Baxter v. Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys.
This text of 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37 (Baxter v. Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal, 5th District primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
WALSH, J.
*347Eleven retired teachers (Teachers) who had been employed in the Salinas Unified High School District (District), disputed attempts by appellant California State Teachers' Retirement System (CalSTRS) to recoup retirement benefit overpayments. The overpayments were the result of a years-long miscalculation by the District of the monthly retirement benefits to which the Teachers were entitled. The parties do not dispute that the District miscalculated Teachers' monthly benefit amounts. But Teachers contend that the statute of limitations bars CalSTRS's efforts to recoup prior overpayments and to reduce future monthly benefits to the proper amounts.
The dispute stems back to 1999, when the District and the Teachers' union entered into a collective bargaining agreement that purported to create a separate class of employees for teachers who elected to work an extra (sixth) period. Some years later-on August 18, 2005, after three Teachers had retired-a District employee sent a memorandum to the Monterey County Office of Education (MCOE), which arguably alerted MCOE to the potential overpayment of retirement benefits to teachers in the District who had worked a sixth period. In December 2008, CalSTRS was advised by its outside auditing firm that Teachers had been overpaid for several years due to the District's improper inclusion of certain earnings in the calculation of their monthly benefits. In July 2010, CalSTRS directed the District to correct its calculations and remit prior overpayment amounts to CalSTRS. Teachers and the District appealed the audit findings of CalSTRS and requested an administrative hearing. In April 2012, before any such hearing, CalSTRS began reducing Teachers' monthly payments.
In February 2013, an administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected the challenges of Teachers and the District, upholding CalSTRS's conclusion that Teachers had been overpaid in the past and that their monthly benefits should be reduced to reflect the proper amounts going forward and should reflect deductions for prior overpayments. The ALJ rejected the statute of limitations defense asserted by Teachers and the District, i.e., that CalSTRS's efforts to recoup prior overpayments and reduce future benefits were time-barred. The Appeals Committee of CalSTRS (Committee), which reviewed the ALJ's order, ultimately rendered a decision in CalSTRS's favor. Teachers successfully *42brought a petition for peremptory writ of administrative mandamus in the superior court compelling CalSTRS to resume paying them at the original monthly amounts. The trial court found that CalSTRS was barred by the *348applicable statute of limitations from either recouping previous overpayments or reducing future payments to reflect the allegedly correct amount of monthly benefits.
In this appeal, we interpret certain provisions of Education Code section 220081 -a statute that has not been the subject of any prior appellate decisions. Under section 22008, subdivision (c) ( § 22008(c) ), the three-year statute of limitations applicable for CalSTRS to bring an action to recoup the overpayments commenced with its "discovery of the incorrect payment." We conclude, contrary to the trial court's decision, that "discovery" means the date CalSTRS actually discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the incorrect payment. We hold that August 18, 2005, the date of the District's memorandum to the MCOE, was the correct accrual date of the statute of limitations here because the memorandum gave CalSTRS (through its ostensible agent, MCOE) inquiry notice of the overpayment issue.
We also address what action by CalSTRS constituted commencement of an "action" for purposes of determining whether the three-year statute of limitations under section 22008, subdivision (a) ( § 22008(a) ) was satisfied. We conclude that, contrary to the trial court's decision, the action was commenced on July 6, 2012, when CalSTRS filed the statement of issues to initiate the administrative proceeding.
The trial court incorrectly concluded that CalSTRS's action to rectify the error for all monthly payments, past and future, was time-barred. Although the trial court correctly found that CalSTRS had not satisfied the three-year statute of limitations because it had commenced the action more than three years after its claim accrued, under the continuous accrual theory, the statute of limitations for periodic payments such as Teachers' monthly retirement benefits here commenced with the due date of each payment. Therefore, only payments due more than three years prior to CalSTRS's commencement of the action on July 6, 2012, were subject to Teachers' statute of limitations defense. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings.
*349FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background2
Teachers3 are 11 former teachers who taught within the District before retiring and becoming members of CalSTRS. CalSTRS is the state agency responsible for managing contributions made by employees and member school districts to the State Teachers' Retirement Fund. (See § 22000 et seq.) Schools within the District utilized a six period schedule. Teachers within the District typically taught five of those periods and used the additional period to prepare prospective lesson plans. Some of them, however, including Teachers, *43agreed to teach during their sixth period time for additional compensation, and to shift their preparation time to before or after the regular school day. Teachers believed that this additional compensation would be credited toward their retirement plan, the so-called "Defined Benefit" plan administered by CalSTRS.
Teachers' understanding stemmed, in part, from the District's belief that such sixth period compensation was creditable. On September 29, 1999, the District and the Salinas Valley Federation of Teachers ("SVFT") entered into a tentative collective bargaining agreement for the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 school years. That agreement included an additional schedule for teachers who taught a sixth period, and changed the definition of a normal workday to include the extra period for all sixth period teachers. Each subsequent iteration of the collective bargaining agreement "contained provisions defining the sixth period teachers as a separate class of employees and the district has developed two distinct salary schedules that reflect the compensation paid to the two classes of certificated employees."
From September 29, 2008, until October 1, 2008, Mayer Hoffman McCann P.C. ("MHM"), an accounting firm commissioned by CalSTRS, performed an audit of District records. CalSTRS received the auditor's findings on December 1, 2008. The audit findings revealed the District's practice of coding Teachers' sixth period earnings as creditable was improper. CalSTRS issued a draft audit report on May 27, 2010, adopting MHM's conclusion that *350
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WALSH, J.
*347Eleven retired teachers (Teachers) who had been employed in the Salinas Unified High School District (District), disputed attempts by appellant California State Teachers' Retirement System (CalSTRS) to recoup retirement benefit overpayments. The overpayments were the result of a years-long miscalculation by the District of the monthly retirement benefits to which the Teachers were entitled. The parties do not dispute that the District miscalculated Teachers' monthly benefit amounts. But Teachers contend that the statute of limitations bars CalSTRS's efforts to recoup prior overpayments and to reduce future monthly benefits to the proper amounts.
