[333]*333Kelleher, J.
This is an appeal from a Superior Court [334]*334judgment vacating an arbitration award which had been granted under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the Warwick Teachers Union Local 915, AFT, AFL-CIO (Union) and the Warwick School Committee (School Committee).
The Union is the exclusive bargaining agent of all the teachers employed by the School Committee. Each year, as a result of negotiations between the Union and the School Committee a collective bargaining agreement is created which governs the conduct of the parties and those whom they represent for the coming year. The controversy in this case concerns, in part, the provisions of the contract which was in force from February 1, 1972 to January 31, 1973.
On June 22, 1972, the School Committee posted a notice of a vacancy for the position of Business Department Head at Warwick Veterans Memorial High School. The vacancy was a “promotional position” within the terms of the contract, and the notice was posted in compliance with its terms. Four teachers applied for the position, including plaintiff and one of the named defendants, Arthur B. Matteson. The candidates were interviewed, and their credentials reviewed by a committee of school administrators composed of the Assistant Superintendent for Secondary Education, the Principal of Veterans Memorial High School, and the Assistant Superintendent for Personnel. This committee unanimously recommended the appointment of Belanger to the vacant position. Its recommendation was in turn reviewed by the supérintendent, who concurred in its decision. Finally, the matter was put before the School Committee who voted to appoint Belanger to the post.
Upon learning that he had been unsuccessful in his bid for the promotion, Matteson met with Mr. Venditto, the Assistant Superintendent in Charge of Personnel to dis[335]*335cuss his dissatisfaction. This was his right under art. V, sec. 4(d) of the agreement. He did not obtain satisfaction from this discussion, and thereafter wrote to his union representative and requested the Union to invoke on his behalf the grievance procedures provided in the collective bargaining agreement. The core of Matteson’s grievance rested with his belief that the School Committee had violated the agreement by appointing Belanger. Article V, sec. 4(b) provides that, “ [candidates shall be recommended on the basis of qualifications for the position. Where qualifications are considered equal, seniority in the Warwick School System shall prevail.” It is undisputed that Matteson has more seniority than Belanger. Throughout this controversy, Matteson and the Union have insisted that since Matteson was at least as equally qualified for the position as Belanger, the appointment should have been given to the senior person.
The School Committee appointed Belanger on August 1, 1972. On August 7, 1972, the Union filed a written notice of Matteson’s grievance with the Assistant Superintendent in Charge of Personnel. The Assistant Superintendent met with Matteson and a union representative in early September. On October 11, 1972, he sent Matte-son a letter notifying him that his decision was to retain Belanger in the post of department head. The Union followed the grievance procedures set forth in the agreement. It first placed Matteson’s cause before the Superintendent and then went before the School Committee. Matteson, having had no success at the administrative level, requested the Union to take his complaint to arbitration. The Union met in executive committee and voted to initiate the arbitration.
A hearing was held on April 6, 1973 before three arbitrators, one selected by the School Committee, one by the Union, and the third chosen jointly by both sides from [336]*336lists prepared by the American Arbitration Association.
The issue submitted to the arbitrators by both' 'sides was: “Has the Committee violated Article V, Section 4 (b) of the collective bargaining agreement by not appointing Mr. Arthur Matteson as Business Department Head at Veterans Memorial High School? If so, what shall the remedy be?”
The arbitration hearing lasted from 10 a.m. to approximately 6:30 p.m. A number of witnesses were presented by the Union and the School Committee. Both Belanger and Matteson testified as to their qualifications. All witnesses were subject to cross-examination. Briefs in support of the respective positions were submitted -and on August 16, 1973 the arbitrators rendered a decision. They ruled that Matteson was entitled to the appointment as head of the Business Department.
After a full year on the job, Belanger found himself deprived of his promotion and back in the classroom. He wrote to his principal and the Union and requested that a grievance be filed on his behalf as he wished to challenge this demotion.
The Union president responded that, although the Union would be happy to file a grievance for him' alleging that the School Committee had not adequately represented or protected his interest in his former position as department head, it would not ask for his reinstatement' in that position because: “We [the Union] cannot, at this time, however, ask for a remedy which in effect would reverse a decision which was a result of a grievance filed by the Union. This would be illogical and inconsistent with our role as bargaining agent and our obligation under the contract. We have, after all, agreed to make binding arbitration the final step in our grievance procedure.”
