Bingham Mines Co. v. Allsop

203 P. 644, 59 Utah 306, 1921 Utah LEXIS 128
CourtUtah Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 29, 1921
DocketNo. 3668
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 203 P. 644 (Bingham Mines Co. v. Allsop) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bingham Mines Co. v. Allsop, 203 P. 644, 59 Utah 306, 1921 Utah LEXIS 128 (Utah 1921).

Opinion

WEBER, J.

On October 26, 1917, Samuel Francis Allsop died in a mine . tunnel of the Bingham Mines Company, at Lark, Utah, while in the employ of that company. He left surviving him a wife and two minor children. Application was made to the Industrial Commission for compensation, claiming that All-sop was killed by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by the Bingham Mines Company. Upon a hearing the Commission found that Allsop came to his death by reason of an accident in the mine of the Bingham Mines Company, and compensation was awarded in the sum of $4,500. On writ of review the record was certified to the district court, and on such review the award was affirmed, the court finding from the evidence that had been adduced before the Commission that the death of deceased was caused by an electric shock accidentally received by him while at Work in the mine in the course of his employment, and that the finding of the Commission that the deceased came to his death by reason of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment was sustained by the evidence. From a judgment entered by the district court plaintiffs appeal.

The first assignment of error urged by appellants raised the question of whether the award can stand, since the Commission failed to make a finding as to the cause of death or what, if any, accident was sustained by the deceased,' or, in other words, whether the mere conclusion stated by' the Commission, that death was caused by reason of an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, was sufficient to sustain the award.

[309]*309In Geo. A. Lowe Co. et al. v. Industrial Com., 56 Utah 519, 190 Pac. 934, this court held findings of fact by the Commission not legally essential to a valid award. That language was not intended as mere dictum. We have 1 repeatedly suggested to the Commission that it is advisable to make findings of the ultimate facts in each case, but we have never held, and do not now hold, that such findings are essential to a valid award.

Appellants insist that there is no competent, substantial evidence in the record that the deceased had sustained any personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and that there is no competent, substantial evidence that he came in contact with an electric wire in the tunnel and suffered death from an electric shock. As stated by appellants, the question whether there 2 is any substantial evidence to support an award is a question of law and to ascertain whether there is some substantial evidence supporting the award is the only purpose of a review in this court. Ind. Com. of Utah v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 Pac. 825; Garfield Smelting Co. v. Ind. Com. of Utah, 53 Utah 133, 178 Pac. 57; Geo. A. Lowe Co. v. Ind. Com. of Utah, 56 Utah 519, 190 Pac. 934; State Road Com. v. Ind. Com., 56 Utah 252, 190 Pac. 544; McVicar v. Ind. Com. of Utah, 56 Utah 342, 191 Pac. 1089; Varoukas v. Ind. Com., 56 Utah 574, 191 Pac. 1091; Utah Fuel Co. v. Ind. Com. of Utah, 57 Utah 246, 194 Pac. 122; Littsos v. Ind. Com. of Utah, 57 Utah 259, 194 Pac. 338. It was incumbent upon the beneficiaries to prove that the death resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of deceased’s employment. If, however, there is any substantial evidence sustaining the conclusion reached by the Commission, though it be slight and though it may seem unsatisfactory to us, the award made must stand. As stated in McVicar v. Ind. Com., supra, the Commission’s conclusions are like the verdict of a jury, and will not be interfered with by this court when supported by some substantial evidence. The same rule is applicable in the district court upon its review of the evidence. Appellants insist that “a finding under the Work[310]*310men’s Compensation Act [Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 3061-3165] cannot rest upon mere conjecture, probability, or possibility.” With the elimination of the word “probability” 3,4 the quoted statement is unobjectionable and meets with our approval. However, there can be no doubt about the proposition that a finding of the Commission may properly rest upon probabilities. The word “probable” is defined in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Vol. 3, page 2728, as, “having the appearance of truth; appearing to be founded in reason.” Courts have defined “probable” as meaning, “Having more evidence for than against” (3 Words and Phrases, Second Series, 1223) and, “A probability of the existence of a thing is created when there is more 'evidence in favor of its existence than against it” (6 Words and Phrases, 5617).

The concrete question in this case, therefore, is whether the evidence indicates that the. deceased probably came in contact with the electric wiring in a mine tunnel, and whether the resulting shock caused or contributed to- his death. The deceased was a mine foreman. On the day of his death he went to work at about 8 o’clock in the morning, and did his work as usual. At 1:30 p. m. he ate his lunch. His death occurred at about 3 o’clock. At about that time he was in the tunnel and gave orders to one of the miners to attend to some duty, and from five to seven minutes after that he was found in a dying condition on the left-hand side of the mine tunnel. A live electric wire was on the right-hand side of the tunnel. The wire carried about 450 volts. Ore'was being taken out of different raises, loaded into ears on a track in the tunnel. At the place where Allsop was found, and where he died, the tunnel Avas about 6 feet 5 inches wide, and about 6 feet 5 inches high. The track was laid about the center of the tunnel. The distance from the top of the rail to the electric wire was 6 feet 2 inches so that the deceased, who was 5 feet 9 inches in height, could not come in contact with it by accident unless he stood on something or unless he raised his hand or carried something in his hand which would extend above his head. Dr. Odell arrived at the scene of the accident a few minutes after All-[311]*311sop’s death. He had known deceased for three or four years, but had never treated him, in his office or elsewhere, and so far as he knew deceased had never shown any symptoms or indication of inability to work. Hr. Odell testified that when he found the deceased his throat and mouth were filled with saliva and ejected food. He further testified as follows:

“If the current went through the respiratory organs it would cause a sort of strangulation. It would produce the very effect that I found in this man’s throat and mouth. His throat and nose were full of blood. That condition may be accounted for by his having come in contact with the wire. That is not the only way, however, it could have been produced. It could have been produced by his receiving a blow on the back of his head. However, there was no evidence of his having received such a blow. If his head came in contact with the wire the condition in which I found him could have been produced as the result of the electric shock.”

It having been suggested that the deceased died from overexertion, Dr. Odell testified:

“When a man dies from overexertion you would expect him before that to be failing somewhat. You would not expect him to be performing his usual work and to appear to be sound and rugged. You would expect him to be coming in occasionally to the mine doctor for treatment.

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Bluebook (online)
203 P. 644, 59 Utah 306, 1921 Utah LEXIS 128, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bingham-mines-co-v-allsop-utah-1921.