The dispute stems back to 1999, when the District and the Teachers' union entered into a collective bargaining agreement that purported to create a separate class of employees for teachers who elected to work an extra (sixth) period. Some years later-on August 18, 2005, after three Teachers had retired-a District employee sent a memorandum to the Monterey County Office of Education (MCOE), which arguably alerted MCOE to the potential overpayment of retirement benefits to teachers in the District who had worked a sixth period. In December 2008, CalSTRS was advised by its outside auditing firm that Teachers had been overpaid for several years due to the District's improper inclusion of certain earnings in the calculation of their monthly benefits. In July 2010, CalSTRS directed the District to correct its calculations and remit prior overpayment amounts to CalSTRS. Teachers and the District appealed the audit findings of CalSTRS and requested an administrative hearing. In April 2012, before any such hearing, CalSTRS began reducing Teachers' monthly payments.
In February 2013, an administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected the challenges of Teachers and the District, upholding CalSTRS's conclusion that Teachers had been overpaid in the past and that their monthly benefits should be reduced to reflect the proper amounts going forward and should reflect deductions for prior overpayments. The ALJ rejected the statute of limitations defense asserted by Teachers and the District, i.e., that CalSTRS's efforts to recoup prior overpayments and reduce future benefits were time-barred. The Appeals Committee of CalSTRS (Committee), which reviewed the ALJ's order, ultimately rendered a decision in CalSTRS's favor. Teachers successfully *42brought a petition for peremptory writ of administrative mandamus in the superior court compelling CalSTRS to resume paying them at the original monthly amounts. The trial court found that CalSTRS was barred by the *348applicable statute of limitations from either recouping previous overpayments or reducing future payments to reflect the allegedly correct amount of monthly benefits.
In this appeal, we interpret certain provisions of Education Code section 220081 -a statute that has not been the subject of any prior appellate decisions. Under section 22008, subdivision (c) ( § 22008(c) ), the three-year statute of limitations applicable for CalSTRS to bring an action to recoup the overpayments commenced with its "discovery of the incorrect payment." We conclude, contrary to the trial court's decision, that "discovery" means the date CalSTRS actually discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the incorrect payment. We hold that August 18, 2005, the date of the District's memorandum to the MCOE, was the correct accrual date of the statute of limitations here because the memorandum gave CalSTRS (through its ostensible agent, MCOE) inquiry notice of the overpayment issue.
We also address what action by CalSTRS constituted commencement of an "action" for purposes of determining whether the three-year statute of limitations under section 22008, subdivision (a) ( § 22008(a) ) was satisfied. We conclude that, contrary to the trial court's decision, the action was commenced on July 6, 2012, when CalSTRS filed the statement of issues to initiate the administrative proceeding.
The trial court incorrectly concluded that CalSTRS's action to rectify the error for all monthly payments, past and future, was time-barred. Although the trial court correctly found that CalSTRS had not satisfied the three-year statute of limitations because it had commenced the action more than three years after its claim accrued, under the continuous accrual theory, the statute of limitations for periodic payments such as Teachers' monthly retirement benefits here commenced with the due date of each payment. Therefore, only payments due more than three years prior to CalSTRS's commencement of the action on July 6, 2012, were subject to Teachers' statute of limitations defense. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings.
*349FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background2
Teachers3 are 11 former teachers who taught within the District before retiring and becoming members of CalSTRS. CalSTRS is the state agency responsible for managing contributions made by employees and member school districts to the State Teachers' Retirement Fund. (See § 22000 et seq.) Schools within the District utilized a six period schedule. Teachers within the District typically taught five of those periods and used the additional period to prepare prospective lesson plans. Some of them, however, including Teachers, *43agreed to teach during their sixth period time for additional compensation, and to shift their preparation time to before or after the regular school day. Teachers believed that this additional compensation would be credited toward their retirement plan, the so-called "Defined Benefit" plan administered by CalSTRS.
Teachers' understanding stemmed, in part, from the District's belief that such sixth period compensation was creditable. On September 29, 1999, the District and the Salinas Valley Federation of Teachers ("SVFT") entered into a tentative collective bargaining agreement for the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 school years. That agreement included an additional schedule for teachers who taught a sixth period, and changed the definition of a normal workday to include the extra period for all sixth period teachers. Each subsequent iteration of the collective bargaining agreement "contained provisions defining the sixth period teachers as a separate class of employees and the district has developed two distinct salary schedules that reflect the compensation paid to the two classes of certificated employees."
From September 29, 2008, until October 1, 2008, Mayer Hoffman McCann P.C. ("MHM"), an accounting firm commissioned by CalSTRS, performed an audit of District records. CalSTRS received the auditor's findings on December 1, 2008. The audit findings revealed the District's practice of coding Teachers' sixth period earnings as creditable was improper. CalSTRS issued a draft audit report on May 27, 2010, adopting MHM's conclusion that *350the District had incorrectly coded Teachers' sixth period earnings, causing Teachers to receive a larger monthly retirement benefit than that to which they were entitled.4
CalSTRS issued its final audit report on July 30, 2010, upholding the draft report's finding. The audit concluded with two corrective orders. First, CalSTRS demanded that, within 60 days, the District submit corrections to CalSTRS to reverse the improperly credited compensation. Once the District submitted corrections, CalSTRS would recalculate the relevant retired teachers' retirement allowances based on the correct final compensation and adjustment notification letters would be sent to affected teachers. Second, the District was ordered to "remit the total overpayments to CalSTRS for the retired members."
The District failed to either submit corrections or remit the amount of the overpayments to CalSTRS. Consequently, on March 2, 2012, CalSTRS sent letters notifying each of the Teachers that, because the District had failed to comply with the corrective orders, CalSTRS would begin reducing Teachers' respective monthly retirement benefit to the correct amount, effective April 1, 2012. In addition, Teachers' respective monthly payment was reduced by 5%, the statutory limit, to repay CalSTRS for the overpayments made to date. (See § 24617.)5
Teachers appealed the final audit findings on or before December 3, 2010. CalSTRS filed a statement of issues with the Office of Administrative Hearings on July 6, 2012.6 An administrative hearing *44was conducted between February 11-15, 2013. All parties appeared. On July 18, 2013, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") issued a proposed decision. The ALJ found in favor of CalSTRS, stated that the District had erred, and held that the District was responsible for reimbursing CalSTRS for the District's reporting errors. On September 9, 2013, the Committee opted to reject the proposed decision, solicit additional briefing from all parties, and reconsider the administrative record and existing evidence. On January 23, 2014, the Committee issued a decision in favor of CalSTRS. *351II. Procedural History
Following the entry of the Committee's decision, on March 24, 2014, Teachers filed a petition for a peremptory writ of administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, naming CalSTRS as respondent and the District as real party in interest. Teachers' arguments included the assertion that insufficient evidence supported the Committee's decision. They sought a writ of mandamus requiring CalSTRS to (1) resume paying them at the monthly benefit levels existing before April 1, 2012, (2) cease any reductions in monthly payments for recoupment of alleged overpayments, and (3) restore all monies withheld since April 1, 2012, due to reductions in monthly benefits that were improper.
