Thompson v. Industrial Commission

23 P.2d 930, 82 Utah 247, 1933 Utah LEXIS 71
CourtUtah Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 11, 1933
DocketNo. 5399.
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 23 P.2d 930 (Thompson v. Industrial Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thompson v. Industrial Commission, 23 P.2d 930, 82 Utah 247, 1933 Utah LEXIS 71 (Utah 1933).

Opinion

FOLLAND, J.

This is an original proceeding to review a decision of The Industrial Commission of Utah denying compensation. William F. Thompson, the plaintiff, was for about four years employed at the Hylton Flour Mills at Ogden as oiler and sweeper. His duties required him to oil and fumigate the machinery, clean and dust collectors, and sweep the floors of the mill. He alleges that on July 10, 1932, while shaking a dust collector, particles of dust entered his eye, caused an ulcer of the right eye to become perforated, resulting in almost total disability of that eye. After a hearing, the commission made findings of fact against applicant and denied compensation. The points relied on for reversal are: (a) That the findings of the commission are not findings of fact but are conclusions of law; (b) that the commission did not make findings on all the material issues; and (c) that the findings of fact, if held to be sufficient as findings, are not supported by the evidence.

By the first finding the commission merely recited the allegations or claim made by applicant. The second finding is as follows: “The applicant has failed to sustain by competent evidence his burden of proof to show that the condition complained of was, either directly or indirectly, due to an accident arising out of or in the *249 course of his employment while employed by the Hylton Flour Mills at Ogden, Utah.”

The ultimate fact to be found was whether or not the applicant sustained an injury by accident arising out of or in the course of employment. No direct finding was made on that determinative issue. The finding is that the applicant failed to sustain the burden of proof. The burden of proving that he sustained an injury by accident in employment rested on the applicant. If he failed to do so, the finding should have been against him. The finding as made is equivalent to a finding that the applicant did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment. If the commission had used such language, it would be a finding of the ultimate fact in issue. In view of the conclusion we have reached on the facts, we are disposed to treat the finding as one to the effect that applicant did not sustain an injury by accident in the course of or arising out of his employment. Banks v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 166, 278 P. 58; Robinson v. Thomas, 75 Utah 446, 286 P. 625.

Plaintiff cites and relies on the case of West v. Standard Fuel Company (Utah), 17 P. (2d) 291, 292, as holding it is the duty of the trial court to make findings on all the material issues raised by the pleadings, and that it is prejudicial error for it to fail to find on issues raised by the pleadings and the evidence. That is undoubtedly the general rule applicable to the making of findings of fact by a court, but the rule is not applicable in proceedings before the Industrial Commission. The statute does not require the making of findings of fact by the commission, and this court has held that findings of fact are not legally essential to a valid award, but has suggested that it is advisable to make findings of ultimate facts in each case. Geo. A. Lowe Co. v. Industrial Commission, 56 Utah 519, 190 P. 934; Bingham Mines Co. v. Allsop, 59 Utah 306, 203 P. 644. Ordinarily the making of specific findings on all issues presented is better practice, is fairer to the parties, *250 and more helpful to the court. The ultimate fact having been found by the commission, it is sufficient, and, if supported by the evidence, will dispose of the case.

The precise point made on the merits is whether or not plaintiff’s eye condition was caused by accident. Plaintiff contends that some dust or other foreign substance fell into his eye on July 10th, which caused an ulcer to break, resulting in the almost total loss of eyesight to his right eye. Defendants contend the condition of the right eye and the left one was an occupational disease, incurred gradually in the course of his work in the mill, and that there was no specific event or occurrence which can be referred to as the starting point of the condition or injury.

The undisputed facts are that plaintiff worked for about four years in the Hylton Flour Mills as oiler and sweeper, and that his eyes were in sufficiently good condition that he could read with the aid of glasses and take care of his duties in the mill, that at the beginning of his service he used glasses, was nearsighted, and that his eyes gradually became worse, so that at the time he ceased employment his right eye had reached the last stage of disability, and he Could not read with the left eye “any more.” He worked continuously up to the 11th day of July, laid off on the 12th and 13th, and worked again on the 14th, and on the 15th he did not go to work. His wife notified the office he was too sick to go to work. He did not consult a physician until after the 14th of July and after an ulcer in the right eye broke. He made no complaint to the management of any accident or injury to his eye until after he quit work on the 14th. There was disagreement in the testimony as to what was told the officials'of the company when he did not return to work on the 15th. Mrs. Thompson testified she notified the office he could not return to work because “my husband was sick, that his eyes were hurting so bad he could not come to work that day, and would come as soon as he could.” The representatives of the mill testified they were informed merely that he had a cold.

*251 Thompson testified as follows on examination by his counsel:

“Q. Did you sustain an injury while you were at work? A. Through this dust fumigating that irritated my eyes in a way so they were inflamed so they caused this ulcer as they call it that came on there.
“Q. Now when did you sustain the injury there? Just go ahead and tell us the history of your case. A. It began about two or three months previous to this time of the accident, it made it hurt a little more than usual, the pain and itching and irritating to my eyes.
“Q. When did it result so that you could not proceed to work any more? A. About the 10th, it commenced to hurt me and the 14th was the last that I could work. * * *
“Q. Did you tell any of them about the condition of your eyes? A. While I was off?
“Q. While you were at work? A. They knew that my eyes was failing like.
“Q. Who knew that? A. Mr. Taylor I presume.
“Q. Whom? A. Mr. Taylor.
“Q. Did you have any talk with him about it, with Mr. Taylor? A. Not about any accident.
“Q. Did you yourself give him any reason why you were unable to continue with the work? A. No, sir.
“Q. Did you have anyone waiting upon you or doctoring your eyes? A. Only home treatments.
“Q. What kind of treatment did you give it? A. Just this McKesson eye water.
“Q.

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Related

Crittenden v. Industrial Commission
479 P.2d 347 (Utah Supreme Court, 1971)
Young v. Salt Lake City
90 P.2d 174 (Utah Supreme Court, 1939)
Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission
66 P.2d 124 (Utah Supreme Court, 1937)
Batchelor v. Industrial Commission
42 P.2d 996 (Utah Supreme Court, 1935)

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Bluebook (online)
23 P.2d 930, 82 Utah 247, 1933 Utah LEXIS 71, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thompson-v-industrial-commission-utah-1933.