United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 24-1148
AMANDA J. BAZINET,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
BETH ISRAEL LAHEY HEALTH, INC., and BETH ISRAEL DEACONESS HOSPITAL-MILTON, INC.
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Angel Kelley, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Gelpí, Montecalvo, and Aframe, Circuit Judges.
Richard Cullin Chambers, Jr., and Joseph Spinale, with whom Chambers and Spinale were on brief for appellant.
Scott Alan Roberts, with whom Samuel R. Gates, Tavish M. Brown, and Hirsch Roberts Weinstein, LLP were on brief, for appellees.
August 13, 2024 AFRAME, Circuit Judge. Fortunately, pandemics are, to
use a favored expression from this Court, "hen's-teeth rare."
E.g., United States v. Blodgett, 872 F.3d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 2017)
(quoting United States v. Polk, 546 F.3d 74, 76 (1st Cir. 2008));
Costa v. INS, 233 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 2000). COVID-19
demonstrated, however, the countless decisions that institutions
must make when a pandemic does strike. These decisions were
largely intended to preserve public safety in emergency
circumstances but also had to comply with the pre-existing
constitutional, statutory, and regulatory regimes that generally
govern societal affairs.
It is unsurprising, given the challenges posed by
COVID-19, that, in the aftermath of the pandemic, some of the
decisions made led to litigation. Indeed, this Court recently
resolved multiple appeals stemming from institutional actions
taken during the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., Skoly v. McKee,
103 F.4th 74 (1st Cir. 2024); Ablordeppey v. Walsh, 85 F.4th 27
(1st Cir. 2023); Brox v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket
S.S. Auth., 83 F.4th 87 (1st Cir. 2023); Lowe v. Mills, 68 F.4th
706 (1st Cir. 2023). This is another appeal in that line.
In 2021, Plaintiff Amanda J. Bazinet worked as an
executive office manager at Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital in
Milton, Massachusetts. In response to COVID-19, the Hospital
adopted a mandatory vaccine policy. Bazinet asserted a religious
- 2 - objection to taking the vaccine and sought an accommodation. The
Hospital rejected Bazinet's accommodation request, which led to
the termination of her employment. In due course, Bazinet brought
a civil action asserting, among other claims, that the Hospital
committed religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the
Massachusetts anti-discrimination law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B,
§ 4 (2018) ("the religious discrimination claims").1
On its own motion, the district court dismissed the
religious discrimination claims for failing to state a claim. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court ruled that Bazinet's complaint
failed to allege that she maintained a sincerely held religious
belief that prevented her from taking the COVID-19 vaccine.
Alternatively, the court held that, as a matter of law, the
Hospital would suffer an undue hardship by granting Bazinet's
request for an accommodation from the vaccine requirement.
Bazinet appeals the dismissal of her religious
discrimination claims. We vacate the district court's order. The
complaint sufficiently alleged that taking the vaccine would
violate Bazinet's religious beliefs. Moreover, determining
1 The Massachusetts statute prohibiting employment discrimination based on religion "has been interpreted largely to mirror Title VII." Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 131 (1st Cir. 2004). Neither party has identified a material distinction between the federal and state laws so for purposes of this appeal, we will consider the claims jointly.
- 3 - whether an undue hardship would result from the Hospital excusing
Bazinet from the vaccine requirement cannot be accomplished at
this preliminary stage of the litigation.
I.
Because this appeal arises from the dismissal of the
complaint for failure to state a claim, we draw the material facts
from Bazinet's complaint and the documents expressly referenced
therein. See Banco Santander de P.R. v. López-Stubbe (In re
Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp.), 324 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2003).
In describing the facts, we "indulge all reasonable inferences
that fit [Bazinet's] stated theory of liability." Id.
As already mentioned, the Hospital employed Bazinet as
an executive office manager when the COVID-19 pandemic began.
Bazinet continued to work for the Hospital at the "zenith" of the
pandemic, relying on the Hospital's assurances that wearing masks
would provide adequate protection.