Thereafter, Belanger instituted this litigation in the Superior Court. He named as defendants Matteson, the [337]*337Union, the arbitrators, and the School Committee and asked the court to overturn the arbitrators’ decision and reinstate him. His suit was based on 2 grounds: (1) that the arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction, and (2) that the Union breached its duty to fairly represent his interests when it decided to pursue Matteson’s grievance.
The trial justice found that there existed a duty of fair representation which the Union had breached, and that the award was in excess of the arbitrators’ power and thus void. He vacated the award, and reinstated Belanger. Matteson and the Union appealed. We will first consider the duty of fair representation facet of this appeal and then go on to discuss the finding that, the arbitrators had exceeded their power by usurping duties and responsibilities which the Legislature has committed to the school committees of the various municipalities and nobody else.
The question of the duty owed by a union to its members is one of first impression in this court. It has, however, been extensively litigated in other jurisdictions, most notably in the federal courts, in cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §151 et seq. (1973), the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.'C.A. §141 et seq. (1973), and the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §151 et seq. (1972).
The first of what has become a long line of cases was Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U. S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944). There, the Court held that the Railway Labor Act, in providing that an organization chosen by the majority of employees would be the exclusive representative of all the employees within its class, mandated a concomitant duty “to act for and not against those whom it represents,” and “to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts * * *.” Id. at 202, 203, 65 S.Ct. at 232, 89 L.Ed. at 183. This duty has also been found in unions [338]*338governed by the NLRB. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330, 337, 73 S.Ct. 681, 686, 97 L.Ed. 1048, 1057 (1953). By taking away the right of individual employees to further their interests individually or to organize into numerous small units to deal with their employer, Congress has given a union power and control over the working lives of each of its members. A corollary of such power is the duty to act for the benefit of its members.
Our Legislature has created a structure of labor regulations which parallels in many significant respects the federal scheme. Our focus here is G. L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §28-9.3-1 et seq. entitled Arbitration of School Teacher Disputes. Section 28-9.3-1 declares it to be the public policy of this state to grant public school teachers the right to organize, to be represented, and to bargain on a collective basis with school committees relevant to “hours, salary, working conditions and other terms of professional employment.” Section 28-9.3-3 mandates that the school committee recognize the labor organization chosen by the teachers to be their “sole and exclusive” bargaining agent. Thus, a labor organization representing teachers of this state has the same broad authority in the negotiation, administration, and enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement as does a union regulated by federal law. We find ourselves in agreement with the persuasive logic of the Steele opinion and its progeny, and, therefore hereby recognize, as implicit in our Act, a statutory duty on the part of an exclusive bargaining agent to fairly and adequately represent the interests of all of those for whom it negotiates and contracts, not only those who are members, but all those who are part of the bargaining unit.1
[339]*339The union and its bargaining unit are necessarily composed of many individuals with diverse views and ofttimes conflicting employment demands. The whole purpose behind the creation of the union is, however, to present a solid, unified front to the employer. “In unity there is strength,” went the old organizing slogan, and it was the truth. In dealing with the employer, the union gains its negotiating power from the fact that it speaks with one voice for all the employees.
That we find a duty on the part of the union does not, however, solve the controversy before us. We must define the parameters of the duty, and then apply it to the facts as found by the Superior Court.
We believe at the start that we must recognize that “[a] wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents * * *.” Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, supra at 338, 73 S.Ct. at 686, 97 L.Ed. at 1058. Recognizing that the interests of employees are often conflicting, the Court found that the union did not breach its duty to its members by bargaining for a seniority provision in the contract which favored some employees, but caused the layoff of others because of their newly lowered position on the seniority lists.
The union must be an advocate for its membership and where its members disagree, the union should not be forced into a neutral position by a court-enforced obligation not to take a stand. In Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. [340]*340335, 84 S.Ct. 363, 11 L.Ed.2d 370 (1964), a multi-employer union found' itself representing the employees of two trucking companies who were merging their businesses. The employees from the dissolved outfit had an interest in retaining their seniority within the absorbing company. That company’s employees obviously did not favor such a happening. The contract signed by both employers and the union was ambiguous. The contract question was put before a joint labor-management committee. The union took the side of the absorbed employees, some of the other employees were “bumped” and they sued their union and their employer. The Court, expanding upon the Huffman holding, said:
“Just as a union must be free to sift out wholly frivolous grievances which would only clog the grievance process, so it must be free to take a position on the not so frivolous disputes. Nor should it be neutralized when the issue is chiefly between two sets of employees. Conflict between employees represented by the same union is a recurring fact. .To remove or gag the union in these cases would surely weaken the collective bargaining and grievance processes.” Id. at 349-50, 84 S.Ct. at 372, 11 L.Ed.2d at 382.
