[625]*625
Opinion
ZARELLA, J.
The plaintiff, Herman Vogel, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after the granting of the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Maimonides Academy of Western Connecticut, Inc. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and (2) denied the plaintiffs motion to reargue and for reconsideration of the decision to grant the motion for summary judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record discloses the following undisputed facts. In March, 1992, the plaintiff resided with his wife and two daughters in Newtown. At that time, his three and one-half year old daughter was enrolled in a school operated by the defendant. While enrolled in the defendant’s school, the plaintiffs daughter was taught a course titled “Family Life Educational Philosophy.” The purpose of the course was to help students to develop skills that would enable them to make sound value judgments and moral decisions regarding interpersonal relationships. Part of the curriculum was designed to teach the difference between proper and improper touching.
On March 27, 1992, while at the defendant’s school, the plaintiffs daughter vocalized words about “daddy” and “touching.” The personnel of the defendant school reported this statement to the department of children and families (department).1 The department investigated the plaintiff concerning the possible sexual abuse of his daughter.
[626]*626The first count of the plaintiffs revised complaint alleges that the defendant’s false accusations placed him in a false light and subjected him to unjustified criticism. The plaintiff claims that as a result of the defendant’s actions, his reputation was damaged, his family life was disrupted and he required psychiatric counseling, incurred medical expenses and lost wages and employment opportunities.2
The second count of the revised complaint incorporates many of the allegations of the first count and alleges that the defendant intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the plaintiff.3 In the third count of the revised complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant acted recklessly in modifying the course and teaching it to children his daughter’s age and, as a result, the plaintiff sustained the injuries previously discussed.4
[627]*627The defendant filed its answer and a special defense dated June 26,1995. In its special defense, the defendant claimed immunity from liability for acts arising from the reporting of suspected child abuse pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 17a-101 et seq.5
The defendant filed its motion for summary judgment on July 7,1997, accompanied by a memorandum of law. The plaintiff objected, and filed an opposing memorandum and his affidavit. The key par agraphs of the affidavit state that the conduct of the defendant was reckless [628]*628in modifying and teaching the program to a three and one-half year old. The affidavit basically reiterated the allegations in the revised complaint. The court, after hearing arguments, granted the motion. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue and for reconsideration. The court denied the motion, and the plaintiff appealed.
I
The plaintiff claims first that the court improperly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the third count of his revised complaint.6 We disagree.
The standard of review for summary judgment is well established. “Practice Book § [17-49] mandates that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fernandez v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 44 Conn. App. 220, 222-23, 688 A.2d 349 (1997). Our review of the court’s judgment is de novo because this appeal raises a question of law. See Serrano v. Burns, 248 Conn. 419, 425, 727 A.2d 1276 (1999).
The plaintiff alleges in the third count of his revised complaint that the defendant recklessly brought about his injuries by improperly instructing his child. The plaintiffs claim for reckless instruction of an improper curriculum is essentially a claim for educational mal[629]*629practice, a claim our Supreme Court declined to recognize in Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 687 A.2d 111 (1996).7 In Gupta, the court joined the vast majority of states that have rejected educational malpractice claims sounding in tort. The court noted in dictum that a claim for educational malpractice “raise[s] questions concerning the reasonableness of conduct by educational institutions in providing particular educational services to students—questions that must be answered by reference to principles of duty, standards of care, and reasonable conduct associated with the law of torts. Cencor, Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396, 399 (Colo. 1994) (en banc). Because these tort principles are difficult, if not impossible, to apply in the academic environment, courts have almost universally held that claims of educational malpractice are not cognizable. Among other problems for adjudication, these claims involve the judiciary in the awkward tasks of defining what constitutes a reasonable educational program and of deciding whether that standard has been breached. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976) (finding no conceivable workability of a rule of care against which [teachers’] alleged conduct maybe measured). In entertaining such claims, moreover, courts are required not merely [630]*630to make judgments as to the validity of broad educational policies . . . but, more importantly, to sit in review of the day-to-day implementation of these policies. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District, [47 N.Y.2d 440, 445, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979)].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, supra, 239 Conn. 590-91.
The Gupta court further stated that the “jurisprudential considerations that shed doubt on the viability of the tort of educational malpractice also inform our analysis of a contract claim based on inadequate educational services.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 591.
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[625]*625
Opinion
ZARELLA, J.
The plaintiff, Herman Vogel, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after the granting of the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Maimonides Academy of Western Connecticut, Inc. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and (2) denied the plaintiffs motion to reargue and for reconsideration of the decision to grant the motion for summary judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record discloses the following undisputed facts. In March, 1992, the plaintiff resided with his wife and two daughters in Newtown. At that time, his three and one-half year old daughter was enrolled in a school operated by the defendant. While enrolled in the defendant’s school, the plaintiffs daughter was taught a course titled “Family Life Educational Philosophy.” The purpose of the course was to help students to develop skills that would enable them to make sound value judgments and moral decisions regarding interpersonal relationships. Part of the curriculum was designed to teach the difference between proper and improper touching.
On March 27, 1992, while at the defendant’s school, the plaintiffs daughter vocalized words about “daddy” and “touching.” The personnel of the defendant school reported this statement to the department of children and families (department).1 The department investigated the plaintiff concerning the possible sexual abuse of his daughter.