After a trial on the petition on April 2, 2015, the court issued its intended decision on May 1, 2015. The trial court concluded that CalSTRS's claims against Teachers to recover monies paid erroneously due to miscalculation of retirement benefits were time-barred, and CalSTRS was further barred from reducing Teachers' future monthly benefits. A judgment granting issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate was entered on June 3, 2015, (1) reversing the administrative decision of the Committee, (2) barring CalSTRS from further withholding or reducing Teachers' monthly defined benefit retirement payments, (3) directing CalSTRS to reimburse Teachers all retirement amounts previously withheld, plus interest, and (4) directing CalSTRS to reimburse the District for any amounts the District paid to CalSTRS under the administrative decision, plus interest. CalSTRS appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Administrative Mandamus
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, a party may file a petition for writ of administrative mandamus "for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer." ( § 1094.5, subd. (a).) Where the decision occurs as a result of a proceeding in which a hearing is required in which evidence is to be taken and the administrative tribunal is vested with discretion to determine the facts, administrative mandamus under section 1094.5 is the exclusive remedy for judicial review of the quasi-adjudicatory administrative action of state-level agencies. ( People v. Tulare County (1955)
*352The Legislature has identified two different standards by which the trial court determines whether administrative findings are supported by the evidence-i.e., the independent judgment and substantial evidence standards-without stating *45which standard applies in a given case. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).)7 But the California Supreme Court has explained that in the case of "administrative decisions which substantially affect vested, fundamental rights," the trial court "exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo." ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971)
Retirement benefits have long been included in the class of vested fundamental rights as to which a superior court independently reviews an agency's findings substantially affecting such rights. (See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974)
II. Standard of Review
An appellate court-regardless of whether the trial court independently reviews administrative findings or reviews them for substantial evidence-*353reviews the trial court's findings in administrative mandamus proceedings for substantial evidence. ( Fukuda , supra , 20 Cal.4th at p. 824,
Pure questions of law decided by the trial court are reviewed de novo by the court of appeal. ( Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1999)
Although the agency's interpretation of a statute or ordinance is given deference by the court ( MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003)
III. Teachers' Retirement Law
We briefly describe the state teachers' retirement system at issue to provide context to this appeal, liberally borrowing from a discussion presented in an opinion of the First District Court of Appeal, Division 4. "CalSTRS was created by the Legislature in 1913 as a retirement system for credentialed California teachers and administrators in kindergarten through community college. (See § 22000 et seq. (Teachers' Retirement Law).)" ( Duarte v. California State Teachers' Retirement System (2014)
"The constitutional obligations of a public retirement board such as the CalSTRS Board have been interpreted to include a duty 'to "ensure the rights of members and retirees to their full, earned benefits." ' [Citation.] Such obligations therefore do not permit the payment of benefits not otherwise authorized. [Citation.] Rather, 'the statutory scheme governs the scope of the benefits earned.' [Citation.] Thus, while ' "[p]ension provisions should be broadly construed in favor of those who were intended to be benefited *355thereby ... [,] they cannot be construed so as to confer benefits on persons not entitled thereto." ' [Citation.]" ( Duarte , supra , 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 385,
IV. Statute of Limitations: Education Code Section 22008
A. Summary
We will first consider when the statute of limitations under section 22008(c) commences, i.e., when the claim under the statute accrues. The statute specifies that the three-year period of limitation for adjustment of errors with respect to the Defined Benefit Program "shall commence with the discovery of the incorrect payment." (Ibid. ) The question is the meaning of "discovery." Does it mean (as the trial court held) the date the party seeking the adjustment (the claimant) has actual knowledge of the incorrect payment? Alternatively, does the statute of limitations commence when the claimant knows about, or has reason to suspect the existence of the incorrect payment?9 After concluding that the statute commences when the claimant has actual or inquiry notice of the incorrect payment, we will consider whether the trial court correctly identified the commencement date of the statute of limitations in this instance. We find that the court, although it applied the incorrect legal standard, correctly held that the claim accrued on August 18, 2005.
Second, we will consider the meaning of the language "action may be commenced" in section 22008(a) to determine what constitutes an "action" for purposes of satisfying the three-year statute of limitations.10
*48Contrary to the trial court's conclusion that CalSTRS commenced an action in April 2012 when it began reducing Teachers' monthly retirement payments, we hold that CalSTRS commenced the action on July 6, 2012, when it filed the statement of issues to initiate the administrative proceeding.
Third, although we find that the trial court correctly held that CalSTRS had not commenced the action within the three-year statute of limitations under section 22008, we conclude the court erred by rejecting CalSTRS's contention that a portion of its action concerning overpayments was not time-barred upon application of the continuous accrual doctrine. Under that doctrine, claims arising out of incorrect periodic payments, such as the pension *356payments here, accrue when each payment is due. Accordingly, only CalSTRS's attempts to address incorrect periodic payments that were due more than three years prior to July 6, 2012, were time-barred under section 22008.
B. Accrual Under Education Code 22008(c), Generally
Section 22008(a) provides that an action seeking adjustments for erroneous payments under the Defined Benefit Program or the Defined Benefit Supplement Program must be brought within "three years after all obligations ... have been discharged." Under section 22008(c), "[i]f an incorrect payment is due to lack of information or inaccurate information regarding the eligibility of a member, former member, beneficiary, or annuity beneficiary to receive benefits under the Defined Benefit Program or Defined Benefit Supplement Program, the period of limitations shall commence with the discovery of the incorrect payment."