Given these facts' of life in the labor-management world, the duty of fair representation which is imposed on the union must not be such as to squelch union advocacy of position, nor must it weaken the union’s ability to act when it does for all its members, even those whose interests may not be served but who are nonetheless bound by the majority vote. The entire scheme of federal and state labor regulations would be pointless if the minority in a union were not bound by the majority will. For example, what would be the efficacy of statutes requiring an employer to bargain exclusively with the duly elected union if the minority of employees who voted against ratification of a collective bargaining contract could then. [341]*341turn around and require the employer to contract with them. individually.
Whether or not the minority should be bound by the majority in the control of the conditions of their employment is not a matter for us to decide. The Legislature has unequivocally declared that to be the policy and we cannot say otherwise. However, concurrent with the union’s power to bind the minority flows the duty which we define today.
In the negotiation process, we hold that a union must make an honest effort to serve the interest of all of its members, without hostility to any, and its power must be exercised in complete good faith and with honesty of purpose. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, supra.
Where the union and the employer have provided by contract for the internal settlement of disputes by means of grievance and arbitration procedures, and where these settlement procedures can be initiated and continued solely by the union, the union is likewise subject to a duty of fair representation in its handling of employee grievances. As in contract negotiations, the union as it deals with grievances must often take a position which is detrimental to some employees as it is helpful to others. The duty upon the Union here is to “* * * in good faith and in a nonarbitrary manner, make decisions as to the merits of particular grievances,” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 194, 87 S.Ct. 903, 919, 17 L.Ed.2d 842, 860 (1967), and, if it decides to pursue a grievance, it must not do so in a perfunctory manner.
Applying these standards of conduct to the facts of this case, we are faced with a clear breach by the Union of the duty it owed to Belanger. The testimony was undisputed, and the trial justice found that throughout the grievance procedure, the Union and its representatives acted without ever contacting Belanger or considering his qualifica[342]*342tions for the position; the Union aligned itself with Matteson in seeking Belanger’s removal; and at the arbitration hearing the union representatives attempted to demonstrate that Matteson, rather than Belanger, was entitled to the position.
The Union admitted at trial that it had no knowledge of Belanger’s qualifications for the contested position until he testified at the arbitration hearing, and that it never contacted Belanger to discuss the impending challenge.
We have said a union may, and often must, take sides. But we wish to make it clear that it must act, when it does, in a nonarbitrary, nonperfunctory manner. Here the Union chose sides totally on the fortuitous circumstances of who the School Committee did not hire. It is true, in a very simplistic sense, that Matteson, being the only member of the bargaining unit with “a grievance,” is therefore the only individual in need of Union support. But one would require blinders to accept this view. It should have been apparent to the Union that Matteson’s grievance, although theoretically against the School Committee, was in reality against Belanger. Any action the Union took on Matteson’s behalf threatened Belanger’s job.
The Union had as much of an obligation to support Belanger as it had to support Matteson until such time as it had examined the qualifications of both candidates, and it believed that the seniority clause would control the selection process.
This was clearly a situation that was akin to the situations found in Humphrey, Huffman, and Vaca where a union faced with conflicting loyalties must make a choice as to which member it will support. To enforce a requirement of neutrality on the union in cases such as this would not, in our opinion, further the purposes of the statute which was designed to strengthen the power of [343]*343teachers in controlling their employment situation by allowing them all to speak through a single, but strong voice. Neutrality could only weaken the power of employees to deal with their employer. Even if in any particular grievance procedure neutrality would not be harmful,2 the cumulative effect of such a stance taken over a period of time would undermine the position of the union as employee advocate in its dealings with the employer.
Also, by remaining neutral, the union would lose the ability to control the scope and focus of the arguments made on behalf of the employees. Professor Cox has argued that the settlement of an individual employee grievance involves more than the individual because precedent is established which will control the course of future employer-employee relations.3 This distinguished educator also points out that any time the parties do battle over their contract, they are also engaging in a process of negotiation over its terms.
