Per Curiam.
The plaintiffs appeal1 challenging the action of the trial court, Rush, J., denying their motion for reconsideration of a judgment of nonsuit previously rendered against them, and denying their motion to set aside that judgment.2 In this appeal, the plaintiffs challenge: (1) the rendition of the original judgment of nonsuit; (2) the denial of their motion to set aside that judgment; and (3) the denial of their motion to reconsider both the judgment of nonsuit and the denial of their motion to open the judgment of nonsuit.3 After full and careful consideration of the relevant portions of the trial court record and of the briefs of the par[464] ties on appeal, we conclude that: (1) under the Practice Book and our well established case law, all of the challenged rulings of the trial court were matters committed to the discretion of the trial court; and (2) any such procedural considerations aside, on their merits all of the challenged actions of the trial court were within its discretion.4 We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On July 13, 1992, the trial court ordered a nonsuit entered against the plaintiffs for their failure to respond to certain discovery requests that had been filed by the defendant on October 18, 1991. The nonsuit followed the plaintiffs’ failure to comply, even partially, with the discovery requests on three previously entered deadlines for compliance, namely, December 18, 1991, February 18, 1992, and July 2, 1992. Practice Book § 231 gives the trial court discretion to impose appropriate sanctions for the failure to comply with discovery requests “as the ends of justice require.”5 The factors [465] to be considered by the court include: (1) whether noncompliance was caused by inability, rather than wilfulness, bad faith or other fault; (2) whether and to what extent noncompliance caused prejudice to the other party, including the importance of the information sought to that party’s case; and (3) which sanction would, under the circumstances of the case, be an appropriate judicial response to the noncomplying party’s conduct. Pavlinko v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 192 Conn. 138, 144, 470 A.2d 246 (1984). As with any discretionary action of the trial court, appellate review requires every reasonable presumption in favor of the action, and the ultimate issue for us is whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did. See, e.g., Pool v. Bell, 209 Conn. 536, 541, 551 A.2d 1254 (1989); DiPalma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 298-99, 303 A.2d 709 (1972). We are convinced that the trial court properly considered all of the relevant factors in ordering the nonsuit. The record demonstrates, furthermore, that, as is appropriate, the trial court recognized that a nonsuit is among the most drastic of the available remedies, and that it exercised its discretion with due caution and restraint in ordering that sanction. 6 We conclude, therefore, that the [466] trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the nonsuit.
Despite the trial court’s invitation based upon the plaintiffs’ representations; see footnote 6; the plaintiffs did not file their motion to set aside the judgment of nonsuit until September 17, 1992. In their counsel’s affidavit in support of their motion, the plaintiffs asserted that the reason for their failure to comply with the discovery orders, for which the judgment of nonsuit had been rendered, “was [the] Plaintiffs’ decision to retain new attorneys and a belief that it would be unfair to bind new counsel with responses to interrogatories and production requests before he had opportunity to evaluate the case.” The plaintiffs also asserted that they had now complied with the discovery requests. The defendant disputed that such compliance had occurred. The defendant also opposed the motion on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the requirements for setting aside a judgment of nonsuit, and that the late and incomplete disclosure would be unduly prejudicial in light of a trial date already set for early December. After full oral argument on the motion and the defendant’s objection, the trial court, on October 7, 1992, denied the motion to set aside the judgment of nonsuit without a written or oral memorandum of decision. The plaintiffs did not seek an articulation of that ruling.
The power of the court to set aside a judgment of nonsuit is governed by General Statutes § 52-212.7 [467] Jaconski v. AMF, Inc., 208 Conn. 230, 237, 543 A.2d 728 (1988); Pantlin & Chananie Development Corp. v. Hartford Cement & Building Supply Co., 196 Conn. 233, 240, 492 A.2d 159 (1985); see also Practice Book § 377. 8 The plaintiff must establish that a good cause of action, the nature of which must be set forth, existed when the judgment of nonsuit was rendered, and that the plaintiff was prevented from prosecuting it because of mistake, accident or other reasonable cause. Pantlin & Chananie Development Corp. v. Hartford Cement & Building Supply Co., supra, 240. In ruling on a motion to open a judgment of nonsuit, the trial court must [468] exercise sound judicial discretion, which will not be disturbed on appeal unless there was an abuse of discretion. Id., 237-38. In reviewing the trial court’s exercise of its discretion, we make every presumption in favor of its action. Acheson v. White, 195 Conn. 211, 215, 487 A.2d 197 (1985). This record amply supports the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion, and we can discern no abuse of discretion that would justify reversing that action.
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Per Curiam.