[626]*626The first count of the plaintiffs revised complaint alleges that the defendant’s false accusations placed him in a false light and subjected him to unjustified criticism. The plaintiff claims that as a result of the defendant’s actions, his reputation was damaged, his family life was disrupted and he required psychiatric counseling, incurred medical expenses and lost wages and employment opportunities.2
The second count of the revised complaint incorporates many of the allegations of the first count and alleges that the defendant intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the plaintiff.3 In the third count of the revised complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant acted recklessly in modifying the course and teaching it to children his daughter’s age and, as a result, the plaintiff sustained the injuries previously discussed.4
[627]*627The defendant filed its answer and a special defense dated June 26,1995. In its special defense, the defendant claimed immunity from liability for acts arising from the reporting of suspected child abuse pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 17a-101 et seq.5
The defendant filed its motion for summary judgment on July 7,1997, accompanied by a memorandum of law. The plaintiff objected, and filed an opposing memorandum and his affidavit. The key par agraphs of the affidavit state that the conduct of the defendant was reckless [628]*628in modifying and teaching the program to a three and one-half year old. The affidavit basically reiterated the allegations in the revised complaint. The court, after hearing arguments, granted the motion. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue and for reconsideration. The court denied the motion, and the plaintiff appealed.
I
The plaintiff claims first that the court improperly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the third count of his revised complaint.6 We disagree.
The standard of review for summary judgment is well established. “Practice Book § [17-49] mandates that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fernandez v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 44 Conn. App. 220, 222-23, 688 A.2d 349 (1997). Our review of the court’s judgment is de novo because this appeal raises a question of law. See Serrano v. Burns, 248 Conn. 419, 425, 727 A.2d 1276 (1999).
The plaintiff alleges in the third count of his revised complaint that the defendant recklessly brought about his injuries by improperly instructing his child. The plaintiffs claim for reckless instruction of an improper curriculum is essentially a claim for educational mal[629]*629practice, a claim our Supreme Court declined to recognize in Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 687 A.2d 111 (1996).7 In Gupta, the court joined the vast majority of states that have rejected educational malpractice claims sounding in tort. The court noted in dictum that a claim for educational malpractice “raise[s] questions concerning the reasonableness of conduct by educational institutions in providing particular educational services to students—questions that must be answered by reference to principles of duty, standards of care, and reasonable conduct associated with the law of torts. Cencor, Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396, 399 (Colo. 1994) (en banc). Because these tort principles are difficult, if not impossible, to apply in the academic environment, courts have almost universally held that claims of educational malpractice are not cognizable. Among other problems for adjudication, these claims involve the judiciary in the awkward tasks of defining what constitutes a reasonable educational program and of deciding whether that standard has been breached. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976) (finding no conceivable workability of a rule of care against which [teachers’] alleged conduct maybe measured). In entertaining such claims, moreover, courts are required not merely [630]*630to make judgments as to the validity of broad educational policies . . . but, more importantly, to sit in review of the day-to-day implementation of these policies. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District, [47 N.Y.2d 440, 445, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979)].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, supra, 239 Conn. 590-91.
The Gupta court further stated that the “jurisprudential considerations that shed doubt on the viability of the tort of educational malpractice also inform our analysis of a contract claim based on inadequate educational services.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 591. The court noted, however, that a cause of action for institutional breach of contract for educational services exists in at least two situations. Id., 592. “The first would be exemplified by a showing that the educational program failed in some fundamental respect, as by not offering any of the courses necessary to obtain certification in a particular field. See Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450, 452, 725 P.2d 155 (1986); Ross v. Creighton University, [957 F.2d 410, 417 (7th Cir. 1992)]. The second would arise if the educational institution failed to fulfill a specific contractual promise distinct from any overall obligation to offer a reasonable program. See, e.g., Cencor, Inc. v. Tolman, supra, 868 P.2d 399; Paladino v. Adelphi University, [89 App. Div. 2d 85, 92, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1982)].” Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, supra, 239 Conn. 592-93. Our Supreme Court has recently had occasion to address this issue in detail. In Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 659, 748 A.2d 834 (2000), the court stated, “If the duty alleged to have been breached is the duty to educate effectively, the claim is not cognizable. Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, supra, 239 Conn. 593-94. If the duty alleged to have been breached is the [631]*631common-law duty not to cause physical injury by negligent conduct, such a claim is, of course, cognizable. That common-law duty does not disappear when the negligent conduct occurs in an educational setting. This principle underlies this court’s decision in [Kirchner v. Yale University, 150 Conn. 623, 192 A.2d 641 (1963)]. The duty of an educator or supervisor to use reasonable care so as not to cause physical injury to a trainee during the course of instruction or supervision is not novel.” The allegations of the plaintiffs complaint clearly allege a breach of a duty to educate effectively and, thus, the claim is not cognizable. We conclude, therefore, that under the facts of this case, the plaintiffs claim of educational malpractice properly did not survive the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
II
The plaintiff contends finally that the court improperly denied his motion to reargue and for reconsideration of the court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We disagree.
Our standard of review regarding challenges to a trial court’s ruling on a motion for reconsideration is abuse of discretion. See Biro v. Hill, 231 Conn. 462, 468, 650 A.2d 541 (1994) (analyzing denial of plaintiffs motion for reconsideration under abuse of discretion standard). Because we conclude that the motion for summary judgment properly was granted, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion to reargue and for reconsideration.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.