HERRMANN, Chief Justice:
In this appeal from the defendant’s conviction for Terroristic Threatening (11
Del.C.
§ 621),
the sole question raised is whether Terroristic Threatening is a lesser-included offense of Attempted Extortion (11
Del.C.
§§ 531 and 846).
I.
The defendant, Ronald J. Bilinski, was indicted for Attempted Extortion. The indictment charged that the defendant attempted to induce employees of the Farmers Bank to deliver $163,000 to him, threatening to bomb the Bank and kill people therein if the money was not delivered.
At the conclusion of the State’s case in a non-jury trial, the Trial Court granted the defendant’s motion for acquittal on the Attempted Extortion charge. The Court found that the defendant believed the Bank had not delivered to him all of the contents of a safe-deposit box which the Bank opened after the defendant failed to make rental payments thereon. Accordingly, the Court held applicable to the charge of Attempted Extortion the affirmative defense of claim of right, as provided by 11
Del.C.
§ 847,
and ruled in favor of the defendant on that charge.
The Court proceeded
sua sponte,
however, on a charge of Terroristic Threatening, holding it to be a lesser-included offense of Attempted Extortion, and found the defendant guilty of that offense.
We affirm.
II.'
The defendant concedes that 11
Del.C.
§ 206(b)
permits prosecution and conviction for an unindicted offense when that offense is included in the offense for which the defendant is charged. The defendant further concedes that § 206(b) defines an included offense as one which is “established by the proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the com
mission of the offense charged.” The defendant contends, however, that there are basic differences in the nature of the offenses of Attempted Extortion and Terror-istic Threatening, i.e., the differing
actus reus
and
mens rea
required to establish the commission of each offense.
A.
The defendant argues that, while the General Assembly has defined Extortion as a crime against property, it has treated Terroristic Threatening as a crime against the person. The gravamen of Extortion, it is argued, is the taking of, or exercise of control over, the property of another. By contrast, the defendant contends, the
actus reus
or physical act that establishes Terror-istic Threatening is the instilling of fear in another by threat. That the
actus rei
proscribed by the Statutes are fatally dissimilar is further supported, he asserts, by the placement of § 846, defining Extortion, in subchapter III of Title 11 entitled “Offenses Involving Property,” while § 621, defining Terroristic Threatening, appears in Sub-chapter II entitled “Offenses Against the Person.” We find these contentions to be entirely untenable.
In Delaware, all crimes are defined by statute. 11
Del.C.
§ 202. Consequently, the defendant’s argument concerning the gravamen or
“actus reus"
of each offense is not germane to the resolution of the issues herein. Moreover, the defendant’s characterization of the offenses is misdirected for several reasons: First, it disregards the clear directive of 1
Del.C.
§ 305
that the structure of the Delaware Code bears no weight in legislative construction. Second, it disregards the plain language of the definitional Statutes which provide that each offense may involve injury to persons and/or property.
See
§§ 621(1) and 846(1), (2),
supra.
Finally, the defendant fails to recognize that even if an examination of the gravamen of the offenses were appropriate, the substance of both is threatening behavior: “The offense [of Extortion] is complete when the threatening statement or communication is made, or is caused to be made with the intent to extort or wrongfully gain money or other property.”
Bove
v.
State,
Del.Supr., 134 A. 630 (1926).
B.
The defendant also contends that the
mens rea
required to establish the commission of each offense is wholly distinct and thus precludes Terroristic Threatening as a lesser-included offense of Attempted Extortion. Extortion, the defendant argues, requires a “conditional” threat, e.g. “Give me the property or I will harm you or your property.” On the other hand, Terror-istic Threatening, he asserts, calls for an “unconditional” threat, i.e., “I will harm you,” an additional fact not required to prove Extortion. It follows, he contends, that Terroristic Threatening cannot constitute a lesser-included offense under § 206(b). We disagree.
Sections 621 and 846 do not qualify the act or mental state required for the commission of each offense as a conditional or unconditional threat. We may not read those requirements into the unambiguous language of the Statutes.
III.
The defendant also contends that because the Extortion Statute (§ 846) requires only “physical injury” as an element, whereas the Terroristic Threatening Statute (§ 621) requires “serious injury” as an element, Terroristic Threatening cannot be “established [as a lesser included offense] by the proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission” of
Extortion. § 206(b)(1). The argument is attractive but does not withstand scrutiny.