Teachers argued below that "discovery" under section 22008(c) includes not only actual discovery, but circumstances where the party has reason to suspect the existence of the incorrect payment. This is the "discovery rule" exception to the normal rule of accrual of causes of action discussed, post. The trial court agreed with CalSTRS's position that only actual knowledge of the incorrect payment triggered the statute of limitations under section 22008(c), holding that "[t]he plain language of the statute requires actual as opposed to inquiry notice." The question being an interpretation of the statutory language, we review the trial court's decision de novo. ( Shamrock Foods , supra , 24 Cal.4th at p. 432,
We are guided by familiar principles of statutory construction, which we have previously summarized-drawing from six California Supreme Court cases-as follows: "In cases of statutory interpretation, 'where the language is clear, its plain meaning should be followed.' We will 'give effect to statutes "according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them" ' and 'will apply common sense to the language at hand and interpret the statute to make it workable and reasonable.' Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look to the Legislature's intent; however, we are not precluded by this ' "plain meaning" rule' from ascertaining whether a literal interpretation of the statute is consistent with its purpose. [¶] The legislative intent of a statute may be revealed from a review of '[b]oth the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment.' 'The *49words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.' And in cases where the meaning of the statutory language is *357uncertain, the court ' "may also consider the consequences of a particular interpretation, including its impact on public policy." ' And 'the statute should be interpreted to avoid an absurd result.' " ( Giorgianni v. Crowley (2011)
The meaning of the phrase "discovery of the incorrect payment" in section 22008(c) is not so plain as to preclude further inquiry in construing the statute. The term "discovery" is not defined in section 22008 or elsewhere in the Teachers' Retirement Law, and, specifically, is not among the 150-plus definitions of terms and phrases found in the statute. (See §§ 22100 through 22177.) And we are unaware of-and the parties were unable to present us with-any legislative history that would assist us in interpreting the term "discovery" in the statute.11 (Cf. People v. Zamora (1976)
Our Supreme Court has explained the competing policy interests inherent in a statute of limitations defense. "A statute of limitations strikes a balance among conflicting interests. If it is unfair to bar a plaintiff from recovering on a meritorious claim, it is also unfair to require a defendant to defend against possibly false allegations concerning long-forgotten events, when important evidence may no longer be available. Thus, statutes of limitations are not mere technical defenses, allowing wrongdoers to avoid accountability. [Citation.] Rather, they mark the point where, in the judgment *358of the legislature, the equities tip in favor of the defendant (who may be innocent of wrongdoing) and against the plaintiff (who failed to take prompt action): '[T]he period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid *50claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.' [Citation.]" ( Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011)
The date the statute commences is a "[c]ritical" aspect of a statute of limitations analysis. ( Pooshs , supra , 51 Cal.4th at p. 797,
There are many instances in which courts have impliedly incorporated the discovery rule into statutes that provide without qualification that accrual is from the date of injury. This is done " 'to ameliorate a harsh rule that would allow the limitations period for filing suit to expire before a plaintiff has or should have learned of the latent injury and its cause.' [Citation.]" ( Pooshs , supra , 51 Cal.4th at pp. 797-798,
Some statutes of limitation expressly provide for accrual when the plaintiff has actual or inquiry notice of the claim. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 340.2 [claim for *51asbestos-related injury must be at the latest, one year after plaintiff "knew, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that such disability was caused or contributed to by such exposure"];
One statute using the word "discovery" to identify the date of accrual is Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d). It provides that the claim shall "not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party ... of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." (Ibid. ) " 'Literally interpreted, this language would give the plaintiff an unlimited period to sue if [he or s]he could establish ignorance of the facts.' " ( Parsons v. Tickner (1995)
A similar analysis has been applied to Code of Civil Procedure section 339, subdivision (1). It calls for a two-year statute of limitations, and provides, in *360part, that a cause of action based "upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing ... shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the loss or damage suffered." (Ibid. ) Courts have applied the discovery rule to varying claims governed by this statute, resulting in the limitation period commencing when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the harm was caused by the defendant. (See, e.g., William L. Lyon & Associates, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012)
The court in Debro v. Los Angeles Raiders (2001)
We are persuaded by authorities that have construed "discovery" statutes similar to section 22008(c) here-such as Code of Civil Procedure sections 338, subdivision (d) and 339, subdivision (1), and Government Code section 12654, subdivision (a) -as providing that the limitations period commences when the plaintiff has knowledge of the facts supporting the claim, either based on actual or inquiry notice. This construction subserves the policies underlying the statute of limitations. It is consistent with the principle that "statutes of limitations are intended to run against those who fail to exercise reasonable care in the protection and enforcement of their rights; therefore, those statutes should not be interpreted so as to bar a victim of wrongful conduct from asserting a cause of action before he [or she] could *361reasonably be expected to discover its existence. [Citations.]" ( Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries (1978)
Moreover, we conclude that interpreting section 22008(c) to incorporate the discovery rule does not place an undue burden on the party claiming the existence of an incorrect benefit payment. "Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent [person] upon inquiry as to a particular fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he [or she] might have learned such fact." ( Civ. Code, § 19.) Charging CalSTRS here, as claimant, with knowledge of an overpayment based upon inquiry notice where the entity, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered it, is entirely proper. (See § 22250, subd. (b) [CalSTRS Board has fiduciary duty to use "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" in management of system]; see also Duarte , supra , 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 385,
The trial court relied upon Eisenbaum v. Western Energy Resources, Inc. (1990)
Eisenbaum , supra ,
We agree with the analysis in Deveny and apply it here. Regardless of the merits of Eisenbaum 's conclusion that Corporations Code section 25507, subdivision (a) requires actual notice, there is no reasoned basis for applying that conclusion here to section 22008(c). A claim based upon a violation of securities laws by a fiduciary is far different from a claim to adjust an incorrectly calculated pension benefit payment. Moreover, here, as was true in Deveny , the "discovery" language of *54section 22008 first appearing in its predecessor statute in 198813 was created long after "other statutes of *363limitations that included the term 'discovery' and that had been judicially construed as establishing an inquiry notice standard. [Citations.] 'Given the Legislature's presumed understanding of the judicial interpretation of the term "discovery" in other statutes of limitation, it is reasonable to assume that it would have used a word other than "discovery" if it intended for the limitations period to commence only upon actual knowledge of ' " the existence of the incorrect payment. ( Deveny , supra , 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 422-423,
We therefore hold that the three-year limitations period for asserting a claim related to an incorrect payment due to a lack of information or inaccurate information under section 22008(c) commences upon actual or inquiry notice, i.e., when the claimant discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the incorrect payment.
C. Accrual of CalSTRS's Claim Here
1. Background
Using the date upon which CalSTRS actually discovered the existence of the overpayments to Teachers as the date of commencement of the statute of limitations-a legal standard we have determined to be erroneous-the trial court concluded that CalSTRS "discovered" the facts regarding the incorrect payments to Teachers on or about August 18, 2005. This was the date a memorandum was sent to MCOE from Cindy Fellows, a District budget analyst (the Fellows memorandum).
