Barton v. Otsuka Pharmaceuticals

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 21, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-04758
StatusUnknown

This text of Barton v. Otsuka Pharmaceuticals (Barton v. Otsuka Pharmaceuticals) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barton v. Otsuka Pharmaceuticals, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK IVAN SEAN BARTON, Plaintiff, -against- OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICALS; BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB; NYS OFFICE OF MENTAL HYGIENE; NYC OFFICE OF 19-CV-4758 (CM) MENTAL HYGIENE; LATIA HARRIS; LASHAWN KITCHEN; LANCE TREVOR ORDER TO AMEND BARTON; THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY; JENNIFER GLADSTONE; VANESSA ESCAURSE; DESTINY ESCOURSE; RAKIM MAYERS; AARON HARRIS OR AARON JENKINS; NASIR JONES; REGINA SMITH, Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. By order dated June 3, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

BACKGROUND The complaint is sloppily written, and not a model of clarity. Plaintiff Ivan Sean Barton, who is no longer in custody, asserts that the events giving rise to this complaint occurred between March 2017 and March 2019 at Rikers Island and Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center. He sues Otsuka Pharmaceuticals, Bristol-Myers Squibb, the mental health agencies of New York City and New York State,1 the Legal Aid Society, and eleven individuals whom Plaintiff does not identify or discuss in any detail. Plaintiff alleges as follows: All Defendants acting in concert as one unit to “obstruct justice” by keeping Plaintiff in a “mental stupor and while profiting from Plaintiff’s suffering and having sex with together in a macabre scheme knowingly forced/compelled Plaintiff to take knowing full well that Plaintiff is not a candidate not is mentally ill, made him take debilitating drugs chiefly Abilify and the companies that makes such drugs giving gifts and money to Plaintiff’s ex paramours named herein and the agencies named herein having committed lewd lascivious acts consistent with pedophilia against Plaintiff’s offspring and those offspring being on illicit drugs and working with the other defendants to harm Plaintiff and to further “obstruct justice” from a wrongful prosecution and all parties known as defendants herein having a meeting of mind to harm and has harm Plaintiff. (ECF No. 2 ¶ III.)

1 The proper names for these agencies is the New York State Office of Mental Health, and the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Plaintiff seeks money damages and injunctive relief. Attached to the complaint is a motion, captioned for the New York State Supreme Court, New York County, seeking to vacate a 1994 judgment of conviction. DISCUSSION A. Rule 8 Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and

plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id The complaint fails to comply with Rule 8, because it does not contain facts showing that

Plaintiff is entitled to relief from Defendants. B. Private Parties The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A claim for relief under § 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties are therefore not generally liable under § 1983. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). A claim for relief under § 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, absent special circumstances suggesting concerted action between an attorney and a state representative, see Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 656 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005)

(citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)), the representation of a defendant by private counsel in state criminal proceedings does not constitute the degree of state involvement or interference necessary to establish a claim under § 1983, regardless of whether that attorney is privately retained, court-appointed, or employed as a public defender. See Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981)); see also Schnabel v.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.
398 U.S. 144 (Supreme Court, 1970)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Polk County v. Dodson
454 U.S. 312 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht
524 U.S. 381 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Colon v. Coughlin
58 F.3d 865 (Second Circuit, 1995)
Bourdon v. Loughren
386 F.3d 88 (Second Circuit, 2004)
Jenkins v. City Of New York
478 F.3d 76 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Sykes v. Bank of America
723 F.3d 399 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Gollomp v. Spitzer
568 F.3d 355 (Second Circuit, 2009)

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Bluebook (online)
Barton v. Otsuka Pharmaceuticals, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barton-v-otsuka-pharmaceuticals-nysd-2019.