texapp-1995.