The Fellows memorandum, addressed "To Whom it May Concern," was sent to the Monterey County entity, MCOE, based upon the understanding that CalSTRS did not want communications to go directly to it, but rather wanted them to be sent to MCOE. The memorandum read, in pertinent part: "It has been brought to our attention that there are some questions regarding how the [D]istrict reports a sixth period class. In 1998, the Salinas Valley Federation of Teachers' Union (SVFT) negotiated to have a separate salary schedule for those certificated employees who worked longer days. [¶] The option is available to the whole certificated class of employees. There are approximately 40 to 50 employees each year that request to work a sixth *364period option .... [¶] Some schools are on a block schedule in which teachers work a total of 5 periods during the year. This is usually 3 periods the first semester and 3 the second semester, which results in a high retirement[ ] base since they worked the extra period the second half of the year. [¶] One of our *55employees, who retired this year, worked the extra block the second semester and when her retirement allowance was sent to her, it was based on the 1st semester earnings and not the second for the years 2003-2004. Any help in this matter would be appreciated .... [¶] Attached are the AB1200, union contract and salary schedules for 2003-2004 which reflect the SVFT and the [D]istrict's agreement to implementing the sixth period salary schedule. (AR 3203.)"
The trial court concluded that the Fellows memorandum provided actual notice to MCOE. Further, it rejected CalSTRS's contention that the memorandum was of no consequence to the question of notice, because there was no evidence that MCOE ever forwarded the document to CalSTRS. The trial court concluded that from the evidence presented at the administrative hearing, MCOE was the ostensible agent of CalSTRS. Reasoning that notice given to the agent is chargeable to the principal, the court concluded that CalSTRS was charged with knowledge of the information imparted to MCOE in the Fellows memorandum.
CalSTRS challenges these findings, contending that it did not discover the overpayment issue until more than three years later, on December 1, 2008, when its outside auditor, MHM, issued the final audit report. It contends that (1) there was no evidence the Fellows memorandum was actually received by MCOE or CalSTRS, (2) there was no evidence that MCOE was CalSTRS's agent, and (3) the memorandum, in any event, did not give notice that incorrect payments were being made to Teachers. We address these three contentions below.
2. The Claim Accrued August 18, 2005
a. Receipt
Fellows testified at the administrative hearing that she sent the memorandum to MCOE along with its attachments. CalSTRS points to no evidence (e.g., testimony from an MCOE representative) disputing MCOE's receipt of the Fellows memorandum. Moreover, a letter properly addressed and mailed is presumed to have been received by the addressee. ( Evid. Code, § 641 ; see also Bank of America v. Giant Inland Empire R.V. Center, Inc. (2000)
b. Agency
The trial court cited certain evidence in the administrative record establishing that MCOE was the agent of CalSTRS. As recited by the court, "CalSTRS['s] retirement counselors would meet teachers at the relevant county's office of education, where counselors would access CalSTRS['s] data through CalSTRS['s] computer, both to prepare for meetings with teachers and to assist those teachers with retirement calculations. [¶] Moreover, school districts were specifically instructed to contact their local county office of education with questions to ensure that their decisions were consistent with the law. And, while CalSTRS provided guidance on retirement issues through administrative directives, school districts were directed to contact their county's office of education if they had questions not *56covered in any such directive. Only if a county office of education could not answer a question was that question forwarded to CalSTRS. Similarly, teachers were advised by CalSTRS['s] retirement counselors to direct questions to CalSTRS through their school districts. The districts would then forward questions to their county's office of education. CalSTRS required questions to be routed through the county offices of education for CalSTRS['s] convenience. CalSTRS explained that there are approximately 1,600 districts statewide and that CalSTRS['s] staff is too small to respond to the high volume of inquiries it receives from these districts."
"An agent is one who represents another, called the principal, in dealings with third persons." ( Civ. Code, § 2295.) An agency relationship may exist if it is either one that is actual ostensible. ( Civ. Code, § 2298.) An agency is actual when the agent is in fact employed by the principal. ( Civ. Code, § 2299.) " 'An agency is ostensible when a principal causes a third person to believe another to be his agent, who is really not employed by him. [Citation.]' " ( J.L. v. Children's Institute, Inc. (2009)
A party claiming that an ostensible agency exists must satisfy three requirements. First, it must show that its dealings with the purported agent were based upon a reasonable belief in the agent's authority. Second, the principal must have been responsible through some act or neglect on its part in creating the party's reasonable belief in the agent's authority. Third, the party must not have been negligent in holding its belief. ( *366Associated Creditors' Agency v. Davis (1975)
We conclude that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that MCOE was "[a]t minimum," the ostensible agent of CalSTRS. This evidence included that (1) CalSTRS's counselors met with teachers at MCOE offices, where the counselors would access CalSTRS's data through its computer to assist teachers with retirement calculations; (2) school districts were instructed to communicate any questions to their county education office so that district decisions were consistent with the law; (3) school districts were instructed to make any inquiries about CalSTRS's administrative directives to their local county education office, not CalSTRS; (4) CalSTRS's retirement counselors instructed teachers to contact their school district-which in turn contacted its local county education office-concerning questions the teachers had of CalSTRS; and (5) CalSTRS's requirement that questions be directed to local county education offices was for CalSTRS's convenience in light of the number of school districts statewide (and, consequently, the potential volume of teacher and other inquiries). Indeed, while CalSTRS argues conclusorily on appeal that "suggesting MCOE is *57CalSTRS['s] agent stretches the imagination," it cites no evidence from the record supporting its position. (See Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)
A principal is deemed to have notice of whatever its agent has notice of and should reasonably communicate to the principal. ( Civ. Code, § 2332 ; see McKenney v. Ellsworth (1913)
Here, information concerning members' pension benefits was clearly matter of the type that should have been reasonably communicated from the agent, MCOE, to its principal, CalSTRS. Accordingly, whatever information that was imparted in the Fellows memorandum to MCOE was data CalSTRS was presumed to know as well.
c. Notice
As noted, the trial court concluded that the Fellows memorandum provided actual notice to MCOE, as ostensible agent of CalSTRS. But applying the correct standard for determining accrual of the statute of limitations under section 22008(c), the proper question is whether the memorandum provided actual or inquiry notice to MCOE of Teachers' incorrect payments.