To establish the commission of Attempted Extortion, the State must show,
inter alia,
that the defendant took a substantial step toward “instilling” fear in another that he would cause “physical injury to anyone” or “damage to property,” if property other than his own were not delivered to him. §§ 531, 846(1), (2). To establish the commission of Terroristic Threatening, there must be proof of (1) a threat, (2) to commit a crime, (3) likely to result in death or “serious injury” to person or property. § 621(1).
“Physical injury” is defined in our Criminal Code as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” § 222(19). Under § 221(a),
the definition is limited to the meaning given.
“Serious injury” is not defined by the Statute. Consequently, under the Criminal Code’s principles of definition the term “has its commonly accepted meaning, and may be defined as appropriate to fulfill the [general] purposes” of the Code. 11
Del.C.
§ 221(c). Under 11
Del.C.
§ 201(1), a general purpose of the Code is “To proscribe conduct which unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens harm to individual or public interests.”
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HERRMANN, Chief Justice:
In this appeal from the defendant’s conviction for Terroristic Threatening (11
Del.C.
§ 621),
the sole question raised is whether Terroristic Threatening is a lesser-included offense of Attempted Extortion (11
Del.C.
§§ 531 and 846).
I.
The defendant, Ronald J. Bilinski, was indicted for Attempted Extortion. The indictment charged that the defendant attempted to induce employees of the Farmers Bank to deliver $163,000 to him, threatening to bomb the Bank and kill people therein if the money was not delivered.
At the conclusion of the State’s case in a non-jury trial, the Trial Court granted the defendant’s motion for acquittal on the Attempted Extortion charge. The Court found that the defendant believed the Bank had not delivered to him all of the contents of a safe-deposit box which the Bank opened after the defendant failed to make rental payments thereon. Accordingly, the Court held applicable to the charge of Attempted Extortion the affirmative defense of claim of right, as provided by 11
Del.C.
§ 847,
and ruled in favor of the defendant on that charge.
The Court proceeded
sua sponte,
however, on a charge of Terroristic Threatening, holding it to be a lesser-included offense of Attempted Extortion, and found the defendant guilty of that offense.
We affirm.
II.'
The defendant concedes that 11
Del.C.
§ 206(b)
permits prosecution and conviction for an unindicted offense when that offense is included in the offense for which the defendant is charged. The defendant further concedes that § 206(b) defines an included offense as one which is “established by the proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the com
mission of the offense charged.” The defendant contends, however, that there are basic differences in the nature of the offenses of Attempted Extortion and Terror-istic Threatening, i.e., the differing
actus reus
and
mens rea
required to establish the commission of each offense.
A.
The defendant argues that, while the General Assembly has defined Extortion as a crime against property, it has treated Terroristic Threatening as a crime against the person. The gravamen of Extortion, it is argued, is the taking of, or exercise of control over, the property of another. By contrast, the defendant contends, the
actus reus
or physical act that establishes Terror-istic Threatening is the instilling of fear in another by threat. That the
actus rei
proscribed by the Statutes are fatally dissimilar is further supported, he asserts, by the placement of § 846, defining Extortion, in subchapter III of Title 11 entitled “Offenses Involving Property,” while § 621, defining Terroristic Threatening, appears in Sub-chapter II entitled “Offenses Against the Person.” We find these contentions to be entirely untenable.
In Delaware, all crimes are defined by statute. 11
Del.C.
§ 202. Consequently, the defendant’s argument concerning the gravamen or
“actus reus"
of each offense is not germane to the resolution of the issues herein. Moreover, the defendant’s characterization of the offenses is misdirected for several reasons: First, it disregards the clear directive of 1
Del.C.
§ 305
that the structure of the Delaware Code bears no weight in legislative construction. Second, it disregards the plain language of the definitional Statutes which provide that each offense may involve injury to persons and/or property.
See
§§ 621(1) and 846(1), (2),
supra.
Finally, the defendant fails to recognize that even if an examination of the gravamen of the offenses were appropriate, the substance of both is threatening behavior: “The offense [of Extortion] is complete when the threatening statement or communication is made, or is caused to be made with the intent to extort or wrongfully gain money or other property.”