In August 2021, the Hospital announced its "Mandatory
Vaccine Policy." The Policy required all Hospital employees to
have received the vaccine or at least begun the two -dose vaccine
protocol by the end of October 2021. An employee who failed to
comply with the Policy would be placed on fourteen-day
administrative leave until the employee came into compliance. The
Hospital would deem any employee to have "voluntarily terminated"
his or her employment if the employee failed to comply with the
- 4 - Policy within the fourteen-day period. Bazinet alleged that
voluntary termination was a "self-serving label" selected by the
Hospital and, in fact, the Hospital terminated the employment
relationship with non-compliant employees.
The Mandatory Vaccine Policy provided for certain
exemptions, including for medical and religious reasons. The
Policy provided that an employee who sought a religious exemption
would not be placed on leave or have their employment terminated
while the exemption request remained pending.
Bazinet timely submitted the Hospital's "Request for
Religious Accommodation - Mandatory Vaccine Policy" in which she
sought exemption from the COVID-19 vaccine requirement. Bazinet
indicated on the form that she (1) maintained sincerely held
religious beliefs, practices, or observances that prevented her
from receiving the vaccine; (2) understood that, if the Hospital
approved her exemption request, she would follow the Hospital's
masking and other infection control requirements; and (3) also
understood that, if the Hospital did not grant her exemption
request, it would engage her in an interactive process seeking to
identify a reasonable accommodation that would not cause an undue
hardship.
Bazinet attached to her accommodation request form a
letter describing her religious objection to taking the COVID-19
vaccine. She began the letter by indicating that she is a
- 5 - "Christian who believes in Jesus Christ and His holy word, the
Bible." She then alleged that the makers of the "COVID-19 vaccines
currently available developed and confirmed their vaccines using
fetal cell lines, which originated from aborted fetuses." Based
on that allegation, Bazinet concluded that "[p]artaking in a
vaccine made from aborted fetuses [would make her] complicit in an
action that not only offends, but . . . is an aberration to [her]
Christian faith." In support of her conclusion, Bazinet identified
a series of "quotes from the Lord" which prevented her from taking
the vaccine based on her belief that the vaccine was developed
using aborted fetuses.
Despite the statement on the accommodation form that the
Hospital would engage in an interactive process to attempt to
identify a reasonable accommodation, the Hospital denied Bazinet's
request for an accommodation without engaging in any further
process. The Hospital told Bazinet that her proposal to wear masks
and take periodic COVID-19 tests was inadequate and that allowing
Bazinet to work without the vaccine would cause the Hospital to
suffer an undue hardship. After the Hospital denied Bazinet's
accommodation request, it terminated her employment.
Bazinet's complaint asserted a series of claims against
the Hospital in addition to the religious discrimination claims.
The Hospital moved to dismiss all claims, except for the religious
discrimination claims. In due course, the district court issued
- 6 - a written order granting the Hospital's motion to dismiss.
Bazinet does not challenge those rulings here.
In that same order, the district court noted that, while
the Hospital had not moved to dismiss the religious discrimination
claims, it was considering doing so on its own motion. The court
indicated that Bazinet's complaint had failed to sufficiently
allege that "her reluctance to be vaccinated [was] grounded in
sincerely held religious beliefs." The court also observed that
Bazinet's claim was likely to fail because the accommodations she
proposed -- masking and periodic testing -- would probably cause
the Hospital undue hardship. The court provided Bazinet with a
chance to respond to its concerns.
In her response, Bazinet attached the accommodation form
and accompanying letter referenced in her complaint to argue that
she adequately alleged that a sincerely held religious belief
prevented her from taking the vaccine. She also argued that the
complaint did not provide an adequate basis for deciding the undue
hardship question and that discovery should be permitted.
The district court thought otherwise. The court
concluded that Bazinet had failed to allege in her complaint the
"necessary factual details about [her] religious views and/or her
beliefs which preclude her from taking the vaccine." It also
determined that it should not consider the information in Bazinet's
accommodation form and letter because Bazinet had presented those
- 7 - documents too late. But, even if the court had considered those
documents, it ruled that Bazinet's claim "would still not be viable
because there is no accommodation that [Bazinet] could have offered
that would not have caused [the Hospital] to suffer an undue
hardship." As a result, the court dismissed Bazinet's religious
discrimination claims with prejudice. Bazinet appealed.