The plaintiffs appeal1 challenging the action of the trial court, Rush, J., denying their motion for reconsideration of a judgment of nonsuit previously rendered against them, and denying their motion to set aside that judgment.2 In this appeal, the plaintiffs challenge: (1) the rendition of the original judgment of nonsuit; (2) the denial of their motion to set aside that judgment; and (3) the denial of their motion to reconsider both the judgment of nonsuit and the denial of their motion to open the judgment of nonsuit.3 After full and careful consideration of the relevant portions of the trial court record and of the briefs of the par[464] ties on appeal, we conclude that: (1) under the Practice Book and our well established case law, all of the challenged rulings of the trial court were matters committed to the discretion of the trial court; and (2) any such procedural considerations aside, on their merits all of the challenged actions of the trial court were within its discretion.4 We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On July 13, 1992, the trial court ordered a nonsuit entered against the plaintiffs for their failure to respond to certain discovery requests that had been filed by the defendant on October 18, 1991. The nonsuit followed the plaintiffs’ failure to comply, even partially, with the discovery requests on three previously entered deadlines for compliance, namely, December 18, 1991, February 18, 1992, and July 2, 1992. Practice Book § 231 gives the trial court discretion to impose appropriate sanctions for the failure to comply with discovery requests “as the ends of justice require.”5 The factors [465] to be considered by the court include: (1) whether noncompliance was caused by inability, rather than wilfulness, bad faith or other fault; (2) whether and to what extent noncompliance caused prejudice to the other party, including the importance of the information sought to that party’s case; and (3) which sanction would, under the circumstances of the case, be an appropriate judicial response to the noncomplying party’s conduct. Pavlinko v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 192 Conn. 138, 144, 470 A.2d 246 (1984). As with any discretionary action of the trial court, appellate review requires every reasonable presumption in favor of the action, and the ultimate issue for us is whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did. See, e.g., Pool v. Bell, 209 Conn. 536, 541, 551 A.2d 1254 (1989); DiPalma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 298-99, 303 A.2d 709 (1972). We are convinced that the trial court properly considered all of the relevant factors in ordering the nonsuit. The record demonstrates, furthermore, that, as is appropriate, the trial court recognized that a nonsuit is among the most drastic of the available remedies, and that it exercised its discretion with due caution and restraint in ordering that sanction. 6 We conclude, therefore, that the [466] trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the nonsuit.
Despite the trial court’s invitation based upon the plaintiffs’ representations; see footnote 6; the plaintiffs did not file their motion to set aside the judgment of nonsuit until September 17, 1992. In their counsel’s affidavit in support of their motion, the plaintiffs asserted that the reason for their failure to comply with the discovery orders, for which the judgment of nonsuit had been rendered, “was [the] Plaintiffs’ decision to retain new attorneys and a belief that it would be unfair to bind new counsel with responses to interrogatories and production requests before he had opportunity to evaluate the case.” The plaintiffs also asserted that they had now complied with the discovery requests. The defendant disputed that such compliance had occurred. The defendant also opposed the motion on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the requirements for setting aside a judgment of nonsuit, and that the late and incomplete disclosure would be unduly prejudicial in light of a trial date already set for early December. After full oral argument on the motion and the defendant’s objection, the trial court, on October 7, 1992, denied the motion to set aside the judgment of nonsuit without a written or oral memorandum of decision. The plaintiffs did not seek an articulation of that ruling.
The power of the court to set aside a judgment of nonsuit is governed by General Statutes § 52-212.7 [467] Jaconski v. AMF, Inc., 208 Conn. 230, 237, 543 A.2d 728 (1988); Pantlin & Chananie Development Corp. v. Hartford Cement & Building Supply Co., 196 Conn. 233, 240, 492 A.2d 159 (1985); see also Practice Book § 377. 8 The plaintiff must establish that a good cause of action, the nature of which must be set forth, existed when the judgment of nonsuit was rendered, and that the plaintiff was prevented from prosecuting it because of mistake, accident or other reasonable cause. Pantlin & Chananie Development Corp. v. Hartford Cement & Building Supply Co., supra, 240. In ruling on a motion to open a judgment of nonsuit, the trial court must [468] exercise sound judicial discretion, which will not be disturbed on appeal unless there was an abuse of discretion. Id., 237-38. In reviewing the trial court’s exercise of its discretion, we make every presumption in favor of its action. Acheson v. White, 195 Conn. 211, 215, 487 A.2d 197 (1985). This record amply supports the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion, and we can discern no abuse of discretion that would justify reversing that action.
On November 12, 1992, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reargue and for reconsideration of: (1) the judgment of nonsuit; and (2) the denial of their motion to open that judgment. Although the motion stated that “[supporting affidavits and a memorandum of law are attached,” those documents were not attached, either to the motion filed in court or to the copy sent to the defendant, and they were not filed in court until November 18, 1992. The defendant objected on both procedural and substantive grounds. After full oral argument, the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion without a written or oral memorandum of decision, and the plaintiffs did not seek articulation. Having examined the record, we can find no basis upon which to reverse the trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion.
The judgment is affirmed.