The Fellows memorandum alerted MCOE "that there are some questions regarding how the [D]istrict reports a sixth period class." Fellows explained that as a result of union negotiations, "a separate salary schedule" was established for teachers working longer days, and approximately 40 to 50 teachers in the District had elected to work longer days. She explained further that in the case of some schools that were on a block schedule in which teachers ordinarily worked five periods a year, where an individual teacher elected to work an extra (sixth) period, this "result[ed] in a high retirement[ ] base since [the teacher] worked the extra period the second half of the year." Fellows advised that one teacher who had "worked the extra block the second semester" had her retirement allowance calculated based upon her first semester earnings, implying in the memorandum that this calculation was in error. And Fellows requested "[a]ny help" in the matter, attaching to her memorandum the union contract and 2003-2004 salary schedules that "implement[ted] the sixth period salary schedule."
There is some merit to CalSTRS's position that the memorandum did not provide actual notice of the miscalculation of Teachers' retirement benefits. Fellows did not identify any of the Teachers by name nor did she specify any particular circumstances involving them that may have resulted in their pension benefits having *58been incorrect. Indeed, eight of the eleven Teachers had not even retired as of the date of the Fellows memorandum; therefore, such specification, as to eight Teachers, would have been impossible.
But the Fellows memorandum gave ample information to MCOE-and, under agency principles, to CalSTRS as well-giving rise to inquiry *368notice of the existence of possible errors in the calculation of retirement benefits for certain teachers who had elected to work an additional (sixth) period. Under the inquiry notice standard that is the basis for the discovery rule, "the limitations period begins once the [claimant] ' " 'has notice or information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry ....' " ' [Citations.] A [claimant] need not be aware of the specific 'facts' necessary to establish the claim ... Once the [claimant] has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, [it] must decide whether to file suit or sit on [its] rights. So long as a suspicion exists, it is clear that the [claimant] must go find the facts; [it] cannot wait for the facts to find [it]." ( Jolly , supra , 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1110-1111,
Here, at minimum, CalSTRS was made aware, through the Fellows memorandum, (1) of a potential problem with respect to the manner in which retirement benefits were being calculated for District teachers who had elected to work an extra period; (2) that, based upon a union contract dating back a number of years, "a separate salary schedule" had been established in the District for those teachers; and (3) that there was at least the assumption that such class of teachers, upon retirement, were entitled to "a high[er] retirement[ ] base" because of having worked an extra period. CalSTRS-particularly in light of its statutory fiduciary duties, including its duty to exercise "due care, skill, prudence, and diligence" (§ 22250, subd. (b)) and to ensure payment to members of full earned benefits and to avoid payment of benefits not earned ( Duarte , supra , 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 385,
Accordingly, notwithstanding the trial court's error in concluding that CalSTRS had actual notice on August 18, 2005, CalSTRS was placed on inquiry notice as of that date through the Fellows memorandum, thus triggering the three-year statute of limitations under section 22008(c).15 We *369will next determine whether *59CalSTRS commenced an "action" within that three-year limitations period.
D. "Action" Commenced Under Education Code Section 22008(a)
1. Introduction
Under section 22008(a), "[n]o action may be commenced by or against the board, the system, or the plan more than three years after all obligations to or on behalf of the member, former member, beneficiary, or annuity beneficiary have been discharged." (Italics added.) The parties advanced various arguments below concerning when, in this instance, CalSTRS "commenced" an "action" to satisfy the three-year limitations period. Urging the earliest date, CalSTRS argued below-and renews the argument on appeal-that it took "action" within the meaning of section 22008(a) on July 30, 2010, when it mailed its final audit report.16 Teachers claim a date nearly two years later-July 6, 2012-contending that CalSTRS initiated an "action" when it filed a statement of issues in the administrative proceeding. The trial court selected neither date. Instead, it concluded that CalSTRS "commenced" an "action" on April 1, 2012, when it "took 'corrective action' " by adjusting downward Teachers' monthly retirement benefits to address both prospectively and retrospectively the error in calculating those benefits. We will discuss below section 22008(a) and determine the appropriate date that CalSTRS "commenced" an "action" in this instance.17
*3702. Section 22008(a)
Neither the phrase "action may be commenced" nor the term "action" is defined in section 22008 or elsewhere in the Teachers' Retirement Law. (See §§ 22100 through 22177 [defining various terms and phrases].) And, as is evident from the submissions of the parties, there is no legislative history to guide us in interpreting section 22008(a).18 Therefore-although we *60acknowledge that "[s]tatutes of limitations found in the Code of Civil Procedure" are inapplicable to administrative proceedings ( Little Co. of Mary Hosp. v. Belshe (1997)
Code of Civil Procedure section 312 provides that "[c]ivil actions, without exception, can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of action shall have accrued, unless where, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute." Title 2 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure goes on to provide numerous (approximately 40) statutes specifying the limitation of actions with respect to various types of civil claims. The term "civil action" in Code of Civil Procedure section 312 is not defined in Part 2, Title 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 312 - 366.3.) But "action" is defined elsewhere in the Code of Civil Procedure as "an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the declaration, enforcement, or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense." ( Code Civ. Proc., § 22.) And "civil action" is defined as one that "is prosecuted by one party against another for the declaration, enforcement, or protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong." ( Code Civ. Proc., § 30.) Code of Civil Procedure section 363 broadens the definition of "action" under Part 2, Title 2, stating that the term "is to be construed, whenever it is necessary so to do, as including a special proceeding of a civil nature." (See Allen v. Humboldt County Board of Supervisors (1963)
*371Applying the Code of Civil Procedure by analogy here to the statute of limitations specified in the Education Code is a challenging task. We will nonetheless proceed with considering whether any of the three benchmarks respectively identified by the parties and the trial court is the date that CalSTRS "commenced" an "action" within the meaning of section 22008(a).
3. July 30, 2010-Mailing of Final Audit Report
CalSTRS argues that the mailing of its final audit report to the District and Teachers on July 30, 2010, constituted commencement of an "action" relative to the incorrect payments. CalSTRS apprised each of the Teachers in separate letters that it had concluded from its final audit that the District had "incorrectly reported (coded) your sixth period teaching assignment (extra duty) earnings totaling approximately [ ] as creditable compensation to the Defined Benefit (DB) Program for the [ ] school year ending in your retirement. Under state law, these extra duty assignment payments should have been credited to the Defined Benefit Supplement (DBS) program, thus it does not count toward the calculation of your DB retirement allowance. These reporting errors *61caused your monthly retirement allowance to be overstated by approximately $[ ] from [ ], your retirement benefit effective date." Each letter advised further that CalSTRS was entitled under the law to recover the overpayment by reducing future payments to each of the Teachers by no more than five percent, because the overpayment was due to error by the school system, but CalSTRS had requested that the District reimburse the overpayments on behalf of each of the Teachers. Lastly, CalSTRS advised each of the Teachers that if he or she disagreed with its determination, he or she was required to appeal it through an administrative hearing process within 90 days of the letter.19
CalSTRS asserts that by sending the final audit report, it commenced the administrative proceeding (i.e., commenced an "action"), because Teachers, in response to the final audit, were required, in peril of losing valuable rights (i.e., the right to contest the audit or require an administrative hearing), to request an administrative hearing within 90 days. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 27102, subd. (c).)20 CalSTRS, accordingly, takes issue with the trial court's conclusion that "[t]he final audit report letter is analogous to a demand letter *372made by a party in hopes of avoiding civil litigation. [CalSTRS] demanded that the District take certain action, but a demand is not action."