II.
Bazinet begins her appeal with a threshold claim. She
says that the parties had agreed that the Hospital would not
challenge the sufficiency of the religious discrimination claims
at the motion to dismiss stage. She contends that agreement with
the Hospital displaced the district court's authority to dismiss
the religious discrimination claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The Hospital, for its part, denies that there was any such
agreement. We need not decide what, if any, agreement the parties
reached because any agreement between the parties could not
displace the district court's ability to rule on the legal question
of whether Bazinet's complaint failed to state a claim.
Parties "may not stipulate to the legal conclusions to
be reached by the court." Tex. Instrument Fed. Credit Union v.
DelBonis, 72 F.3d 921, 928 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Saviano v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 765 F.2d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1985)). That
is because "[i]ssues of law are the province of courts, not of
parties to a lawsuit." Id.
- 8 - District courts retain the power to dismiss complaints
sua sponte for a failure to state a claim. Chute v. Walker, 281
F.3d 314, 319 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Futura Dev. of P.R., Inc. v.
Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 144 F.3d 7, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1998)).
That is because whether a complaint adequately states a claim under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) presents a legal question, see Glassman
v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996), which,
as just mentioned, is "the province of courts," Tex. Instrument
Fed. Credit Union, 72 F.3d at 928. Thus, the parties cannot
stipulate away the district court's ability to dismiss a complaint
for failure to state a claim.
Bazinet's own citation demonstrates the error in her
argument. She too cites Tex. Instrument Fed. Credit Union to
highlight the proposition that "parties to a lawsuit are free to
stipulate to factual matters." Id. (quoting Saviano, 765 F.2d at
645). But a dismissal for failure to state a claim is not a
factual matter. It is a legal conclusion in which the court
determines that the facts alleged, even if true, are inadequate to
state a claim for relief. See Frese v. Formella, 53 F.4th 1, 5-6
(1st Cir. 2022). This is precisely the sort of legal question to
which the parties cannot bind the district court on the answer.
Thus, even assuming the parties had reached an agreement that the
Hospital would not seek to dismiss the religious discrimination
- 9 - claims, the district court was still free to take up the matter on
its own motion.
That brings us to the nub of the dispute -- whether the
district court properly exercised its authority by dismissing
Bazinet's religious discrimination claims under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). We review the district court's dismissal order de novo.
Rivera v. Kress Stores of P.R., Inc., 30 F.4th 98, 102 (1st Cir.
2022).
Sua sponte dismissals "are strong medicine[] and should
be dispensed sparingly." Chute, 281 F.3d at 319 (quoting González-
González v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 2001)).
Generally, we will vacate a sua sponte dismissal "unless the
parties have been afforded notice and an opportunity to amend the
complaint or otherwise respond." Garaylade-Rijos v. Municipality
of Carolina, 747 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Futura Dev.
of P.R., Inc. v. Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 144 F.3d 7, 14
(1st Cir. 1998)). Here, the district court provided Bazinet with
the required notice and opportunity to respond before ordering
dismissal. In that response, Bazinet attached the request for
religious accommodation and supporting letter that she referenced
in her complaint.
In evaluating the dismissal order, we consider the facts
as alleged in Bazinet's complaint and the content of documents she
sufficiently referenced in the complaint. See Freeman v. Town of
- 10 - Hudson, 714 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2013). In conducting this
review, we "ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer
legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action
elements." Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d
50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset,
640 F.3d 1, 7, 11-13 (1st Cir. 2011)). This is all in service of
our ultimate objective to determine whether Bazinet's complaint
sets forth plausible claims of religious discrimination, bearing
in mind that a court should not dismiss a complaint with properly
pled factual allegations, "even if it strikes a savvy judge that
actual proof of those [alleged] facts is improbable." Ocasio-
Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
To establish her religious discrimination claims,
Bazinet must first show "that a bona fide religious practice
conflicts with an employment requirement and was the reason for
the adverse employment action." Lowe, 68 F.4th at 719 (quoting
Sánchez-Rodríguez v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., 673 F.3d 1, 12 (1st
Cir. 2012)). If Bazinet makes that showing, the burden shifts to
the Hospital to show that it "offered a reasonable accommodation
or, if it did not offer an accommodation, that doing so would have
resulted in undue hardship." Id. (quoting Cloutier, 390 F.3d at
133).
