Bozenhard v. Town of Shrewsbury

18 Mass. L. Rptr. 141
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedAugust 13, 2004
DocketNo. 991539
StatusPublished

This text of 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 141 (Bozenhard v. Town of Shrewsbury) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bozenhard v. Town of Shrewsbury, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 141 (Mass. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

Agnes, A.J.

1.Introduction

This action is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs, Cushing and Gladys Bozenhard (“the Bozenhards”), appealed a decision by the Shrewsbury Board of Sewer Commissioners (“the Board”). The Board denied the Bozenhards’ request for an abatement of a betterment assessment in connection with a sewer line constructed along a portion of their land. The total assessment against the plaintiffs’ real estate is $8,003.80. The plaintiffs seek an abatement of $5,000. The Bozenhards appealed the Board’s assessment because 25,000 square feet of the 40,019 assessed is covered by an electric utility easement. The Bozenhards have filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds the assessment 1) is disproportionate; 2) is substantially in excess of the benefits conferred; 3) is irrevocably devoted to a use which renders it incapable of receiving a benefit of the sewer; 4) is incapable of receiving the intended benefit because it cannot be drained into the sewer; and 5) is unreasonable and unjust. The Board has filed a cross motion for summary judgment on grounds that that 1) the method employed by the Board known as the “uniform rate,” conformed to G.L.c. 83, §14 and §15 and is authorized by G.L.c. 83 and c. 502 of the Acts of 1954;3 2) the assessment is not disproportionate; 3) the plaintiffs have received a full benefit from the assessment; 5) the plaintiffs’ land benefited from the assessment; and 6) the plaintiffs’ properiy can be physically drained into the sewer as the statute means and intends. For the reasons stated below the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is allowed.

2.Factual Background

The Bozenhards own a parcel of land with frontage on Main Street in Shrewsbury, Massachusetts. In September 1997, the Board ordered the construction of a common sewer along a portion of Main Street, Shrewsbury. Pursuant to G.L.c. 80, §§14 and 15, the Board ordered a betterment assessment to be made upon each lot of land with frontage on Main Street running along the new sewer line. The method used to determine the area subject to the betterment assessment consisted of the multiplication of the frontage of each parcel — in this case 400.19 feet — by a fixed depth of 100 feet, resulting in a total square footage of 40,019 feet. A uniform tax of $.20 per square foot was assessed on the total square footage.

The Bozenhards object to the betterment assessment on the grounds that 25,000 square feet of their total assessment is occupied by an electric utility easement that should be exempt from the betterment assessment. They filed an appeal with the Board requesting the assessment be abated by the amount of frontage occupied by the easement. The Board denied the request and the Bozenhards have filed an appeal in the Superior Court pursuant to G.L.c. 80, §7.

3.Standard of Review

Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion for summary judgment should be granted when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Parties generally move for summary judgment after completing discovery. The moving party must demonstrate that the parties do not dispute any material facts. If any material facts are disputed the motion must be denied. Factual disputes can not be resolved at the summary judgment stage, but must be reserved for trial.

Assuming there are no material facts in dispute, the court may grant a motion for summaiy judgment if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial it must either: (i) submit affirmative evidence negating an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim; or (ii) demonstrate that the non-moving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish its claim. Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 711 (1991). The moving party may support its motion with pleadings, deposition transcripts, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and affidavits. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An adverse party may not defeat a motion for summary judgment by resting merely on the allegations and denials of its pleadings but must set forth specific facts with affidavits, deposition testimony, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

[142]*1424.All Rational Presumptions Are Made in Favor of the Validity of Every Legislative Act

Injudicial review of legislative acts, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that, “(a]ll rational presumptions are made in favor of the validity of every act of the legislative department of government, and the court will not refuse to enforce it unless its conflict with the Constitution is established beyond reasonable doubt.” Perkins v. Westwood, 226 Mass. 268, 271 (1917). “It is only when a legislative finding cannot be supported upon any rational basis of fact that can be reasonably conceived to sustain it that a court is empowered to strike down the enactment.” Slome v. Chief of Police of Fitchburg, 304 Mass. 187, 189 (1939). A person challenging the constitutionality of a statute thus has an “onerous burden of proof’ to establish its invalidity. Commonwealth v. Henry’s Drywell Co., 366 Mass. 539, 541 (1974). Moreover, it is the duty of the court to construe statutes so as to avoid constitutional difficulties when reasonable principles of statutory construction permit. School Committee of Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Ass’n, 385 Mass. 78, 79 (1982).

5.Proportionality of the Assessment

The Massachusetts Constitution empowers the legislature “to impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and persons resident, and estates lying, within the said commonwealth.” Mass.Const.Pt. 2, c. 1, § 1, Art. 4. The Bozenhards argue that the utility easement prevents them from using a portion of their land for any purpose which may involve a sewer connection and therefore an assessment of their entire parcel is unconstitutional as applied to them because it has the effect of assigning to them a disproportionate share of the costs of the sewer. However, the Bozenhards’ argument does not accurately reflect the rule on proportionality. A property or real estate tax is proportional in a strict mathematical sense, only when it bears the same ratio to the whole sum raised by taxation as the taxpayer’s taxable estate bears to the whole taxable estate of the Commonwealth. Keniston v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 380 Mass. 888, 895 (1980), quoting Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 613, 621 (1915). However, the court has recognized that “practically it is impossible to secure exact equality or proportion in the imposition of taxes.” Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 231 (1961), quoting Cheshire v. County Comm’rs of Berkshire, 118 Mass. 386 (1875). See also Keniston, 380 Mass, at 896, quoting County of Essex v. Newburyport, 254 Mass. 232 (1926) (“No tax system has been devised whereby a perfect equalization of its burdens” can be accomplished). In calculating the Bozenhards’ assessment, the Board used the formula authorized by statute.

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Bluebook (online)
18 Mass. L. Rptr. 141, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bozenhard-v-town-of-shrewsbury-masssuperct-2004.