The Union must choose its side in a nonarbitrary manner, based on its good-faith judgment as to the merits of the conflicting claims. In the present case the Union never offered Belanger an opportunity to present his case to them. It never recognized its duty to independently determine whether Matteson or Belanger was entitled to the job. It seems to us that the only fair procedure in this type of a conflict is for the Union, at the earliest stages [344]*344of the grievance procedure, to investigate the case for both sides, to give both contestants an opportunity to be heard, and to submit their qualifications to the Union. We are not mandating a full-blown hearing, replete with strict rules of procedure and adversary proceedings. If the Union investigates in an informal manner, this would be sufficient so long as its procedure affords the two employees the ability to place all the relevant information before the Union. See Bures v. Houston Symphony Soc’y, 503 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1974); Waiters Union, Local 781 v. Hotel Ass’n, 498 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
For a union to make a decision affecting its members without investigating the underlying factual situaton is a clear breach of the duty of fair representation. De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970). In an examination of the union’s conduct in its discharge of its duty to the members of the bargaining unit, there are three possible foci for our analysis; the union’s motives, its decision-making procedures, and the reasons for its acting as it did. A court’s investigation into the first two questions is proper and necessary. We will, however, be more careful in any review of the merits of the Union’s decision. An inquiry into the merits would open the way for our substituting our judgment for that of the Union, and that is not our role. It will be enough protection for an employee represented by a union if we inquire into motives and ensure that the union has fairly considered both sides before taking a stand.
In examining the record presented to us, we find no evidence of bad faith4 by the Union. However, the Union’s [345]*345decision to press on with Matteson’s grievance without making any effort to assess the relative qualifications of the respective candidates was patently defective. Thus, the Union breached its duty to represent fairly the interests of one of its members — Belanger.
Although we reach this conclusion in agreement with the trial justice, we cannot agree with the remedy he fashioned — the overturning of the arbitrators’ award. Where the parties to a collective bargaining agreement agree to submit disputes as to the enforcement and effect of their, contract to private grievance procedures, culminating in final and binding arbitration, such arbitrators’. decisions are, except for a few very limited situations, unreviewable by the courts. See United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). The Legislature has mandated arbitration in conflicts arising in the negotiation process, this arbitration is declared by statute to be final and not appealable unless procured by fraud or in violation of the law. Section 28-9.3-12. The arbitration contemplated by this statute relates to the resolving of the substantive .terms that will be part of a new contract. It does not embrace the settling of controversies which relate to the terms of an executed contractThis distinction between precontract and postcontract arbitration was pointed out in Providence Teachers Union, [346]*346Local 958 v. School Committee, 108 R. I. 444, 448, 276 A.2d 762, 765 (1971).
We are dealing here with a situation which arises in the postcontract phase of arbitration.
The trial justice in vacating the award because of the fair representation breach placed great emphasis on the case of Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., International Ass’n of Machinists, Local 1377, 8 Wis.2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), where the court promulgated the proposition that “[ejmployees not fairly represented by the union should never be put in the position of having to solely depend upon the employer championing their rights under the collective-bargaining contract.” Id. at 275, 99 N.W.2d at 138. If the court intended this pronouncement as an absolute, categorical inflexible rule, we cannot subscribe to its principle. There are exceptions to most, if not all, rules and, as will be seen, a union’s failure in the area of fair representation does not automatically nullify an arbitration award.
Although owing no fiduciary duty to Belanger, the School Committee nonetheless forcefully argued his position because his and its position were coextensive. We do not have a situation like Bieski v. Eastern Automobile Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1968), where the employees challenging the award did not have their position effectively represented. Here the employer and Belanger adopted the same stance before the arbitrators.
The employer has not caused Belanger any harm. The only wrong to Belanger was caused by his Union’s breach of its obligation to him. He has a right to use the judicial process to remedy that wrong, but the remedy must be coextensive with the damage occasioned by the breach. And that damage does not necessarily encompass the loss of his job. The Union • could have, consistent with its duty, still found Matteson to be the proper choice for [347]*347Business Department Head at Warwick Veterans High School. If it had reached such a decision by fair and proper means, the arbitration hearing would still have been conducted, and the award against Belanger would still have been granted. Thus, the Union’s wrong here was not the direct cause of the adverse arbitration decision. This is not a situation where the Union’s action was the “but-for” cause of Belanger’s predicament. We do not now have to resolve the proper remedy for a situation where a union, purporting to represent one of its members in a dispute with an employer, so ineffectively represents the member before an arbitration panel in a case where the employer’s position is contrary to the member’s and consequently adversely affects him.