- 11 - The district court ruled that Bazinet's claim foundered
from the start because she failed to allege that she maintained a
religious practice that conflicted with the Hospital's mandatory
vaccine requirement. The court considered the complaint wanting
because its text offered nothing more than an assertion that
Bazinet "has sincerely held religious beliefs which place her in
conflict with the provisions of the . . . Policy and prevent her
from receiving the injections" required thereunder.
We need not determine whether such an unelaborated
assertion may be insufficient on its own to allege a religious
practice or belief in support of a religious discrimination claim
because the district court also should have considered the
documents expressly referenced in the complaint in which Bazinet
requested a religious accommodation. Thus, the information in
these documents should have been included when evaluating the
sufficiency of the complaint. See Freeman, 714 F.3d at 36. The
Hospital acknowledged this point both in its brief and at oral
argument.
In her accommodation request, Bazinet explained her
religious objection to being vaccinated. She stated her
understanding that presently available COVID-19 vaccines were
developed using fetal cell lines that originated from aborted
fetuses. She also explained that taking the vaccine would make
her complicit in the performance of abortions which would be "an
- 12 - aberration to [her] Christian faith." Bazinet provided numerous
quotations from religious sources that she says support her view.
Accepting those allegations as true for present purposes, she has
sufficiently pleaded a religious belief that conflicts with
receiving the COVID-19 vaccine as required by the Policy.
The Hospital says otherwise, relying on Kiel v. Mayo
Clinic Health Sys. Southeast Minnesota, 685 F. Supp. 3d 770 (D.
Minn. 2023). There, the employee made a similar allegation that
taking the vaccine "would make her a participant in the abortion
that killed the unborn baby." Id. at 783. The district court
ruled that the employee's allegation was not sufficiently
religious because there are "[c]ertainly, many Christians who
oppose abortion [who] still receive vaccines." Id. at 784. Thus,
"religious opposition to abortion is different from an opposition
to vaccines that were potentially developed using a fetal cell
line." Id. (emphasis omitted).
After the Hospital filed its brief in this Court, the
Eighth Circuit reversed Kiel. Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic, Ambulance,
102 F.4th 894 (8th Cir. 2024).2 The Eighth Circuit properly
rejected Kiel's rationale because the fact that many Christians
have elected to receive the vaccine does not undermine a particular
2 See also Savel v. MetroHealth Sys., 96 F.4th 932, 944 (6th Cir. 2024) (vacating order granting motion to dismiss Title VII religious accommodation claim over objection to taking COVID- 19 vaccine).
- 13 - employee's religious beliefs on the subject. See id. at 901-02.
The law does not require that a religious practice or belief at
issue be "acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others." EEOC v. Unión Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos
y Alcantarillados de P.R., 279 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting
Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714
(1981)).
Bazinet, like the employees in Ringhofer, grounded her
objection to taking the vaccine in a religious belief connecting
the COVID-19 vaccine to opposition to abortion. Whether few or
many share that religious view is irrelevant. For similar reasons,
it is also irrelevant at this stage of the litigation that the
Hospital tells us that Bazinet is mistaken in believing that the
COVID-19 vaccines were developed from fetal tissue obtained from
aborted fetuses. That the Hospital disputes Bazinet's factual
foundation for her belief about the development of the vaccines
does not change the religious character of the belief.
The Hospital also says that Bazinet's objection is not
religious in nature because Bazinet asserted in her religious
accommodation form that she cannot "take part in any such vaccine
at this time." The Hospital focuses on the "at this time" language
to contend that Bazinet rejected the vaccine on an "ad hoc basis,"
which, it says, is incompatible with religious belief.