While the trial court's demand letter analogy is imperfect, we conclude that CalSTRS's act of sending the final audit to Teachers did not constitute the commencement of an "action" under section 22008(a). The final audit certainly identified CalSTRS's position regarding the calculation of Teachers' monthly retirement benefits. Its mailing, however, did not initiate a proceeding of any kind. It was not the commencement of a judicial or administrative proceeding against Teachers concerning the overpayment controversy. To conclude otherwise would subvert any reasonable construction of the statutory phrase "action may be commenced." (See Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs' Assn. v. Board of Retirement (1997)
Moreover, accepting the position that the final audit's mailing was the commencement of an "action" would permit CalSTRS, in theory, to delay for an indeterminate time taking any action to address alleged overpayments to a retiree, such as by reducing his or her monthly benefits or bringing an action for restitution of prior overpayments. Such a position would permit CalSTRS, in an extreme *62case, to lull the retiree for years into a false belief that CalSTRS would take no action to recoup the alleged overpayments or reduce future payments. This consequence would run contrary to the principle that " 'establish[ing] any particular limitations period under any particular statute of limitations entails the striking of a balance' between the public policy favoring extinction of stale claims and that favoring resolution of disputes on their merits. [Citation.]" ( Samuels , supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 13,
4. April 1, 2012-Reduction of Monthly Benefits
On March 2, 2012, CalSTRS wrote to each of the Teachers to advise that, since the date it had issued its final report, "the District ha[d] not submitted the required corrections" to Teachers' reported earnings to the Defined Benefit Program; "accordingly, CalSTRS will be making the corrections and adjusting your benefit beginning with your April 1, 2012 retirement benefit. This adjustment will result in a reduction to your ongoing retirement allowance. [The adjustment] will also create an overpayment in benefits previously paid to you." The letters went on to advise Teachers that CalSTRS would collect prior overpayments at a rate of five percent from future payments. On *373March 16, 2012, CalSTRS sent separate letters to Teachers advising each of them of the specific overpayment amounts and the reduced monthly benefits that would be paid, commencing with the April 1, 2012 benefit payment.
The trial court concluded that CalSTRS's act of adjusting downward Teachers' respective monthly pension benefits on April 1, 2012, constituted commencing an "action" under section 22008(a). In so holding, the court relied on section 24616, which provides that "[a]ny overpayment made to or on behalf of any member ... shall be deducted from any subsequent benefit that may be made payable under the Defined Benefit Program ..., except as provided in Section 24616.5. These deductions shall be permitted concurrently with any suit for restitution, and recovery of overpayment by adjustment shall reduce by the amount of the recovery the extent of liability for restitution." The trial court reasoned that under section 24616, CalSTRS was authorized to use " 'self-help' by adjusting benefit payments to account for overpayments." The court held that CalSTRS's doing so here, effective April 1, 2012, was " 'corrective action' " that constituted "action" within the meaning of section 22008(a) that tolled the statute of limitations. But, the court concluded further, because "[t]his action was taken more than three years" after CalSTRS received actual notice of the overpayments, CalSTRS's claim was time-barred.
We respectfully disagree with the trial court. CalSTRS's reduction of future monthly payments to Teachers was not the commencement of an "action" relative to the incorrect payments. While such conduct is indeed a type of "action" in the broadest sense of the word (see Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2009) p. 12, col. 2) ["action ... 5 a : a thing done: DEED"] ), the unilateral reduction of Teachers' monthly payments was not the commencement of an "action" analogous to the initiation of a lawsuit satisfying the statute of limitations under the Code of Civil Procedure. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 30 ["[a] civil action is prosecuted by one party against another for the declaration, enforcement, or protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong"].)21 We *63thus conclude that CalSTRS's reduction of Teachers' respective monthly payments, effective April 1, 2012, based upon recalculated benefit amounts, together with a deduction for prior overpayments, did not constitute the commencement of an "action" under section 22008(a). *3745. July 6, 2012-Filing of Statement of Issues
On July 6, 2012, CalSTRS filed a nine-page pleading entitled "Statement of Issues" with the Office of Administrative Hearings. In the pleading, CalSTRS-identifying itself as "Complainant"-(1) identified the parties, including a specification of the retirement dates of each of the 11 Teachers (each named as a "Respondent" in the pleading); (2) presented a statement of facts; and (3) provided a discussion concerning the grounds upon which CalSTRS asserted that its position should be upheld.
Teachers urge that the filing of the statement of issues was conduct that qualified as CalSTRS's commencement of an "action" to satisfy section 22008. They argue that "[l]ike a complaint, the filing of a 'statement of issues' is the legal action that creates the jurisdiction of the administrative court to hear the legal dispute between the governmental agency and the party affected." Teachers' position has merit.
The dispute here was subject to resolution under the Administrative Procedure Act. (See Gov. Code, §§ 11340 to 11529, incl.) A party aggrieved by a final audit determination of CalSTRS is entitled to make a timely request for an administrative hearing, as Teachers did here. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 27102, subd. (c).) The disposition of such a request is governed by section 22219, subdivision (b) ( Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 27103 ), which statute provides that the administrative hearing "shall be conducted in accordance with [ Gov. Code, § 11500 et seq. ], relating to administrative adjudication, and the board shall have all of the powers granted in that chapter." Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the document that initiates the administrative adjudicative proceeding is the statement of issues. ( California Radioactive Materials Management Forum v. Department of Health Services (1993)
We conclude that, in the context of satisfying a prescribed statute of limitations, *64the filing of a statement of issues to initiate administrative *375proceedings is the closest analogue to the filing of a civil complaint. Just as a plaintiff commences a civil action (including a special proceeding) by filing a complaint or a petition ( Garcia , supra , 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 411,
We therefore hold the filing by CalSTRS of the statement of issues with the Office of Administrative Hearings constituted the commencement of an "action" under section 22008(a).
