Berman v. Freedom Financial Network, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedSeptember 1, 2020
Docket4:18-cv-01060
StatusUnknown

This text of Berman v. Freedom Financial Network, LLC (Berman v. Freedom Financial Network, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Berman v. Freedom Financial Network, LLC, (N.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 DANIEL BERMAN, CASE NO. 18-cv-01060-YGR

11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 12 vs. Re: Dkt. No. 224 13 FREEDOM FINANCIAL NETWORK, LLC, ET AL., 14 Defendants. 15 In this action, plaintiffs Daniel Berman, Stephanie Hernandez, and Erica Russell on behalf 16 of himself and a putative class, allege violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 17 (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. section 227 et seq. by means of autodialed text messages and prerecorded 18 voice calls as part of a telemarketing campaign by Lead Science, LLC (also known as “Drips”) 19 and Fluent, Inc. (“Fluent”) promoting the services of Freedom Financial Network, LLC and 20 Freedom Debt Relief, LLC (collectively “Freedom”). Fluent obtained leads for the text message 21 campaign via its consumer-facing websites which offer users the possibility of rewards, discounts, 22 product samples or entry into sweepstakes, which collect the users’ data for use in Fluent’s clients’ 23 marketing campaigns. The instant motion seeks to compel arbitration of the claims asserted by 24 plaintiffs Stephanie Hernandez and Erica Russell. (Dkt. No. 224.) 25 Having carefully considered the papers submitted, the admissible evidence, and the 26 pleadings in this action, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the motion to 27 compel arbitration. 1 The Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) requires a district court to stay judicial 2 proceedings and compel arbitration of claims covered by a written and enforceable arbitration 3 agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 3. A party may bring a motion in the district court to compel arbitration. 4 9 U.S.C. § 4. The FAA reflects “both a ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration’ and the 5 ‘fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.’” AT&T Mobility LLC v. 6 Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011); Mortensen v. Bresnan Commuc’ns, LLC, 722 F.3d 1151, 7 1157 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The [FAA] . . . has been interpreted to embody “‘a liberal federal policy 8 favoring arbitration.’”). The FAA broadly provides that an arbitration clause in a contract 9 involving a commercial transaction “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. 10 Once a court is satisfied the parties agreed to arbitrate, it must promptly compel arbitration. 9 11 U.S.C. § 4. 12 In ruling on the motion, the Court’s role is typically limited to determining whether: (i) 13 an agreement exists between the parties to arbitrate; (ii) the claims at issue fall within the scope 14 of the agreement; and (iii) the agreement is valid and enforceable. Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier 15 Diabetic Servs., Inc., 363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004). The party seeking to compel 16 arbitration bears the burden to establish these conditions. “[I]f there is a genuine dispute of 17 material fact as to any of these queries, a [d]istrict [c]ourt should apply a ‘standard similar to the 18 summary judgment standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.’” Ackerberg v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 898 F. 19 Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Concat LP v. Unilever, PLC, 350 F.Supp.2d 20 796, 804 (N.D. Cal. 2004)); see also Starke v. SquareTrade, Inc., No. 17-2474-CV, 2019 WL 21 149628, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 10, 2019) (same). “If the parties contest the existence of an 22 arbitration agreement, the presumption in favor of arbitrability does not apply.” Goldman, 23 Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2014). 24 The Ninth Circuit in Nguyen described contracts formed through internet websites as 25 generally taking on one of two forms: (1) “browsewrap” agreements whereby the website’s 26 terms and conditions of use are provided via a hyperlink at the bottom of a webpage and assent 27 to the terms is assumed by continued use of the website; and (2) “clickwrap” agreements in 1 button or box to indicate they agree before proceeding. Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 2 F.3d 1171, 1175–77 (9th Cir. 2014). 3 Often websites present some hybrid of the two, such as putting a link to the terms of the 4 agreement on the page, sometimes near a button the user must click to continue. For instance, in 5 Nguyen the “Terms of Use” hyperlink was near the buttons a user would need to click to complete 6 an online purchase. Id. at 1177. In considering the conspicuousness of the notice there, the Court 7 noted details of the layout of the website in question:

8  “the ‘Terms of Use’ link appears either directly below the relevant button a user must click on to proceed in the checkout process or just a few inches 9 away”  “the content of the webpage is compact enough that a user can view the link 10 without scrolling. . . [or] is close enough to the ‘Proceed with Checkout’ button that a user would have to bring the link within his field of vision in 11 order to complete his order;” and  “checkout screens here contained “Terms of Use” hyperlinks in underlined, 12 color-contrasting text.” 13 Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 2014). Despite these elements 14 supporting conspicuousness, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless held that the website was insufficient 15 to bind the consumer because it contained no admonition to “review terms” or otherwise prompt 16 the user to take affirmative action to demonstrate assent to the terms at issue, including the 17 arbitration clause. Id. at 1178-79 (“where a website makes its terms of use available via a 18 conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website but otherwise provides no notice to users nor 19 prompts them to take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the 20 hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on—without more—is insufficient to give rise to 21 constructive notice.”) Id.; see also Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (7th 22 Cir. 2016) (courts enforce contracts accepted by an electronic “click” on a website only if “the 23 layout and language of the site give the user reasonable notice that a click will manifest assent to 24 an agreement.”); Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2018) (affirming 25 denial of motion to compel arbitration where “[e]ven though the hyperlink did possess some of the 26 characteristics that make a term conspicuous, the presence of other terms on the same screen with 27 a similar or larger size, typeface, and with more noticeable attributes diminished the hyperlink's 1 capability to grab the user's attention.”)1 2 In essence, “the onus [is] on website owners to put users on notice of the terms to which 3 they wish to bind consumers.” Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1178–79.

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747 F.3d 733 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Kevin Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc.
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Bluebook (online)
Berman v. Freedom Financial Network, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/berman-v-freedom-financial-network-llc-cand-2020.