- 14 - The answer to this argument appears in the very next
sentence of Bazinet's accommodation request. There, Bazinet
asserted that the vaccines "currently available" were developed
from aborted fetuses. There would be no inconsistency with
Bazinet's claimed religious belief if she later agreed to take a
COVID-19 vaccine that she viewed as not being developed from
aborted fetuses. Thus, Bazinet's use of the "at this time"
language is compatible with a professed religious belief based on
her understanding of the present state of COVID-19 vaccine
development.
In addition to claiming that Bazinet did not
sufficiently plead that her objection to the vaccine was religious,
the Hospital contends that Bazinet does not sincerely hold a
religious belief against taking the vaccine. In this regard, the
Hospital points out that much of Bazinet's complaint attacked the
scientific efficacy of the COVID-19 vaccine, challenged the wisdom
of the Hospital's Policy, and criticized the government for
encouraging vaccine mandates. It says that these objections have
nothing to do with religion. But, as the Eighth Circuit
recognized, the mere fact that there is "overlap between a
religious and political view does not [necessarily] place [the
view] outside the scope of Title VII's religious protections."
Ringhofer, 102 F.4th at 901. Thus, "[i]f an accommodation request
can be read on its face as plausibly based in part on an aspect of
- 15 - the plaintiff-employee's religious belief or practice, that is
enough to survive a motion to dismiss." Passarella v. Aspirus,
Inc., Nos. 23-1660, 23-1661, 2024 WL 3561180, at *4 (7th Cir. Jul.
29, 2024). That is the situation here.
In a similar vein, the Hospital challenges the sincerity
of Bazinet's alleged religious belief because her request for
accommodation "appears to have been largely cut-and-pasted from
cookie-cutter, anti-vaccine forms that were widely available on
the internet." That information is not properly before us at this
preliminary stage because the internet printouts provided by the
Hospital are not referred to in Bazinet's complaint. In any event,
that Bazinet found information on the internet which coincided
with her professed religious beliefs does not establish that her
beliefs are insincere. The sincerity of Bazinet's religious belief
is a proper subject for discovery, and it cannot be resolved at
this early stage. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13
(2005); Williams v. Wilkinson, 645 F. App'x 692, 699 n.12 (10th
Cir. 2016); Robert v. Raytheon Tech. Corp., No. 23-cv-12206-NMG,
2024 WL 1809407, at *4 (D. Mass. Apr. 25, 2024).
The last issue we consider is the district court's
alternative ground for dismissal, i.e., that the Hospital would
suffer an undue hardship by granting Bazinet an accommodation from
its mandatory vaccine requirement. The court's resolution of the
- 16 - undue hardship question at the motion to dismiss stage was also
premature.
Undue hardship in a Title VII religious discrimination
case is an affirmative defense. Lowe, 68 F.4th at 719. "The undue
hardship defense is built into the statutory definition of
'religion,' see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), such that an employment
action cannot constitute discrimination on the basis of religion,
and an employer cannot be liable under Title VII for religious
discrimination, if the undue hardship defense applies."3 Lowe, 68
F.4th at 724. Undue hardship under Title VII requires employers
"to accommodate, within reasonable limits, the bona fide religious
beliefs and practices of employees." Sánchez-Rodríguez, 673 F.3d
at 12 (quoting Unión Independiente, 279 F.3d at 55).
In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court
further defined what constitutes an undue hardship. See Groff v.
DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023). Prior to Groff, we held, relying on
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), that
an employer established an undue hardship by showing that an
accommodation would pose "more than a de minimis cost." Cloutier,
390 F.3d at 134. We were hardly alone in applying that standard.
3 Section 2000e(j) provides, "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."
- 17 - E.g., Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 952 F.3d 821, 825 (6th
Cir. 2020); Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 727 F. App'x 581, 586 (11th
Cir. 2018); Harrell v. Donahue, 638 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2011);
Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2009);
EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 312 (4th
Cir. 2008); Baker v. Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 548 (2d Cir. 2006);
EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1576 (7th Cir.
1997); Beadle v. Hillsborough Cty. Sherriff's Dep't, 29 F.3d 589,
592 (4th Cir. 1994); Lee v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 1019,
1023 (10th Cir. 1994); Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1440
(9th Cir. 1993); Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141,
146 (5th Cir. 1982).