Bove
v.
State,
Del.Supr., 134 A. 630 (1926).
B.
The defendant also contends that the
mens rea
required to establish the commission of each offense is wholly distinct and thus precludes Terroristic Threatening as a lesser-included offense of Attempted Extortion. Extortion, the defendant argues, requires a “conditional” threat, e.g. “Give me the property or I will harm you or your property.” On the other hand, Terror-istic Threatening, he asserts, calls for an “unconditional” threat, i.e., “I will harm you,” an additional fact not required to prove Extortion. It follows, he contends, that Terroristic Threatening cannot constitute a lesser-included offense under § 206(b). We disagree.
Sections 621 and 846 do not qualify the act or mental state required for the commission of each offense as a conditional or unconditional threat. We may not read those requirements into the unambiguous language of the Statutes.
III.
The defendant also contends that because the Extortion Statute (§ 846) requires only “physical injury” as an element, whereas the Terroristic Threatening Statute (§ 621) requires “serious injury” as an element, Terroristic Threatening cannot be “established [as a lesser included offense] by the proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission” of
Extortion. § 206(b)(1). The argument is attractive but does not withstand scrutiny.
To establish the commission of Attempted Extortion, the State must show,
inter alia,
that the defendant took a substantial step toward “instilling” fear in another that he would cause “physical injury to anyone” or “damage to property,” if property other than his own were not delivered to him. §§ 531, 846(1), (2). To establish the commission of Terroristic Threatening, there must be proof of (1) a threat, (2) to commit a crime, (3) likely to result in death or “serious injury” to person or property. § 621(1).
“Physical injury” is defined in our Criminal Code as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” § 222(19). Under § 221(a),
the definition is limited to the meaning given.
“Serious injury” is not defined by the Statute. Consequently, under the Criminal Code’s principles of definition the term “has its commonly accepted meaning, and may be defined as appropriate to fulfill the [general] purposes” of the Code. 11
Del.C.
§ 221(c). Under 11
Del.C.
§ 201(1), a general purpose of the Code is “To proscribe conduct which unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens harm to individual or public interests.”
Viewed in this context and in the light of the Code’s principles of definition, we are of the opinion that “physical injury,” sufficient to “instill” fear, as those terms are used in the Extortion Statute, must be construed to equate the commonly accepted meaning of the term “serious injury,” as that term is used in the Terroristic Threatening Statute.
This conclusion finds support in (1) the above-mentioned general purpose of the Code; (2) the statutory classification of the offenses: Attempted Extortion constitutes a class D felony, Terroristic Threatening a class A misdemeanor; and (3) the Code’s express definition of “serious physical injury” at § 222(20).
If the General Assembly had meant the latter stronger term in the Terroristic Threatening Statute, it could have used it. The defendant may not, in effect, substitute the § 222(20) definition for the undefined term used in § 621.
Under this construction of the statutory terms involved, it follows that, because proof of Terroristic Threatening does not require proof of any facts as to the nature of the injury threatened in addition to those required to establish Attempted Extortion, the former is a lesser-included offense of the latter under § 206(b). We conclude that the Trial Judge proceeded properly on the lesser charge.
IV.
Finally, in the alternative, the defendant contends that his intent was “conditional” because he acted upon a claim-of-right. It follows, he asserts, that the charge of Terroristic Threatening is subject to the affirmative defense of claim-of-right under § 847, as was the charge of Attempted Extortion in the instant case. We disagree.
The claim-of-right defense is limited to Extortion and theft-related crimes.
See
§ 847;
Wright v. State,
Del.Supr., 405 A.2d 685 (1979). Further, under 11
Del.C.
§ 254, “The fact that a defendant’s intention was conditional is immaterial unless the condi
tion negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense.” The harm sought to be prevented by § 846, defining Extortion, is the wrongful acquisition of property by threat. Section 847 thus constitutes a defense to § 846 since a legitimate claim of right negatives the element of wrongful or unlawful acquisition. By contrast, the harm sought to be prevented by § 621, defining Terroristic Threatening, is the threat-induced fear itself. Consequently, the nature of the claim underlying the threatening behavior is immaterial. Our law does not permit the owner of property to terrorize another in order to retrieve his property.
AFFIRMED.