Where there has been a fair hearing before duly appointed arbitrators who have by whatever means heard both sides of the controversy and have before them all the relevant information upon which to base a decision, we will not overturn the award.5
In Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 84 S.Ct. 363, 11 L.Ed.2d 370 (1964), the Court refused to overturn the decision of a joint committee whose decision, according to the contract, was to be final and binding, and in doing so, the Court rejected the employees’ contention that even if the union had acted in good faith and was entitled to take the position it had, the employees were deprived of a fair hearing due to inadequate representation of their position. The Court noted that the employees had notice of the hearing, that they never requested a continuance, and that there was no evidence that they could have added anything to the hearing by [348]*348way of facts or theory.6 Id. at 350-51, 84 S.Ct. 372; 11 L.Ed.2d 382. It was therefore, “ 'idle speculation to assume that the result would have 'been different had the matter been differently presented.’ ” Id.
The facts in this case mandate a similar conclusion. Belanger was thoroughly conversant with the grievance procedures. Sometime prior to his confrontation with Matteson, he had filed a grievance with the Union against an appointment to the position of Head of the Business Department at another Warwick high school. Belanger subsequently withdrew the grievance. Furthermore, Belanger had been notified of the hearing on Matteson’s grievance 10 days before it occurred. The School Committee’s representative at the hearing before the arbitrators was Mr. Venditto, the Assistant Superintendent in Charge of Personnel, a gentleman who is no neophyte when it comes to this type of proceeding. It is uncontradicted that prior to the hearing he had summoned Belanger to his office where he and Belanger reviewed the testimony that Belanger would present to show his entitlement to fill the vacancy. At the hearing, Belanger and three other witnesses testified as to his qualifications for the position. He was present during the entire presentation of evidence and in the Superior Court he conceded that there was nothing- further which he sought to offer at the hearing which was relevant to his qualifications. Belanger also agreed that at no time did he ever ask that the hearing be postponed or continued so that he could avail himself of the services of an attorney. Matteson appeared and testified at the hearing. Two other witnesses appeared on his behalf. The Union’s executive secretary presented Matteson’s grievance. The secretary is not an attorney. It is obvious from the record before- us .that [349]*349the arbitrators had been presented a thorough and detailed listing of the qualifications and background of each candidate. We perceive no impropriety in the hearing conducted by the arbitrators which would justify the vacating of their award on the basis of the fair representation doctrine.
We would also emphasize that the manner in which this litigation arose differs markedly from that in Vaca v. Sipes, supra, and the majority of cases which have found a breach of the duty of fair representation. See, e.g., Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1974); Steinman v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., Local 449, 441 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1971). In all of these cases the litigation was essentially an employee’s suit against the employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. The threshold question to be resolved in each of those cases was whether the employee had exhausted his remedies under the contract to permit him to sue in court. The employee, if he hadn’t exhausted his contract remedies, or, in so doing had obtained a final, binding decision, had to overcome this impediment to his private suit. Vaca recognized that where the contract remedies are controlled by the union and not the employee, it would be unfair to deprive the employee of a remedy against a wrongful employer where his union had failed to properly and adequately make use of the contract procedures. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 185, 87 S.Ct. 903, 914, 17 L.Ed.2d 842, 855 (1967). To allow a union’s intentional or arbitrary failure to defend the employee’s rights to bar his one chance to pursue them on his own was termed by the Court “patently unfair.” The underlying wrongful conduct by the employer should not be immune from correction due to the wrongful conduct of the union.
But those situations are markedly different from the present one. Here we can conceive of no action which [350]*350Belanger might maintain against his employer. Indeed, initially, Belanger had attempted to have the School Committee enter this litigation on his side as a joint plaintiff. The only breach was by the Union; the arbitrators had Belanger’s position aggressively argued and thus, unlike a Vaca situation, the Union breach did not foreclose a fair utilization of the contractual remedy; and the employer, who had done no wrong, should not be subjected to a relitigation of the question of who should be the head of the Business Department at Warwick Veterans High School. In Vaca, the Court expressly relied on an underlying employer breach to justify its forcing the employer to defend its actions beyond the contractually agreed forums. Id. at 196, 87 S.Ct. at 920, 17 L.Ed.2d at 861. In Humphrey, the Court also felt constrained to suggest that if the employer knew of the alleged union breach, and there was in fact a breach, it might overturn the arbitrators’ decision.