Groff clarified that the standard is more rigorous than
previously thought. It stated that a successful undue hardship
defense requires the employer to show that "the burden of granting
an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in
relation to the conduct of its particular business." Groff, 600
U.S. at 470. This requires courts to take "into account all
relevant factors in the case at hand, including the particular
accommodations at issue and their practical impact in light of the
nature, size and operating cost of an employer." Id. at 470-71
(cleaned up).
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on undue hardship grounds
is appropriate only "if the facts establishing the defense are
- 18 - clear on the face of the plaintiffs' pleadings and there is no
doubt that the plaintiffs' claims are barred." Lowe, 68 F.4th at
719 (cleaned up). Lowe is a recent example of when dismissal for
an undue hardship would be appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6).
Lowe involved a Maine law that imposed a COVID-19 vaccine
mandate for healthcare workers that did not include religious
exemptions. 68 F.4th at 719-22. It was undisputed that a health
care provider, who violated the Maine law by granting religious
exemptions to the vaccine requirement, would face a risk of license
suspension by Maine authorities. Id. at 719-20. While Lowe was
decided when Groff was pending in the Supreme Court, we held that,
even under the heightened standard Groff eventually announced,
potential license suspension for violating a state statute
constituted an undue hardship as a matter of law. Id. at 722.
Usually, however, it will not be possible to adjudicate the undue
hardship defense at the pleading stage because the Groff test is
"fact-specific." Groff, 600 U.S. at 468.
This case falls into the more usual category where
conducting the undue-hardship evaluation requires further factual
development. Unlike in Lowe, the Massachusetts vaccine mandate
applicable to the Hospital does not bar religious exemptions.
Thus, the Hospital would not have been breaking state law by
granting Bazinet an accommodation. Taylor v. Milford Reg'l Med.
- 19 - Ctr., Inc., No. 4:23-cv-40009-MRG, 2024 WL 2111459, at *6 & n.5
(D. Mass. May 10, 2024).
The parties dispute whether granting Bazinet an
accommodation would cause an undue hardship for other reasons.
The Hospital, on one hand, says that Bazinet was required to work
in-person; thus, anything short of vaccination was an undue
hardship because of the health and safety risks that it would pose
to other employees and patients. Bazinet, on the other, alleges
that the Hospital granted employees exemptions for medical
reasons; thus, her request should have received more
individualized consideration that could have led the Hospital to
grant an accommodation.
The Hospital supplied the district court with a copy of
a position statement it filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. The position statement sets forth the reasons that
the Hospital decided to deny all religious accommodation requests
from the vaccine requirement for employees whom it determined
needed to work in person. The Hospital appended to the position
statement several exhibits, including the Policy, Bazinet's job
description, her religious accommodation request, and a memorandum
describing the Hospital's process for reviewing accommodation
requests that included conclusions as to when, in the Hospital's
view, granting an accommodation constitutes an undue hardship.
While the district court could consider Bazinet's accommodation
- 20 - request and the Policy because those documents were sufficiently
referenced in Bazinet's complaint, neither document demonstrates
on its face that granting Bazinet an accommodation would have
caused the Hospital an undue hardship. See Lowe, 68 F.4th at 719.
The remaining documents, including the Hospital's position
statement and attached memorandum articulating the Hospital's
explanation for its undue hardship conclusion, were not referenced in
Bazinet's complaint. Thus, these documents were not properly before
the district court at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.4 And Bazinet of course
has not had the chance to contest the Hospital's assertions about the
costs that would flow from granting her a religious accommodation to
the vaccine requirement. More factual development is necessary.
* * *
Whether Bazinet's religious discrimination claims will
succeed or even survive summary judgment is uncertain. But these
claims should have advanced past Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, we vacate
the district court's order dismissing Bazinet's religious
discrimination claims and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. The parties shall bear their own costs.
So Ordered.
4 While Bazinet's complaint refers to the Policy specifically on numerous occasions, and "policies and procedures" generally on several others, it does not mention the Hospital's memorandum supporting its undue hardship conclusion.
- 21 -