E. Whether CalSTRS's Action Is Entirely Time-Barred
The trial court concluded in its tentative decision that because CalSTRS did not commence an action within three years of its actual knowledge that incorrect payments had been made to Teachers, CalSTRS was "time-barred from taking corrective action regarding the [Teachers'] overpayments." In the judgment granting Teachers' petition for peremptory writ of mandate, the court determined that CalSTRS was barred from taking action to address the miscalculation of Teachers' respective monthly retirement benefits, including any further withholding or reduction of those benefits, and it ordered CalSTRS to reimburse Teachers any amounts it had previously withheld.
CalSTRS argues that, even if the trial court correctly found that CalSTRS did not commence an action within three years under section 22008, the court erred in concluding that CalSTRS was barred from pursuing any relief as to any monthly payments, past or prospective. CalSTRS contends that under a proper reading of section 22008(c), "each monthly payment triggers a new limitations period." Therefore, CalSTRS argues, under the continuous accrual *376theory,23 the statute of limitations barred its effort to remedy the overpayment problem only as to monthly pension payments made more than three years before it commenced the "action." Teachers disagree, arguing that (1) CalSTRS is barred from asserting the *65continuous accrual theory under invited error principles; (2) CalSTRS waived the issue by abandoning the continuous accrual theory in proceedings below; and (3) the continuous accrual theory, in any event, is not applicable in this case.
1. Invited Error/Waiver
Teachers claim that counsel for CalSTRS below "unequivocally [declined to assert] the continuous accrual [theory]." Teachers quote a portion of the transcript of the April 2, 2015 hearing in support of their position, contending that CalSTRS is thereby estopped from asserting the continuous accrual theory. They argue, alternatively, that CalSTRS abandoned the argument below and therefore has waived its right to assert it here. Addressing these invited error/waiver contentions requires us to consider the entire context of the briefing and argument below.
In the Committee's decision, it concluded that "under the plain language of section 22008, subdivision (c) each monthly benefit payment triggers a new limitation period. The cases cited by Teachers in support of the proposition that the 'continuing accrual' theory does not apply to section 22008, subdivision (c) are distinguishable ..." But because the Committee concluded that CalSTRS was timely in commencing an "action" under section 22008, it deemed "the issue of continuing accrual ... not pertinent to the resolution of the statute of limitations issue."
In their trial briefs, the parties-in a somewhat circuitous fashion-raised the theory of continuous accrual. In Teachers' opening brief, they urged-erroneously24 -that the Committee had "correctly held that the continuing accrual theory does not apply," and they stated that, therefore, they would not address the issue further absent the court's request. (Emphasis and capitalization omitted.) CalSTRS did not directly address the continuous accrual theory in *377its trial brief. Instead-in what appears to be a shorthand reference to the theory-it observed that "the plain language of [ § 22008(c) ] triggers a new cause of action each time a new benefit payment is made based on the 'inaccurate information regarding the eligibility' of the beneficiaries to receive a benefit." Teachers in their reply brief below addressed CalSTRS's point, arguing that the language of section 22008(c) did not support "the proposition that an entire new cause of action is triggered each time a new benefit is paid." They asserted further-relying on Dillon v. Board of Pension Commrs. of Los Angeles (1941)
The court in its tentative decision did not specifically address whether the continuous accrual theory applied in connection with Teachers' statute of limitations defense. But in a subsequent (prejudgment) hearing on June 3, 2015, CalSTRS's counsel raised the applicability of the continuous accrual theory in connection with the parties' resolution of the appropriate language for the proposed judgment: The court responded that CalSTRS could not "withhold future payments on the same basis that was litigated in this case." In so concluding, the court specifically held that the continuous accrual theory did not apply.
"Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by its own conduct induces the commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because of that error. [Citations.]" ( Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991)
*378A party may be deemed "to have waived a claim of error either by affirmative conduct or by failure to take proper steps in the trial court to avoid or cure the error. [Citations.]" (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2015) ¶ 8:249, p. 8-178, original italics.) As our high court has explained: " 'An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been but was not presented to the lower court by some appropriate method .... The circumstances may involve such intentional acts or acquiescence as to be appropriately classified under the headings of estoppel or waiver .... Often, however, the explanation is simply that it is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it could easily have been corrected at the trial.' [Citation.]" ( Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979)
We disagree with Teachers that CalSTRS is barred from arguing the continuous accrual theory here due to invited error or waiver. The trial court's comments on the record at the two hearings clearly show that it ruled that continuous accrual did not apply because of its own determination of the merits of the doctrine's applicability, not because of the argument of CalSTRS's counsel. (See Munoz v. City of Union City (2007)
2. Continuous Accrual Theory
As a general rule, a claim accrues for purposes of the commencement of the statute of limitations, " ' "when it is complete with all of its elements"-those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation.' [Citations.]" ( Aryeh , supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 1191,
CalSTRS contends that the continuous accrual theory applies here. Relying on Dryden , supra ,
In Dryden , supra , 6 Cal.2d at page 577,
The Dryden court noted that, under the applicable city charter provision, the pensioner was entitled to monthly payments based upon a calculation of his average monthly salary for three years prior to his death. ( Dryden , supra , 6 Cal.2d at p. 577,
The principle enunciated by our high court in Dryden applies to CalSTRS's claim. We are concerned here with periodic payments to retired school teachers under a defined benefit pension system. The right of each of the Teachers to receive monthly payments, and the obligation of CalSTRS to disburse them, are continuing ones that accrue when such payments become due. ( Dryden , supra , 6 Cal.2d at pp. 580-581,
Teachers' reliance on Carrick , supra ,
*382Under Dryden , supra ,
F. Conclusion
Teachers argued below that, in addition to CalSTRS's action being time-barred, it *70was precluded based upon principles of equitable estoppel and laches. In its decision, the court decided "it [was] unnecessary to address [Teachers'] equitable estoppel, and laches defenses" because of its conclusion that CalSTRS's claims were time-barred.
Because we have concluded that the trial court erred in determining that CalSTRS's claims regarding incorrect monthly pension benefits to Teachers were wholly time-barred, the matter must be reversed and remanded. Upon remand, the trial court is directed to consider and decide Teachers' equitable estoppel and laches defenses.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party shall bear his/her/its own respective costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR:
Elia, Acting P.J.
Premo, J.
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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