Here, it would be unfair to subject the School Committee to a relitigation of the promotional dispute. If we were to hold otherwise, no employer would be safe in expending time and money in arbitration unless it first assured itself that the Union had not defaulted in its obligation to the employees it represented. This independent investigation into internal union procedures and decision making would be an affront to the union, and a burden on the employer.
It follows from what we have said that the trial justice erred when he vacated the arbitrators’ award because of the Union’s breach of its duty to represent fairly the interests of all its membership including that of Belanger.
We come now to the trial justice’s vacating the arbitrators’ award on the ground that they had exceeded their powers.
Within recent years we observed that the General As[351]*351sembly, when it authorized the teachers to organize and bargain collectively with the respective committees, intended to confer on the teachers many of the well-recognized rights enjoyed by those who work in the private sectors of the economy including the right to have binding arbitration of grievances. Providence Teachers Union, Local 958 v. School Committee, 108 R. I. 444, 448, 276 A.2d 762, 765 (1971). In taking this position, we ruled that the provisions of the School Teachers’ Arbitration Act should be considered in conjunction with other relevant labor legislation, to wit, G. L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) ch. 9 of tit. 28, which sets up a legislative framework for the arbitration of labor controversies, and consequently we recognized the validity of a clause calling for binding arbitration of grievances. The particular grievance in the Providence Teachers Union case related to a provision calling for the payment of severance pay to those teachers who retired during the contract period. What was said about severance pay can certainly be said about grievances concerning promotions.
Section 28-9-18 limits the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to vacate an award on proof of any one of these three specific grounds: (1) “fraud” in the procuring of the award, (2) the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or have so imperfectly executed them that no “mutual, final and definite award” was made, or (3) no valid submission or contract to arbitrate. The trial justice in ruling that the arbitrators had exceeded their powers relied first on G. L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §16-2-18 which states that the “selection of teachers” as well as the “entire care, control, and management of all the public school interests * * * shall be vested in the school committee” and secondly on his finding that the arbitrators had gone beyond the powers because of a purported shifting of the burden of proof by the board at the hearing.
[352]*352Belanger cites §16-2-18 and then states that the court in Dawson v. Clark, 93 R. I. 457, 176 A.2d 732 (1962), observed that a school committee could not delegate the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Legislature. He also consistently refers to the filling of the business department vacancy as a “hiring.”. We acknowledge the presence of the statute and the holding in Dawson, but Belanger fails to give its entire holding.
To be precise, the Dawson case states that the committee’s jurisdiction could not be delegated in absence of legislative authority to do so. Id. at 461, 176 A.2d at 735. However, assuming the absence of such authority, whoever succeeded to the post of department head is not being hired, he is being promoted. We think it elemental that the promotional provisions in the collective bargaining agreement envision the advancement of one who has already been hired and a member of the Warwick school system before the vacancy occurred. In such circumstances, you must have a hiring before you have a promotion. While we disagree with most of Belanger’s contentions, we agree with his position that the selection process alluded to in §16-2-18 refers to an original hiring. The statutory grant relating to teacher selection does not, in our opinion, encompass within its language, the promotion of one whose performance warrants a “well done” and an advancement within the system.
When in 1975 we look at §16-2-18’s language describing the committee’s control and management of the school system, we must keep in mind that this statute was passed shortly after the turn of the century (1903) in a day when teachers were more prone to be disciples of John Dewey than supporters of Samuel Gompers. In reading §16-2-18, one must not forget that some 70 years later the General Assembly in enacting the School Teachers’ Arbitration Act ordered the school committees of this [353]*353state to go and sit down at the bargaining table with the representatives of their teachers’ union and then negotiate in “good faith” on such matters as hours, salary, working conditions, and “all other terms and conditions of employment.” We have no doubt that the Legislature intended that classroom teachers should have the same opportunity of upward mobility as other workers who, because of the promotional provisions of their labor contract, remain on the job and hope that some day because of their superior performance they will move up the employment ladder and assume another and a better-paying position. An undue fixation with the language of §16-2-18 and a failure to broaden one’s viewpoint so as to see what the General Assembly did, once the midpoint of this century had been reached, could result in the emasculation of the School Teachers’ Arbitration Act. The legislative mandate for good-faith bargaining is broad and unqualified and we will not limit its thrust in the absence of an explicit statutory provision which specifically bars a school committee from making an agreement as to a particular term or condition of employment. Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 129-30, 282 N.E.2d 109, 113, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 23 (1972). When §16-2-18 and the School Teachers’ Arbitration Act are placed in their respective time frames, it is obvious that the tightfisted grip which a school committee in 1903 might have held over the day-to-day operations of its schools has been relaxed somewhat when, at its January 1966 session, the Legislature directed such committees to act as responsible public employers; otherwise the goal of affording the advantage of collective bargaining procedures to this particular group of public employees could never be realized. It follows that the Warwick School Committee was well within its power when it agreed that its promotions of teachers could be subject to review by [354]*354the arbitrators through the use of the grievance mechanism set forth in the agreement. The arbitrators could therefore properly find a violation of the equal-ability proviso and direct that Matteson be appointed forthwith to the post at the high school.
