O'Brien v. Industrial Commission

61 P.2d 418, 90 Utah 266, 1936 Utah LEXIS 18
CourtUtah Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 16, 1936
DocketNo. 5773.
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 61 P.2d 418 (O'Brien v. Industrial Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
O'Brien v. Industrial Commission, 61 P.2d 418, 90 Utah 266, 1936 Utah LEXIS 18 (Utah 1936).

Opinion

FOLLAND, Justice.

This is a certiorari to review a decision of the Industrial Commission denying compensation for the death of T. Frank O’Brien to the plaintiff, Louise Pegg O’Brien, his widow. The deceased was injured September 4, 1934 while working for the Salt Lake City F. E. R. A. as a hoisting engineer. While walking between the crane and hoist on a plank, he *267 stubbed his toe on a fire rake, became unbalanced, and either fell or jumped to the ground. He sustained an incomplete fracture of the left acetabular cavity without displacement or deformity; this cavity being the socket of the ball and socket joint at the upper end of the thigh. Death occurred May 12,1935. The State Insurance Fund, the insurance carrier, furnished medical and hospital attention and paid compensation for disability up to the time of death. O’Brien seemed at first to respond to treatment and to be recovering from the injury to his hip joint, but at the end of the month he complained he was not making satisfactory recovery. Dr. Henry Raile had charge of the case as physician. From time to time other physicians were called in consultation and to give treatment. Dr. W. N. Pugh was first called into consultation. Massage treatments were given by Mr. Wilson, a masseur. In January, O’Brien complained of pain and aching in the back, and it became apparent he was suffering from some ailment other than the fracture of the acetabular cavity. Dr. J. U. Giesy gave electrotherapy treatments, but, not producing the desired results, were discontinued. Dr. James P. Kerby took X-ray pictures of the spinal column and reported that at some previous time there had been a slight compressed fracture of the seventh dorsal vertebrae. The history of the patient showed that in 1926 he had suffered a fracture of the sixth, seventh, eighth, and tenth ribs on the left side. There was no certainty as to whether the fracture occurred at the time of the injury, September 4, 1934, or at some previous time. The doctor’s opinion was that it was an older fracture than the injury to the hip. All this time the patient was losing strength and weight, and the doctors felt there was some pathology not yet recognized. On March 20, 1935, Dr. Reed Harrow, a specialist in brain and nervous diseases, came into the case. After examination he recommended an exploratory operation on the spine. This operation was performed on May 8th. Dr. Harrow reported :

*268 “It is my opinion that Mr. O’Brien suffered from a sarcoma of the spinal column. Whether the primary lesion is in the spine or elsewhere, I am unable to say.”

He further reported that life expectancy was about a month. The patient’s recovery from the operation was uneventful, but he lived only a few days more than a month thereafter. An autopsy was performed by Dr. L. L. Daines in the presence of Dr. Harrow. A lengthy report of findings was made with pathological diagnosis as follows:

“Endothelioma (Ewing’s tumor) of the bodies of the lumbar vertebra with metastasis of the regional lymph nodes and pleurae of both lungs. Marked edema of the spinal cord with suppuration.”

All written reports of the attending physicians and of the doctors who performed the autopsy were introduced in evidence. Drs. Harrow and Giesy, among those who had treated the patient, were called and examined, as was also Dr. Daines, who performed the autopsy. Drs. O. J. La Barge and Leland R. Cowan, the one a specialist in general tumors and the other in internal medicine, were also called and gave testimony. Neither of these doctors had treated the patient, but gave their evidence based on the testimony and reports introduced. There seemed to be no doubt but that death was caused by the tumor. The inquiry narrowed to the question of whether the tumor found its cause in the accident of September 4, 1934, either arising because of the injury to the hip or the compressed fracture of the seventh dorsal vertebrae, if it were occasioned by the fall, or whether the injury of that date lighted up a pre-existing condition which hastened death.

The evidence, viewed most liberally in favor of plaintiff, would indicate that it was probable that the tumor resulted from the trauma. Had the commission found the fact to be that the trauma caused or lighted up or accelerated the tumor and had made an award of compensation, it is probable that the evidence would have supported such finding. But the commission held otherwise. Can we, on this rec *269 ord, reverse the commission on the theory that the testimony showing probability is so conclusive as to require a finding that the tumor was caused by the accident? In Bingham Mines Co. v. Allsop, 59 Utah 306, 203 P. 644, 645, this court, reviewing a case where the commission had made an award of compensation, discussed the question as to whether an award could properly rest on opinion evidence of probability. The court defined “probability” as follows:

“Appellants insist that ‘a finding under the Workmen’s Compensation Act * * * cannot rest upon mere conjecture, probability, or possibility.’ With the elimination of the word ‘probability’ the quoted statement is unobjectionable and meets with our approval. However, there can be no doubt about the proposition that a finding of the Commission may properly rest upon probabilities. The word ‘probable’ is defined in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, vol. 3, page 2728, as, ‘having the appearance of truth; appearing to be founded in reason.’ Courts have defined ‘probable’ as meaning, ‘Having more evidence for than against’ (3 Words and Phrases, Second Series, p. 1223) and, ‘A probability of the existence of a thing is created when there is more evidence in favor of its existence than against it’ (6 Words and Phrases, First Series, p. 5617).”

Plaintiff argues that the medical experts having testified it was probable the trauma had caused the tumor, the commission was bound to accept that view of the case and find for plaintiff. Some of the medical experts said, in effect, that there was a probability that the tumor resulted from the trauma. Nevertheless, when we review the entire evidence of the physicians we are not able to say that the commission was arbitrary or capricious in refusing to adopt that view of the evidence. The mere statement that the proposition is probable presupposes a conflict in the evidence, since the word probable as above defined means there is “more evidence in favor of its existence than against it.” If there is evidence both in favor of and against a proposition, it is a matter of weighing evidence which is the prerogative of the commission and not of this court. All the evidence available bearing on the subject was before *270 the commission, and it was aided in reaching its result by the opinion evidence of the experts. One reading1 the record is forced to conclude that the probability in favor of the proposition was not strong, but instead it was rather a matter of possibility. No one of the doctors was willing to give a positive opinion that the trauma caused the tumor which brought about the death of the deceased. Isolated statements of some of the experts indicate an opinion of probability. These are quoted in plaintiff’s brief and relied upon by her.

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Bluebook (online)
61 P.2d 418, 90 Utah 266, 1936 Utah LEXIS 18, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/obrien-v-industrial-commission-utah-1936.