Home/Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court/Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield

Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield

178 N.E.2d 10, 343 Mass. 223
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedNovember 20, 1961
StatusPublished
Cited by67 cases

This text of 178 N.E.2d 10 (Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 178 N.E.2d 10, 343 Mass. 223 (Mass. 1961).

Opinion

Cutter, J.

These two bills in equity present questions about the validity of the proposed 1961 assessment of property taxes in Springfield. They have been argued together.

The Bettigole ease is brought by individual, fiduciary, and corporate owners of multi-family dwellings, commercial real estate, and other property in Springfield which it is alleged “will be in 1961 and subsequent years . . . deliberately . . . over-valued and over-assessed both in relation to other classes of taxable real estate for which assessed valuations have been established at lower percentages of fair cash value and in relation to the general average or ratio of valuations to fair cash value of taxable real estate in” Springfield. It is alleged that the board of assessors (the board) has for many years established assessed valuations for different classes of real estate in the city at widely differing percentages of the full fair cash value of such real estate and plans to do so for 1961. The bill seeks a declaration as to the “lawfulness under the Constitution *225 and laws of [t]he Commonwealth of the policy and practice” jnst described, and also injunctive relief (a) against continuance of this assessment practice by the assessors, and (b) against action to send out bills for, and to collect, the taxes so assessed. The Attorney General has been notified of the proceeding and afforded an opportunity to be heard.

The second case (the Herchovitz case) is a bill by sixteen taxable inhabitants under G. L. c. 40, § 53, 3 to restrain the raising and collection of money by real estate taxation in the manner alleged now to be intended. The allegations closely resemble those in the Bettigole case. Similar injunctive relief is sought and, in the prayer for general relief, a determination under G. L. c. 231A, § 6, is also requested.

Each case was presented in the Superior Court upon a statement of agreed facts, which (apart from paragraphs relating to the procedural aspects of the particular case) is closely similar to the other. Each case was reported without decision upon the pleadings and the statement of agreed facts. The facts are set out below as they appear in the statements of agreed facts.

By August 1,1961, the board “had determined the sound value [a term used by the board as equivalent to fair cash value] of each parcel of taxable real estate in the [c]ity as of January 1, 1961, and the fair cash value of the personal property owned by each [taxable] person.” The board had also classified all parcels of real estate into six categories, set out below, and a majority 4 had voted on September 8 and 15,1961, “to establish . . . [1961] assessed valuations of all taxable property in the [e]ity by applying the following . . . percentages to the sound value determined *226 by the . . . [board] for the following classes of property,” respectively, viz., (1) single family residences —150% ; (2) two family residences — 60%; (3) three family residences — 65%; (4) four or more family residences — 70%; (5) property of public utilities and commercial and industrial properties — 85%; (6) farms, vacant land, and other real estate — 70%. Personal property subject to local taxation was to be assessed at 85% of the fair cash value thereof previously determined by the board.

“The [b]oard determined assessed valuations for 1960 in substantially the same manner as it intends to use in 1961 and 1962” and the board’s “practice of applying varying percentages of sound or fair cash value of different classes of property in arriving at assessed valuations was deliberate and intentional.” A table (Annex A), made a part of each statement of agreed facts, is reproduced following this page. It shows, for example, that the fair cash (sound) value of 22,005 parcels of single family residence property was $266,285,568 (col. 3), but that these parcels were assessed at an aggregate of $133,142,792 (col. 5) for only 50% (col. 4) of their fair cash (sound) value. The table indicates that, if all taxable property in the city had been assessed at 100% of fair cash value, these 22,005 parcels would have been subjected to aggregate taxes of $11,223,937 (col. 7) at a tax rate of $42.15 per $1,000 of valuation, whereas they were in fact taxed only $8,601,024 (col. 6) under a tax rate of $64.60. The table also shows that 2,521 parcels of public utility, commercial and industrial properties, assessed at 85% of fair cash value (col. 4), were in fact taxed $9,602,217 (col. 6), whereas, if all taxable property in the city had been assessed at 100% of fair cash value, the aggregate tax on these 2,521 parcels would have been only $7,370,792 (col. 7). This is the most striking comparison revealed by Annex A, and (although this is not done in the statements of agreed facts) its effect can be shown in tabular form (by a simple mathematical calculation from Annex A) as follows:—

*227

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Bluebook (online)
178 N.E.2d 10, 343 Mass. 223, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bettigole-v-assessors-of-springfield-mass-1961.