In considering the trial justice’s finding as to the improper shifting of the burden of proof, we will briefly set forth the approach taken by the arbitrators in resolving the controversy. The posted notice informed prospective candidates seeking to be head of the business department that in addition to having the “personal qualifications determined by the administration to be necessary for appointment,” they must also possess a “thorough knowledge” of the subjects within the department’s area of responsibility which knowledge had been gained by “classroom experience,” an “ability to lead teachers and students” to a point where there would be a “high degree of cooperative action and good morale,” and finally, an “exceptional ability to plan, develop and evaluate the curriculum * * In commenting on the terms of the contract the arbitrators observed that the Union and the School Committee, by their conduct and language in the agreement7 permitting the grieving of promotions, had contemplated a “reasonable judgment” by the school officials of the candidates’ qualifications and a “meaningful review” by the arbitrators of any contested advancement. They then stated that initially it was Matteson’s obligation to show that he satisfied the requirements set forth in the notice and that he was senior to Belanger [355]*355and that once this was accomplished, the School Committee could bring forth the factors which led it to believe that the junior man was superior. The arbitrators, after construing the agreement’s reference to instances where equally qualified candidates are under consideration as meaning there was “little to choose between the two,” ruled that the reasonableness standard to which we have already alluded required that there be a “material superiority” in the qualifications exhibited by the successful applicant. The arbitrators also remarked that, in showing this degree of superiority, the School Committee could not rely solely on its subjective opinion as to Belanger’s attributes but had to point to a factual evidentiary basis which would support such a conclusion. Finally, the arbitrators went on to evaluate the evidence in the light of the guidelines they had established and, as is obvious at this point, they found both individuals equally qualified and Matteson, as the senior candidate, entitled to the position.
The trial justice, in his concern for the procedural pattern laid out by the arbitrators and the shifting burdens of proof and persuasion they adopted, has apparently overlooked the fact that an arbitration award is the decision of an extrajudicial tribunal which the parties themselves have created and by whose judgment they have mutually agreed to abide. While we have some doubt as to whether the arbitrators in their thoughtful analysis of the Warwick contract and how they would resolve the problem presented to them did in fact shift the burden of proof, the fact that the arbitration panel may fail to follow the strict legal rules of procedure and evidence is no ground for striking down their award. Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Button & Goode, Inc., 242 Md. 509, 518, 219 A.2d 801, 807 (1966). A judicial reversal of an arbitration award based solely on the review[356]*356ing court’s disagreement with, the arbitrators’ interpretation of the contract would not only nullify the bargain-made by the parties but also threaten the strong public policy that favors private settlement of grievance disputes arising from collective bargaining agreements. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Local Union 200, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, 42 Ohio St.2d 516, 330 N.E.2d 703 (1975). Except for complete irrationality, arbitrators are free to fashion applicable rules and determine the facts of a dispute before them without their award being subject to judicial revision. Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 385, 278 N.E.2d 633, 635, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422 (1972). As noted earlier, the General Assembly in enacting legislation authorizing the arbitration of disputes involving provisions contained in a collective bargaining agreement restricted the Superior Court’s power to vacate an arbitration award to three grounds. A mistake of law is not one of the grounds. Such an omission is clear evidence that an award cannot be challenged on such a ground. Loretta Realty Corp. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 83 R. I. 221, 226, 114 A.2d 846, 849 (1955). We see no reason for faulting the arbitrators for the manner in which they decided to evaluate the evidence presented to them. There has been no excessive use of the arbitrators’ power as they determined whether Belanger or Matteson should have been promoted.
The defendant’s appeal is sustained, the judgment appealed from is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court.