Baur v. Mesta MacHine Co.

176 A.2d 684, 405 Pa. 617, 1961 Pa. LEXIS 680
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 29, 1961
DocketAppeal, 215
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 176 A.2d 684 (Baur v. Mesta MacHine Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baur v. Mesta MacHine Co., 176 A.2d 684, 405 Pa. 617, 1961 Pa. LEXIS 680 (Pa. 1961).

Opinions

Opinion by

Justice Alpern,

This Court decided in Baur v. Mesta Machine Co., 393 Pa. 380, 143 A. 2d 12 (1958) that when an employer voluntarily provides a first aid room and administers to ill as well as injured employees, it has [619]*619the duty to provide proper medical care. If the employee’s death from coronary occlusion was found to he due to the neglect of the employer in not providing proper medical care, this would constitute an “industrial accident” which is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Law. In reaching this conclusion this Court adopted the arguments advanced by Mesta and its insurance carriers in opposing the right of the plaintiff to recover in trespass against the defendants for the improper care given the decedent by the male nurse in charge of the Mesta dispensary. A demurrer to the trespass action was sustained. The right of the claimant to proceed under the Workmen’s Compensation Law was specifically established.

Thereafter the widow’s claim before the referee and the Workmen’s Compensation Board was heard. Both held that this was not an industrial accident for which compensation should be allowed. The County Court of Allegheny County reversed, holding that the decision of the board was capricious and unwarranted in the light of the uncontradicted testimony in the record. On appeal to the Superior Court that court held that the board was right in denying the claim. This appeal presents the record and the legal problems implicit in the case back to this court for determination.

The facts in this case are important for the determination of the legal issues involved. Frank Baur, forty-five years of age, had been employed for nine years as a steel chipper at the Mesta Machine Company plant. On February 29, 1956 he reported for work at three o’clock for an eight-hour shift. Baur was doing lighter work than usual that day and had worked only fifteen minutes when he became ill. No unusual exertion brought on his illness.

Baur told a fellow workman, Widock, that he was feeling sick and that he had pneumonia. He said his [620]*620chest hurt and it was hard getting his breath. He was advised to go to the dispensary which had been maintained for years by his employer, and where employees were directed to go when they were ill or injured at work.

According to the dispensary records he came there at 4:15 P.M. He related his symptoms to the registered male nurse at the dispensary. The nurse testified that he complained of diarrhea and vomiting, pains in his stomach and chest pains, nausea and chills. The nurse stated that he was perspiring and nervous and told him that he had been under a doctor’s care previously for a virus condition. He was put on a cot for an hour and a half.

No doctor was ever called. The Homestead Hospital was within five minutes of the Mesta plant but Baur was not taken there. He was given no medical assistance the entire two hours he remained in the dispensary.

Baur’s condition had become. much worse in the two hours he remained in the dispensary. When Widock, who had seen him at 3:15 saw him at six P. M. Baur complained that the pain in his chest was terrible. Widock testified that Baur tried to squeeze his chest to ease the pain. He was perspiring heavily, his color had changed, he looked beat. He vomited. It is significant that Widock who helped him dress and who helped him. to the cab was sufficiently concerned by the deterioration in his condition to call Mrs. Baur and tell her to have a doctor there when Baur got home for her husband was mighty sick.

Widock helped to dress Baur and accompanied him to a waiting cab. It was necessary to walk fifty yards to get to the cab. Widock helped Baur into the cab. One more unfortunate incident occurred. The cab that had been called for Baur then arrived, and after a discussion between the two drivers, Baur was taken [621]*621out of the first cab and moved into the second cab. The cab driver testified he assisted Baur “because he didn’t seem to manage very well by himself.” This was at 6:10 or 6:15 P.M.

In the course of the ride Baur told the cab driver that the pain in his chest was very severe. “. . . as sort of a dirty gray. He looked Uke he was dirty and very dark and his eyes were very bloodshot.” Baur complained he was cold. The cab driver turned the heat up although the cab was actually warm.

The cab driver noticed a short time later that Baur had become unconscious. He was gasping for air. He loosened his clothing and took him to the Homestead Hospital. He was dead on arrival at 6:30. The cause of death was later determined to be coronary occlusion.

The application of the prudent nurse test to the conduct of the nurse in the case at bar indicates graphically the capriciousness of the Board’s finding that proper medical care was given to Baur.

1. The nurse had no right to diagnose the case. Diagnosis is the exclusive province of doctors. Yet this nurse proceeded to diagnose Baur’s illness as the continuance of a virus condition. The nurse in charge of the dispensary was not an inexperienced nurse. He became a registered nurse in 1928. He was aware of the fact that a nurse does not have the right to diagnose. “Q. When you were dealing with Mr. Baur in the first aid room and before 4:15 and about 6 or 6:15 when he left, did you take into consideration the possibility that Mr. Baur might have had heart trouble of some sort? A. I believe anyone may think so, but I am not in any position to diagnosis.”

2. A reasonably prudent nurse would have considered it necessary to have a doctor prescribe for Baur. Allowing him to be on the cot was certainly not prescribed treatment for a serious condition. The [622]*622increased severity of the chest pains, the excessive perspiration, vomiting, two bowel movements, and obvious distress required a doctor to prescribe medication. Only when Baur asked for something to settle his stomach, after vonliting again, was any attention paid to him. He was given a teaspoon of citrus carbonate. No effort was made to call Baur’s own physician, or the plant physician. Had a physician examined Baur the seriousness of his condition would have resulted in a proper diagnosis of heart involvement. Appropriate treatment — morphine and oxygen — would have been given.

3. Failure on the part of the nurse to recognize that Baur was getting worse was gross incompetence;

It was the opinion of the nurse that Baur had “gotten over his initial shock.” The testimony of Widock established that he was much worse than when he had seen him originally. The pain was greater, his color worse, he looked beat, he was perspiring profusely, he was less agile. His condition was so much worse that Widock called his wife to have a doctor at the house when Baur arrived by car. The layman knew a doctor was needed. The nurse did not.

The cab driver, Swan, described Baur’s dark grey color and bloodshot eyes and Ms complaint of severe chest pains. The nurse should have noted what laymen could see.

4. Failure to recognize that severe chest pains, vomiting, chills and perspiration indicated a heart involvement which required prompt treatment by a physician was not the act of a reasonably prudent nurse.

5.

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Bluebook (online)
176 A.2d 684, 405 Pa. 617, 1961 Pa. LEXIS 680, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baur-v-mesta-machine-co-pa-1961.